Audiotext Communications Network, Inc. v. US Telecom, Inc.

164 F.R.D. 250, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 271, 1996 WL 11842
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedJanuary 4, 1996
DocketCiv. A. No. 94-2395-GTV
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 164 F.R.D. 250 (Audiotext Communications Network, Inc. v. US Telecom, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Audiotext Communications Network, Inc. v. US Telecom, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 250, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 271, 1996 WL 11842 (D. Kan. 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RUSHFELT, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion To Compel.Production of Documents (doc. 186.) Plaintiffs Audiotext Communications Network, Inc. and Connections U.S.A., Inc. seek to compel defendant US Telecom, Inc. (Sprint) to produce a bound notebook of documents reviewed and relied upon by Ralph Reid (Reid) before the third session of his deposition. Defendant opposes the motion.

Plaintiffs deposed Reid on July 31 and August 1 and 2, 1995. They claim that, before the third day of deposition, Reid reviewed documents contained in the notebook at issue. They assert that he used such documents to prepare for his deposition, to refresh his memory, and to change previous testimony. They suggest that they are entitled to review the notebook. They assert that defendants have waived whatever privilege they may have had, when they allowed Reid to use the documents in preparation for deposition. They claim, furthermore, that the documents are necessary to effectively cross-examine Reid and to evaluate his credibility. They invoke Fed.R.Evid. 612 as grounds for obtaining the notebook.

Defendant claims the notebook is privileged as attorney work product. It asserts that its counsel assembled the notebook in anticipation of litigation. It argues that the documents contained therein reflect the work product and mental impressions of its counsel. It submits, moreover, that at the deposition it produced the documents upon which Reid relied. It contends, furthermore, that plaintiffs have not shown a substantial need for the notebook. In addition it apparently claims protection under the attorney-client privilege.

Defendant has not supported its claim of work product. “To constitute work product under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3), the material must be documents and tangible things, prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, and prepared by or for another party or for that other party’s representative.” Sunbird Air Servs., Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., No. 89-2181-V, unpublished op. at 5 (D.Kan. Sept. 4, 1992). Defendant suggests that the selecting and grouping of the documents makes them attorney work product. Such suggestion ignores prior decisions of this court. The selecting and grouping of information does not transform discoverable documents into work product. See Bohannon v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 127 F.R.D. 536, 539-40 (D.Kan.1989); Henshaw v. Hennessy Indus. Inc., No. 91-2248-KHV, unpublished op. at 4 (D.Kan. Feb. 4, 1993); Sunbird Air Servs., Inc., at A-5. Defendant states that it has previously produced all [253]*253documents contained in the notebook. Such production demonstrates the discoverability of the individual documents. Collecting and organizing discoverable documents in a notebook does not make the notebook protected work product. Defendant presents no other grounds for finding the notebook to constitute work product.

Defendant briefly refers to the attorney-client privilege in response to the motion and during the deposition of Mr. Reid. To the extent it relies on such privilege, the court overrules the objection. Defendant has not substantiated it. Defendant admits, moreover, that it has produced to plaintiffs all documents contained in the notebook. Such production would destroy whatever privileged status existed before the production.

In. any event reference to Fed. R.Evid. 612 indicates the notebook should be disclosed, whether or not it is work product or protected by the attorney-client privilege. Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F.Supp. 482, 493 (S.D.N.Y.1994). “As a general rule, when a document is used to refresh one’s recollection, any privilege protecting that document must give way.” Moore v. Fieser, No. 88-1134-C, unpublished op. at 5, 1989 WL 89940 (D.Kan. June 5,1989).

The “potential for conflict [that] exists between Rule 612, which favors disclosure of materials used to refresh a witness’ recollection, and the work-product privilege” is resolved by the courts on a case-by-ease basis by balancing “the competing interest in the need for full disclosure and the need to protect the integrity of the adversary system protected by the work-product rule.” Also, when “Confronted with the conflict between the command of Rule 612 to disclose materials used to refresh recollection and the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege ... the weight of authority holds that the privilege ... is waived.”

Ehrlich, 848 F.Supp. at 493 (alterations in original). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has provided a persuasive rationale for disclosing materials used to refresh the memory of a witness:

In the setting of modern views favoring broad access to materials useful for effective cross-examination, embodied in rules like 612 and like the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, it is disquieting to posit that a party’s lawyer may “aid” a witness with items of work product and then prevent totally the access that might reveal and counter-act the effects of such assistance. There is much to be said for a view that a party or its lawyer, meaning to invoke the privilege, ought to use other and different materials, available later to a cross-examiner, in the preparation of witnesses. When this simple choice emerges the decision to give the work product to the witness could well be deemed a waiver of the privilege.

Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (quoted in FDIC v. Renda, No. 85-2216-O, unpublished op. at 4, 1987 WL 348635 (D.Kan. Mar. 30, 1988)).

Fed.R.Evid. 612 applies to depositions, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(c).1 Rule 612 provides in pertinent part: if a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of testifying, either—

(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the subject matter of the testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera, excise any portions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.

[254]*254“The purpose of the rule is ... to promote the search of credibility and memory.” Fed. R.Evid. 612 advisory committee’s notes.

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164 F.R.D. 250, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 271, 1996 WL 11842, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/audiotext-communications-network-inc-v-us-telecom-inc-ksd-1996.