Ashley Hushen, Julie Hushen, Alexandra Weary, and Nicole Weary v. Benjamin Gonzales.

2025 CO 37

• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado
• Decided: June 9, 2025
• Docket: 23SC818
• Status: Published

Opinion

2025 CO 37

Ashley Hushen, Julie Hushen, Alexandra Weary, and Nicole Weary, Petitioners
v.
Benjamin Gonzales. Respondent

No. 23SC818

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc

June 9, 2025

          Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 22CA696

          Attorneys for Petitioners Ashley Hushen and Julie Hushen: Sutton Booker P.C. Katie B. Johnson Joel S. Babcock Denver, Colorado

          Attorneys for Petitioners Alexandra Weary and Nicole Weary: Zansberg Beylkin LLC Steven D. Zansberg Denver, Colorado

          Attorney for Respondent: Carolyn Pelloux Denver, Colorado

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          Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Department of Early Childhood: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Megan A. Embrey, Senior Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado

          Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Russell D. Johnson, Deputy Solicitor General Janna K. Fischer, Assistant Solicitor General Denver, Colorado

          Attorneys for Amici Curiae Rocky Mountain Victim Law Center, Colorado Coalition Against Sexual Assault, Colorado Organization for Victim Assistance, Know Your IX, Spark Justice Law LLC, and C.A. Goldberg, PLLC: Katherine Houston Lakewood, Colorado

          JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

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          OPINION

          HART JUSTICE

         ¶1 Ashley Hushen and Alexandra Weary were among a number of students who came forward to their high school administrators with allegations that one of their classmates, Benjamin Gonzales,^[1] had sexually harassed them. During the school's investigation of those allegations pursuant to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers provided statements. The first phase of the Title IX investigation ended with Benjamin being suspended from school for three days. It also led the Jefferson County District Attorney to charge him as a juvenile for unlawful sexual contact with Ashley, Alexandra, and two others. Benjamin was acquitted of all criminal conduct. Then, the school reopened the Title IX investigation. At the end of that phase of the investigation, the school concluded that Benjamin had not, in fact, engaged in any conduct that violated its school policies. The record shows that all three of the students involved in this case, as well as many others at the school, felt traumatized by both the school's process and the criminal proceeding. By the time all of the proceedings had closed, the students involved had graduated from high school.

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         ¶2 About a year later, Benjamin brought a lawsuit in the district court against Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers, alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on some of the statements they had made during the Title IX investigations. Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers responded by filing a "special motion to dismiss" under Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute, section 13-20-1101, C.R.S. (2024),^[2] arguing that the statements they made in the school's investigations were absolutely privileged from use in a tort action because they were made during a quasi-judicial proceeding.

         ¶3 It is this sad background that brings us to this point.

         ¶4 Both the trial court and a division of the court of appeals concluded that the Title IX proceedings were not quasi-judicial. Both courts acknowledged that the proceedings addressed the interests of specific individuals by applying previously established law or policy to present or past facts. See Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Vill, 757 P.2d 622, 627-28 (Colo. 1988). But they determined

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that the proceedings were nonetheless not quasi-judicial because they suffered from significant procedural shortcomings. One consequence of these rulings is that the accused can move forward with a civil tort suit against his accusers because they complained about perceived sexual harassment as part of a Title IX investigation designed and conducted by their high school. Another related consequence may be that other students will be deterred from coming forward in the face of sexual harassment at school.

         ¶5 Recognizing the significance of these consequences, we clarify here that whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial is a separate inquiry from whether that proceeding offers sufficient due process. The first question is important for determining whether participants in the proceeding are entitled to assert privilege, protecting them from tort liability for the statements they make during that proceeding-the issue in this dispute. The second question-the adequacy of the process provided-is an essential one. It is, in fact, a constitutional question. The right to due process is fundamental, and participants in a public proceeding that determines their rights or obligations are entitled to challenge that proceeding for its lack of due process. But that is a separate question from whether the proceeding itself is, under Colorado law, a quasi-judicial proceeding.

         ¶6 Determining whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial is a relatively easy threshold issue. However, the issue of whether that proceeding met the

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requirements of due process-either as it was designed to be run or as it actually was run-is a difficult question that often forms the entire basis of a lawsuit. Combining those two questions unnecessarily complicates a court's quasi-judicial analysis and could result in disparate outcomes in similar proceedings-e.g., a Title IX investigation, an attorney discipline matter, or an employee disciplinary process-from one case to another.

         ¶7 We therefore take this opportunity to clarify that a proceeding is quasi- judicial if it involves (1) a determination of the interests, rights, or duties of specific individuals and (2) the application of current law or policy to past or present facts. We explained in Cherry Hills that, "[t]he existence of a statute . . . mandating [some basic due process] . . . is a clear signal that the governmental decision is to be regarded as quasi-judicial," 757 P.2d at 627, but we have never said that due process protections are required to identify a proceeding as quasi-judicial. Instead, whether a proceeding meets the requirements of due process is a question to be answered on its own. With these principles in mind, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

         I. Facts and Procedural History

         ¶8 Ashley, Alexandra, and Benjamin all attended Evergreen High School ("EHS"), a public high school in the Jefferson County School District (the

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"District"). The three students began their junior year in the fall of 2018. In September 2018, Ashley and Alexandra reported allegations of verbal and physical harassment by Benjamin to school administrators. Two other EHS students also reported allegations of verbal and physical harassment at that time. The District opened a Title IX investigation. Benjamin was suspended for three school days at the end of the month, prior to the conclusion of the investigation. The reasons for that timing are not apparent in the record.

         ¶9 Pursuant to its obligations under Title IX, the District had established specific grievance procedures to address formal complaints of sexual harassment, such as those filed by Ashley, Alexandra, and other students at EHS.^[3] This is the process that is supposed to be followed when a complaint is filed. ¶10 Under the District's published procedures, the filing of a formal complaint initiates the investigation phase of the grievance process. Jeffco Public Schools,

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Title IX Policies and Procedures: Sex-Based Discrimination and Sexual Harassment, https://www.jeffcopublicschools.org/services/legal/title-ix [https://perma.cc/ 9TNQHV7Z]. First, the Title IX coordinator provides written notice of the allegations and the grievance process to all parties. Id. Although "[t]he specific steps of the investigation will vary based on the nature of the allegations and other factors," the District always carries the burden of gathering evidence to determine whether the reported conduct occurred. Id. After gathering that evidence, the District's Title IX investigator creates an investigative report summarizing what it found. Id.

         ¶11 Before the investigator's report is finalized, the parties have an equal opportunity to inspect and review any evidence the District obtains and to submit a written response. Id. After the report is finalized, the investigator sends it to both parties who, again, can provide written responses before the investigator submits the final report to the decision-making panel. Id.

         ¶12 The District's decision-making panel then considers the investigative report and any written responses. Id. It also gives each party the opportunity to submit written questions for any other party or witness, respond to those questions, and submit limited follow-up questions. Id. The decision-making panel issues its determination in writing, including its findings of fact, rationale, and imposition

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of any disciplinary sanctions. Id. Any party can appeal the decision-making panel's determination, triggering the District's process for reviewing appeals. Id.

         ¶13 The record suggests that this District process was not followed during the first phase of the Title IX investigation into student complaints about Benjamin's conduct. Alexandra submitted a written description of an alleged offense to EHS on September 18. Benjamin submitted a written response on September 19. That same day, two other students submitted written descriptions of alleged offenses to EHS. On September 26, Benjamin submitted a written response to the accusations, alleging that "the offense did not happen." Alexandra submitted another written statement alleging that Benjamin had inappropriately touched Ashley and one other student. Ashley submitted her own written statement as well. The record indicates that Benjamin and another student, who he said was present during the alleged incidents, were questioned in person by a school official regarding the accusations in the written submissions. In late October, the District found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Benjamin had violated one or more of its policies. Benjamin and his parents submitted a written request for the District's superintendent to review that determination, but the District did not grant this request. By November 2018, Benjamin had enrolled at Columbine High School.

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         ¶14 Following the District's investigation, the Jefferson County District attorney's Office pursued juvenile delinquency charges against Benjamin for three counts of unlawful sexual contact. His trial occurred in December 2019, and he was acquitted of all charges. The trial court ordered that Benjamin's criminal records be expunged pursuant to section 19-1-306(5)(a), C.R.S. (2024). The order included the expungement of "[r]eferences to the criminal case or charge contained in the school records." People v. Gonzales, No. 18JD726 (Dist. Ct., Jefferson Cnty., Dec. 20, 2019) (quoting § 19-1-306(10)(h)). In January 2020, Benjamin, citing the trial court's expungement order, sought to have the outcome of the District's Title IX investigation also removed from his school records.

15 About a month later, rumors began circulating that Benjamin might be permitted to return to EHS to complete his senior year. Worried that Benjamin would be returning to the school when they had believed he would never do so, some parents, including Ashley's and Alexandra's, emailed school officials voicing their concerns. In March 2020, the District rescinded its October 2018 Title IX finding and reopened the investigation. During the reopened investigation, the District considered supplemental reports and responses from the complainant students, supplemental witness interviews, trial transcripts, and forensic interview transcripts. On July 8, 2020, the District concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that Benjamin had violated its sexual harassment/assault

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policies. Again, the record does not demonstrate that the school followed its own Title IX policies in this second phase of the investigation. In any event, Benjamin and his classmates had graduated from high school at this point. Benjamin did not return to EHS.

         ¶16 Approximately one year later, Benjamin sued Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers, alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on statements they had made during the District's Title IX investigation. He sought compensatory damages; damages for past, present, and future pain and suffering; psychological pain and suffering; loss of reputation; loss of quality of life; statutory interest; expert fees; and attorney fees and costs. Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers moved to dismiss the tort suit under section 13-20-1101, Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute. They asserted that the statements they made during the Title IX investigation were protected activity under that law and, as relevant here, that their statements were absolutely privileged as statements made in a quasi-judicial proceeding and could not be used to subject them to tort liability.^[4]

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         ¶17 The trial court addressed each of the communications that formed the basis of the lawsuit to determine whether any of them were subject to absolute privilege and thus protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court reasoned that the application of absolute privilege is determined through an objective analysis of the procedural safeguards applied in a proceeding. Because the court found that the District's Title IX investigation was not adversarial in nature and had procedural shortcomings-especially as applied-it concluded that the investigation was not quasi-judicial and, therefore, the communications were not absolutely privileged. Accordingly, the court denied the motion in part and ruled that Benjamin's claims could proceed.^[5]

         ¶18 A division of the court of appeals affirmed this conclusion, ruling that the District's Title IX investigation could not justify affording absolute privilege to Alexandra's, Ashley's, or their mothers' statements. Gonzales v. Hushen, 2023 COA 87, ¶ 44, 540 P.3d 1268, 1282. It first considered what kind of proceeding could be deemed "quasi-judicial" for answering this question. Id. at ¶¶ 27-51, 540 P.3d at 1279-1283. The division concluded that Colorado's basic definition of a quasi-judicial proceeding-one that "involves a determination of the rights, duties, or

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obligations of specific individuals on the basis of the application of presently existing legal standards or policy considerations to past or present facts," Cherry Hills, 757 P.2d at 625-was insufficient in this context. Gonzales, ¶ 59, 540 P.3d at 1285. Instead, the division reasoned that an inquiry into whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial, for purposes of determining if statements made during that proceeding are entitled to absolute privilege, must consider whether the proceeding contains sufficient procedural safeguards, including procedures through which a party can test the veracity of the other party's statements. Id. at ¶ 60, 540 P.3d at 1285. The division concluded by setting a high bar for the safeguards that would render such proceedings quasi-judicial. See id. at ¶¶ 52-64, 540 P.3d at 1284-1286 (suggesting a requirement of a hearing, a right to call witnesses and cross-examine witnesses, a requirement of live interviews of witnesses, a requirement that statements be provided under oath, and a right to robust participation by counsel).

         ¶19 Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers petitioned this court for certiorari review, and we granted the petition.^[6]

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         II. Analysis

         ¶20 We review de novo whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial for purposes of applying absolute privilege to statements made in the proceeding or offering absolute immunity to individuals involved in the proceeding. Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 2012 CO 54, ¶ 42, 285 P.3d 986, 1000.^[7]

         ¶21 A quasi-judicial proceeding is subject to judicial review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). The hallmarks of quasi-judicial proceedings are uncomplicated and well defined in Colorado. In Cherry Hills, we considered the essential characteristics of such a proceeding, 757 P.2d at 625-28, and we have consistently applied those characteristics in subsequent cases. As we said almost forty years ago:

The central focus, in our view, should be on the nature of the governmental decision and the process by which that decision is reached. If, for example, the governmental decision is likely to adversely affect the protected interests of specific individuals, and if a decision is to be reached through the application of preexisting legal standards or policy considerations to present or past facts presented to the governmental body, then one can say with reasonable certainty

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that the governmental body is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity in making its determination. Id. at 627.

         ¶22 We observed in Cherry Hills that a statute or ordinance mandating specific procedural safeguards is a "clear signal that the governmental decision is to be regarded as quasi-judicial." Id. At the same time, we emphasized that those kinds of legal indicia are not required to make a process quasi-judicial. Id. And we stressed that, regardless of whether such legal indicia exist, "it is incumbent upon the governmental body to provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard to those persons whose protected interests are likely to be affected by the governmental decision." Id. at 627-28. Beyond those statements about procedural safeguards, we said nothing.

         ¶23 We have made this same basic point repeatedly. In Widder v. Durango School District No. 9-R, 85 P.3d 518, 527 (Colo. 2004), for example, we rejected the argument that a proceeding could not be quasi-judicial unless notice and a hearing were legally mandated. We explained that notice and a hearing requirement would be "'a clear signal that the governmental decision is to be regarded as quasi-judicial'" but that these factors are not the "sine qua non of quasi-judicial action." Id. at 527 (quoting Cherry Hills, 757 P.2d at 627). Instead, we emphasized again what we had said in Cherry Hills: What makes an action quasi-judicial is the impact

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on the protected rights of specific individuals and a decision reached through preexisting legal standards applied to present or past facts. Id.

         ¶24 We acknowledge that in Widder, as in a number of our other cases, we have referred to "the process by which [a] decision is reached" as important to the inquiry. Id. (emphasis added). In this context, however, the word "process" refers to the "application of preexisting legal standards ... to present or past facts" and not to any specific procedural requirements. Id. (quoting Cherry Hills, 757 P.2d at 627). A number of our other cases have been read to suggest procedural requirements that go well beyond Cherry Hills. Today we clarify that the language in those opinions has been misunderstood. There are no independent procedural requirements that make a process quasi-judicial. Cherry Hills, 757 P.2d at 627-28. ¶25 Of course, many agencies do impose their own procedural requirements, and much of the confusion in developing caselaw has come from that fact. Take Hofflerv. Colorado Department of Corrections, 27P.3d 371 (Colo. 2001), the case the division cited to support its holding that significantly more procedural safeguards are required to conclude that a proceeding is quasi-judicial for purposes of absolute immunity. Gonzales, ¶¶ 41, 45-50, 540 P.3d at 1282-83.^[8] Hoffler worked

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for the Department of Corrections, and that department's disciplinary process specifically required an adversarial hearing at which the employee is entitled to representation and to conduct cross-examination, among other things. Hoffler, 27 P.3d at 373-74. We determined that the proceeding was quasi-judicial and that Hoffler's statements were entitled to privilege against civil tort liability. Id. at 375. ¶26 The division relied heavily on Hoffler, reasoning that our determination that the proceeding was quasi-judicial focused on the specific procedural safeguards, which it deemed "critical" to our conclusion in that case. Gonzales, ¶ 46, 540 P.3d at 1283. All that we were doing in Hoffler, however, was describing the extensive procedural safeguards that the agency itself had chosen to put in place. While those safeguards were certainly evidence of the quasi-judicial nature of the proceeding, they were not prerequisites, and we did not suggest that they were.

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         ¶27 Today we clarify Hoffler in the same manner that our decision in Cherry Hills clarified our earlier opinion in Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1975). In Snyder, we had suggested that a proceeding could only be quasi-judicial if there was a state or local law requiring a particular governmental body to make a decision subject to particular procedural standards. 542 P.2d at 374. We rejected that notion in Cherry Hills, emphasizing the importance of focusing on the same points we have focused on here: that a proceeding addresses the interests of specific individuals and that a decision is reached through the application of preexisting laws or policy considerations to present or past facts. 757 P.2d at 626-27.

         ¶28 The division's conclusion that a proceeding "must contain sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure reliability and fundamental fairness," Gonzales, ¶ 50, 540 P.3d at 1283, does not belong in the quasi-judicial inquiry. Whether a proceeding (either as written or as conducted in practice) contained sufficient procedural safeguards is instead a question of due process. Due process questions can, of course, always be raised.^[9]

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         ¶29 We cannot agree with the division's reading of our prior cases to support the notion that a proceeding must share more features of the judicial process for absolute privilege to apply than are required for the proceeding to be reviewable under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). We recognize that the division's justification in creating a new rule for determining when a proceeding is quasi-judicial for absolute privilege is rooted in a reasonable concern that, while people must be encouraged to participate candidly in a quasi-judicial proceeding, they must also be accountable for "malicious falsehoods." Gonzales, ¶ 44, 540 P.3d at 1282 (quoting Khan v. Yale Univ., 295 A.3d 855, 863 (Conn. 2023)). More procedural safeguards, the division reasoned, would balance reliability and fundamental fairness. Id. at ¶ 50, 540 P.3d at 1283. But by accounting for this concern in answering the threshold question of whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial, the division improperly blended the due process question with the definitional assessment of whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial.

         ¶30 Our holding today clarifies that these extremely important due process concerns are independent of the assessment of whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial. Just as a judicial proceeding itself can be found inadequate due to a lack of due process, so can a quasi-judicial proceeding. In neither case do we say the proceeding loses its character as judicial or quasi-judicial. Instead, it is fatally flawed for lack of due process.

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         ¶31 And of course, the scope of absolute privilege does not shield an inadequate proceeding from judicial review for a violation of the accused's right to due process and cannot protect the accuser from policies to which they are accountable, with school discipline being just one example.

         ¶32 We confronted a similar example in Stepanek v. Delta County, 940 P.2d 364, 370 (Colo. 1997), in which we concluded that, although the proceeding was quasi-judicial in nature and the attorney was absolutely immune from suit in tort, that immunity did not relieve the attorney from the rules governing the profession. Accordingly, sanctions could be levied against him. Id. Similarly, in Hoffler, although we concluded that the employee's statements were absolutely privileged, the employee was not protected from a personnel disciplinary proceeding brought by her employer. 27 P.3d at 376.

         ¶33 Importantly, these remedies focus on the process itself and not the victim's participation in it. A lawyer is always subject to the rules governing the legal profession, an employee to basic codes of conduct, and of course, a student to school policy. A student who violates that policy by making dishonest statements in a Title IX investigation would be subject to whatever school disciplinary process applied. All of these remedies are very different from the threat of personal civil tort liability for participating in a quasi-judicial proceeding. While we are sympathetic to the division's concern about the possibility of untruthful

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statements being made in quasi-judicial proceedings, the correct remedy for that possibility lies within the particular system-not in a split definition of quasi-judicial. Not only do we see no need to rewrite our definition of quasi-judicial into two separate inquiries, but we also worry that any effort to do so would lead to a cumbersome, heavily litigated threshold question that would ultimately deter participation in processes-like Title IX, employee discipline, and attorney regulation-that are designed to protect victims of misconduct.

         III. Application

         ¶34 We now apply the quasi-judicial inquiry to the District's formal Title IX proceeding. The proper questions include whether (1) the District's Title IX proceeding addressed the interests of specific individuals and (2) the District applied preexisting laws or policy considerations to present or past facts in reaching its decision.

         ¶35 After Ashley, Alexandra, and the other two students reported the allegations of harassment by Benjamin, the District opened a Title IX investigation. The District notified Benjamin and his parents that an investigation had been opened based on students' complaints about Benjamin's conduct and, later, that he had been found in violation of the school's existing policies.

         ¶36 Because this proceeding involved consideration of the rights and obligations of a specific individual through the application of preexisting policies to present

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and past facts, the proceeding was quasi-judicial. That is the end of our quasi-judicial inquiry. Therefore, any statements made during the District's Title IX proceeding are protected by absolute privilege and cannot be used as the basis for a civil lawsuit against the participant who made those statements. The possibility that the proceeding did not comply with the District's published grievance process has no bearing on whether the proceeding was quasi-judicial. Nor does the fact that it looked very little like a judicial process held in a court system. Instead, these matters raise due process concerns about the Title IX proceeding. These are extremely important questions, but, again, they are different from those at issue in this case.

         IV. Conclusion

         ¶37 Absolute privilege allows individuals to participate in fact-finding processes-like Title IX investigations, attorney regulation proceedings, or employee discipline proceedings-without fear that their participation will serve as the basis for lawsuits against them. See Stepanek, 940 P.2d at 368 ("The purpose behind a grant of absolute immunity is to preserve the independent decision-making and truthfulness of critical judicial participants without subjecting them to the fear and apprehension that may result from a threat of personal liability." (emphases added)). The underlying defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims subject Ashley and Alexandra to the threat of civil tort liability in a

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way that could discourage victimized students from reporting harassment out of fear that they, too, would be subject to personal tort liability. The possibility that a student who reported harassment or even an assault might then face civil tort litigation-and possibly liability-for statements made during the reporting procedure is very likely to deter use of that reporting system.

         ¶38 Because we hold that there is only one type of quasi-judicial inquiry, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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Notes:

^[1] For the remainder of this opinion, we refer to all students by their first names only. The Petitioners filed a motion asking that the students be referred to only by their initials, given that the events that initiated this dispute occurred when all of the students were minors. We have denied that motion because the students' full names were used in the court of appeals' opinion and in briefing before this court.

^[2] "SLAPP" is an acronym for strategic lawsuits against public participation. Section 13-20-1101(1)(a) begins by setting forth the legislature's intent: "The general assembly finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process." It goes on to explain that the purpose of the statute "is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, to protect the rights of persons to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury." § 13-20-1101(1)(b).

^[3] The evidence in the record includes a link to the District's website detailing its Title IX procedures, which indicates the page was copyrighted in 2022. The division's opinion explained that, during oral argument, defendants' counsel asserted that the procedures outlined in that link were the same in 2018. We thus review the District's procedure from the website as the procedure in place in 2018. However, we acknowledge that the parties are not in agreement about which procedures were formally in place at that time. In any event, since the status of a proceeding as quasi-judicial does not turn on the particulars of the processes being used beyond the application of existing law or policy to the rights or obligations of particular individuals in light of present or past facts, our analysis would not change.

^[4] Section 13-20-1101(2)(a)(I) includes among protected proceedings "[a]ny written or oral statement or writing made [in] ... any other official proceeding authorized by law."

^[5] The court granted the motion with respect to some of the communications at issue because it concluded that they were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute due to qualified immunity.

^[6] We granted certiorari to review the following issue:

1. Whether the doctrine of absolute privilege applies to statements made in connection with a public school district's formal Title IX investigation.

^[7] The parties here, and much prior caselaw, use "absolute privilege" and "absolute immunity" interchangeably. They are not the same thing. The distinction is that absolute privilege protects statements made by participants in a quasi-judicial proceeding-decisionmakers, witnesses, and the like- from use in a subsequent tort suit. Absolute immunity completely protects those participants from suit based not only on their statements, but also on a broad spectrum of conduct. Churchill, ¶ 39, 285 P.3d at 999. This case focuses on whether the statements made by Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers are privileged from use in a tort suit against them.

^[8] The division also relied on Churchill. Gonzales, ¶ 45, 540 P.3d at 1282. But Churchill is an application of federal immunity law in an importantly distinguishable context, not an application of Cherry Hills. In Churchill, we determined that the members of the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado were absolutely immune from liability for their decision to terminate a former professor because their decision to terminate was a quasi-judicial action. 285 P.3d at 991. In support of that finding, we relied exclusively on federal common law regarding absolute immunity because the underlying claim was a federal action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not a state civil claim. Churchill, ¶ 28, 285 P.3d at 996 n.7 ("[W]e resolve the federal question of absolute immunity based only on federal law."). We declined to apply the quasi-judicial inquiry articulated in our C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) caselaw not because, as the division reasoned, quasi-judicial in 106(a)(4) cases is defined more broadly than it is for absolute privilege, but because it is defined more broadly than quasi-judicial in federal absolute immunity caselaw.

^[9] Benjamin did, in fact, file a federal lawsuit against the District asserting a violation of Title IX and of his right to due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in relation to both the initial and the reopened Title IX investigations.