Ashmore v. CGI Group Inc.

138 F. Supp. 3d 329, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136382, 2015 WL 5813371
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 23, 2015
DocketNo. 11 Civ. 8611(AT)
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 138 F. Supp. 3d 329 (Ashmore v. CGI Group Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ashmore v. CGI Group Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 329, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136382, 2015 WL 5813371 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ANALISA TORRES, District Judge:

In this whistleblower action, Plaintiff, Benjamin Ashmore, alleges that Defendants, CGI’ Group Inc. and CGI Federal Inc. (collectively, “CGI”), violated the anti-retaliation provisions of § 806 of the Sar-banes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Sarbanes-Oxley Aet”), codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (“Section 806”).1 Plaintiff also brings a breach of contract claim. Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND2

I. CGI arid the Section 8 Program

In 1974, the Housing Act of 1937 was amended to create the Section 8 Housing [334]*334Program (“Section 8 Program”), which authorizes the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) to provide federally subsidized housing benefits through rental assistance programs. PL 56.1 ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 136.3 HUD utilizes two types of contracts to implement the Section 8 Program: (1) housing assistance program contracts (“HAP contract”) and (2) annual contributions contracts (“ACC”). Id. ¶3. Through a. HAP contract, HUD contracts directly with the owner of a privately-owned dwelling (“project owner”) to whom HÚD pays subsidies. CMS Conrtract Mgmt. Servs. v. Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency, 745 F.3d 1379, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir.2014).4 Alternatively, through an ACC, HUD contracts with a public housing agency (“PHA”), arid the PHA then enters into HAP contracts with project owners. PL 56.1 ¶¶4-5. HUD provides funds to the PHA, and the PHA then uses those funds to pay subsidies to project owners. Id,

.. A. restructuring of HUD was announced in 1997, including reforms aimed at transferring HUD’s loan and contract administration functions and responsibilities to capable state, local, and other entities. Id, ÍÍ 7; CMS, 745 F,3d at 1382. In.May 1999, HUD issued, a request for proposals (“RFP”) seeking bids from contractors, i.e. qualified PHAs, which would provide administrative services for most of the project-based Section 8 HAP contracts then being administered by HUD. PL 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10. These administrative services are performed pursuant to a performance-based ACC (“PBACC”)..entered into, .between HUD and the qualified PHA. Id. ¶ 10. A PHA that enters into a PBACC is referred to as performance-based contract administrator (“PBCÁ”). Id. ¶ 11.

CGI provides subcontracting services to PHAs. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. CGI agrees to perform tasks necessary for compliance with the Section 8 Program in exchange for a share of revenues. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. In 2009, HUD announced a nationwide rebid of all the' PBACCs previously awarded through the RFP because the terms of the original contracts had expired and HUD sought to control costs associated with the current PBCÁ program. Id. ¶ 15. Upon announcement of the rebid, Marybeth Car-ragher, vice president of consulting services and leader of CGI’s nationwide PBCA practice, assembled a strategy team tasked with the responsibility of both maintaining CGI’s current subcontracting relationships and expanding CGI’s presence. Id. ¶¶ 16-18; Carragher Decl. ¶¶ 1, 19-20, ECF No. 117. This strategy team, the Rebid Assessment Team, was known within CGI as the “Rat Pack.” Pl. 56.1 ¶ 17.

I. The Rat Pack and the Shell Company Scheme

In May 2009, CGI hired Plaintiff as a government services delivery manager. Id. ¶ 25; Carragher Decl. Ex. 1, at 1, ECF No. 117-1. Before taking this position, Plaintiff worked for HUD, where his duties included overseeing PBCAs. Id. ¶¶ 26, 29. When Plaintiff commenced em[335]*335ployment, Carragher was Plaintiffs manager and Panos Kyprianou, director of consulting services, was Plaintiffs mentor. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs responsibilities included working on PBCA rebid projects, and he was among those who participated in, Rat Pack discussions. Id. ¶ 33; Ashmore Decl. ¶ 55, ECF No. 135; Herbst Decl. Ex. 2, Rudy Dqp. 30:4-18, ECF No. 134-2.

On January 14, 2010,. Carragher learned that HUD proposed to limit the number of units on which a PHA or a PHA subcontractor: could bid during the rebid process. PI. 56.1 ¶ 23. The prospective “unit cap” was to be fixed at 300,000 units, a number that fell below CGI’s intended expansion objectives.5 Id. ¶ 24. The Rat Pack conducted brainstorming sessions during which members proposed ideas for dealing with the unit cap if it were implemented, Id. ¶ 127. Plaintiff alleges that the fraudulent scheme about which he blew the whistle was conceived during these discussions. Id. ¶ 108. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Rat Pack participants discussed a shell company scheme that involved current CGI directors resigning from CGI and setting up independent companies. Id. ¶¶ 108, 110, 112, 114. Although ostensibly independent, these' entities would have access to CGI’s resources and expertise and would enter into agreements with PHAs in lieu of CGI. Id. Following the' rebid, CGI would acquire these purportedly independent companies and', as a result, their Section 8 contracts. Id. In this way, CGI bids would not exceed the unit cap. Id.

At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he first learned of the shell company scheme over drinks at a hotel in Fairfax, Virginia. Klein Decl. Ex., 11, Ashmore Dep. 334:18-335:2, ECF Nos. 116-14, 116-15. Plaintiff stated that Les Pierce, a member of the Rat Pack, initially raised the shell company idea, and although Plaintiff testified that he did “not think[] there was much seriousness to it,” he stated that he voiced objections to the scheme’s efficacy. Id. at 339:13-15, 340:3-341:5. Plaintiff testified that the idea was next raised during a regular Rat Pack strategy call that took place after the Virginia meeting. Id. at 348:3—14, 349:13-20^. Plaintiff stated that the. reintroduction of the issue made him realize that the shell company idea was more than “just baek-of-the-envelope ideas being tossed at a table” and that he voiced his position that the scheme was illegal. Id, at 352:9-354:8. Plaintiff stated that following this discussion, the topic “dropped off the radar” and that the Rat Pack was in a “holding pattern.” Id. at 355:11-14. He further testified that at this time “[tjhere were no concrete steps ... no action items, ... nothing planned beyond a discussion about is this a way to do it” and.that he was not aware of particular steps being taken to implement the scheme. Id. at 357:6-358:2.

Plaintiff stated that this changed on May 11, 2010, when the scheme moved beyond a “broad idea” and crystallized into “an actual breakdown ... of which states would go with which directors.”6 Id. at 359:3-16. Plaintiff testified that he came to this realization because a document outlining the scheme, though not explicitly [336]

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138 F. Supp. 3d 329, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136382, 2015 WL 5813371, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ashmore-v-cgi-group-inc-nysd-2015.