Auburn Sales, Inc. v. Cypros Trading & Shipping, Inc.

898 F.3d 710
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedAugust 6, 2018
Docket17-2501
StatusPublished
Cited by40 cases

This text of 898 F.3d 710 (Auburn Sales, Inc. v. Cypros Trading & Shipping, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Auburn Sales, Inc. v. Cypros Trading & Shipping, Inc., 898 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge.

This dispute arises from Auburn Sales, Inc.'s role as a middleman selling Chrysler automotive parts. Auburn Sales would buy Chrysler parts and then resell those parts to Cypros Trading & Shipping, Inc., who would then sell those parts to customers in the Middle East. This business arrangement, however, came to an end when the FBI raided Cypros' warehouse and charged its president, Fadi Kilani, with trafficking in counterfeit goods. Unbeknownst to Auburn Sales, Kilani had been obtaining counterfeit parts, mixing them with the legitimate Chrysler parts received from Auburn Sales, and then selling the comingled parts to customers.

After the fallout, Auburn Sales brought tortious interference claims and a breach of contract claim against Cypros that the district court dismissed on summary judgment. The district court identified two undisputed facts that are fatal to Auburn Sales' claims: (1) Cypros did not specifically intend to interfere with Auburn Sales' relationship with Chrysler, and (2) Cypros and Auburn Sales did not have a written contract. Because we conclude that Michigan tortious interference law requires the specific intent to interfere with a business relationship, and that the Michigan statute of frauds applies here, we AFFIRM.

I.

Auburn Sales bought automotive parts from Chrysler, and then resold them to Cypros. 1 Cypros then resold the Chrysler parts to customers in the Middle East. The supply chain worked as follows: (1) Automotive Aftermarket Resources, LLC ("AAR") obtained Chrysler parts, (2) that Auburn Sales purchased at a markup, then (3) Cypros would pay an additional premium for the parts from Auburn Sales. Despite this "three-level" system, neither AAR nor Auburn Sales ever took possession of the parts. Instead, Auburn acted as a middleman-getting paid roughly three *714 percent to ensure that Chrysler "drop shipped" the parts directly to Cypros.

This was a successful business model. Auburn Sales' gross sales grew from $1 million in 2010 to more than $3.5 million in 2012. Importantly, this entire business relationship was created only through oral agreements between Chrysler, AAR, Auburn Sales, and Cypros. There was "nothing in writing" between the parties. (Rigby Dep., R. 107-5 at 55.) No partnership agreement; no written contracts.

Instead, Auburn Sales would typically provide Cypros a spreadsheet with quotes for various parts-which would change from time to time. Then, when Cypros required certain parts, it would send Auburn Sales a purchase order based on the spreadsheet pricing. As Auburn Sales described the arrangement, Cypros "would order parts based on [its] requirements." ( Id. at 128.) But if Cypros was not happy with a certain price, it did not have an obligation to buy the parts. And if Cypros wanted to end the business relationship altogether, it was free to do so. Nevertheless, from 2010 through early 2013, the parties successfully worked together.

Everything changed in February 2013. Without Auburn Sales' knowledge, Cypros had been counterfeiting automotive parts. Cypros would obtain counterfeit parts, mix them with the legitimate Chrysler parts received from Auburn Sales, and then sell the comingled parts to customers. Cypros accomplished this by placing fake Chrysler labels on parts. The FBI caught wind of the scheme and raided Cypros' New Jersey warehouse on February 19, 2013. Shortly thereafter, Cypros' president, Fadi Kilani, pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 371 and § 2320(a) -conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods and trafficking in counterfeit goods.

When Chrysler learned of Cypros' counterfeiting, it terminated the supply chain between AAR, Auburn Sales, and Cypros. It remains disputed whether, after the FBI raid, Auburn Sales could have obtained Chrysler parts for other potential customers, if any existed. Regardless, Cypros' counterfeiting, along with the end of the "three-level" supply chain between Chrysler and Cypros, put Auburn Sales out of business for good. 2

In response, Auburn Sales filed this lawsuit against Cypros, bringing claims under Michigan law for tortious interference with a business relationship, tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage, breach of contract, and negligence. The district court dismissed the negligence claim at the pleadings stage. Auburn Sales does not appeal that decision. Then, after the parties completed discovery, Auburn Sales and Cypros filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the remaining tortious interference claims and breach of contract claim (along with Cypros' counterclaims; not at issue here).

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Cypros and dismissed Auburn Sales' remaining claims. Regarding the tortious interference claims, the district court explained that Auburn Sales "failed to demonstrate that Defendants sold counterfeit automobile parts for the purpose of causing Chrysler to refuse to sell parts to AAR [and Auburn Sales]." (Op. & Order Granting Summ. J., R. 123 at 8.) For the breach of contract claim, the district court determined that the Michigan statute of frauds, found at Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.2201 , barred the claim because "[n]either party asserts that there was a written agreement" and Auburn Sales failed to establish that it had an *715 exclusive requirements contract with Cypros. ( Id. at 11.) Auburn Sales filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied, and Auburn Sales appealed.

II.

Summary judgment comes down to two questions. First, whether Michigan law requires the specific intent to interfere with a business relationship to support a tortious interference claim-even where the act alleged was wrongful in itself. And second, whether the Michigan statute of frauds invalidates the oral agreement between the parties. The district court answered both questions in the affirmative. We now review this decision de novo. United Rentals (N. Am.), Inc. v. Keizer , 355 F.3d 399 , 405 (6th Cir. 2004).

In this diversity action, we apply Michigan tort and contract law. Maldonado v. Nat'l Acme Co. , 73 F.3d 642 , 644 (6th Cir. 1996). In doing so, our task is to apply the same law that Michigan state courts would apply. Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,

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Bluebook (online)
898 F.3d 710, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/auburn-sales-inc-v-cypros-trading-shipping-inc-ca6-2018.