Assembly of God v. Sangster

290 P.2d 1057, 178 Kan. 678, 1955 Kan. LEXIS 416
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedDecember 10, 1955
Docket39,971
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 290 P.2d 1057 (Assembly of God v. Sangster) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Assembly of God v. Sangster, 290 P.2d 1057, 178 Kan. 678, 1955 Kan. LEXIS 416 (kan 1955).

Opinion

*679 The opinion of the court was delivered by

Price, J.:

This is an original proceeding in mandamus whereby it is sought to compel the register of deeds of Rice County to record a certain bond resolution upon payment of the fee required for the recording of an instrument affecting real estate, but without payment of the mortgage registration fee.

The question involved is whether the instrument is one by which a lien is created or imposed upon real property.

The case is before us on plaintiff’s motion for a writ of mandamus, to which is attached a copy of the instrument, and defendant’s motion to quash. In the interest of accuracy, the pleadings (omitting formal parts), together with material portions of the instrument in question, are set out in full as an appendix to this opinion.

The instrument was tendered for record under G. S. 1953 Supp. 67-221, which reads in part:

.“Every instrument in writing that conveys real estate, ... or whereby any real estate may be affected, . . . may be recorded in the office of register of deeds of the county in which such real estate is situated: . . .”

G. S. 1949, 79-3101, reads in part:

“The words ‘real property’ and ‘real estate’ as used in this act, . . . shall include all property a conveyance or mortgage of which is entitled to record as real property or interest therein under the laws of this state. The words ‘mortgage of real property’ shall include every instrument by which a lien is created or imposed upon real property, notwithstanding that the debt secured thereby may also be secured by a hen upon personal property. . . .”

G. S. 1949, 79-3102, reads in part:

“Before any mortgage of real property, or renewal or extension of the same shall be received and filed for record . . . , there shall be paid to the register of deeds of the county in which such property or any part thereof is situated, a registration fee for each one hundred dollars and major fraction thereof, of the principal debt or obligation which is secured by such mortgage, the sum of 25 cents; . . .”

Refore proceeding to a discussion of the provisions of the instrument in question a few fundamental principles should be stated.

The fee in question, commonly referred to as the mortgage registration fee, has been held to be a tax. (Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Anderson, 145 Kan. 209, 64 P. 2d 14.)

The mortgage registration fee act applies only to mortgages on real estate. (National Bank of Tulsa v. Warren, 177 Kan. 281, 285, 279 P. 2d 262.)

*680 It is an elementary rule of law that taxation is the rule — exemption the exception, and that exemption provisions are to construed strictly against the claimant for exemption. (Palmer v. Commission of Revenue and Taxation, 156 Kan. 690, 135 P. 2d 899; First Nat’l Bank v. Lovitt, 158 Kan. 535, 148 P. 2d 738, and Clements v. Ljungdahl, 161 Kan. 274, 167 P. 2d 603.)

Notwithstanding the fact there is a statute (G. S. 1949, 67-303) which sets out a “short form” of mortgage, it has been held that in order to create a mortgage contract no particular “form” of instrument is necessary and no particular words are required. The “form” of an agreement by which security is given is unimportant if the purpose plainly appears. All that is necessary is that there be a debt and that the instrument creates a lien on real property as security for the payment of the debt. (Charpie v. Stout, 88 Kan. 318, 128 Pac. 396 [rehearing denied 88 Kan. 682, 129 Pac. 1166]; Hall v. Goldsworthy, 136 Kan. 247, 249, 14 P. 2d 659.)

Art. 11, § 1, of our Constitution, exempts from taxation property which is used exclusively for religious purposes. (See also G. S. 1949, 79-201.)

G. S. 1949, 79-3102, supra, does not exempt a mortgage on church property from payment of the mortgage registration fee. The only exceptions are in cases where a mortgage or instrument is given solely for the purpose (1) of correcting or perfecting a previously recorded mortgage or other instrument, or (2) for the purpose of providing additional security for the same indebtedness where the registration fee has been paid on the original mortgage or instrument. (Lovitt case, supra, p. 540.)

. As already shown, the statute (G. S. 1949, 79-3101) defines a mortgage of real property as including every instrument “by which a lien is created or imposed upon real property.”

The word “lien” has been variously defined as being a hold or claim which one has upon the property of another as security for a debt or charge, as a tie that binds property to a debt or claim for its satisfaction, as a right to possess and retain property until a charge attaching to it is paid or discharged, as a charge imposed upon specific property by which it is made security for the performance of an act, and as being synonymous with a charge or encumbrance upon a thing. (Mendenhall v. Burnette, 58 Kan. 355, 363, 49 Pac. 93; Bisby v. Quinby, 92 Kan. 86, 140 Pac. 635; 33 Am. Jur., Liens, § 2, p. 419; 53 C. J. S., Liens, § 1, p. 826.)

*681 The question before us, therefore, resolves itself into the determination whether the instrument in question creates or imposes a “lien” upon the described property of the church.

In our opinion it does, and therefore the mortgage registration fee must be paid before- the instrument is entitled to be recorded.

It is quite true that the instrument is not in the “form” of a mortgage, in the usual sense of the word, but, as already stated, the form of an agreement by which security is given is unimportant if the purpose plainly appears, and we think there can be no doubt as to the purpose of this instrument, notwithstanding the fact that on the printed form appears the self-serving typed-in statement (Section XV) that the instrument is not intended as a mortgage on the described real property of the church.

The preamble to the instrument states that plaintiff desires to provide for the payment of indebtedness incurred in the construction of a church. Section II earmarks the church collections for payment of the bonds. Under Section III the proceeds from the sale of bonds are to be used exclusively for payment of obligations created in erecting and equipping a church. Section IV states that the property in question is now free and clear of all encumbrances and plaintiff binds and obligates itself that the property will not be encumbered in any manner; that no further liens or claims of any character shall be permitted to attach to the property while the bonds in question, or any of them, are outstanding, and that the property will not be sold while bonds are outstanding unless the purchaser shall assume and agree to pay such outstanding and unpaid bonds.

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Bluebook (online)
290 P.2d 1057, 178 Kan. 678, 1955 Kan. LEXIS 416, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/assembly-of-god-v-sangster-kan-1955.