IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 55A23
Filed 28 June 2024
JOSEPH ASKEW, CHARLIE GORDON WADE III, and CURTIS WASHINGTON
v. CITY OF KINSTON, a municipal corporation
On appeal of right of a substantial constitutional question pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(1) of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 287 N.C. App.
222 (2022), vacating an order of summary judgment entered on 29 September 2021
by Judge Joshua Willey in Superior Court, Lenoir County, and remanding the case.
Heard in the Supreme Court on 9 April 2024.
Ralph T. Bryant, Jr., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Hartzog Law Group LLP, by Dan M. Hartzog Jr. and Katherine Barber-Jones, for defendant-appellee.
EARLS, Justice.
In Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783 (1992), this Court “recognized a
direct action under the State Constitution against state officials for violation of rights
guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights.” The question in this case is whether
plaintiffs bringing Corum claims must exhaust administrative remedies before
entering the courthouse doors. The Court of Appeals said yes. Linking administrative
exhaustion to subject-matter jurisdiction, it held that a court cannot hear a Corum
suit unless the plaintiff first depleted all agency relief. Askew v. City of Kinston, 287 ASKEW V. CITY OF KINSTON
Opinion of the Court
N.C. App. 222, 230 (2022).
We reject that approach. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
dictate jurisdiction over Corum claims. That authority flows from the Constitution
itself. See Corum, 330 N.C. at 784. To ensure that North Carolinians “may seek to
redress all constitutional violations,” Corum creates a unique path into court when
existing channels fail to offer an adequate remedy. Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 342 (2009).
The prospect of agency relief goes to an element of a Corum cause of action:
that the plaintiff lacks meaningful redress through “established claims and
remedies.” Corum, 330 N.C. at 784; see also Washington v. Cline, 898 S.E.2d 667, 671
(N.C. 2024). That issue is substantive rather than jurisdictional—it focuses on
whether Corum is the right vehicle for a claim, not a court’s power to act on it. In
Corum cases like this one, the question is whether the review and relief afforded by
the administrative process is an effective stand-in for a direct constitutional suit. See
id. Because the Court of Appeals substituted that case-by-case inquiry with a blanket
jurisdictional mandate, we vacate and remand.
I. Background
A. Kinston Crafts a Large-Scale Condemnation Plan
Plaintiffs Joseph Askew and Curtis Washington1 live and own property in the
1 At the start of this litigation, a third plaintiff—Gordon Wade III—joined Mr. Askew
and Mr. Washington in filing the complaint. Mr. Wade, however, voluntarily dismissed his claims without prejudice before the trial court granted summary judgment for Kinston.
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City of Kinston (Kinston). Plaintiffs are African American, and they allege that their
lots are in predominately African American neighborhoods. In 2017, Kinston
condemned two of Mr. Askew’s properties and one of Mr. Washington’s. Soon after, it
slated those properties for demolition.
Those condemnations were not isolated decisions—they were part of Kinston’s
renewed efforts to remove blighted buildings. In the early 2010s, Kinston began
razing “condemned, unsafe properties.” For several years, those properties were
“identified one-by-one” and “[d]emolitions proceeded when necessary.” Starting in
2017, however, Kinston adopted “a more targeted approach to improve the
appearance of neighborhoods.” It ramped up its efforts to “condemn[ ] and demolish[ ]
dilapidated, blighted houses and commercial buildings.” And that same year, it upped
demolition funding by 150%.
To make wise use of those new funds, Kinston’s planning department chose
150 properties “that met the criteria for condemnation” under “applicable statutes
and building code provisions.” The City narrowed that list to a “Top 50” to prioritize
for condemnation. According to Kinston, it chose those “Top 50” properties based on
factors like dilapidation and closeness to “a heavily travelled road.” The City also
used a technique called clustering—sites in “proximity to other qualifying” buildings
were grouped together as “part of a ‘cluster’ of dilapidated properties.” Identifying
and focusing on “clusters” ensured that “buildings close together were condemned”
and made “eligible for demolition around the same time.” As an added measure,
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Kinston asked its police department to “identify[ ] buildings [that] were especially
problematic.”
Later that year, the Kinston City Council met to review the “Top 50” list and
the criteria used to create it. During the meeting, council members “confirmed that
houses would be clustered to cut down on cost where possible.” Adam Short, Kinston’s
planning director, pointed the council to clusters in specific areas that were
candidates for large-scale condemnations. For instance, he flagged a grouping of lots
on Tower Hill Road as a “great starting point for clustering.” That area, Mr. Short
conceded in deposition, “is predominantly African American.” The council, with minor
revisions, approved the selection criteria and finalized the “Top 50” list. With that
blessing, Kinston moved forward with condemning and demolishing the “Top 50”
properties.
B. Plaintiffs Assert Racial Discrimination in Kinston’s Condemnation Selections
Plaintiffs offer a different perspective on Kinston’s condemnation scheme. In
their view, the City engaged in the “systematic destruction of African American
buildings” by using “the process for demolishing dilapidated properties in a racial[ly]
discriminatory manner.” They allege that Kinston singled out “buildings that are
owned by African Americans or buildings that exist in the African American
neighborhoods.” At the same time, they continue, Kinston ignored “buildings that are
in similar or worse state[s] of disrepair[ ] that have Caucasian property owners” and
are located “in the neighborhoods with predominately Caucasian residents.”
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Plaintiffs assert, for instance, that the City “has targeted the east side of Kinston
where African Americans primarily live.” But in “primarily Caucasian” areas—such
as “Mitchell Town, a historic district . . . on the west side of Kinston”—“very few or
any buildings are being demolished.” Though the City has funds to repair and
preserve historic properties, plaintiffs contend that it “distribute[s] those funds in a
racially disproportionate manner.” In their view, Kinston reserves those funds for
“historic buildings” in “predominately Caucasian neighborhoods, while
systematically destroying and denying the same financial assistance to African
American residents.”
Plaintiffs argue that the City’s “actionable double standard” was a conscious
scheme made possible by its “arbitrary selection process.” They allege that Kinston
“has no guidelines” for selecting properties to condemn and demolish. Instead,
plaintiffs contend, the City makes “arbitrary decisions” about which properties are
chosen for demolition, which ones are actually demolished, and when those
demolitions move forward. From plaintiffs’ perspective, the City selected sites for
demolition that do not fit any standardized criteria. It has “removed properties from
the list of demolition without following any guidelines.” According to plaintiffs, then,
Kinston did not pick “which buildings would be demolished based on the condition of,
or degree of disrepair of the buildings.” And guidelines proffered by the City were,
plaintiffs assert, crafted “to specifically justify the decision to target the African
American buildings in Kinston for demolition.”
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In short, plaintiffs urge that Kinston has weaponized “a local blight ordinance
to target low-income African American Kinston residents, so the [C]ity can take their
property and resell it to high-end developers without paying compensation to the
African American owners.” And when Kinston placed plaintiffs’ properties on the
demolition list, they allege, it did so because of their race.
C. Kinston’s Process for Condemning Properties and the Administrative Relief Available to Property Owners
Kinston asserts that it relied on then-existing blight statutes to condemn the
chosen properties—including plaintiffs’—and schedule them for demolition.2 Those
provisions allowed the City’s building inspectors to condemn a structure as
“especially dangerous to life because of its liability to fire or because of bad condition
of walls, overloaded floors, defective construction, decay, unsafe wiring or heating
system, inadequate means of egress, or other causes.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-426(a) (2019)
(repealed 2019). An inspector must post a notice in a “conspicuous place” on the
building. N.C.G.S. § 160A-426(c) (2019) (repealed 2019). That notice, in turn, must
specify the structure’s dangerous condition. N.C.G.S. § 160A-428 (2019) (repealed
2019).
2 In 2019, the General Assembly repealed Article 19 of Chapter 160A of the General
Statutes and added Chapter 160D. See An Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land-Use Regulatory Laws of the State, S.L. 2019-111, §§ 2.1(a), 2.3, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 424, 439. However, Article 19 of Chapter 160A remained in effect during the events relevant to the claims in this case. Id. § 3.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at 547 (“[B]ecomes effective on January 1, 2021, and applies to local government development regulation decisions made on or after that date.”).
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It need also alert the property’s owner of a hearing before the inspector. Id.
During that hearing, the owner is “entitled to be heard in person or by counsel,” and
may “present arguments and evidence” against condemnation. Id. The inspector may
then order the owner to “remedy the defective conditions by repairing, closing,
vacating, or demolishing” the structure, or by “taking other necessary steps” to fix the
problem. N.C.G.S. § 160A-429 (2019) (repealed 2019).
An administrative process allows property owners to challenge a condemnation
decision. Within ten days of the inspector’s written order, an owner may appeal it to
the city council. N.C.G.S. § 160A-430 (2019) (repealed 2019). The council, in turn,
reviews the inspector’s decision and—after hearing from the owner—may “affirm,
modify and affirm, or revoke the order.” Id. The owner may then challenge the
council’s decision by petitioning the superior court for writ of certiorari. N.C.G.S. §
160A-393(f) (2019) (repealed 2019).
On review, the superior court examines whether the challenged order is “[i]n
violation of constitutional provisions,” “[a]rbitrary or capricious,” or “[a]ffected by
other error of law.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-393(k)(1) (2019) (repealed 2019). It makes that
decision based on the record, statutorily defined as the documents, exhibits, and other
materials submitted to the city council. N.C.G.S. § 160A-393(i) (2019) (repealed 2019).
But if the court deems the record “not adequate to allow an appropriate
determination” of the legal merits, it may supplement the record with affidavits,
witness testimony, or documentary and other evidence as needed. N.C.G.S. § 160A-
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393(j) (2019) (repealed 2019).
After examining a condemnation order, the superior court may affirm the
council’s decision, reverse it and remand the case with instructions, or remand the
case for further proceedings. N.C.G.S. § 160A-393(l) (2019) (repealed 2019). If, for
instance, the court finds that a condemnation was “based upon an error of law,” it
may “remand the case with an order that directs the decision-making board to take
whatever action should have been taken had the error not been committed or to take
such other action as is necessary to correct the error.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-393(l)(3)
(repealed 2019). Ancillary injunctive relief is also available—the court may enjoin a
“party to th[e] proceeding to take certain action or refrain from taking action that is
consistent with the court’s decision on the merits of the appeal.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-
393(m) (2019) (repealed 2019).
D. Kinston Condemns Plaintiffs’ Properties
In late November 2017, Kinston condemned two of Mr. Askew’s properties
citing fire hazards, decay, structural problems, and unsafe wiring. After a hearing,
the building inspector issued orders to abate and directed Mr. Askew to “remedy the
defective conditions” by repairing or demolishing the buildings within set timeframes.
Mr. Askew appealed neither order.
City inspectors revisited the sites at the agreed-upon intervals. For the first
property, they saw no “observable improvement to the condition” and so
recommended “[m]oving forward with the condemnation process.” Mr. Askew sought
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a hearing from the Kinston City Council and appeared at a meeting in January 2019.
The council upheld the condemnation order. Mr. Askew never petitioned the superior
court for writ of certiorari, as allowed by statute.
For Mr. Askew’s second property, city inspectors visited the lot and noted
improvements. As requested, they gave Mr. Askew more time to continue repairs. But
when inspectors returned to the site the next year, they elected to condemn it because
Mr. Askew had “failed to stabilize the structure or protect the building from water
damage that continues to cause rot and decay.”
In 2018, Kinston condemned Mr. Washington’s property citing fire hazards,
decay, structural problems, and a collapsing roof. The building inspector issued an
abatement order, but Mr. Washington did not appeal it to the Kinston City Council
or superior court.
In 2019, Mr. Askew and Mr. Washington jointly sued Kinston in federal court,
alleging “violations of their [Fourteenth] amendment, substantial due process, equal
protection rights, discrimination, disparity and condemnation of a historical home.”
Askew v. City of Kinston, No. 4:19-CV-13-D, 2019 WL 2126690, at *1 (E.D.N.C. May
15, 2019) (alteration in original). A federal district court dismissed the complaint for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at *4.
E. Plaintiffs Bring Corum Claims Against Kinston
Mr. Askew and Mr. Washington then filed Corum claims against Kinston in
the Superior Court, Lenoir County. According to plaintiffs, the City’s discriminatory
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and arbitrary decisions violated the equal protection and due process guarantees of
North Carolina’s Constitution. That meant, plaintiffs continued, that the
administrative process could not offer an “adequate remedy at state law.” For
Kinston’s constitutional breaches, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief, and damages over $25,000.
In its answer, Kinston generally denied the complaint’s allegation. It later
moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. The superior court granted summary judgment for Kinston
on all claims. Mr. Askew and Mr. Washington appealed.
F. The Court of Appeals Rules Against Plaintiffs on Jurisdictional Grounds
The Court of Appeals also dispensed with plaintiffs’ claims. See Askew, 287
N.C. App. at 229–30. But rather than examine the summary judgment ruling, the
Court of Appeals focused on jurisdiction. See id. at 229. This Court has explained:
As a general rule, where the legislature has provided by statute an effective administrative remedy, that remedy is exclusive and its relief must be exhausted before recourse may be had to the courts. This is especially true where a statute establishes . . . a procedure whereby matters of regulation and control are first addressed by commissions or agencies particularly qualified for the purpose.
Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 721 (1979) (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals
imported that exhaustion requirement into the framework for Corum claims. See
Askew, 287 N.C. App. at 229–30. It held, in essence, that a court cannot hear a direct
constitutional suit unless the plaintiff depletes all avenues of administrative relief.
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See id.
In the court’s view, plaintiffs “primarily seek to enjoin [Kinston] from
demolishing [their] properties.” Id. at 229. They did “not allege that exhaustion would
be futile.” Id. And since the administrative process allows “the city council and the
superior court to review [p]laintiffs’ injuries and grant the relief [they] seek,” the
court reasoned, they “are not excused from exhausting their administrative
remedies.” Id. Because plaintiffs bypassed the administrative scheme before raising
their Corum claims, the court explained, their failure to exhaust administrative relief
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. Id. at 230. The Court of Appeals thus directed
the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs’ Corum claims without prejudice for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
II. Analysis
The Court of Appeals’ analysis was doubly flawed. It failed to disaggregate and
examine plaintiffs’ distinct constitutional claims. On top of that, the court tied
administrative exhaustion to subject-matter jurisdiction over Corum suits,
transplanting the rules for run-of-the-mill agency disputes into Corum’s unique
framework.
A. Plaintiffs’ Discrete Corum Claims
Corum embodies a “time-honored” legal principle: “[W]here there is a right,
there must be a remedy.” See Washington, 898 S.E.2d at 668–69 (cleaned up). To
“ensure that every right does indeed have a remedy in our court system,” id., Corum
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offers a common law cause of action when existing relief does not sufficiently redress
“a violation of a particular constitutional right,” Corum, 330 N.C. at 784 (emphasis
added). Our post-Corum cases have elaborated on that point, explaining that “an
adequate remedy is one that meaningfully addresses the constitutional violation,
even if the plaintiff might prefer a different form of relief.” See Washington, 898
S.E.2d at 671; see also id. at 672 (explaining that Corum “applies when one’s rights
are violated, and the law offers either no remedy or a remedy that is meaningless”).
The “power to fashion an appropriate remedy” turns on “the right violated and
the facts of the particular case.” Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 373 (1994) (quoting
Corum, 330 N.C. at 784). That is because different rights “protect persons from
injuries to particular interests.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978). And so
“[v]arious rights” in various contexts may “require greater or lesser relief to rectify”
their breach. Corum, 330 N.C. at 784; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 163 (1803) (“[E]very right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury
its proper redress.” (cleaned up)).
Across our Corum precedent, then, we have parsed the different constitutional
injuries—and thus the different modes of relief—at play when the state infringes the
“[v]arious rights” protected by our Constitution. See Corum, 330 N.C. at 782 (free
speech); Copper v. Denlinger, 363 N.C. 784, 788 (2010) (procedural due process);
Deminski v. State Bd. of Educ., 377 N.C. 406, 413 (2021) (opportunity to receive a
sound basic education); Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 535 (2018) (pursuit
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of “one’s profession free from unreasonable governmental action”); Washington, 898
S.E.2d at 672 (speedy trial).
If a plaintiff brings distinct Corum actions for the violation of distinct
constitutional rights, courts may not lump those claims together. That cookie-cutter
approach to rights and remedies strays from Corum’s flexible inquiry. As a legal and
logical matter, the scope and nature of the constitutional wrong dictate whether
existing modes of redress “apply to the facts alleged” or “provide for the type of remedy
sought.” Craig, 363 N.C. at 340, 342. To thus accord “every injury its proper redress,”
Washington, 898 S.E.2d at 670 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163), Corum
requires courts to disaggregate “the right[s] violated,” the constitutional harms
alleged, and the “appropriate remedy” on “the facts of the particular case,” Simeon,
339 N.C. at 373 (quoting Corum, 330 N.C. at 784).
The Court of Appeals, however, collapsed plaintiffs’ claims into a monolith
without examining the contours, injuries, and theories underpinning each. Plaintiffs
brought two Corum suits—one based on substantive due process, the other on equal
protection. Both are rooted in Article I, Section 19, often called the Law of the Land
Clause. In full, that provision reads:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
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N.C. Const., art. I, § 19. Despite their shared constitutional origins, plaintiffs’ Corum
claims assert different rights, raise different injuries, and envision different modes of
relief.
Substantive due process “is a guaranty against arbitrary legislation,
demanding that the law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be
obtained.” Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 461 (1985). In essence, it guards against
unreasonable government actions that deprive people of life, liberty, or property. See
Halikierra Cmty. Servs. LLC v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 898 S.E.2d 685,
689 (N.C. 2024). Invoking that guarantee, plaintiffs contend that Kinston’s decisions
to condemn and demolish their properties were “unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious.” See State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 371 (1975). For their substantive due
process claim, then, plaintiffs’ alleged constitutional injury is the “arbitrary and
unduly discriminatory interference” with their rights as property owners. See In re
Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 424 (1970). If their argument holds, plaintiffs can remedy that
harm by stopping the City from following through on its condemnation orders and
demolishing their lots.
But plaintiffs advance another Corum claim—an equal protection challenge to
Kinston’s condemnation scheme. They argue that the City chose properties based on
race—that it singled out black-owned properties in majority-black neighborhoods,
while ignoring similarly dilapidated white-owned homes in predominately white
neighborhoods. That racially disparate treatment, plaintiffs urge, violates the Equal
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Protection Clause, which “guarantees equal treatment of those who are similarly
situated.” Grace Baptist Church v. City of Oxford, 320 N.C. 439, 447 (1987) (cleaned
up).
For plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, then, the constitutional violation is
Kinston’s alleged discrimination based on race. That harm springs from plaintiffs’
right to evenhanded treatment from the government. Plaintiffs’ ultimate complaint,
in other words, is not about what happens to their land but the alleged racial
targeting that tainted the proceedings from the start. Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
641, 643 (1993) (“An understanding of the nature of appellants’ claim is critical to our
resolution of the case . . . Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality.” (cleaned up)); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1984)
(explaining that discrimination harms “persons who are personally denied equal
treatment” by “perpetuating archaic and stereotypic notions or by stigmatizing
members of the disfavored group as innately inferior and therefore as less worthy
participants in the political community” (cleaned up)).
If plaintiffs carry the day, their equal protection claim contemplates a distinct
form of relief—equal treatment from Kinston, not a specific outcome as to their
properties. Said differently, this claim focuses on the journey—how the City chose
properties—rather than the destination—whether Kinston may ultimately condemn
and demolish plaintiffs’ lots. When “the right invoked is that to equal treatment, the
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appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment.” See id. at 740; cf. State v.
Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 309 (1987) (invoking Equal Protection Clause to set aside
conviction based on racial discrimination in grand jury selection but allowing the
State to reindict defendant through nondiscriminatory procedures). For instance, if
plaintiffs come forward with enough evidence to prove that Kinston chose properties
using impermissible race-based criteria in violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
the appropriate remedy would be to prohibit the City from engaging in race-based
discrimination. Even then, plaintiffs’ properties might ultimately be selected for
condemnation using race-neutral criteria. See S. S. Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654,
663 (1971) (holding that a city violated Equal Protection Clause by selectively
enforcing ordinance and awarding plaintiffs injunction “so long as [city officials]
continue the discriminatory practices” but limiting relief so that the city could
“inaugurat[e] and carry[ ] out a nondiscriminatory enforcement policy and program”).
But merely stopping Kinston from demolishing plaintiffs’ specific lots would not fix
the asserted racial targeting that undergirded the City’s condemnation plan. In other
words, no administrative decision would redress the alleged race-based
discrimination at the threshold.
The Court of Appeals grasped one of plaintiffs’ Corum claims. It squarely
addressed their substantive due process challenge to Kinston’s demolition of their
individual properties. But the court overlooked plaintiffs’ equal protection suit and
the contours of that asserted right. It recast the constitutional harm as the mere
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condemnation of plaintiffs’ land and the resulting interference with their property
rights. See Askew, 287 N.C. App. at 229. So framed, the proper relief for that injury,
the court continued, is “to enjoin [Kinston] from demolishing [p]laintiffs’ properties.”
Id. And if plaintiffs’ constitutional injuries are reduced to disputes about their
individual lots, the administrative process seems suited to the task. The Court of
Appeals thought so. In its view, the administrative remedy allowed “the city council
and the superior court to review [p]laintiffs’ injuries and grant the relief [they]
seek”—i.e., quashing the condemnation orders for their properties and stopping
Kinston’s demolitions. Id.
But though that summation may fairly characterize plaintiffs’ substantive due
process claim, it sidesteps their equal protection challenge. For the latter, plaintiffs
assert a different injury—Kinston’s alleged racial discrimination—which requires a
different species of relief—a “mandate of equal treatment.” See Heckler, 465 U.S. at
740. According to plaintiffs, then, the administrative process is miscalibrated for their
equal protection claims. It can only halt the condemnation of atomized parcels, they
contend, not strike at Kinston’s alleged systemic discrimination. Plaintiffs thus urge
that forcing them to exhaust administrative channels would only prolong the
inequality they assert.
We leave the merits of those arguments for remand. But methodologically,
plaintiffs’ challenges to the administrative process highlight the missteps in the
opinion below. By treating plaintiffs’ separate constitutional claims as the same, the
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Court of Appeals dislocated the Corum analysis from the discrete “right[s] violated
and the facts of the particular case.” Simeon, 339 N.C. at 373 (quoting Corum, 330
N.C. at 784).
B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
A second flaw built on the first. The Court of Appeals tied administrative
exhaustion to subject-matter jurisdiction over direct constitutional suits, holding that
a court’s power to hear Corum claims hinges on whether the plaintiff first depleted
administrative relief. That was error. In so holding, the Court of Appeals drew from
a distinct class of cases—those dealing with routine administrative grievances
reviewable through statutory channels. But the rules for garden variety agency
disputes cannot be unflinchingly transplanted into the universe of Corum.
We start with first principles. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s “power to
pass on the merits of a case.” Slattery v. Appy City, LLC, 898 S.E.2d 700, 704 (N.C.
2024) (cleaned up). It is “conferred by the Constitution, statutes and the law of the
land, that is, by sovereign authority.” Stafford v. Gallops, 123 N.C. 19, 22 (1898).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is also “fundamental.” Henderson County v. Smyth, 216
N.C. 421, 424 (1939). In “its absence a court has no power to act.” In re T.R.P., 360
N.C. 588, 590 (2006).
As we have explained, the “allegations of a complaint determine a court’s
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.” In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 345
(2009). Because the “nature of the case and the type of relief sought” differ between
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administrative disputes and Corum claims, a court’s jurisdiction over those matters
is triggered by different allegations and governed by different rules. See In re T.R.P.,
360 N.C. at 590 (cleaned up).
1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Administrative Law
In the administrative realm, jurisdiction over agency disputes turns on
whether a party channeled their claim through prescribed administrative avenues.
See Presnell, 298 N.C. at 722. If the legislature has “explicitly provided” a vehicle to
“seek effective judicial review of [a] particular administrative action,” id. at 722, that
“relief must be exhausted before recourse may be had to the courts,” id. at 721. That
rule serves pragmatic aims. See Elmore v. Lanier, 270 N.C. 674, 678 (1967). It
recognizes that an agency is well-suited to resolve and review “matters it customarily
handles, and can apply distinctive knowledge to.” Axon Enter. v. FTC, 143 S. Ct. 890,
901 (2023). And it fosters efficient and informed decision-making, giving the “entity
most concerned with a particular matter the first chance to discover and rectify
error,” gather facts, and decide matters within its specialized domain. Presnell, 298
N.C. at 721.
A court’s power to review administrative decisions is—like agencies
themselves—an “artificial creature of statute.” High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. N.C.
Dep’t. of Transp., 366 N.C. 315, 318–19 (2012) (cleaned up). When “jurisdiction is
statutory and the [l]egislature requires the [c]ourt to exercise its jurisdiction in a
certain manner, to follow a certain procedure, or otherwise subjects the [c]ourt to
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certain limitations, an act of the [c]ourt beyond these limits is in excess of its
jurisdiction.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 590 (cleaned up). In those cases, the
“procedures established by law for the determination of juridical disputes” are like
ships, “fashioned by lawmakers to carry legal controversies into judicial ports for
decision.” See Brissie v. Craig, 232 N.C. 701, 707 (1950). Litigants who deviate from
statutorily prescribed routes will end up “shipwrecked on procedural reefs.” Id.
To avoid those treacherous shoals, parties challenging administrative matters
must adhere to statutory criteria as a “condition[ ] precedent to obtaining a review by
the courts.” In re State ex rel. Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 234 N.C. 651, 653 (1951); cf. In re
T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 590 (noting that pleading requirements for “certain causes of
action created by statute” are “not a matter of form, but substance, and a defect
therein is jurisdictional” (cleaned up)). Said differently, courts may examine agency
disputes within legislative parameters, or not at all. See id. Administrative
exhaustion—if statutorily required and “followed by effective judicial review”—thus
“acquires the status of a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Presnell, 298 N.C. at 722. Courts
may hear such claims only after plaintiffs deplete “their available administrative
remedies or demonstrate[ ] that doing so would [be] futile.” See Abrons Fam. Prac. &
Urgent Care, PA v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 370 N.C. 443, 453 (2018).
2. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Corum Claims
But agencies are not courts. See Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t,
Health & Nat. Res., 333 N.C. 318, 321 (1993). And Corum claims are not
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administrative grievances. While subject-matter jurisdiction over administrative
matters is legislatively devised and statutorily defined, the judiciary’s power to hear
Corum claims flows from the “authority granted to it by the Constitution.” See
Henderson County, 216 N.C. at 423. That is, in part, because our “Constitution opens
the courthouse doors to all who suffer injury.” Fearrington v. City of Greenville, No.
89PA22, slip op. at 10 (N.C. May. 23, 2024). It also enshrines a “foundational principle
of every common law legal system”—that “[w]here there is a right, there is a remedy.”
Washington, 898 S.E.2d at 668 (citing N.C. Const. art. I, § 18). Because it is “the state
judiciary that has the responsibility to protect the state constitutional rights of the
citizens,” Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, the power to hear and redress constitutional
violations is “conferred by the Constitution,” Stafford, 123 N.C. at 22; see also Meads
v. N.C. Dep’t of Agric., 349 N.C. 656, 670 (1998) (“[I]t is the province of the judiciary
to make constitutional determinations . . . .”); Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358
N.C. 605, 642 (2004) (“[W]hen the State fails to live up to its constitutional duties, a
court is empowered to order the deficiency remedied . . . .”).
A complaint thus activates a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction if it alleges the
“infringement of a legal right” secured by the Constitution and presents a justiciable
controversy. See Comm. to Elect Dan Forest v. Emps. Pol. Action Comm., 376 N.C.
558, 608 (2021). Said another way, a court has jurisdiction if “the right of [plaintiffs]
to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution” is “given one
construction and will be defeated” if “given another.” See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
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Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946));
cf. Bell, 327 U.S. at 681–82 (“[W]here the complaint, as here, is so drawn as to seek
recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal
court, but for two possible exceptions later noted, must entertain the suit.”).
The Court of Appeals, however, appeared to conflate two concepts: jurisdiction
versus a cause of action. The difference between those is key. Jurisdiction concerns a
court’s authority to hear and decide a case. See Slattery, 898 S.E.2d at 704. A cause
of action, on the other hand, is the set of facts or allegations that create a legal right
to sue. See Cause of Action, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “cause
of action” as “[a] group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing”).
It captures the theory on which a plaintiff builds their suit, pointing to the wrong
done and the remedy sought. In specific cases, Corum provides a “direct cause of
action under the State Constitution,” allowing a plaintiff to raise and redress a
constitutional violation when existing mechanisms fall short. Corum, 330 N.C. at 786.
As a unique species of common law suit, Corum claims depend on the
Constitution for both substance and a vehicle into court. They are born of necessity,
taking root in the interstices between rights and remedies. Corum grounded its
precepts in a simple truth: the “very purpose of the Declaration of Rights is to ensure
that the violation of these rights is never permitted by anyone who might be invested
under the Constitution with the powers of the State.” Id. at 783. Our Constitution
thus secures the people’s “rights against state officials and shifting political
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majorities.” Id. at 787. It also tasks the courts with the “responsibility to guard and
protect” constitutional guarantees. Id. at 785. To fulfill their duty and “ensure that
every right does indeed have a remedy in our court system,” Washington, 898 S.E.2d
at 668, courts may draw on their “inherent constitutional power to fashion a common
law remedy for a violation of a particular constitutional right,” Corum, 330 N.C. at
784. Thus, Corum’s promise: “[I]n the absence of an adequate state remedy, one
whose state constitutional rights have been abridged has a direct claim against the
State under our Constitution.” Id. at 782.
But Corum also recognized the prudential and structural parameters of that
“extraordinary” authority. Id. at 784. It thus set two “critical limitations” on direct
constitutional suits. Id. Courts must “bow to established claims and remedies” when
adequate. Id.; see also In re Alamance Cnty. Court Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 101 (1991)
(urging judicial respect of existing “statutory remedies and constraints when the[y]
do not stand in the way of obtaining what is reasonably necessary for the proper
administration of justice”). And courts must minimize inter-branch friction by
crafting the “least intrusive remedy available and necessary to right the wrong.”
Corum, 330 N.C. at 784; see also In re Alamance Cnty., 329 N.C. at 99 (cautioning
that the use of inherent powers “must be no more forceful or invasive than the
exigency of the circumstances requires”). Corum thus furnishes a court-created claim
in specific circumstances: when existing channels do not adequately redress “a
violation of a particular constitutional right.” Corum, 330 N.C. at 784; see also In re
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Alamance Cnty., 329 N.C. at 100 (reserving inherent powers for cases where “other
means to rectify” the problem “are unavailable or ineffectual”).
Consistent with those limits, the inadequacy of “established claims and
remedies” is an element of a Corum cause of action. Corum, 330 N.C. at 784; see also
Deminski, 377 N.C. at 413. It marks the conditions in which the judiciary will step
into the breach and fashion a vehicle for a plaintiff to “have the merits of his case
heard and his injury redressed if successful.” Craig, 363 N.C. at 341. And it “ensures
that an adequate remedy must provide the possibility of relief under the
circumstances.” Id. at 340. As part of a Corum cause of action, then, the sufficiency
of existing relief—including administrative remedies—does not dictate subject-
matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (“[T]he absence of a valid (as opposed
to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.”). The
“courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case” is “not defeated by
the possibility that the averments [in the complaint] might fail to state a cause of
action on which petitioners could actually recover.” Id. (cleaned up). If the complaint
places the dispute within the “authority granted to [the court] by the Constitution
and laws of the sovereignty,” Henderson County, 216 N.C. at 423, that court has
“jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of action on which [it]
can grant relief as well as to determine issues of fact arising in the controversy,” Bell,
327 U.S. at 682.
By those lights, administrative exhaustion does not imbue or divest a court
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with jurisdiction over Corum claims. The availability of agency relief goes to an
element of a plaintiff’s cause of action—i.e., whether Corum offers a direct
constitutional claim because existing relief falls short. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782. That
a court may hear the case does not, of course, mean the plaintiff will “win other
pretrial motions, defeat affirmative defenses, or ultimately succeed on the merits of
his case.” Craig, 363 N.C. at 340. But those eventualities turn on the merits of the
claim, not the courts’ power to hear it at all. For that reason, Corum does not shut
the courthouse doors merely because a plaintiff did not deplete administrative relief.
3. Remedial Adequacy and Administrative Exhaustion
The question instead is whether the administrative process is an adequate
proxy for a direct constitutional suit. Cf. Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 428 (1979)
(“[W]hen an effective administrative remedy exists, that remedy is exclusive.”).
Courts must examine the interplay between the specific administrative regime, the
asserted constitutional right, and “the wrongs of which [a plaintiff] complain[s].” See
id. In general terms, an administrative process is adequate if it allows the plaintiff to
enter the courthouse doors, meaningfully air their constitutional claim, and if
successful, secure substantive redress for their injuries. See Craig, 363 N.C. 339–40
(“[T]o be considered adequate in redressing a constitutional wrong, a plaintiff must
have at least the opportunity to enter the courthouse doors and present his claim.”);
see also id. at 340 (“[A]n adequate remedy must provide the possibility of relief under
the circumstances.”). We decline to set a checklist, as each case will turn on the fit
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between the administrative scheme, the asserted constitutional violation, and the
facts alleged. In substance, though, an adequate administrative remedy must offer a
fair “turn at bat”—it may not doom Corum claims to echo into a bureaucratic void.
See Goldston v. State, 361 N.C. 26, 35 (2006) (cleaned up); cf. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Hosp. Auth. v. N.C. Indus. Comm’n, 336 N.C. 200, 209–10 (1993) (finding
administrative remedy inadequate because plaintiffs challenged the facial validity of
agency rule and the statute only allowed review of individual disputes and awards on
“specific claims for compensation”).
This Court has followed that case-by-case approach. In Deminski, for instance,
the plaintiff—a mother of public school students—brought Corum claims against a
school board for its deliberate indifference to harassment in the classroom. See
Deminski, 377 N.C. at 407. The board urged us to withhold Corum relief because the
plaintiff enjoyed an adequate administrative remedy under N.C.G.S. § 115C-45.
According to the board, that statute provided a right to appeal a final administrative
decision of a school employee—first to the local school board and then to superior
court. Since the plaintiff could eventually challenge the school’s inaction or violation
of state law, the board argued, the administrative process was good enough to bar her
Corum suit.
We disagreed, holding that the plaintiff “alleged a colorable constitutional
claim for which no other adequate state law remedy exists.” Id. at 415. Necessarily,
then, we rejected the adequacy of the administrative remedy and excused the plaintiff
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from exhausting it. See id. Our opinion acknowledged that the administrative process
could protract the ongoing harassment. See id. at 409. We noted, for instance, that
the plaintiff and her children repeatedly alerted the school of the bullying. Id. In
response, school personnel alluded to the administrative protocol in place, “insist[ing]
that there was a process that would take time.” Id. (cleaned up). But despite those
assurances, “the bullying and harassment continued with no real change.” Id.
When the plaintiff sued, she alleged that the school—and thus the board—
failed “to take adequate action to address” known harassment in the classroom. Id.
at 414. Given the nature of the claim and the board’s history of inaction, forcing the
plaintiff to deplete essentially irrelevant administrative remedies would prolong the
cycle of deliberate indifference she sought to end. Reasoning that the constitutional
violation “cannot be redressed through other means,” we allowed the plaintiff to seek
Corum relief. Id. at 415.
In other cases, too, we have allowed Corum claims that assert constitutional
harm in the administrative process itself. See Tully, 370 N.C. at 536 (allowing Corum
claim under Article I, Section I when the plaintiff’s government employer “arbitrarily
and capriciously denied him the ability to appeal an aspect of the promotional
process” by ignoring its own policies and “summarily denying his grievance petition
without any reason or rationale other than that the examination answers were not a
grievable item” (cleaned up)). That approach is not an outlier. The Supreme Court of
the United States, for instance, has allowed parties to bypass the usual
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administrative course when raising “structural constitutional claims,” see Axon, 143
S. Ct. at 904, that allege harm in “being subjected to unconstitutional agency
authority,” see id. at 903 (cleaned up). If a plaintiff challenges their “subjection to an
illegitimate” administrative process “irrespective of its outcome,” the Court
explained, they “will lose their rights not to undergo the complained-of agency
proceedings if they cannot assert those rights until the proceedings are over.” Id. at
903–04.
That precedent imparts a clear lesson: conditioning Corum claims on
administrative exhaustion would ignore the special status of constitutional rights and
the courts’ special role in protecting them from state encroachment. In some cases, a
particular agency process may allow meaningful ventilation of a particular
constitutional claim on particular facts. See, e.g., Copper, 363 N.C. at 788–89. In
others, administrative channels may prove unavailing. See, e.g., Deminski, 377 N.C.
at 414. But the adequacy of administrative relief is, at bottom, a flexible inquiry that
a court must weigh. See, e.g., Craig, 363 N.C. at 342 (affirming the denial of summary
judgment award and allowing Corum claim to proceed because plaintiff lacked an
adequate remedy); see also Washington, 898 S.E.2d at 673 (affirming entry of
summary judgment against Corum claimant because an existing statutory remedy
provided adequate relief for speedy trial violation). Flatly tying administrative
exhaustion to jurisdiction is inappropriate for Corum claims and the constitutional
rights under their aegis.
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C. Application
So examined, the Court of Appeals’ errors are clear. It merged plaintiffs’
separate claims under the Law of the Land Clause, treating their substantive due
process and equal protection challenges as one and the same. The court’s analysis
thus overlooked the distinct constitutional injuries and theories of recovery raised by
plaintiffs’ separate Corum claims. That distinction (or lack thereof) matters.
According to plaintiffs, Corum relief is needed precisely because the administrative
process cannot meaningfully redress their discrete constitutional harms.
The Court of Appeals did not grapple with plaintiffs’ adequacy arguments,
much less the City’s responses. Instead, it imported the administrative exhaustion
requirement into Corum’s unique realm. Building on its first analytical shortfall, the
court surmised that the crux of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims—the unjustified
condemnation of their properties—could be reviewed and redressed through the
administrative process. Askew, 287 N.C. App. at 229. For that reason, it held that
plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust extinguished the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
Id. at 230. That was error, as explained above. On remand, the Court of Appeals must
revisit the administrative scheme and reevaluate its congruence with plaintiffs’
discrete Corum claims.
III. Conclusion
The trial court granted summary judgment to Kinston on all claims against it.
But because the Court of Appeals resolved the case on jurisdictional grounds, it
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vacated the trial court’s ruling without reaching its substance. We vacate the Court
of Appeals decision and remand to that court to conduct a standard de novo review of
the merits of the trial court’s summary judgment order. See Est. of Graham v.
Lambert, 385 N.C. 644, 650 (2024).
Because plaintiffs are the nonmovants, the Court of Appeals must view the
evidence in their favor and ask whether “there is any genuine issue as to any material
fact, and whether any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See Kessing
v. Nat’l Mortg. Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 535 (1971). The trial court did not specify its
rationale for granting summary judgment. On remand, then, the Court of Appeals
should first ask whether the administrative process provides an adequate state law
remedy for plaintiffs’ discrete constitutional challenges. After disaggregating
plaintiffs’ Corum suits, the court should affirm the summary judgment order if there
is no genuine factual question that the administrative process “meaningfully
addresses the constitutional violation.” See Washington, 898 S.E.2d at 671. If
“established claims or remedies” are inadequate for plaintiffs’ equal protection or
substantive due process challenges, see Corum, 330 N.C. at 784, the Court of Appeals
should then examine whether a genuine factual dispute exists on the merits of the
surviving Corum claims.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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