STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP-15-3
LAWRENCE AUSTIN,
Petitioner,
v. DECISION AND ORDER ON THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S SOC APPEAL STATE OF MAINE BUREAU OF HUMAN RESOURCES, ET AL.,
Respondent.
Pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure SOC and the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 M.R.S. §§ 11001-11008, Petitioner Lawrence Austin, appeals the decision of the
Maine Civil Service Appeals Board ("the Board"). The Board concluded that Petitioner's
challenge to the adverse employment decision was untimely and thus beyond the Board's
jurisdiction. Because of the Administrative Procedure Act's own statutory time
limitations, this Court must likewise dismiss Petitioner's appeal of the Board's decision.
BACKGROUND
Because no record has been submitted by the agency under 5 M.R.S. § 11007, the
factual background derives from Petitioner's Petition for Review and the Board's written
decision attached thereto.
Petitioner Lawrence Austin is a long-time employee of the State of Maine, having
\vorked at the Department of Corrections for 29 years. Petitioner was once the
Superintendent of the Mountain View Youth Development Center. On May 15, 2013, he
1 was notified by the Commissioner of Corrections that he was being terminated from that
position. Petitioner received a letter of termination. At the same time, Petitioner was
offered a position as Director of the Charleston Correctional Facility, but \Vas told that he
would have to apply for the position when it opened a few weeks later. Petitioner applied,
and was awarded the position on June 7, 2015. Petitioner did not receive a letter of
appointment for the new position.
Petitioner was told that his transfer was a "voluntary demotion" because he was
applying for the Charleston Correctional Facility job. Thus, under the Civil Service
Rules, he would not receive "red circled" pay. 1 Only an employee who is "involuntarily
demoted" receives "red circled" pay. Petitioner believed that his superiors' determination
that he was voluntarily demoted was in error.
In February, 2014, Petitioner approached the Maine Bureau of Human Resources
personnel manager assigned to the Charleston Correctional Facility, and the personnel
manager expressed the opinion that Petitioner was involuntarily demoted. Petitioner then
approached a different person, who expressed the opinion that Petitioner was voluntarily
demoted. Petitioner then wrote to the Director of Human Resources to have the Director
investigate what Petitioner considered were atypical employment practices. However, the
Director advised Petitioner that he had failed to adhere to the deadlines for appealing
employment disputes. The Director indicated that Petitioner could file an appeal with the
Civil Service Appeals Board.
The Court understands that for an employ~e to be "red circled" means that he or she 1
maintains a salary commensurate with his or her previous job when he or she moves to an otherwise lower-paying job.
2 Petitioner brought his appeal to the Board, arguing that the Department of
Corrections failed to follow proper procedures in terminating his employment and in
reappointing him to another position. The Board held a jurisdictional hearing on October
21, 2014. Relying on 5 M.R.S. § 7083, which sets forth the procedures by which
employees must bring employment grievances, the Board concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's appeal because Petitioner did not adhere to those
procedures.
The Board issued its amended decision of December 23, 2014. In its decision, the
Board expressed that Petitioner "may appeal by filing a Petition for Review in the
Superior Court pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 11001, et seq. within thirty (30) days after
receipt of notice of this Decision." (Attachment to Petitioner's Petition for Review at 3)
On January 23, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review in this Court.
The State moved to dismiss Petitioner's appeal under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
1. Jurisdiction
Before the Court can hear the merits of a Rule SOC appeal, it must be satisfied
that it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The time limit for filing a petition
for review of final agency action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
is jurisdictional, Fournier v. Dep't of Corrections, 2009 ME 112, ~ 2, 983 A.2d 403, and
the Superior Court has no legal power to entertain an appeal filed after that time. Waning
v. Dep't ojTransp., 2008 ME 95, ~ 9, 953 A.2d 365. This time limit must be applied
uniformly and consistently to parties represented by counsel and self-represented parties
3 alike. Fournier, 2009 ME 112, ~ 2. The Court has no inherent power to extend or ignore
statutory appeal periods in the absence of delegated statutory authority to do so. City of
Lewiston v. Nle. State Employees Ass'n, 638 A.2d 739,741-42 (rejecting various
arguments for why a petition filed one day beyond the statutory time limit should
nevertheless be heard by the court); McKen:ie v. Maine Employment Sec. Comm'n, 453
A.2d 505 (Me. 1982).
Under the APA, a party aggrieved by the final decision of an administrative
agency must file his or her petition for review "within 30 days after receipt of notice" of
that decision." 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3). "If the review is sought from an agency's failure or
refusal to act, the petition for review shall be filed within 6 months of the expiration of
the time within which the action should reasonably have occurred." ld. Here, Petitioner
challenges the Board's decision that it did not have jurisdiction to consider his grievance.
Accordingly, Petitioner had 30 days from which to file his appeal. 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3). 2
2. Analysis
Petitioner received notice of his right to appeal on December 23, 2014-the same
day the Board issued its decision. The Board's decision explicitly spelled out that
"Appellant may appeal by filing a Petition for Review in the Superior Court pursuant to
[the APA] within thirty (30) days after receipt of notice of this Decision." Thus,
2 Petitioner is incorrect in characterizing the action from which he appeals as a "failure or refusal to act." Petitioner classifies the "failures" as being either (or both) the Department of Corrections' ("DOC") failing to adhere to proper termination procedures or the Bureau of Human Resources' ("BHR") failing to correct the DOC's mistake. These are not the relevant "failures to act" for purposes of 5 M.R.S. § 11002(1). Rather, the Board in this instance actually took action on Petitioner's appeal, and it is that decision which this Court reviews. See Tomer v.1'v1e. Human Rights Comm 'n, 2008 ME 190, ~ 11 n.4, 962 A.2d 335 (an agency's dismissal of an employment discrimination complaint >vas not a "failure or refusal to act;" rather, it was an act from which the aggrieved employee had 30 days to appeal) (citing Lingley v. Me. Workers' Camp. Bd., 2003 ME 32, ~ 9, 819 A.2d 327). Therefore, the 30-day time period applies under 5 J\LR.S. § 11002(3).
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP-15-3
LAWRENCE AUSTIN,
Petitioner,
v. DECISION AND ORDER ON THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S SOC APPEAL STATE OF MAINE BUREAU OF HUMAN RESOURCES, ET AL.,
Respondent.
Pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure SOC and the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 M.R.S. §§ 11001-11008, Petitioner Lawrence Austin, appeals the decision of the
Maine Civil Service Appeals Board ("the Board"). The Board concluded that Petitioner's
challenge to the adverse employment decision was untimely and thus beyond the Board's
jurisdiction. Because of the Administrative Procedure Act's own statutory time
limitations, this Court must likewise dismiss Petitioner's appeal of the Board's decision.
BACKGROUND
Because no record has been submitted by the agency under 5 M.R.S. § 11007, the
factual background derives from Petitioner's Petition for Review and the Board's written
decision attached thereto.
Petitioner Lawrence Austin is a long-time employee of the State of Maine, having
\vorked at the Department of Corrections for 29 years. Petitioner was once the
Superintendent of the Mountain View Youth Development Center. On May 15, 2013, he
1 was notified by the Commissioner of Corrections that he was being terminated from that
position. Petitioner received a letter of termination. At the same time, Petitioner was
offered a position as Director of the Charleston Correctional Facility, but \Vas told that he
would have to apply for the position when it opened a few weeks later. Petitioner applied,
and was awarded the position on June 7, 2015. Petitioner did not receive a letter of
appointment for the new position.
Petitioner was told that his transfer was a "voluntary demotion" because he was
applying for the Charleston Correctional Facility job. Thus, under the Civil Service
Rules, he would not receive "red circled" pay. 1 Only an employee who is "involuntarily
demoted" receives "red circled" pay. Petitioner believed that his superiors' determination
that he was voluntarily demoted was in error.
In February, 2014, Petitioner approached the Maine Bureau of Human Resources
personnel manager assigned to the Charleston Correctional Facility, and the personnel
manager expressed the opinion that Petitioner was involuntarily demoted. Petitioner then
approached a different person, who expressed the opinion that Petitioner was voluntarily
demoted. Petitioner then wrote to the Director of Human Resources to have the Director
investigate what Petitioner considered were atypical employment practices. However, the
Director advised Petitioner that he had failed to adhere to the deadlines for appealing
employment disputes. The Director indicated that Petitioner could file an appeal with the
Civil Service Appeals Board.
The Court understands that for an employ~e to be "red circled" means that he or she 1
maintains a salary commensurate with his or her previous job when he or she moves to an otherwise lower-paying job.
2 Petitioner brought his appeal to the Board, arguing that the Department of
Corrections failed to follow proper procedures in terminating his employment and in
reappointing him to another position. The Board held a jurisdictional hearing on October
21, 2014. Relying on 5 M.R.S. § 7083, which sets forth the procedures by which
employees must bring employment grievances, the Board concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's appeal because Petitioner did not adhere to those
procedures.
The Board issued its amended decision of December 23, 2014. In its decision, the
Board expressed that Petitioner "may appeal by filing a Petition for Review in the
Superior Court pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 11001, et seq. within thirty (30) days after
receipt of notice of this Decision." (Attachment to Petitioner's Petition for Review at 3)
On January 23, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review in this Court.
The State moved to dismiss Petitioner's appeal under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
1. Jurisdiction
Before the Court can hear the merits of a Rule SOC appeal, it must be satisfied
that it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The time limit for filing a petition
for review of final agency action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
is jurisdictional, Fournier v. Dep't of Corrections, 2009 ME 112, ~ 2, 983 A.2d 403, and
the Superior Court has no legal power to entertain an appeal filed after that time. Waning
v. Dep't ojTransp., 2008 ME 95, ~ 9, 953 A.2d 365. This time limit must be applied
uniformly and consistently to parties represented by counsel and self-represented parties
3 alike. Fournier, 2009 ME 112, ~ 2. The Court has no inherent power to extend or ignore
statutory appeal periods in the absence of delegated statutory authority to do so. City of
Lewiston v. Nle. State Employees Ass'n, 638 A.2d 739,741-42 (rejecting various
arguments for why a petition filed one day beyond the statutory time limit should
nevertheless be heard by the court); McKen:ie v. Maine Employment Sec. Comm'n, 453
A.2d 505 (Me. 1982).
Under the APA, a party aggrieved by the final decision of an administrative
agency must file his or her petition for review "within 30 days after receipt of notice" of
that decision." 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3). "If the review is sought from an agency's failure or
refusal to act, the petition for review shall be filed within 6 months of the expiration of
the time within which the action should reasonably have occurred." ld. Here, Petitioner
challenges the Board's decision that it did not have jurisdiction to consider his grievance.
Accordingly, Petitioner had 30 days from which to file his appeal. 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3). 2
2. Analysis
Petitioner received notice of his right to appeal on December 23, 2014-the same
day the Board issued its decision. The Board's decision explicitly spelled out that
"Appellant may appeal by filing a Petition for Review in the Superior Court pursuant to
[the APA] within thirty (30) days after receipt of notice of this Decision." Thus,
2 Petitioner is incorrect in characterizing the action from which he appeals as a "failure or refusal to act." Petitioner classifies the "failures" as being either (or both) the Department of Corrections' ("DOC") failing to adhere to proper termination procedures or the Bureau of Human Resources' ("BHR") failing to correct the DOC's mistake. These are not the relevant "failures to act" for purposes of 5 M.R.S. § 11002(1). Rather, the Board in this instance actually took action on Petitioner's appeal, and it is that decision which this Court reviews. See Tomer v.1'v1e. Human Rights Comm 'n, 2008 ME 190, ~ 11 n.4, 962 A.2d 335 (an agency's dismissal of an employment discrimination complaint >vas not a "failure or refusal to act;" rather, it was an act from which the aggrieved employee had 30 days to appeal) (citing Lingley v. Me. Workers' Camp. Bd., 2003 ME 32, ~ 9, 819 A.2d 327). Therefore, the 30-day time period applies under 5 J\LR.S. § 11002(3).
4 Petitioner had adequate notice that his right to appeal \Vould expire after 30 days unless
he appealed pursuant to the stated statute.
Petitioner signed and attested to his Petition for Revie'>v on the thirtieth day after
notice (January 22, 2015), but filed his petition on the thirty first day (January 23, 2015).
Therefore, Petitioner did not file his Petition for Review within 30 days after receipt of
notice. 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3). Petitioner's appeal falls outside of the statutory time bar.
Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's Rule 80C petition, and the
Court is compelled to dismiss the Petition.
The entry is:
1. Petitioner Lawrence Austin's Rule 80C Appeal is DISMISSED.
2. The clerk shall incorporate this order into the docket by reference. M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).
Dated: June 10, 2015
Justice, Superior Court
5 Date Filed 1/23/15 Kennebec Docket No. AP-15-03 F County Action: Petition for Review soc J. Murphy
Lawrence Austin vs. State of Maine, et al.
Plaintiff's Attorney Defendant's Attorney
Lawrence Austin Kelly Morrell, AAG 14 North Street Place 6 State House Station Augusta, ME 04330 Augusta, ME 04333
Date of Entry
1/23/15 Petition for Judicial Review, filed. s/Austin, ProSe
2/4/15 Certified Mail Return Receipt for Maine Bureau of Human Resources, filed.
2/4/15 Certified Mail Return Receipt for Office of Attorney General, filed.
2/10/15 Entry of Appearance for State of Maine, filed (2/9/15). s/Morrell, AAG
2/14/15 Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, filed 2/11/15. s/Morrell, AAG
3/10/15 Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, filed 2/27/15. s/Austin, ProSe
3/10/15 Respondent's Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, filed 3/5/15. s/Morrell, AAG
3/11/15 Petitioner's Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Request to Deny Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, filed 3/9/15. s/Austin, Pro Se
4/14/15 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss sched,uled for 6/2/15 at 10:30 a.m. Notice of Hearing sent to Petitioner and AAG Morrell
6/2/15 Hearing held, J. Murphy presiding. Petitioner and AAG Morrell. Courtroom 3 Under advisement.
6/10/15 DECISION AND ORDER ON THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S SOC APPEAL, Murphy, J. 1. Petitioner Lawrence Austin's Rule SOC Appeal is DISMISSED. 2. The clerk shall incorporate this order into the docket by reference. Copy to Petitioner and AAG Morrell. Copy to repositories ..
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