Askew v. City of Kinston

Opinions

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 55A23

Filed 28 June 2024

JOSEPH ASKEW, CHARLIE GORDON WADE III, and CURTIS WASHINGTON

v.

CITY OF KINSTON, a municipal corporation

On appeal of right of a substantial constitutional question pursuant to

N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(1) of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 287 N.C. App.

222 (2022), vacating an order of summary judgment entered on 29 September 2021

by Judge Joshua Willey in Superior Court, Lenoir County, and remanding the case.

Heard in the Supreme Court on 9 April 2024.

Ralph T. Bryant, Jr., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Hartzog Law Group LLP, by Dan M. Hartzog Jr. and Katherine Barber-Jones, for defendant-appellee.

EARLS, Justice.

In Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783 (1992), this Court “recognized a

direct action under the State Constitution against state officials for violation of rights

guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights.” The question in this case is whether

plaintiffs bringing Corum claims must exhaust administrative remedies before

entering the courthouse doors. The Court of Appeals said yes. Linking administrative

exhaustion to subject-matter jurisdiction, it held that a court cannot hear a Corum

suit unless the plaintiff first depleted all agency relief. Askew v. City of Kinston, 287

Opinion of the Court

N.C. App. 222, 230 (2022).

We reject that approach. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not

dictate jurisdiction over Corum claims. That authority flows from the Constitution

itself. See Corum, 330 N.C. at 784. To ensure that North Carolinians “may seek to

redress all constitutional violations,” Corum creates a unique path into court when

existing channels fail to offer an adequate remedy. Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd.

of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 342 (2009).

The prospect of agency relief goes to an element of a Corum cause of action:

that the plaintiff lacks meaningful redress through “established claims and

remedies.” Corum, 330 N.C. at 784; see also Washington v. Cline, 898 S.E.2d 667, 671

(N.C. 2024). That issue is substantive rather than jurisdictional—it focuses on

whether Corum is the right vehicle for a claim, not a court’s power to act on it. In

Corum cases like this one, the question is whether the review and relief afforded by

the administrative process is an effective stand-in for a direct constitutional suit. See

id. Because the Court of Appeals substituted that case-by-case inquiry with a blanket

jurisdictional mandate, we vacate and remand.

I. Background

A. Kinston Crafts a Large-Scale Condemnation Plan

Plaintiffs Joseph Askew and Curtis Washington1 live and own property in the

1 At the start of this litigation, a third plaintiff—Gordon Wade III—joined Mr. Askew

and Mr. Washington in filing the complaint. Mr. Wade, however, voluntarily dismissed his claims without prejudice before the trial court granted summary judgment for Kinston.

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City of Kinston (Kinston). Plaintiffs are African American, and they allege that their

lots are in predominately African American neighborhoods. In 2017, Kinston

condemned two of Mr. Askew’s properties and one of Mr. Washington’s. Soon after, it

slated those properties for demolition.

Those condemnations were not isolated decisions—they were part of Kinston’s

renewed efforts to remove blighted buildings. In the early 2010s, Kinston began

razing “condemned, unsafe properties.” For several years, those properties were

“identified one-by-one” and “[d]emolitions proceeded when necessary.” Starting in

2017, however, Kinston adopted “a more targeted approach to improve the

appearance of neighborhoods.” It ramped up its efforts to “condemn[ ] and demolish[ ]

dilapidated, blighted houses and commercial buildings.” And that same year, it upped

demolition funding by 150%.

To make wise use of those new funds, Kinston’s planning department chose

150 properties “that met the criteria for condemnation” under “applicable statutes

and building code provisions.” The City narrowed that list to a “Top 50” to prioritize

for condemnation. According to Kinston, it chose those “Top 50” properties based on

factors like dilapidation and closeness to “a heavily travelled road.” The City also

used a technique called clustering—sites in “proximity to other qualifying” buildings

were grouped together as “part of a ‘cluster’ of dilapidated properties.” Identifying

and focusing on “clusters” ensured that “buildings close together were condemned”

and made “eligible for demolition around the same time.” As an added measure,

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Kinston asked its police department to “identify[ ] buildings [that] were especially

problematic.”

Later that year, the Kinston City Council met to review the “Top 50” list and

the criteria used to create it. During the meeting, council members “confirmed that

houses would be clustered to cut down on cost where possible.” Adam Short, Kinston’s

planning director, pointed the council to clusters in specific areas that were

candidates for large-scale condemnations. For instance, he flagged a grouping of lots

on Tower Hill Road as a “great starting point for clustering.” That area, Mr. Short

conceded in deposition, “is predominantly African American.” The council, with minor

revisions, approved the selection criteria and finalized the “Top 50” list. With that

blessing, Kinston moved forward with condemning and demolishing the “Top 50”

properties.

B. Plaintiffs Assert Racial Discrimination in Kinston’s Condemnation Selections

Plaintiffs offer a different perspective on Kinston’s condemnation scheme. In

their view, the City engaged in the “systematic destruction of African American

buildings” by using “the process for demolishing dilapidated properties in a racial[ly]

discriminatory manner.” They allege that Kinston singled out “buildings that are

owned by African Americans or buildings that exist in the African American

neighborhoods.” At the same time, they continue, Kinston ignored “buildings that are

in similar or worse state[s] of disrepair[ ] that have Caucasian property owners” and

are located “in the neighborhoods with predominately Caucasian residents.”

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Plaintiffs assert, for instance, that the City “has targeted the east side of Kinston

where African Americans primarily live.” But in “primarily Caucasian” areas—such

as “Mitchell Town, a historic district . . . on the west side of Kinston”—“very few or

any buildings are being demolished.” Though the City has funds to repair and

preserve historic properties, plaintiffs contend that it “distribute[s] those funds in a

racially disproportionate manner.” In their view, Kinston reserves those funds for

“historic buildings” in “predominately Caucasian neighborhoods, while

systematically destroying and denying the same financial assistance to African

American residents.”

Plaintiffs argue that the City’s “actionable double standard” was a conscious

scheme made possible by its “arbitrary selection process.” They allege that Kinston

“has no guidelines” for selecting properties to condemn and demolish. Instead,

plaintiffs contend, the City makes “arbitrary decisions” about which properties are

chosen for demolition, which ones are actually demolished, and when those

demolitions move forward. From plaintiffs’ perspective, the City selected sites for

demolition that do not fit any standardized criteria. It has “removed properties from

the list of demolition without following any guidelines.” According to plaintiffs, then,

Kinston did not pick “which buildings would be demolished based on the condition of,

or degree of disrepair of the buildings.” And guidelines proffered by the City were,

plaintiffs assert, crafted “to specifically justify the decision to target the African

American buildings in Kinston for demolition.”

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In short, plaintiffs urge that Kinston has weaponized “a local blight ordinance

to target low-income African American Kinston residents, so the [C]ity can take their

property and resell it to high-end developers without paying compensation to the

African American owners.” And when Kinston placed plaintiffs’ properties on the

demolition list, they allege, it did so because of their race.

C. Kinston’s Process for Condemning Properties and the Administrative Relief Available to Property Owners

Kinston asserts that it relied on then-existing blight statutes to condemn the

chosen properties—including plaintiffs’—and schedule them for demolition.2 Those

provisions allowed the City’s building inspectors to condemn a structure as

“especially dangerous to life because of its liability to fire or because of bad condition

of walls, overloaded floors, defective construction, decay, unsafe wiring or heating

system, inadequate means of egress, or other causes.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-426(a) (2019)

(repealed 2019). An inspector must post a notice in a “conspicuous place” on the

building. N.C.G.S. § 160A-426(c) (2019) (repealed 2019). That notice, in turn, must

specify the structure’s dangerous condition. N.C.G.S. § 160A-428 (2019) (repealed

2019).

2 In 2019, the General Assembly repealed Article 19 of Chapter 160A of the General

Statutes and added Chapter 160D. See An Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land-Use Regulatory Laws of the State, S.L. 2019-111, §§ 2.1(a), 2.3, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 424, 439. However, Article 19 of Chapter 160A remained in effect during the events relevant to the claims in this case. Id. § 3.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at 547 (“[B]ecomes effective on January 1, 2021, and applies to local government development regulation decisions made on or after that date.”).

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It need also alert the property’s owner of a hearing before the inspector. Id.

During that hearing, the owner is “entitled to be heard in person or by counsel,” and

may “present arguments and evidence” against condemnation. Id. The inspector may

then order the owner to “remedy the defective conditions by repairing, closing,

vacating, or demolishing” the structure, or by “taking other necessary steps” to fix the

problem. N.C.G.S. § 160A-429 (2019) (repealed 2019).

An administrative process allows property owners to challenge a condemnation

decision. Within ten days of the inspector’s written order, an owner may appeal it to

the city council. N.C.G.S. § 160A-430 (2019) (repealed 2019). The council, in turn,

reviews the inspector’s decision and—after hearing from the owner—may “affirm,

modify and affirm, or revoke the order.” Id. The owner may then challenge the

council’s decision by petitioning the superior court for writ of certiorari. N.C.G.S. §

160A-393(f) (2019) (repealed 2019).

On review, the superior court examines whether the challenged order is “[i]n

violation of constitutional provisions,” “[a]rbitrary or capricious,” or “[a]ffected by

other error of law.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-393(k)(1) (2019) (repealed 2019). It makes that

decision based on the record, statutorily defined as the documents, exhibits, and other

materials submitted to the city council. N.C.G.S. § 160A-393(i) (2019) (repealed 2019).

But if the court deems the record “not adequate to allow an appropriate

determination” of the legal merits, it may supplement the record with affidavits,

witness testimony, or documentary and other evidence as needed. N.C.G.S. § 160A-

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393(j) (2019) (repealed 2019).

After examining a condemnation order, the superior court may affirm the

council’s decision, reverse it and remand the case with instructions, or remand the

case for further proceedings. N.C.G.S. § 160A-393(l) (2019) (repealed 2019). If, for

instance, the court finds that a condemnation was “based upon an error of law,” it

may “remand the case with an order that directs the decision-making board to take

whatever action should have been taken had the error not been committed or to take

such other action as is necessary to correct the error.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-393(l)(3)

(repealed 2019). Ancillary injunctive relief is also available—the court may enjoin a

“party to th[e] proceeding to take certain action or refrain from taking action that is

consistent with the court’s decision on the merits of the appeal.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-

393(m) (2019) (repealed 2019).

D. Kinston Condemns Plaintiffs’ Properties

In late November 2017, Kinston condemned two of Mr. Askew’s properties

citing fire hazards, decay, structural problems, and unsafe wiring. After a hearing,

the building inspector issued orders to abate and directed Mr. Askew to “remedy the

defective conditions” by repairing or demolishing the buildings within set timeframes.

Mr. Askew appealed neither order.

City inspectors revisited the sites at the agreed-upon intervals. For the first

property, they saw no “observable improvement to the condition” and so

recommended “[m]oving forward with the condemnation process.” Mr. Askew sought

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a hearing from the Kinston City Council and appeared at a meeting in January 2019.

The council upheld the condemnation order. Mr. Askew never petitioned the superior

court for writ of certiorari, as allowed by statute.

For Mr. Askew’s second property, city inspectors visited the lot and noted

improvements. As requested, they gave Mr. Askew more time to continue repairs. But

when inspectors returned to the site the next year, they elected to condemn it because

Mr. Askew had “failed to stabilize the structure or protect the building from water

damage that continues to cause rot and decay.”

In 2018, Kinston condemned Mr. Washington’s property citing fire hazards,

decay, structural problems, and a collapsing roof. The building inspector issued an

abatement order, but Mr. Washington did not appeal it to the Kinston City Council

or superior court.

In 2019, Mr. Askew and Mr. Washington jointly sued Kinston in federal court,

alleging “violations of their [Fourteenth] amendment, substantial due process, equal

protection rights, discrimination, disparity and condemnation of a historical home.”

Askew v. City of Kinston, No. 4:19-CV-13-D, 2019 WL 2126690, at *1 (E.D.N.C. May

15, 2019) (alteration in original). A federal district court dismissed the complaint for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at *4.

E. Plaintiffs Bring Corum Claims Against Kinston

Mr. Askew and Mr. Washington then filed Corum claims against Kinston in

the Superior Court, Lenoir County. According to plaintiffs, the City’s discriminatory

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and arbitrary decisions violated the equal protection and due process guarantees of

North Carolina’s Constitution. That meant, plaintiffs continued, that the

administrative process could not offer an “adequate remedy at state law.” For

Kinston’s constitutional breaches, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment,

injunctive relief, and damages over $25,000.

In its answer, Kinston generally denied the complaint’s allegation. It later

moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs failed to exhaust

administrative remedies. The superior court granted summary judgment for Kinston

on all claims. Mr. Askew and Mr. Washington appealed.

F. The Court of Appeals Rules Against Plaintiffs on Jurisdictional Grounds

The Court of Appeals also dispensed with plaintiffs’ claims. See Askew, 287

N.C. App. at 229–30. But rather than examine the summary judgment ruling, the

Court of Appeals focused on jurisdiction. See id. at 229. This Court has explained:

As a general rule, where the legislature has provided by statute an effective administrative remedy, that remedy is exclusive and its relief must be exhausted before recourse may be had to the courts. This is especially true where a statute establishes . . . a procedure whereby matters of regulation and control are first addressed by commissions or agencies particularly qualified for the purpose.

Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 721 (1979) (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals

imported that exhaustion requirement into the framework for Corum claims. See

Askew, 287 N.C. App. at 229–30. It held, in essence, that a court cannot hear a direct

constitutional suit unless the plaintiff depletes all avenues of administrative relief.

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See id.

In the court’s view, plaintiffs “primarily seek to enjoin [Kinston] from

demolishing [their] properties.” Id. at 229. They did “not allege that exhaustion would

be futile.” Id. And since the administrative process allows “the city council and the

superior court to review [p]laintiffs’ injuries and grant the relief [they] seek,” the

court reasoned, they “are not excused from exhausting their administrative

remedies.” Id. Because plaintiffs bypassed the administrative scheme before raising

their Corum claims, the court explained, their failure to exhaust administrative relief

deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. Id. at 230. The Court of Appeals thus directed

the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs’ Corum claims without prejudice for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.

II. Analysis

The Court of Appeals’ analysis was doubly flawed. It failed to disaggregate and

examine plaintiffs’ distinct constitutional claims. On top of that, the court tied

administrative exhaustion to subject-matter jurisdiction over Corum suits,

transplanting the rules for run-of-the-mill agency disputes into Corum’s unique

framework.

A. Plaintiffs’ Discrete Corum Claims

Corum embodies a “time-honored” legal principle: “[W]here there is a right,

there must be a remedy.” See Washington, 898 S.E.2d at 668–69 (cleaned up). To

“ensure that every right does indeed have a remedy in our court system,” id., Corum

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offers a common law cause of action when existing relief does not sufficiently redress

“a violation of a particular constitutional right,” Corum, 330 N.C. at 784 (emphasis

added). Our post-Corum cases have elaborated on that point, explaining that “an

adequate remedy is one that meaningfully addresses the constitutional violation,

even if the plaintiff might prefer a different form of relief.” See Washington, 898

S.E.2d at 671; see also id. at 672 (explaining that Corum “applies when one’s rights

are violated, and the law offers either no remedy or a remedy that is meaningless”).

The “power to fashion an appropriate remedy” turns on “the right violated and

the facts of the particular case.” Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 373 (1994) (quoting

Corum, 330 N.C. at 784). That is because different rights “protect persons from

injuries to particular interests.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978). And so

“[v]arious rights” in various contexts may “require greater or lesser relief to rectify”

their breach. Corum, 330 N.C. at 784; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)

137, 163 (1803) (“[E]very right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury

its proper redress.” (cleaned up)).

Across our Corum precedent, then, we have parsed the different constitutional

injuries—and thus the different modes of relief—at play when the state infringes the

“[v]arious rights” protected by our Constitution. See Corum, 330 N.C. at 782 (free

speech); Copper v. Denlinger, 363 N.C. 784, 788 (2010) (procedural due process);

Deminski v. State Bd. of Educ., 377 N.C. 406, 413 (2021) (opportunity to receive a

sound basic education); Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 535 (2018) (pursuit

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of “one’s profession free from unreasonable governmental action”); Washington, 898

S.E.2d at 672 (speedy trial).

If a plaintiff brings distinct Corum actions for the violation of distinct

constitutional rights, courts may not lump those claims together. That cookie-cutter

approach to rights and remedies strays from Corum’s flexible inquiry. As a legal and

logical matter, the scope and nature of the constitutional wrong dictate whether

existing modes of redress “apply to the facts alleged” or “provide for the type of remedy

sought.” Craig, 363 N.C. at 340, 342. To thus accord “every injury its proper redress,”

Washington, 898 S.E.2d at 670 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163), Corum

requires courts to disaggregate “the right[s] violated,” the constitutional harms

alleged, and the “appropriate remedy” on “the facts of the particular case,” Simeon,

339 N.C. at 373 (quoting Corum, 330 N.C. at 784).

The Court of Appeals, however, collapsed plaintiffs’ claims into a monolith

without examining the contours, injuries, and theories underpinning each. Plaintiffs

brought two Corum suits—one based on substantive due process, the other on equal

protection. Both are rooted in Article I, Section 19, often called the Law of the Land

Clause. In full, that provision reads:

No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national origin.

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N.C. Const., art. I, § 19. Despite their shared constitutional origins, plaintiffs’ Corum

claims assert different rights, raise different injuries, and envision different modes of

relief.

Substantive due process “is a guaranty against arbitrary legislation,

demanding that the law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be

obtained.” Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 461 (1985). In essence, it guards against

unreasonable government actions that deprive people of life, liberty, or property. See

Halikierra Cmty. Servs. LLC v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 898 S.E.2d 685,

689 (N.C. 2024). Invoking that guarantee, plaintiffs contend that Kinston’s decisions

to condemn and demolish their properties were “unreasonable, arbitrary or

capricious.” See State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 371 (1975). For their substantive due

process claim, then, plaintiffs’ alleged constitutional injury is the “arbitrary and

unduly discriminatory interference” with their rights as property owners. See In re

Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 424 (1970). If their argument holds, plaintiffs can remedy that

harm by stopping the City from following through on its condemnation orders and

demolishing their lots.

But plaintiffs advance another Corum claim—an equal protection challenge to

Kinston’s condemnation scheme. They argue that the City chose properties based on

race—that it singled out black-owned properties in majority-black neighborhoods,

while ignoring similarly dilapidated white-owned homes in predominately white

neighborhoods. That racially disparate treatment, plaintiffs urge, violates the Equal

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Protection Clause, which “guarantees equal treatment of those who are similarly

situated.” Grace Baptist Church v. City of Oxford, 320 N.C. 439, 447 (1987) (cleaned

up).

For plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, then, the constitutional violation is

Kinston’s alleged discrimination based on race. That harm springs from plaintiffs’

right to evenhanded treatment from the government. Plaintiffs’ ultimate complaint,

in other words, is not about what happens to their land but the alleged racial

targeting that tainted the proceedings from the start. Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,

641, 643 (1993) (“An understanding of the nature of appellants’ claim is critical to our

resolution of the case . . . Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race are by

their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the

doctrine of equality.” (cleaned up)); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1984)

(explaining that discrimination harms “persons who are personally denied equal

treatment” by “perpetuating archaic and stereotypic notions or by stigmatizing

members of the disfavored group as innately inferior and therefore as less worthy

participants in the political community” (cleaned up)).

If plaintiffs carry the day, their equal protection claim contemplates a distinct

form of relief—equal treatment from Kinston, not a specific outcome as to their

properties. Said differently, this claim focuses on the journey—how the City chose

properties—rather than the destination—whether Kinston may ultimately condemn

and demolish plaintiffs’ lots. When “the right invoked is that to equal treatment, the

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appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment.” See id. at 740; cf. State v.

Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 309 (1987) (invoking Equal Protection Clause to set aside

conviction based on racial discrimination in grand jury selection but allowing the

State to reindict defendant through nondiscriminatory procedures). For instance, if

plaintiffs come forward with enough evidence to prove that Kinston chose properties

using impermissible race-based criteria in violation of the Equal Protection Clause,

the appropriate remedy would be to prohibit the City from engaging in race-based

discrimination. Even then, plaintiffs’ properties might ultimately be selected for

condemnation using race-neutral criteria. See S. S. Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654,

663 (1971) (holding that a city violated Equal Protection Clause by selectively

enforcing ordinance and awarding plaintiffs injunction “so long as [city officials]

continue the discriminatory practices” but limiting relief so that the city could

“inaugurat[e] and carry[ ] out a nondiscriminatory enforcement policy and program”).

But merely stopping Kinston from demolishing plaintiffs’ specific lots would not fix

the asserted racial targeting that undergirded the City’s condemnation plan. In other

words, no administrative decision would redress the alleged race-based

discrimination at the threshold.

The Court of Appeals grasped one of plaintiffs’ Corum claims. It squarely

addressed their substantive due process challenge to Kinston’s demolition of their

individual properties. But the court overlooked plaintiffs’ equal protection suit and

the contours of that asserted right. It recast the constitutional harm as the mere

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condemnation of plaintiffs’ land and the resulting interference with their property

rights. See Askew, 287 N.C. App. at 229. So framed, the proper relief for that injury,

the court continued, is “to enjoin [Kinston] from demolishing [p]laintiffs’ properties.”

Id. And if plaintiffs’ constitutional injuries are reduced to disputes about their

individual lots, the administrative process seems suited to the task. The Court of

Appeals thought so. In its view, the administrative remedy allowed “the city council

and the superior court to review [p]laintiffs’ injuries and grant the relief [they]

seek”—i.e., quashing the condemnation orders for their properties and stopping

Kinston’s demolitions. Id.

But though that summation may fairly characterize plaintiffs’ substantive due

process claim, it sidesteps their equal protection challenge. For the latter, plaintiffs

assert a different injury—Kinston’s alleged racial discrimination—which requires a

different species of relief—a “mandate of equal treatment.” See Heckler, 465 U.S. at

740. According to plaintiffs, then, the administrative process is miscalibrated for their

equal protection claims. It can only halt the condemnation of atomized parcels, they

contend, not strike at Kinston’s alleged systemic discrimination. Plaintiffs thus urge

that forcing them to exhaust administrative channels would only prolong the

inequality they assert.

We leave the merits of those arguments for remand. But methodologically,

plaintiffs’ challenges to the administrative process highlight the missteps in the

opinion below. By treating plaintiffs’ separate constitutional claims as the same, the

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Court of Appeals dislocated the Corum analysis from the discrete “right[s] violated

and the facts of the particular case.” Simeon, 339 N.C. at 373 (quoting Corum, 330

N.C. at 784).

B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

A second flaw built on the first. The Court of Appeals tied administrative

exhaustion to subject-matter jurisdiction over direct constitutional suits, holding that

a court’s power to hear Corum claims hinges on whether the plaintiff first depleted

administrative relief. That was error. In so holding, the Court of Appeals drew from

a distinct class of cases—those dealing with routine administrative grievances

reviewable through statutory channels. But the rules for garden variety agency

disputes cannot be unflinchingly transplanted into the universe of Corum.

We start with first principles. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s “power to

pass on the merits of a case.” Slattery v. Appy City, LLC, 898 S.E.2d 700, 704 (N.C.

2024) (cleaned up). It is “conferred by the Constitution, statutes and the law of the

land, that is, by sovereign authority.” Stafford v. Gallops, 123 N.C. 19, 22 (1898).

Subject-matter jurisdiction is also “fundamental.” Henderson County v. Smyth, 216

N.C. 421, 424 (1939). In “its absence a court has no power to act.” In re T.R.P., 360

N.C. 588, 590 (2006).

As we have explained, the “allegations of a complaint determine a court’s

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.” In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 345

(2009). Because the “nature of the case and the type of relief sought” differ between

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administrative disputes and Corum claims, a court’s jurisdiction over those matters

is triggered by different allegations and governed by different rules. See In re T.R.P.,

360 N.C. at 590 (cleaned up).

1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Administrative Law

In the administrative realm, jurisdiction over agency disputes turns on

whether a party channeled their claim through prescribed administrative avenues.

See Presnell, 298 N.C. at 722. If the legislature has “explicitly provided” a vehicle to

“seek effective judicial review of [a] particular administrative action,” id. at 722, that

“relief must be exhausted before recourse may be had to the courts,” id. at 721. That

rule serves pragmatic aims. See Elmore v. Lanier, 270 N.C. 674, 678 (1967). It

recognizes that an agency is well-suited to resolve and review “matters it customarily

handles, and can apply distinctive knowledge to.” Axon Enter. v. FTC, 143 S. Ct. 890,

901 (2023). And it fosters efficient and informed decision-making, giving the “entity

most concerned with a particular matter the first chance to discover and rectify

error,” gather facts, and decide matters within its specialized domain. Presnell, 298

N.C. at 721.

A court’s power to review administrative decisions is—like agencies

themselves—an “artificial creature of statute.” High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. N.C.

Dep’t. of Transp., 366 N.C. 315, 318–19 (2012) (cleaned up). When “jurisdiction is

statutory and the [l]egislature requires the [c]ourt to exercise its jurisdiction in a

certain manner, to follow a certain procedure, or otherwise subjects the [c]ourt to

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certain limitations, an act of the [c]ourt beyond these limits is in excess of its

jurisdiction.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 590 (cleaned up). In those cases, the

“procedures established by law for the determination of juridical disputes” are like

ships, “fashioned by lawmakers to carry legal controversies into judicial ports for

decision.” See Brissie v. Craig, 232 N.C. 701, 707 (1950). Litigants who deviate from

statutorily prescribed routes will end up “shipwrecked on procedural reefs.” Id.

To avoid those treacherous shoals, parties challenging administrative matters

must adhere to statutory criteria as a “condition[ ] precedent to obtaining a review by

the courts.” In re State ex rel. Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 234 N.C. 651, 653 (1951); cf. In re

T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 590 (noting that pleading requirements for “certain causes of

action created by statute” are “not a matter of form, but substance, and a defect

therein is jurisdictional” (cleaned up)). Said differently, courts may examine agency

disputes within legislative parameters, or not at all. See id. Administrative

exhaustion—if statutorily required and “followed by effective judicial review”—thus

“acquires the status of a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Presnell, 298 N.C. at 722. Courts

may hear such claims only after plaintiffs deplete “their available administrative

remedies or demonstrate[ ] that doing so would [be] futile.” See Abrons Fam. Prac. &

Urgent Care, PA v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 370 N.C. 443, 453 (2018).

2. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Corum Claims

But agencies are not courts. See Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t,

Health & Nat. Res., 333 N.C. 318, 321 (1993). And Corum claims are not

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administrative grievances. While subject-matter jurisdiction over administrative

matters is legislatively devised and statutorily defined, the judiciary’s power to hear

Corum claims flows from the “authority granted to it by the Constitution.” See

Henderson County, 216 N.C. at 423. That is, in part, because our “Constitution opens

the courthouse doors to all who suffer injury.” Fearrington v. City of Greenville, No.

89PA22, slip op. at 10 (N.C. May. 23, 2024). It also enshrines a “foundational principle

of every common law legal system”—that “[w]here there is a right, there is a remedy.”

Washington, 898 S.E.2d at 668 (citing N.C. Const. art. I, § 18). Because it is “the state

judiciary that has the responsibility to protect the state constitutional rights of the

citizens,” Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, the power to hear and redress constitutional

violations is “conferred by the Constitution,” Stafford, 123 N.C. at 22; see also Meads

v. N.C. Dep’t of Agric., 349 N.C. 656, 670 (1998) (“[I]t is the province of the judiciary

to make constitutional determinations . . . .”); Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358

N.C. 605, 642 (2004) (“[W]hen the State fails to live up to its constitutional duties, a

court is empowered to order the deficiency remedied . . . .”).

A complaint thus activates a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction if it alleges the

“infringement of a legal right” secured by the Constitution and presents a justiciable

controversy. See Comm. to Elect Dan Forest v. Emps. Pol. Action Comm., 376 N.C.

558, 608 (2021). Said another way, a court has jurisdiction if “the right of [plaintiffs]

to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution” is “given one

construction and will be defeated” if “given another.” See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

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Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946));

cf. Bell, 327 U.S. at 681–82 (“[W]here the complaint, as here, is so drawn as to seek

recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal

court, but for two possible exceptions later noted, must entertain the suit.”).

The Court of Appeals, however, appeared to conflate two concepts: jurisdiction

versus a cause of action. The difference between those is key. Jurisdiction concerns a

court’s authority to hear and decide a case. See Slattery, 898 S.E.2d at 704. A cause

of action, on the other hand, is the set of facts or allegations that create a legal right

to sue. See Cause of Action, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “cause

of action” as “[a] group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing”).

It captures the theory on which a plaintiff builds their suit, pointing to the wrong

done and the remedy sought. In specific cases, Corum provides a “direct cause of

action under the State Constitution,” allowing a plaintiff to raise and redress a

constitutional violation when existing mechanisms fall short. Corum, 330 N.C. at 786.

As a unique species of common law suit, Corum claims depend on the

Constitution for both substance and a vehicle into court. They are born of necessity,

taking root in the interstices between rights and remedies. Corum grounded its

precepts in a simple truth: the “very purpose of the Declaration of Rights is to ensure

that the violation of these rights is never permitted by anyone who might be invested

under the Constitution with the powers of the State.” Id. at 783. Our Constitution

thus secures the people’s “rights against state officials and shifting political

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majorities.” Id. at 787. It also tasks the courts with the “responsibility to guard and

protect” constitutional guarantees. Id. at 785. To fulfill their duty and “ensure that

every right does indeed have a remedy in our court system,” Washington, 898 S.E.2d

at 668, courts may draw on their “inherent constitutional power to fashion a common

law remedy for a violation of a particular constitutional right,” Corum, 330 N.C. at

784. Thus, Corum’s promise: “[I]n the absence of an adequate state remedy, one

whose state constitutional rights have been abridged has a direct claim against the

State under our Constitution.” Id. at 782.

But Corum also recognized the prudential and structural parameters of that

“extraordinary” authority. Id. at 784. It thus set two “critical limitations” on direct

constitutional suits. Id. Courts must “bow to established claims and remedies” when

adequate. Id.; see also In re Alamance Cnty. Court Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 101 (1991)

(urging judicial respect of existing “statutory remedies and constraints when the[y]

do not stand in the way of obtaining what is reasonably necessary for the proper

administration of justice”). And courts must minimize inter-branch friction by

crafting the “least intrusive remedy available and necessary to right the wrong.”

Corum, 330 N.C. at 784; see also In re Alamance Cnty., 329 N.C. at 99 (cautioning

that the use of inherent powers “must be no more forceful or invasive than the

exigency of the circumstances requires”). Corum thus furnishes a court-created claim

in specific circumstances: when existing channels do not adequately redress “a

violation of a particular constitutional right.” Corum, 330 N.C. at 784; see also In re

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Alamance Cnty., 329 N.C. at 100 (reserving inherent powers for cases where “other

means to rectify” the problem “are unavailable or ineffectual”).

Consistent with those limits, the inadequacy of “established claims and

remedies” is an element of a Corum cause of action. Corum, 330 N.C. at 784; see also

Deminski, 377 N.C. at 413. It marks the conditions in which the judiciary will step

into the breach and fashion a vehicle for a plaintiff to “have the merits of his case

heard and his injury redressed if successful.” Craig, 363 N.C. at 341. And it “ensures

that an adequate remedy must provide the possibility of relief under the

circumstances.” Id. at 340. As part of a Corum cause of action, then, the sufficiency

of existing relief—including administrative remedies—does not dictate subject-

matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (“[T]he absence of a valid (as opposed

to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.”). The

“courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case” is “not defeated by

the possibility that the averments [in the complaint] might fail to state a cause of

action on which petitioners could actually recover.” Id. (cleaned up). If the complaint

places the dispute within the “authority granted to [the court] by the Constitution

and laws of the sovereignty,” Henderson County, 216 N.C. at 423, that court has

“jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of action on which [it]

can grant relief as well as to determine issues of fact arising in the controversy,” Bell,

327 U.S. at 682.

By those lights, administrative exhaustion does not imbue or divest a court

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with jurisdiction over Corum claims. The availability of agency relief goes to an

element of a plaintiff’s cause of action—i.e., whether Corum offers a direct

constitutional claim because existing relief falls short. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782. That

a court may hear the case does not, of course, mean the plaintiff will “win other

pretrial motions, defeat affirmative defenses, or ultimately succeed on the merits of

his case.” Craig, 363 N.C. at 340. But those eventualities turn on the merits of the

claim, not the courts’ power to hear it at all. For that reason, Corum does not shut

the courthouse doors merely because a plaintiff did not deplete administrative relief.

3. Remedial Adequacy and Administrative Exhaustion

The question instead is whether the administrative process is an adequate

proxy for a direct constitutional suit. Cf. Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 428 (1979)

(“[W]hen an effective administrative remedy exists, that remedy is exclusive.”).

Courts must examine the interplay between the specific administrative regime, the

asserted constitutional right, and “the wrongs of which [a plaintiff] complain[s].” See

id. In general terms, an administrative process is adequate if it allows the plaintiff to

enter the courthouse doors, meaningfully air their constitutional claim, and if

successful, secure substantive redress for their injuries. See Craig, 363 N.C. 339–40

(“[T]o be considered adequate in redressing a constitutional wrong, a plaintiff must

have at least the opportunity to enter the courthouse doors and present his claim.”);

see also id. at 340 (“[A]n adequate remedy must provide the possibility of relief under

the circumstances.”). We decline to set a checklist, as each case will turn on the fit

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between the administrative scheme, the asserted constitutional violation, and the

facts alleged. In substance, though, an adequate administrative remedy must offer a

fair “turn at bat”—it may not doom Corum claims to echo into a bureaucratic void.

See Goldston v. State, 361 N.C. 26, 35 (2006) (cleaned up); cf. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

Hosp. Auth. v. N.C. Indus. Comm’n, 336 N.C. 200, 209–10 (1993) (finding

administrative remedy inadequate because plaintiffs challenged the facial validity of

agency rule and the statute only allowed review of individual disputes and awards on

“specific claims for compensation”).

This Court has followed that case-by-case approach. In Deminski, for instance,

the plaintiff—a mother of public school students—brought Corum claims against a

school board for its deliberate indifference to harassment in the classroom. See

Deminski, 377 N.C. at 407. The board urged us to withhold Corum relief because the

plaintiff enjoyed an adequate administrative remedy under N.C.G.S. § 115C-45.

According to the board, that statute provided a right to appeal a final administrative

decision of a school employee—first to the local school board and then to superior

court. Since the plaintiff could eventually challenge the school’s inaction or violation

of state law, the board argued, the administrative process was good enough to bar her

Corum suit.

We disagreed, holding that the plaintiff “alleged a colorable constitutional

claim for which no other adequate state law remedy exists.” Id. at 415. Necessarily,

then, we rejected the adequacy of the administrative remedy and excused the plaintiff

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from exhausting it. See id. Our opinion acknowledged that the administrative process

could protract the ongoing harassment. See id. at 409. We noted, for instance, that

the plaintiff and her children repeatedly alerted the school of the bullying. Id. In

response, school personnel alluded to the administrative protocol in place, “insist[ing]

that there was a process that would take time.” Id. (cleaned up). But despite those

assurances, “the bullying and harassment continued with no real change.” Id.

When the plaintiff sued, she alleged that the school—and thus the board—

failed “to take adequate action to address” known harassment in the classroom. Id.

at 414. Given the nature of the claim and the board’s history of inaction, forcing the

plaintiff to deplete essentially irrelevant administrative remedies would prolong the

cycle of deliberate indifference she sought to end. Reasoning that the constitutional

violation “cannot be redressed through other means,” we allowed the plaintiff to seek

Corum relief. Id. at 415.

In other cases, too, we have allowed Corum claims that assert constitutional

harm in the administrative process itself. See Tully, 370 N.C. at 536 (allowing Corum

claim under Article I, Section I when the plaintiff’s government employer “arbitrarily

and capriciously denied him the ability to appeal an aspect of the promotional

process” by ignoring its own policies and “summarily denying his grievance petition

without any reason or rationale other than that the examination answers were not a

grievable item” (cleaned up)). That approach is not an outlier. The Supreme Court of

the United States, for instance, has allowed parties to bypass the usual

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administrative course when raising “structural constitutional claims,” see Axon, 143

S. Ct. at 904, that allege harm in “being subjected to unconstitutional agency

authority,” see id. at 903 (cleaned up). If a plaintiff challenges their “subjection to an

illegitimate” administrative process “irrespective of its outcome,” the Court

explained, they “will lose their rights not to undergo the complained-of agency

proceedings if they cannot assert those rights until the proceedings are over.” Id. at

903–04.

That precedent imparts a clear lesson: conditioning Corum claims on

administrative exhaustion would ignore the special status of constitutional rights and

the courts’ special role in protecting them from state encroachment. In some cases, a

particular agency process may allow meaningful ventilation of a particular

constitutional claim on particular facts. See, e.g., Copper, 363 N.C. at 788–89. In

others, administrative channels may prove unavailing. See, e.g., Deminski, 377 N.C.

at 414. But the adequacy of administrative relief is, at bottom, a flexible inquiry that

a court must weigh. See, e.g., Craig, 363 N.C. at 342 (affirming the denial of summary

judgment award and allowing Corum claim to proceed because plaintiff lacked an

adequate remedy); see also Washington, 898 S.E.2d at 673 (affirming entry of

summary judgment against Corum claimant because an existing statutory remedy

provided adequate relief for speedy trial violation). Flatly tying administrative

exhaustion to jurisdiction is inappropriate for Corum claims and the constitutional

rights under their aegis.

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C. Application

So examined, the Court of Appeals’ errors are clear. It merged plaintiffs’

separate claims under the Law of the Land Clause, treating their substantive due

process and equal protection challenges as one and the same. The court’s analysis

thus overlooked the distinct constitutional injuries and theories of recovery raised by

plaintiffs’ separate Corum claims. That distinction (or lack thereof) matters.

According to plaintiffs, Corum relief is needed precisely because the administrative

process cannot meaningfully redress their discrete constitutional harms.

The Court of Appeals did not grapple with plaintiffs’ adequacy arguments,

much less the City’s responses. Instead, it imported the administrative exhaustion

requirement into Corum’s unique realm. Building on its first analytical shortfall, the

court surmised that the crux of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims—the unjustified

condemnation of their properties—could be reviewed and redressed through the

administrative process. Askew, 287 N.C. App. at 229. For that reason, it held that

plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust extinguished the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

Id. at 230. That was error, as explained above. On remand, the Court of Appeals must

revisit the administrative scheme and reevaluate its congruence with plaintiffs’

discrete Corum claims.

III. Conclusion

The trial court granted summary judgment to Kinston on all claims against it.

But because the Court of Appeals resolved the case on jurisdictional grounds, it

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vacated the trial court’s ruling without reaching its substance. We vacate the Court

of Appeals decision and remand to that court to conduct a standard de novo review of

the merits of the trial court’s summary judgment order. See Est. of Graham v.

Lambert, 385 N.C. 644, 650 (2024).

Because plaintiffs are the nonmovants, the Court of Appeals must view the

evidence in their favor and ask whether “there is any genuine issue as to any material

fact, and whether any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See Kessing

v. Nat’l Mortg. Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 535 (1971). The trial court did not specify its

rationale for granting summary judgment. On remand, then, the Court of Appeals

should first ask whether the administrative process provides an adequate state law

remedy for plaintiffs’ discrete constitutional challenges. After disaggregating

plaintiffs’ Corum suits, the court should affirm the summary judgment order if there

is no genuine factual question that the administrative process “meaningfully

addresses the constitutional violation.” See Washington, 898 S.E.2d at 671. If

“established claims or remedies” are inadequate for plaintiffs’ equal protection or

substantive due process challenges, see Corum, 330 N.C. at 784, the Court of Appeals

should then examine whether a genuine factual dispute exists on the merits of the

surviving Corum claims.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

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