Ashanti Cheree-Combsez v. Englewood Health & Rehabilitation, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. Ohio
• Decided: April 20, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00282
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

ASHANTI CHEREE-COMBSEZ,

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:25-cv-282

vs.

ENGLEWOOD HEALTH District Judge Michael J. Newman & REHABILITATION, et al., Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 6) ______________________________________________________________________________

This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff Ashanti Cheree-Combsez brings this case pro se against her former employer, Defendant Englewood Health & Rehabilitation, and its Director of Human Resources, Defendant Colleen Gardner. Doc. No. 1. Her complaint asserts racial discrimination in violation Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.;1 disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; and multiple state-law claims. Id. at PageID 4-7. This case is before the Court on Defendants’ joint Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 6. In response to the motion, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition (Doc. No. 8) and Defendants replied (Doc. No. 12). Thus, the motion is ripe for review.

1 Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. See Doc. No. 1 at PageID 2. The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim in her favor as a Title VII racial discrimination claim. See id. at PageID 4-5; see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). I. At the motion to dismiss stage, “all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). The Court “construe[s] the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, accept[s] its allegations as true, and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Royal Truck & Trailer Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Kraft, 974 F.3d 756, 758 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2008)). However, the Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Winget, 510 F.3d at 582–83 (citation omitted) (quotation omitted). A complaint will not suffice if it offers only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Instead, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Additionally, the Court accepts a pro se plaintiff’s allegations as true and “construe[s] filings by pro se litigants liberally.” Owens v. Keeling, 461 F.3d 763, 776 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005)). However, while pro se pleadings are “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, pro se petitioners must still satisfy basic pleading requirements. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Rule 12(b)(6), like all other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. II. Having carefully and thoroughly considered the pleadings and briefing in support of, and in opposition to, Defendants’ motion, along with the procedural posture of this case, the efficient and appropriate way forward is to permit discovery to occur and consider the parties’ arguments on summary judgment, not earlier at the motion-to-dismiss phase of litigation. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 514 (6th Cir. 2021). Proceeding in this manner will ensure that the Court reviews these arguments only after appropriate discovery has been completed and will guarantee that the Court’s consideration of the parties’ arguments is not premature. Id.; cf. Humphreys v. Bank of Am., 557 F. App’x 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2014); Grose v. Caruso, 284 F. App’x 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2008) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Nuchols v. Berrong, 141 F. App’x 451, 453

(6th Cir. 2005); LRL Prop. v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1113 (6th Cir. 1995) (Jones, J., dissenting). III. Accordingly, Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 6) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. April 20, 2026 s/Michael J. Newman Hon. Michael J. Newman United States District Judge