B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Arnold

88 Ga. App. 64
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedApril 22, 1953
Docket34577
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 88 Ga. App. 64 (B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Arnold) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Arnold, 88 Ga. App. 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1953).

Opinion

Carlisle, J.

1. “The Workmen’s Compensation Act makes the finding of the board upon the facts final and conclusive, and in the absence of fraud such finding cannot be set aside by any court, if there is any competent evidence to support it. Code, § 114-710; Georgia Casualty Co. v. Martin, 157 Ga. 909 (122 S. E. 881); Maryland Casualty Co. v. England, 160 Ga. 810 (129 S. E. 75); Bituminous Casualty Co. v. Jackson, 68 Ga. App. 447 (23 S. E. 2d, 191).” Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hopkins, 71 Ga. App. 175 (30 S. E. 2d, 357).

2. “The weight and credit to be given to the testimony of the witnesses and also the conflicts in the evidence . . . [are] matters for determination by the board. Continental Casualty Co. v. Bennett, 69 Ga. App. 683 (26 S. E. 2d, 682); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams, 44 [65]*65Ga. App. 452 (161 S. E. 853); Bituminous Casualty Co. v. Jackson, supra.” Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hopkins, supra, p. 177.

Decided April 22, 1953.

3. “While competent expert testimony is entitled to great weight, it is not so authoritative that either court, jury, or commission is bound to be governed by it, since it is advisory merely and intended to assist them in coming to a correct conclusion. Consequently courts, juries, and commissions, in determining the issues they are called upon to settle, may and should take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances attending the subject-matter of the inquiry.” Blanchard v. Savannah River Lumber Co., 40 Ga. App. 416, 424 (149 S. E. 793).

4. Under an application of the foregoing rules, the superior court did not ■ err in affirming the award of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation granting compensation for the claimant’s loss of vision in his right eye. The claimant testified positively that something flew into, or was blown into, his eye while he was at work; that a fellow employee examined his eye with dirty, greasy hands, and wiped the eye with his shirttail; that he suffered constant pain for several months thereafter; that he had had no trouble with the eye prior to that time; that he had received compensation for injury only once in a period of some twenty-one years; that he reported the injury at once to his superior, who sent him to the company doctor who thought nothing was seriously wrong with the eye; and that he continued to have constant pain in the eye and consulted a series of physicians, some of his own choosing and others chosen by the employer. All of these physicians, who were opthalmologists, testified in the case. They were in accord, with one exception, that the alleged injury did not cause the claimant's loss of vision. Their theories of why this was so were quite variant, ranging from malingering, hysteria, allergy, self-inflicted or accidentally inflicted caustic or acid in the eye, to herpes zoster opthalmicus. We think, therefore, that the trial director, whose findings were affirmed by the board, was authorized from all the facts and circumstances to find that there was a causal connection between the injury to the eye, received during the course of his employment, and the loss of vision in that eye, and that the injury arose out of his employment. It does not affirmatively appear that the trial director did not consider the herpes zoster opthalmicus theory. He says that he considered all the theories. The physician who presented the herpes theory at no point in his testimonj'- stated that the injury to the eye could not have caused the herpes zoster opthalmicus. He stated that the sliver of steel would not have caused it. Therefore, it remains that the claimant, before the injury, could see from the eye, with which he had had no trouble prior to the alleged injury; following the injury he was in constant pain for a period of several months; and at the time of the hearing he had lost the vision of his right eye. The director was authorized to disregard the conflicting medical testimony and draw his conclusion from the chain of events, facts, and circumstances attending the claimant’s loss of vision in the right eye.

Judgment affirmed.

' Gardner, P. J., and Townsend, J., concur. Jones, Williams, Dorsey & Kane, for plaintiff in error. George D. Stewart, contra.

Upon the hearing of the claim for workmen’s compensation of Howard Arnold for the loss of his right eye, a trial director of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation made the following findings of fact and entered the following award:

“It was agreed and stipulated that Howard Arnold was an employee of the Martha Mills Division of the B. F. Goodrich Company on October 8, 1951. It was denied that he sustained an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment.

“I find as a matter of fact that his average weekly wage was $73.27. I further find as a matter of fact that this claimant sustained an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment on October 8, 1951, when something either blew or flew into his eye in the due course of his employment.

“I further find that his helper, Ed Elliott, with his dirty hands and a dirty shirttail, wiped or attempted to wipe something out of this man’s eye and admitted that the shirt could have been worn by him from one day to a week.

“I further find as a matter of fact that this injury was immediately reported to his superior and he was sent to Dr. Kellum who put drops in his eye and he continuously returned for treatment for about ten days. He was then sent to Dr. Martin, an eye specialist, who treated him five times and then dismissed him, saying his eyes would be all right.

“I further find as a matter of fact this claimant was treated by some five different doctors who testified and admitted that the claimant complained and contended there was something in his eye from the beginning.

“I further find as a matter of fact that the claimant’s wife further substantiated his testimony testifying as to the claimant’s injured eye being red, swollen and watering and heard his continuous complaints; put the medicine in the eye according to directions and witnessed his agony from the date of the injury.

[67]*67“I further find as a matter of fact that his doctor, Dr. Kellum, who examined him, placed drops in his eye and testified he did not see anything in the eye except small particles of floating pus. He put some 20 percent fluorescein, which is a standard dye [into his eye]; he examined it but did not see any foreign body in the eye; then gave him aureomycin drops; that on his two visits the eye looked about the same and he changed the drops and gave him penicillin dissolved in sodium sulfanilate and told him to return the next day; on his return, which was four days later, the eye didn’t seemed improved or worse; he then changed the medicine to sulfathiazole salve which he was to put in his eye several times a day and he gave him three injections of penicillin, 300,000 units in all in each dose. His eye still did not look any worse or any better. He had his nurse check the claimant’s vision which was 20/200. He then had him sent to Dr. Martin.

“He did not see him again until November 15 at which time his eye had made a remarkable change for the worse.

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Bluebook (online)
88 Ga. App. 64, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/b-f-goodrich-co-v-arnold-gactapp-1953.