Atlantic Steel Company v. McLarty

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Atlantic Steel Company v. McLarty

39 S.E.2d 733, 74 Ga. App. 300, 1946 Ga. App. LEXIS 525

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedOctober 3, 1946

Docket31344.

StatusPublished

Cited by14 cases

This text of 39 S.E.2d 733 (Atlantic Steel Company v. McLarty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Atlantic Steel Company v. McLarty, 39 S.E.2d 733, 74 Ga. App. 300, 1946 Ga. App. LEXIS 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946).

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Opinions

Parker, J.

It is the contention of the plaintiff in error that the testimony of the claimant to the effect that his loss of vision began immediately after the accident of April 25, 1945, did no more than raise an inference that such loss of vision was due to the accident, and that this inference was conclusively rebutted and must yield to the direct testimony of the physician that the burns which the claimant sustained at that time did not injure the eye itself in any way, and that his blindness resulted from a detachment of the retina brought about by the progressive contraction of the old scar. The contention of the defendant in error is that the case is merely one of a finding of fact by the full board based on conflicting evidence, and that in the absence of fraud, if there is any evidence to support it, such finding is conclusive upon the courts. Upon a careful examination of the record this court agrees with the contention of the defendant in error. The proposition stated is so well established in this State that the citation of authority may be limited to a single case. See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Davis, 73 Ga. App. 10 (35 S. E. 2d, 521), and cases cited.

The full board of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation in hearing an .appeal from an award of a deputy director acts as a fact-finding body in a de novo investigation, and may enter an award approving or disapproving the award of the deputy director, and such award of the full board is binding upon the courts if supported by any competent evidence, although there be some evidence to support the finding of the deputy director. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 63 Ga. App. 777, 782 (12 S. E. 2d, 80). The full board on the appeal from the award of the deputy director, as a fact-finding body, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. It was authorized to find from the *304 testimony of the claimant that the substance which splashed into his eye caused an injury which resulted in at least a 50% impairment of the vision in that eye. It has been held that the testimony of an injured person as to the extent of his injuries may be believed in preference to the opinions of “a whole college of physicians” testifying to the contrary. See City of Allanta v. Champe, 66 Ga. 659, 663, Southern Ry. Co. v. Tankersley, 3 Ga. App. 548 (1) (60 S. E. 297), Southern Ry. Co. v. Petway, 7 Ga. App. 659 (1) (67 S. E. 886), and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Dupee, 71 Ga. App. 148, 153 (30 S. E. 2d, 365). In the final analysis, the testimony of the doctors as to the cause of the claimant’s blindness was in the nature of opinions based on their observation and experience, while the claimant’s testimony as to the cause, nature and extent of his injuries was based on personal facts and experience better known to him than to anyone else. See Hall v. General Accident Assurance Corp., 16 Ga. App. 66 (2), 80 (85 S. E. 600), Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Jackson, 68 Ga. App. 447 (23 S. E. 2d, 191), and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hopkins, 71 Ga. App. 175 (30 S. E. 2d, 357).

Pursuant to the act of the General Assembly, approved March 8, 1945, requiring that the full court consider any case in which one of the judges of a division may dissent, this case was considered and decided by the court as a whole.

Judgment affirmed.

Broyles, C. J., Sutton, P. J., MacIntyre and Gardner, JJ., concur.

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Parker, J.

It is the contention of the plaintiff in error that the testimony of the claimant to the effect that his loss of vision began immediately after the accident of April 25, 1945, did no more than raise an inference that such loss of vision was due to the accident, and that this inference was conclusively rebutted and must yield to the direct testimony of the physician that the burns which the claimant sustained at that time did not injure the eye itself in any way, and that his blindness resulted from a detachment of the retina brought about by the progressive contraction of the old scar. The contention of the defendant in error is that the case is merely one of a finding of fact by the full board based on conflicting evidence, and that in the absence of fraud, if there is any evidence to support it, such finding is conclusive upon the courts. Upon a careful examination of the record this court agrees with the contention of the defendant in error. The proposition stated is so well established in this State that the citation of authority may be limited to a single case. See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Davis, 73 Ga. App. 10 (35 S. E. 2d, 521), and cases cited.

The full board of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation in hearing an .appeal from an award of a deputy director acts as a fact-finding body in a de novo investigation, and may enter an award approving or disapproving the award of the deputy director, and such award of the full board is binding upon the courts if supported by any competent evidence, although there be some evidence to support the finding of the deputy director. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 63 Ga. App. 777, 782 (12 S. E. 2d, 80). The full board on the appeal from the award of the deputy director, as a fact-finding body, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. It was authorized to find from the *304 testimony of the claimant that the substance which splashed into his eye caused an injury which resulted in at least a 50% impairment of the vision in that eye. It has been held that the testimony of an injured person as to the extent of his injuries may be believed in preference to the opinions of “a whole college of physicians” testifying to the contrary. See City of Allanta v. Champe, 66 Ga. 659, 663, Southern Ry. Co. v. Tankersley, 3 Ga. App. 548 (1) (60 S. E. 297), Southern Ry. Co. v. Petway, 7 Ga. App. 659 (1) (67 S. E. 886), and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Dupee, 71 Ga. App. 148, 153 (30 S. E. 2d, 365). In the final analysis, the testimony of the doctors as to the cause of the claimant’s blindness was in the nature of opinions based on their observation and experience, while the claimant’s testimony as to the cause, nature and extent of his injuries was based on personal facts and experience better known to him than to anyone else. See Hall v. General Accident Assurance Corp., 16 Ga. App. 66 (2), 80 (85 S. E. 600), Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Jackson, 68 Ga. App. 447 (23 S. E. 2d, 191), and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hopkins, 71 Ga. App. 175 (30 S. E. 2d, 357).

Pursuant to the act of the General Assembly, approved March 8, 1945, requiring that the full court consider any case in which one of the judges of a division may dissent, this case was considered and decided by the court as a whole.

Judgment affirmed.

Broyles, C. J., Sutton, P. J., MacIntyre and Gardner, JJ., concur.

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39 S.E.2d 733, 74 Ga. App. 300, 1946 Ga. App. LEXIS 525, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atlantic-steel-company-v-mclarty-gactapp-1946.

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