25CA0984 Inman v CDOC 06-25-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0984 Logan County District Court No. 25CV4 Honorable Dina M. Christiansen, Judge
Paul Inman,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Executive Director of Colorado Department of Corrections and Warden of Sterling Correctional Facility,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 25, 2026
Paul Inman, Pro Se
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rebekah Ryan, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Plaintiff, Paul Inman, appeals the district court’s judgment
dismissing his C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) complaint against defendants, the
Department of Corrections (DOC) and its Executive Director, for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After being convicted of numerous offenses in several cases,
Inman was sentenced in April 1996 to the custody of the DOC for a
term of seventy-three years. Between 1996 and 2022, the DOC
awarded Inman earned time credits and calculated a parole
eligibility date of December 2024. In November 2024, the parole
board granted Inman discretionary release, to become effective
January 30, 2025. Consistent with the DOC’s procedure, the
discretionary release decision triggered a standard audit of Inman’s
sentence computation.
¶3 The audit revealed that the DOC had been awarding Inman
earned time credit without having the statutory authority to do so.
Specifically, the DOC applied the wrong subsection of the parole
eligibility statute, section 17-22.5-403, C.R.S. 2025, to Inman’s
sentence. The DOC had been using section 17-22.5-403(2) to
calculate Inman’s parole eligibility date after discounting his earned
1 time credit, when it should have used section 17-22.5-403(3) to
calculate Inman’s parole eligibility date. Under subsection (3), an
inmate who has been convicted of two crimes of violence isn’t parole
eligible until they have served at least seventy-five percent of their
sentence, and subsection (2), which allows for the reduction of
earned time credit from time served, states that its provisions “shall
not apply to any such offender.” Because he had two prior
convictions for crimes of violence, the DOC was statutorily
prohibited from applying Inman’s earned time credit to reduce his
sentence.
¶4 Applying the proper subsection of the statute, Inman’s
mandatory release date is April 18, 2068, and his parole eligibility
date is February 1, 2032. The DOC notified Inman of the error, and
the parole board rescinded its order granting discretionary release.
¶5 Representing himself, Inman filed a complaint under C.R.C.P.
106(a)(4), seeking judicial review of the DOC’s decision to rescind
“the vested award of approx[imately] 3,365 days of earned time
[credit]” from his time computation after the parole board had
already granted him parole. The DOC moved to dismiss, arguing
that any award or revocation of earned time was a purely
2 administrative process within the DOC’s discretion that didn’t entail
a hearing and wasn’t a quasi-judicial action. Because judicial
review of DOC actions under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) is available only for
judicial or quasi-judicial actions, the DOC claimed that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Inman’s claims. The
district court agreed and granted the DOC’s motion to dismiss,
concluding that the award or revocation of earned time was an
administrative process within the DOC’s discretion and not a quasi-
judicial action subject to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4).
II. Analysis
¶6 Inman is self-represented and raises three arguments on
appeal: (1) the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed
his C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) petition; (2) the DOC abused its discretion
when it withdrew his vested and previously awarded earned time
credit in contravention of the parole board’s decision to grant
parole; and (3) the DOC violated his due process rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by withdrawing his vested
earned time and denying his parole without providing notice or
holding a hearing.
3 ¶7 Although Inman contends that the DOC abused its discretion
when it withdrew the previously awarded earned time credit and
violated his constitutional rights by doing so without providing him
with due process, the only matter properly before us is whether the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction to review his C.R.C.P.
106(a)(4) complaint.
¶8 We are mindful of the challenges inherent in self-
representation and acknowledge Inman’s frustration. But our
review is limited to whether the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Inman’s complaint, and the merits of
Inman’s second and third issues fall outside that narrow scope. We
therefore cannot address them. See Gandy v. Williams, 2019 COA
118, ¶ 8 (recognizing that appellate courts liberally construe the
filings of self-represented litigants while applying the same law and
procedural rules applicable to parties represented by counsel).
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶9 Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority to
decide a particular matter, and a judgment rendered without
subject matter jurisdiction is void. In re Support of E.K., 2013 COA
99, ¶ 8. “If a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it is
4 deprived of any authority to act from the outset of the case.” People
in Interest of C.N., 2018 COA 165, ¶ 15.
¶ 10 “When the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is challenged,
the plaintiff has the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists, and
the trial court may consider evidence outside of the complaint when
necessary to resolve the issue.” City of Boulder v. Pub. Serv. Co. of
Colo., 996 P.2d 198, 203 (Colo. App. 1999).
¶ 11 When a complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, we apply a mixed standard of review. Id. While the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we
consider de novo, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless
they are unsupported by the record and thus clearly erroneous. Id.
¶ 12 Rule 106(a)(4) “provides for review of quasi-judicial decisions
made by a governmental body or officer in a civil matter where the
law otherwise provides no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.”
Brown v. Walker Com., Inc., 2022 CO 57, ¶ 1. “Judicial review
under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) is limited to judicial and quasi-judicial
agency action.” Rivera-Bottzeck v. Ortiz, 134 P.3d 517, 522 (Colo.
App. 2006). Administrative actions are not subject to review under
C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). Id. at 521-22. Rule 106(a)(4) is the exclusive
5 remedy for reviewing quasi-judicial decisions. JJR 1, LLC v. Mt.
Crested Butte, 160 P.3d 365, 369 (Colo. App. 2007).
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25CA0984 Inman v CDOC 06-25-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0984 Logan County District Court No. 25CV4 Honorable Dina M. Christiansen, Judge
Paul Inman,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Executive Director of Colorado Department of Corrections and Warden of Sterling Correctional Facility,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 25, 2026
Paul Inman, Pro Se
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rebekah Ryan, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Plaintiff, Paul Inman, appeals the district court’s judgment
dismissing his C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) complaint against defendants, the
Department of Corrections (DOC) and its Executive Director, for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After being convicted of numerous offenses in several cases,
Inman was sentenced in April 1996 to the custody of the DOC for a
term of seventy-three years. Between 1996 and 2022, the DOC
awarded Inman earned time credits and calculated a parole
eligibility date of December 2024. In November 2024, the parole
board granted Inman discretionary release, to become effective
January 30, 2025. Consistent with the DOC’s procedure, the
discretionary release decision triggered a standard audit of Inman’s
sentence computation.
¶3 The audit revealed that the DOC had been awarding Inman
earned time credit without having the statutory authority to do so.
Specifically, the DOC applied the wrong subsection of the parole
eligibility statute, section 17-22.5-403, C.R.S. 2025, to Inman’s
sentence. The DOC had been using section 17-22.5-403(2) to
calculate Inman’s parole eligibility date after discounting his earned
1 time credit, when it should have used section 17-22.5-403(3) to
calculate Inman’s parole eligibility date. Under subsection (3), an
inmate who has been convicted of two crimes of violence isn’t parole
eligible until they have served at least seventy-five percent of their
sentence, and subsection (2), which allows for the reduction of
earned time credit from time served, states that its provisions “shall
not apply to any such offender.” Because he had two prior
convictions for crimes of violence, the DOC was statutorily
prohibited from applying Inman’s earned time credit to reduce his
sentence.
¶4 Applying the proper subsection of the statute, Inman’s
mandatory release date is April 18, 2068, and his parole eligibility
date is February 1, 2032. The DOC notified Inman of the error, and
the parole board rescinded its order granting discretionary release.
¶5 Representing himself, Inman filed a complaint under C.R.C.P.
106(a)(4), seeking judicial review of the DOC’s decision to rescind
“the vested award of approx[imately] 3,365 days of earned time
[credit]” from his time computation after the parole board had
already granted him parole. The DOC moved to dismiss, arguing
that any award or revocation of earned time was a purely
2 administrative process within the DOC’s discretion that didn’t entail
a hearing and wasn’t a quasi-judicial action. Because judicial
review of DOC actions under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) is available only for
judicial or quasi-judicial actions, the DOC claimed that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Inman’s claims. The
district court agreed and granted the DOC’s motion to dismiss,
concluding that the award or revocation of earned time was an
administrative process within the DOC’s discretion and not a quasi-
judicial action subject to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4).
II. Analysis
¶6 Inman is self-represented and raises three arguments on
appeal: (1) the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed
his C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) petition; (2) the DOC abused its discretion
when it withdrew his vested and previously awarded earned time
credit in contravention of the parole board’s decision to grant
parole; and (3) the DOC violated his due process rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by withdrawing his vested
earned time and denying his parole without providing notice or
holding a hearing.
3 ¶7 Although Inman contends that the DOC abused its discretion
when it withdrew the previously awarded earned time credit and
violated his constitutional rights by doing so without providing him
with due process, the only matter properly before us is whether the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction to review his C.R.C.P.
106(a)(4) complaint.
¶8 We are mindful of the challenges inherent in self-
representation and acknowledge Inman’s frustration. But our
review is limited to whether the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Inman’s complaint, and the merits of
Inman’s second and third issues fall outside that narrow scope. We
therefore cannot address them. See Gandy v. Williams, 2019 COA
118, ¶ 8 (recognizing that appellate courts liberally construe the
filings of self-represented litigants while applying the same law and
procedural rules applicable to parties represented by counsel).
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶9 Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority to
decide a particular matter, and a judgment rendered without
subject matter jurisdiction is void. In re Support of E.K., 2013 COA
99, ¶ 8. “If a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it is
4 deprived of any authority to act from the outset of the case.” People
in Interest of C.N., 2018 COA 165, ¶ 15.
¶ 10 “When the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is challenged,
the plaintiff has the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists, and
the trial court may consider evidence outside of the complaint when
necessary to resolve the issue.” City of Boulder v. Pub. Serv. Co. of
Colo., 996 P.2d 198, 203 (Colo. App. 1999).
¶ 11 When a complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, we apply a mixed standard of review. Id. While the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we
consider de novo, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless
they are unsupported by the record and thus clearly erroneous. Id.
¶ 12 Rule 106(a)(4) “provides for review of quasi-judicial decisions
made by a governmental body or officer in a civil matter where the
law otherwise provides no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.”
Brown v. Walker Com., Inc., 2022 CO 57, ¶ 1. “Judicial review
under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) is limited to judicial and quasi-judicial
agency action.” Rivera-Bottzeck v. Ortiz, 134 P.3d 517, 522 (Colo.
App. 2006). Administrative actions are not subject to review under
C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). Id. at 521-22. Rule 106(a)(4) is the exclusive
5 remedy for reviewing quasi-judicial decisions. JJR 1, LLC v. Mt.
Crested Butte, 160 P.3d 365, 369 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 13 “[A] proceeding is quasi-judicial if it involves (1) a
determination of the interests, rights, or duties of specific
individuals and (2) the application of current law or policy to past or
present facts.” Hushen v. Gonzales, 2025 CO 37, ¶ 7. The
existence of a statute mandating some basic due process is a clear
signal that the governmental decision is quasi-judicial. Id. (citing
Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 757 P.2d
622, 627 (Colo. 1988)). We review a trial court’s determination of
whether a plaintiff was seeking review of a quasi-judicial function of
a governmental body de novo. Jones v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 53 P.3d
1187, 1191 (Colo. App. 2002).
B. Discussion
¶ 14 Inman seeks review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) of the DOC’s
decision to withdraw his earned time credits. But, as indicated
above, Inman is entitled to such review only if the DOC’s action was
quasi-judicial. Because the DOC’s decision was administrative, we
6 conclude that it wasn’t quasi-judicial and isn’t subject to review
under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4).1
¶ 15 The DOC’s decision to withdraw Inman’s earned time credits
didn’t have the hallmarks of a quasi-judicial action. Namely, it
didn’t involve a determination of Inman’s rights based on the
application of existing legal standards to facts that needed to be
developed at a hearing. See Verrier v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 77 P.3d
875, 879 (Colo. App. 2003) (concluding that because the DOC’s
establishment of policies concerning earned time deductions didn’t
determine the plaintiff’s rights, duties, or obligations, its actions
were not quasi-judicial in nature); Hushen, ¶ 23 (“What makes an
action quasi-judicial is the impact on the protected rights of specific
individuals and a decision reached through preexisting legal
standards applied to present or past facts.”). Rather, the DOC,
acting in an administrative capacity, withdrew the credits, which,
by statute, Inman was ineligible to receive.2
1 We express no opinion as to the propriety of a mandamus action
filed under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2). 2 We express no opinion on whether the DOC was authorized under
the statutory scheme to administratively withdraw the earned time credits that it had already granted to Inman.
7 ¶ 16 In short, the DOC’s withdrawal of Inman’s earned time credits
wasn’t a quasi-judicial action. It was an administrative decision
and therefore isn’t subject to review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4).
Because review under C.R.C.P 106(a)(4) is limited to judicial and
quasi-judicial actions, the district court properly dismissed Inman’s
complaint for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
III. Disposition
¶ 17 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.