Ashley Marriott v. Jonathan Persing

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 11, 2024
• Docket: 23-3620
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0111n.06

Case No. 23-3620

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Mar 11, 2024 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ASHLEY M. MARRIOTT, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF DEPUTY JONATHAN PERSING; ) OHIO SERGEANT JAMES TOUVILLE; ) MAHONING COUNTY, OHIO, ) OPINION Defendants-Appellees. ) )

Before: GRIFFIN, NALBANDIAN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Ashley Marriott sued Deputy Jonathan Persing, Sergeant James

Touville, and Mahoning County, Ohio, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging she was arrested without

probable cause. The district court granted summary judgment to the arresting officers and the

county. Marriott appeals the grant of summary judgment to the arresting officers. For the reasons

below, we affirm.

I.

At all relevant times, Deputy Jonathan Persing and Sergeant James Touville were

employed with the Mahoning County Sheriff’s Department.

The following facts are undisputed, as almost all of them come from Deputy Persing’s and

Sgt. Touville’s bodycam footage. On June 5, 2020, Ashley Marriott and her ex-fiancé, Michael Case No. 23-3620, Marriott v. Persing

Abbott, attended a horse show at the Canfield, Ohio, fairgrounds. Abbott came to watch Marriott

participate in the horse show, even though she told him she did not want him there. When the two

met up after the show at Marriott’s trailer, they got into an argument. Marriott called 911 to report

that Abbott was at the fairgrounds and would not leave her alone.

Deputy Persing arrived on the scene first, and Sgt. Touville quickly followed. Marriott

told the officers that she just wanted them to make sure that Abbott left the fairgrounds. At

Marriott’s direction, the officers approached her trailer to find an intoxicated Abbott seated outside

in a camping chair. While Abbott began to explain to the officers why he was at the fairgrounds,

Deputy Persing noticed a bloody scratch on the left side of Abbott’s neck. Abbott immediately

asserted, “Oh this, this is her. This scratch mark, that’s her,” while pointing to the scratch. He

then said, “The scratch marks that you’re looking at, that’s her. She grabbed me by the face. The

scratch marks, that would be her.” During his recounting of the events, he used his left hand to

demonstrate how Marriott scratched him, and his motion was consistent with his injury. He also

asked the officers to look at the right side of his neck because he thought there would likely be

identical marks there. Marriott denied there had been any violence, to which Abbott retorted, “You

didn’t grab me by the face?”

Deputy Persing used a flashlight to look more closely at Abbott’s scratch. Touville asked,

“So she did that to you?” Abbott responded, “I won’t say that,” to which Touville replied, “You

already said that.” Sgt. Touville told Abbott that he already provided one explanation for the

scratch and warned him that if he contradicted his prior accusation, he would be obstructing justice.

Sgt. Touville again asked what happened, and Abbott responded there “was no domestic” and that

he had done nothing wrong. Marriott then accused Abbott of throwing beer at her trailer and

putting muffins inside, but upon Sgt. Touville privately asking her if Abbott threw anything at her

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or committed any violence against her, Marriott denied that he did so. Sgt. Touville also asked

Marriott about her relationship with Abbott, and she confirmed that they lived together as “man

and wife.”

With evidence that Marriott had scratched Abbott, confirmation that the two were domestic

partners, and no indication that Marriott acted in self-defense, the officers decided they needed to

arrest Marriott. As they placed Marriott in handcuffs, Abbott approached the officers and yelled

that he “never said that” Marriott scratched him. Sgt. Touville asked Abbott if he had lied to him

earlier, and Abbott responded, “I said, ‘No, I wasn’t going to say anything after that.’” Sgt.

Touville explained to Abbott his earlier statements described conduct that constituted domestic

violence, but Abbott simply retorted that he himself could not see the scratch marks on his neck.

Ohio prosecutors dropped Marriott’s domestic-violence charge at Abbott’s request. In

2022, Marriott sued Deputy Persing, Sgt. Touville, and Mahoning County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

claiming the defendants violated her constitutional rights by arresting her without probable cause.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all three defendants, holding that Deputy

Persing and Sgt. Touville had probable cause to arrest Marriott, and that Marriott’s Monell claim

against Mahoning County necessarily failed because there was no underlying constitutional

violation. Marriott timely appealed. On appeal, Marriott does not challenge the grant of summary

judgment to Mahoning County.

II.

We review grants of summary judgment de novo. See Puskas v. Delaware Cnty., 56 F.4th

1088, 1093 (6th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence presented shows

there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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III.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for a person seeking to vindicate the violation of her

constitutional rights. Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1159–60 (6th Cir. 2021). A

plaintiff must prove two things to succeed on a § 1983 claim: (1) “a right secured by the United

States Constitution,” and (2) “the deprivation of that right by a person acting under color of state

law.” Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation

omitted). The district court liberally construed Marriott’s complaint as bringing a § 1983 claim

for arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures by police officers. U.S. Const.

amend. IV. A warrantless arrest by an officer is reasonable if probable cause exists for the arrest.

Graves v. Mahoning Cnty., 821 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2016). An arresting officer has probable

cause “if the facts and circumstances” known to the officer “were sufficient to warrant a prudent

man in believing that the [arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense.” Arnold v.

Wilder, 657 F.3d 353, 363 (6th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d

1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995)). In reviewing whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest,

courts look to “the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer

at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). Generally, “the existence

of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable

determination possible.” Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d 334, 341 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fridley v.

Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 2002)). But when, as here, the facts are undisputed, “the

ultimate question of probable cause . . . is a question of law for the court and not a jury.” Gerics

v. Trevino, 974 F.3d 798, 805 (6th Cir. 2020). And when bodycam footage captures the event in

question, we “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Green v. Throckmorton,

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681 F.3d 853, 859 (6th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

381 (2007)).

In assessing whether there is probable cause to make an arrest, officers must “consider the

totality of the circumstances.” Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir. 2000). And

officers cannot ignore “exculpatory evidence” when making their probable-cause determination.

Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, 969 F.3d 265, 279 (6th Cir. 2020). That said, officers do not

need to “conduct quasi-trials.” Logsdon, 492 F.3d at 342; see Washington v. Napolitano, 29 F.4th

93, 98 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[A]n officer is not required to investigate an individual’s innocent

explanations as to an alleged crime, nor to resolve all credibility issues between witnesses, before

making an arrest based on probable cause.”).

Deputy Persing and Sgt. Touville arrested Marriott for domestic violence. Ohio’s

domestic-violence statute provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause

physical harm to a family or household member.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.25(A). It also

provides that a “[f]amily or household member” includes “a person living as a spouse.” Id.

§ 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i). And a “[p]erson living as a spouse” includes “a person . . . who . . . has

cohabited with the offender within five years prior to the date of the alleged commission of the act

in question.” Id. § 2919.25(F)(2). Ohio law further defines “[p]hysical harm to persons” as “any

injury . . . regardless of its gravity or duration.” Id. § 2901.01(A)(3).

Deputy Persing and Sgt. Touville had probable cause to arrest Marriott. The bodycam

footage shows that once the officers began talking to Abbott, Deputy Persing noticed the bloody

scratch on Abbott’s neck. The scratch falls within the definition of “physical harm” under Ohio’s

domestic-violence statute. See id.; State v. Hamrick, 77 N.E.3d 467, 471 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017);

City of Cleveland Heights v. Brewer, 673 N.E.2d 215, 216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam).

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Abbott immediately told the officers that Marriott caused the scratch. Abbott even demonstrated

how Marriott scratched him, and his motions were consistent with those that would cause the

scratch he sustained. Marriott also told the officers that she and Abbott had recently lived together

as if they were married, meaning Abbott’s “[f]amily or household member” had caused him harm.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i); (F)(2). Marriott further confirmed that she and Abbott

had been arguing, and while Abbott threw beer at her trailer, he never physically threatened her,

eliminating a self-defense justification. This evidence was sufficient “to warrant a prudent man in

believing that [Marriott] had committed” domestic violence. Arnold, 657 F.3d at 363.

Marriott’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. She argues that a jury could find that

the officers turned a blind eye to potentially exculpatory evidence by refusing to listen to Abbott

when he approached them after they placed Marriott under arrest “to insist that no domestic

violence had taken place.” D. 22 at p.4; cf. Kentucky v. Young, 51 F. App’x 543, 546–47 (6th Cir.

2002). But at that point, Deputy Persing and Sgt. Touville already had probable cause to arrest

Marriott, so Abbott’s insistence was of little importance. The officers had sufficient evidence that

Marriott scratched Abbott. The law did not require them to reevaluate the credibility of Abbott’s

earlier statement that Marriott scratched him when he tried to recant it. See Logsdon, 492 F.3d at

342; Washington, 29 F.4th at 98. True, Abbott seemed to believe Marriott’s scratches to his neck

did not constitute domestic violence. But the video evidence shows the officers observing those

scratches on Abbott’s neck, and it shows Marriott confirming that she and Abbott had recently

been domestic partners. So scratching Abbott on the neck was domestic violence under Ohio law,

no matter how miniscule the resultant injury. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.25(A). It does not

matter whether Abbott felt violated or whether he believed Marriott committed a crime. See

Logsdon, 492 F.3d at 341; Green, 681 F.3d at 859.

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Marriott also argues that this case is comparable to Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421 (6th

Cir. 2015). In Wesley, we reversed the district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 case alleging false

arrest when the arrestee pleaded that the officer arrested him based only on a child’s

uncorroborated eyewitness allegation. Id. at 429–30. But this case is not like Wesley. Here, along

with Abbott’s direct accusation, the officers saw a physical injury that was consistent with Abbott’s

allegations in the context of the couple arguing.

This case more closely resembles Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244 (6th Cir.

2003). There, we affirmed summary judgment for the officers when the arrestee was arrested for

domestic violence despite the victim’s “thrice-changing explanations” and an injury from days

prior. Id. at 256–57. Here, Abbott recanted his accusation only once, while offering no alternative

explanation (and only after it became clear the officers intended to arrest Marriott), and his injury

was fresh, giving the officers here even more reason to believe Marriott committed a crime than

the officers had in Thacker.

Marriott further contends that a “reasonable juror could conclude that Deputy Persing and

Sgt. Touville were actively seeking some reason to” arrest her. D. 22 at p.10. But the Supreme

Court has repeatedly held that an officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary,

probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (per

curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)). If

probable cause exists, the officers’ motives would not “invalidate an otherwise lawful arrest.”

Hartman v. Thompson, 931 F.3d 471, 482 (6th Cir. 2019).

IV.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

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