Ashley Sanchez, an individual on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Vail Resorts Management Company, a Colorado corporation; Trimont Land Company, a California corporation; Vail Resorts, Inc., a business entity of unknown form; The Vail Corporation, a business entry of unknown form; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 ASHLEY SANCHEZ, an individual on No. 2:25-cv-01259 WBS SCR behalf of herself and all others 13 similarly situated, 14 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY 15 v. 16 VAIL RESORTS MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 17 a Colorado corporation; TRIMONT LAND COMPANY, a California 18 corporation; VAIL RESORTS, INC., a business entity of unknown 19 form; THE VAIL CORPORATION; a business entry of unknown form; 20 and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 21 Defendants. 22

23 ----oo0oo---- 24 This action is one of five related-case putative class 25 actions, and seven total putative class actions, involving wage- 26 and-hour claims against some or all of the defendants to the 27 instant action. (See Docket No. 20-1 at 5.) Presently before 28 1 the court is defendants’ motion to stay the instant action.1 2 Unsurprisingly, defendants ask the court to stay the instant 3 action “pending the outcome of the earlier-filed cases” because 4 the instant action is “materially duplicative” of those actions. 5 (Id. at 5.) Specifically, defendants argue that a stay is 6 warranted under the first-to-file rule. (Id. at 11.) 7 I. First-to-File Rule 8 The first-to-file rule is “a judicially created 9 doctrine of federal comity, which applies when two cases 10 involving substantially similar issues and parties have been 11 filed in different districts.” In re Bozic, 888 F.3d 1048, 1051 12 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation modified).2 Under this rule, “when 13 cases involving the same parties and issues have been filed . . . 14 the second district court has the discretion to transfer, stay, 15 or dismiss the second case in the interest of efficiency and 16 judicial economy.” Cedars–Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 17 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1997). 18 “In applying the first-to-file rule, a court looks to 19 three threshold factors: (1) the chronology of the two actions; 20 (2) the similarity of the parties, and (3) the similarity of the 21 issues.” Adoma v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 22

23 1 Because the court has determined it would not benefit from oral argument on this motion, the motion is taken under 24 submission and is decided on the papers. The previously scheduled hearing on the motion is vacated. 25

26 2 The first-to-file rule is also applicable when two cases are filed in the same district. See Wallerstein v. Dole 27 Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1294 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that “the first to file rule is not limited to 28 cases brought in different districts.”) 1 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Karlton, J.) (quotations omitted). “When 2 applying the first-to-file rule, courts should be driven to 3 maximize economy, consistency, and comity.” Kohn Law Grp., Inc. 4 v. Auto Parts Mfg. Miss., Inc., 787 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 5 2015) (quotations omitted). 6 While the first-to-file rule “should not be disregarded 7 lightly,” “[a] court may, in its discretion, decline to apply the 8 . . . rule in the interests of equity or where the [8 U.S.C. § 9 1404(a)] balance of convenience weighs in favor of the later- 10 filed action.” Wallerstein v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 967 11 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1293-94 (N.D. Cal. 2013). As such, “[t]he 12 circumstances under which an exception to the first-to-file rule 13 typically will be made include bad faith, anticipatory suit, and 14 forum shopping.” Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 15 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1991). 16 a. Chronology of the Actions 17 Four overlapping, putative wage-and-hour class actions 18 were brought prior to the instant action, all of which are 19 currently pending before this court pursuant to a related case 20 designation (Docket No. 6). Heggen v. Heavenly Valley Limited 21 Partnership, et al., No. 2:21-cv-00107 WBS SCR (E.D. Cal. brought 22 Oct. 21, 2020) (“Heggen Action”); Hamilton v. Heavenly Valley, 23 Limited Partnership, No. 2:21-cv-01608 WBS SCR (E.D. Cal. brought 24 July 8, 2021) (“Hamilton Action”); Gibson, et al. v. Vail 25 Corporation, No. 2:21-cv-01260 WBS SCR (E.D. Cal. brought Apr. 26 20, 2021) (“Gibson Action”); Roberds v. Vail Corporation, et al., 27 No. 2:21-cv-02251 WBS SCR (E.D. Cal. brought Sept. 8, 2021) 28 (“Roberds Action”). Plaintiff does not contest this chronology, 1 which satisfies the first component of the first-to-file rule, 2 see Adoma, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1146. 3 b. Similarity of the Parties 4 The first-to-file rule requires “only substantial 5 similarity” between the parties, not exact identity of the 6 parties. See Kohn Law Group, Inc., 787 F.3d at 1240. In 7 putative class actions, the classes are compared, rather than the 8 named plaintiffs. See Bates-Ferreira v. Swedish Match North 9 America, LLC, No. 2:24-cv-00987 TLN CKD, 2025 WL 950506, at *3 10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2025). “[P]roposed classes in class action 11 lawsuits are substantially similar where both classes seek to 12 represent at least some of the same individuals.” Wallerstein, 13 967 F. Supp. 2d at 1296. 14 The putative class in the instant action substantially 15 overlaps with the putative classes in the earlier-filed actions. 16 As this court previously stated, the Heggen, Hamilton, Gibson, 17 and Roberds Actions have been brought by “overlapping groups of 18 employees” seeking redress for alleged violations of the 19 California Labor Code. (See Docket No. 6 at 3.) Notably, 20 plaintiff does not contest this finding. (See Docket No. 23.) 21 As for the defendants across the pending related-case 22 actions, the Gibson Action names Vail Corporation as a defendant; 23 the Hamilton and Heggen Actions name Heavenly Valley, Limited 24 Partnership as a defendant; and the Roberds Action names both 25 Vail Corporation and Heavenly Valley, Limited Partnership as 26 defendants. Although Trimont Land Company is named as a 27 defendant only in the instant action, Trimont Land Company 28 appears to be a corporate affiliate of both the Vail Corporation 1 and Heavenly Valley, Limited Partnership,3 and courts have found 2 that “parties to a litigation may be ‘substantially similar’ to 3 other actions where affiliate entities are named as parties,” 4 Energy Monster v. Monster Energy Co., No. ED-cv-202528 JGB SPX, 5 2021 WL 3598862, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2021). 6 Plaintiff directs the court to the “motion to dismiss 7 Defendants Vail Resorts Management Company, Vail Resorts, Inc., 8 and The Vail Corporation from this action” she filed the day she 9 filed her opposition to defendants’ motion to stay. (Docket Nos. 10 23 at 3; 22 (motion to dismiss).) She observes that, if her 11 motion to dismiss is granted, “the only remaining Defendant . . . 12 will be Trimont Land Company,” which is “not a Defendant in any 13 of the other pending actions.” (Docket No. 23 at 3.) 14 Countenancing this heavily contingent argument would “allow . . . 15 plaintiff to avoid the first-to-file rule by strategically 16 dropping or adding . . . defendant[s],” which is the “precise 17 behavior the first-to-file rule intends to prevent.” Zuru LLC v. 18 Lego Sys., Inc., No. 19-cv-131 DSF AFMx, 2019 WL 6998790, at *1 19 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2019). 20 Accordingly, this factor also counsels in favor of 21 applying the first-to-file rule. 22 c. Similarity of the Issues 23 As with the parties, “the issues in the two actions 24 must be substantially similar, rather than identical” to warrant 25 application of the first-to-file rule. Wallerstein, 967 F. Supp. 26

27 3 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/812011/000081201125000104 28 /exhibit212025-q4.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2026). 1 2d at 1296 (emphasis in original). “To determine whether . . . 2 suits involve substantially similar issues, we look at whether 3 there is ‘substantial overlap’ between” them. Kohn, 787 F.3d at 4 1241. 5 The claims in the instant action, all of which are 6 brought pursuant to California law, are as follows: failure to 7 pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime, failure to provide 8 meal periods, failure to provide rest periods, failure to pay 9 final wages, failure to timely pay wages, failure to maintain 10 accurate payroll records, failure to reimburse business expenses, 11 and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. (See 12 Docket No. 1-2 at 9.) 13 The Gibson, Roberds, and Hamilton Actions include each 14 and every claim brought in the instant action (see Docket No. 20- 15 1 at 14-15), which plaintiff does not dispute (see Docket No. 16 23). Further, as defendants point out, there are four related- 17 case actions -- the Heggen, Gibson, Hamilton, and Roberds Actions 18 -- currently pending before this court, all of which were 19 previously deemed to be “alleging similar California Labor Code 20 Violations against the Vail Corporation and its related 21 entities.” (Docket No. 6 (Order Relating Cases) at 3); cf. 22 Stetson v. W. Publ'g Corp., No. 2:08-cv-00810-RGK E, 2016 WL 23 5867434, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2016), aff'd in part, vacated 24 in part, remanded, 714 F. App'x 681 (9th Cir. 2017) (observing 25 overlap between related case designation and substantial 26 similarity of issues). 27 Plaintiff asserts in purported opposition that the 28 “first-filed rule is not applicable” here, where “parallel 1 litigation is pending in federal and state courts.” (Docket No. 2 23 at 2 (citing Just Film, Inc. v. Merch. Servs., Inc., No. 10- 3 cv-1993 CW, 2012 WL 10555, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2012).) This 4 assertion ignores the fact that, as discussed above, there are no 5 fewer than four instances of parallel federal litigation 6 currently pending before this very court. 7 Accordingly, the first-to-file rule applies, and the 8 court will stay the instant action pending resolution of the 9 earlier-filed, related actions. 10 IV. Conclusion 11 The court observes that this case is one of several it 12 has recently confronted in which litigants have brought multiple 13 actions comprised of substantially the same parties and issues 14 across various forums. This emerging pattern of duplicative 15 litigation is troubling. While every party has the right to 16 zealously litigate their case, the court is skeptical that 17 maintaining multiple, materially identical actions in state and 18 federal court is a fruitful method for doing so. Indeed, “[t]he 19 goal of the Court (and the parties) should be to resolve [each] 20 case on the merits rather than through costly and time-consuming 21 fights over side-issues” such as the propriety of the procedural 22 gymnastics the court has just cartwheeled through. Ltd. v. 23 Boeing Co., No. 23-cv-176 RSM, 2025 WL 2400458, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 24 July 1, 2025); cf. also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (directing courts to 25 apply procedural rules to “secure the just, speedy, and 26 inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”). 27 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to stay 28 (Docket No. 20) be, and the same thereby is, GRANTED. This ene nN I IEE I EIDE EEE IE NE IIE

1 action is hereby STAYED pending resolution of 2 Heggen v. Heavenly Valley, Limited Partnership, 2:21-cv-107 WBS 3 SCR; Gibson v. Vail Corp., No. 2:21-cv-1260 WBS SCR; Hamilton v. 4 Heavenly Valley, Limited Partnership, 2:21-cv-1608 WBS SCR; and 5 Roberds v. Vail Corporation, 2:21-cv-2251 WBS SCR. 6 | Dated: March 20, 2026 bette 2d. □□ 7 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28