BATCHELDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which RYAN, J., joined. JONES, J. (pp. 1112-1118), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs LRL Properties, LRL Properties II, Ltd., and Melvin S. Ross, a general partner of LRL and LRL II, filed a complaint on October 21, 1992, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and supplemental state claims of defamation and tortious interference with business relationships. The complaint named eight defendants, including the Portage Metropolitan Housing Authority (PMHA), and the PMHA’s executive director, a program administrator, and its five board members at the time of the filing of the suit.
Defendants filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint and plaintiffs moved for leave to file a First Amended Complaint. The district court expressly denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint and granted defendants’ motion, dismissing each of plaintiffs’ federal claims and dismissing, without prejudice, plaintiffs’ state claims. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
A.
Because this case was dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[t]his Court must construe [1101]*1101the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s], accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff[s] undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claims that would entitle [them] to relief.” In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.1993); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.1993). And since the district court denied plaintiffs’ motion to file an amended complaint, we review both the complaint and the proposed amended complaint for purposes of construing the facts.
Plaintiffs LRL and LRL II are Ohio partnerships organized in part for the purpose of owning and operating an apartment complex (“Kenwood Courts”) in the City of Kent, Ohio. Plaintiff Melvin Ross is a general partner of both LRL entities. Kenwood Courts, a large-scale low-income housing project, consists of 216 apartments in Phase I, owned by LRL, and 228 apartments in Phase II, owned by LRL II. Through a variety of subsidy programs, Kenwood Courts is able to charge its tenants below market-rate rent; it looks to the government to make up the difference between rents collected and operating expenses. In Portage County, the primary conduit for housing subsidies is the PMHA.
Defendant PMHA is a political subdivision of the State of Ohio with the authority and duty to administer low-income housing programs in Portage County, Ohio, and specifically, as an agent of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), to administer federal Section 8 housing pro-, grams in Portage County. Defendant Anderson is Executive Director of the PMHA. Defendant Smith is the Director of the Section 8 Department at the PMHA. Defendants Durst, Davison, Antognoli, Sicu-ra, and Crews are or were members of the Board of Commissioners of PMHA during the time relevant to the claims asserted.
Plaintiffs allege that since at least 1985, the PMHA has pursued a political and/or economic objective of replacing the existing management and ownership of Kenwood Courts with alternative ownership and management, either by the PMHA or by those with whom defendants have a favored or preferred relationship. Further, plaintiffs allege that in pursuing this goal the defendants have violated plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due process rights, have treated plaintiffs differently from similarly situated persons, have defamed plaintiffs] and have tortiously interfered with plaintiffs’ business interests.
B.
In 1985 and 1986, plaintiffs received a HUD Section 8 rent subsidy for 129 units in Phase II of Kenwood Courts. In early 1987, the PMHA offered to purchase Kenwood Courts from the plaintiffs for $8,000,000, but the City of Kent refused to enter into a Cooperation Agreement, a prerequisite to the purchase. Later in 1987, plaintiffs entered into an option agreement to sell Kenwood Courts to a private development entity known as Renaissance Village Ltd. Partnership (“RVLP”) for $7,000,000.
In 1988 and 1989, the PMHA, over the course of thirteen months, awarded 191 units of Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Rental Assistance to RVLP for the purpose of renovating Kenwood Courts. Plaintiffs do not allege that during this thirteen month period they applied for any Section 8 rehabilitation funds.
In late 1989, it became apparent that the RVLP proposal was no longer feasible. In August, 1990, RVLP was declared in default of its agreement with the PMHA Board. According to plaintiffs, when it became apparent to PMHA that the RVLP proposal was no longer viable, defendants pursued a number of alternative strategies in furtherance of their goal to replace existing ownership of Kenwood Courts. Plaintiffs assert that the defendants proposed converting the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Assistance to other forms of assistance that only PMHA could utilize to the exclusion of plaintiffs and other property owners. Plaintiffs further contend that defendants proposed a secret joint venture with RVLP wherein PMHA would, through a related non-profit organization, purchase Phase II of Kenwood Courts at a depressed price. According to plaintiffs, the only proposal the defendants did not [1102]*1102seriously consider was permitting plaintiffs to benefit directly from the Section 8 program.
Plaintiffs also assert that in an effort to damage and impugn the reputation of plaintiffs and to force alternative ownership at Kenwood Courts, defendants made a number of malicious and knowingly false communications. According to plaintiffs, on June 28, 1989, defendant Anderson sent copies of a letter to HUD, indicating that more than 60 units had been terminated from Section 8 assistance at Kenwood Courts for failure to meet housing standards. Also in June 1989, Anderson wrote to HUD claiming that Ken-wood Courts was deteriorating. This, according to plaintiffs, was a campaign of “defamation and innuendo.”
Plaintiffs also allege that defendant Smith intentionally refused to give plaintiffs requisite rent increases in the Section 8 Program, increases to which plaintiffs were entitled under the terms of the United States Code of Federal Regulations. Plaintiffs allege that this occurred three times — in or around April 1988, in or around March 1989, and in or around July 1990.
Further, plaintiffs assert that defendants embarked upon a campaign of arbitrary and capricious enforcement of housing quality standards relating to the Section 8 Existing Housing Program. Plaintiffs complain that defendant Smith and his housing inspectors imposed their own arbitrary standards, invented violations, and held plaintiffs to a more rigorous standard than other similarly situated property owners. Plaintiffs also claim that defendants weakened plaintiffs’ financial standing by providing their tenants with alternative financing assistance for rental housing and encouraging the tenants to move elsewhere, all in violation of HUD regulations.
On September 1, 1990, in the wake of RVLP’s failure, the PMHA readvertised for applications for participation in the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program. Plaintiffs allege that even prior to readvertisement defendants had decided that if plaintiffs applied, their application would be rejected. Plaintiffs did submit an application for Moderate Rehabilitation assistance, but only for Phase I of Kenwood Courts.
Pursuant to federal regulation, PMHA established procedures for processing the proposals for Moderate Rehabilitation assistance. Proposals were to be screened for completeness, for evidence indicating that there would be no permanent displacement of tenants, for preliminary verification of tenant eligibility, and for evidence that the existing rent was below the Moderate Rehabilitation Fair Market Rent. According to plaintiffs, these criteria constituted a threshold. Developers submitting proposals failing to meet these criteria would be notified; remaining proposals would then be ranked. These remaining proposals, that is, those that had met the threshold requirements, would be entitled to participate in the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Assistance funds. Plaintiffs contend that the purpose of the ranking was simply to determine the order of priority among the competitors and that once ranked, all participants were entitled to assistance, at least to the extent that funds remained in the Section 8 allocation from HUD and until any project was determined financially unfeasible. According to plaintiffs, the PMHA abandoned its specific procedures in contravention of the law, regulations, and its own internal policies in order to assure that plaintiffs would not receive assistance.
The PMHA received three proposals in addition to plaintiffs’: (1) Portage Area Development Corporation for 68 units of assistance; (2) Frank S. Polichena for 4 units; and (3) Associated Estates Corporation (AEC) for 191 units in connection with their proposed purchase of Kenwood Courts from plaintiffs. The PMHA awarded Portage Development 68 units and Mr. Polichena 4 units, and requested additional information from AEC, plaintiffs’ proposed purchaser of the property, before any further action could be taken.1
[1103]*1103On October 22, 1990, the PMHA Board rejected plaintiffs’ proposal on the basis of “low ranking,” citing as reasons for the rejection “insufficient rehabilitation costs proposed, compared to HUD’s required list of work items and established costs and compared to other proposals,” and “lack of verifiable rehabilitation specifications and financing for the neighboring property, i.e., Phase II and the questionable feasibility of the project.”
Plaintiffs claim that these proffered reasons for rejection are a fabrication since it is not until later in the PMHA’s procedures that the rehabilitation cost and final feasibility are determined. Further, plaintiffs claim that the “estimated” costs used in their application were practically identical to those previously verified in connection with the RVLP proposal, and that the PMHA approved the application of Mr. Polichena, which did not include any cost information. Plaintiffs also note that the condition or rehabilitation of neighboring properties was not listed as a condition of approval and that other applications were not subject to the same conditions.
According to plaintiffs, the defendants subsequently changed their story regarding' the reasons for rejection, contending that LRL failed to meet its initial screening criteria even though (1) the defendants had already stated the proposal was ranked; (2) the rehabilitation cost and the “other concerns” cited were not part of the initial screening criteria; (3) the plaintiffs were not notified that they did not meet the initial screening criteria as required by defendants’ procedures; and (4) the plaintiffs did, in fact, meet the initial screening criteria.
On October 23, 1990, defendants notified the plaintiffs that they could request reconsideration of defendants’ rejection of their proposal for the reasons stated above. Plaintiffs requested reconsideration and met with defendants Anderson and Smith at which time they were given the opportunity to clarify their proposal and were advised that they would have a farther avenue of appeal to the Board of Commissioners. However, Anderson subsequently notified plaintiffs that their proposal did not meet the initial screening criteria and that they would not have any further right of appeal, but that they could meet with the PMHA Board if they chose. That meeting was scheduled, but after plaintiffs requested that the date be changed, Anderson advised them that they would not be permitted to meet with the Board. This suit was filed October 21, 1992.
II.
The plaintiffs raise numerous claims of error on appeal. First, they argue that in deciding the motion to dismiss, the district court applied a higher standard of scrutiny to their complaint than permitted under the federal rules. Second, plaintiffs claim that the district court improperly denied their motion to file an amended complaint. Third, plaintiffs argue that the district court used the incorrect statute of limitations in determining that the bulk of their allegations were time-barred. Finally, plaintiffs contend that the district court erroneously concluded that plaintiffs failed to state substantive and procedural due process claims and an equal protection claim for which relief could be granted.
Whether a district court correctly dismisses a suit pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is a question of law subject to de novo review. Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 296 (6th Cir.1993); DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d at 1239-40. Though this is a liberal standard of review, it requires more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d at 1240. “ ‘In practice, “a ... complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” ’ ” Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1988) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.1984) (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 656 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir.1981), cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3100, 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983)), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054, 105 S.Ct. 1758, 84 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985)). And, this Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual [1104]*1104inferences.” Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987).
It is plaintiffs’ contention that the district court ignored the expansive interpretation given to pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) motions and instead imposed a higher standard of pleading than is permitted by the law. Plaintiffs cite Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993), in which a district court in Texas had ordered § 1983 claims dismissed “because they failed to meet the ‘heightened pleading standard’ required by the decisional law of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.” Id. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1161. The Supreme Court concluded:
We think that it is impossible to square the “heightened pleading standard” applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of “notice pleading” set up by the Federal Rules. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1163. However, plaintiffs point to nothing in the record indicating that the district court either intended to hold or in fact held the defendants to a higher standard;, to the contrary, the district court correctly laid out the standard as follows:
“A complaint should not be dismissed ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ” Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674, 679 (6th Cir.1988) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 [78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80] (1957)).
The sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law. In reviewing the complaint, “[a]ll well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true.” Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir.1984).
This assignment of error is without merit.
Plaintiffs next assign as error the district court’s denial of leave to file an amended complaint. Denial of leave to file, an amended complaint is usually reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Janikowski v. Bendix Corp., 823 F.2d 945, 951 (6th Cir.1987); Estes v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 636 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir.1980). However, this Court has held, “[w]hen ... the district court has based its decision [to deny leave to amend] on ‘a legal conclusion that the amended pleading would not withstand a motion to dismiss,’ there is authority that we review such a decision de novo.” Vild v. Visconsi, 956 F.2d 560, 565 (6th Cir.) (quoting Martin v. Associated Truck Lines, Inc., 801 F.2d 246, 248 (6th Cir.1986)), cert. denied, ,— U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 99, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992). Among the reasons the district court gave for denying leave to amend the complaint was the fact that the proposed amended complaint does not “cure any of the insufficiencies pointed out as regards plaintiffs’ fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection claims.” Thus, we review de novo the district court’s denial of leave to amend.
Our de novo review leads us to conclude that the district court correctly denied the motion. The additional facts alleged in the amended complaint are primarily an attempt to construct a theory to get around the two-year statute of limitations. In the abuse of discretion context, this Court has held: “Denial of [leave to amend] is not an abuse of discretion where ‘[t]he infirmities of the original complaint are not dissipated by the amended complaint.’” Hamilton v. Bean, 745 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1984) (quoting Hohensee v. Akron Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 277 F.2d 359, 360 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 914, 81 S.Ct. 277, 5 L.Ed.2d 227 (1960)). Because the infirmities in the original complaint were not cured by the allegations in the amended complaint, the district court properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion to amend.
C.
The district court held that “the two-year statute of limitations applicable in Section 1983 cases bars any of plaintiffs’ claims which occurred beforé October 21, 1990, two years [1105]*1105prior to the filing date.” The plaintiffs assert that this was incorrect and that a four-year statute of limitations is actually the appropriate statute of limitations^
Plaintiffs assert a number theories to buttress their contention that the district court’s holding with respect to the statute of limitations was in error. Plaintiffs first claim that the district court applied the incorrect statute of limitations; in the alternative, they assert a “continuing violation” theory, a “continuing conspiracy” theory, and a “discovery” theory.
1. Wrong Statute of Limitations
The plaintiffs’ claim that the district court applied the wrong statute of limitations is meritless. The plaintiffs cite to two Ohio Court of Appeals decisions which hold that Ohio’s four-year “residual” statute of limitations is the proper statute of limitations in § 1983 eases. See Bojac Corp. v. Kutevac, 64 Ohio App.3d 368, 581 N.E.2d 625, 627 (1990) (holding that Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.09(D) is the “most logical and appropriate [statute of limitations in a § 1983 action] based on the United States Supreme Court holding in Owens v. Okure [488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) ]”); Weethee v. Roso, 64 Ohio App.3d 532, 582 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1989) (holding Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.09(D) is the appropriate statute of limitations in § 1983 actions). If this Court had not spoken on this issue, these Ohio eases might be persuasive; however this Court, sitting en banc, squarely addressed this issue in Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc), and definitively held that “the appropriate statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio ... requires that actions ... be filed within two years after their accrual.” Id. at 992. On at least one occasion after Browning and after the two Ohio Court of Appeals decisions, we have been invited to revisit the issue and have declined to do so. See Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 506, 510 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1261, 111 S.Ct. 2917, 115 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991).2 The district court’s application of the two-year limitation period was not erroneous.
2. Continuing Violation Theory
Next, plaintiffs allege that they have sufficiently pled a continuing violation of their rights such that the statute of limitations should be extended.3 In Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212 (6th Cir.1991), this Court explained: “[C]ourts view ‘continuing violations’ as falling into two categories of ‘narrowly limited exceptions’ to the usual rule that ‘statutes of limitations ... are triggered at the time the alleged discriminatory act occurred.’ ” Id. at 216 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Penton Indus. Pub. Co., 851 F.2d 835, 837-38 (6th Cir.1988)); see also Anderson v. City of Bristol, 6 F.3d 1168, 1174-75 (6th Cir.1993); Haithcock v. Frank, 958 F.2d 671, 677-78 (6th Cir.1992). The first category of continuing violations “arises where there is some evidence of present discriminatory activity giving rise to a claim of a continuing violation_” Dixon, 928 F.2d at 216. In Dixon, this Court explained:
The rationale underlying this category is that the employer commits an illegal act, [1106]*1106such as giving unequal pay for equal work, each time the employer dispenses the unequal pay. Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d 397, 398 (6th Cir.1982). This result follows from the fact that paying unequal wages for equal work is in itself the forbidden discriminatory act. It is irrelevant that the employer has committed the same illegal act at other times prior to the beginning of the relevant limitations period.
Id.
The second category of continuing violations arises where there “has occurred ‘a longstanding and demonstrable policy of discrimination.’” Id. at 217 (quoting Penton Indus., 851 F.2d at 838). “Unrelated incidents of discrimination will not suffice to invoke this exception; rather there must be a continuing ‘over-arching policy of discrimination.’ ” Id. (quoting Janikowski, 823 F.2d at 948); see Haithcock, 958 F.2d at 678.
No matter how favorably construed, the facts pled by the plaintiffs cannot establish a continuing violation. The plaintiffs are complaining of a series of discrete and separate acts that, at best, are separate incidents of discrimination and are not sufficient, even when the plaintiffs’ pleadings are liberally construed, to establish an “over-arching policy of discrimination.”
3. Continuing Conspiracy Theory
Plaintiffs next assert a “continuing conspiracy” theory, relying on White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 533, 66 L.Ed.2d 292 (1980), and cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1089, 101 S.Ct. 882, 66 L.Ed.2d 816 (1981), a pro se criminal case from the Eighth Circuit, which held “[b]ecause it appears this action was filed within three years of the last overt act of what may have been a continuing conspiracy to deprive [defendant] of constitutional rights, we cannot say that any claim stated in the complaint is barred_” Id. at 281. Plaintiffs contend that, construing “the Complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the pleadings can easily be read to allege the existence of a conspiracy among defendants and such non-defendants as RVLP, the City of Kent, and defendant PMHA’s related non-profit corporation.” 4
Reading the complaint and proposed amended complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we find only two paragraphs that can be read arguably to allege concert of action between the defendants and another party. Paragraphs sixty-six and sixty-seven of the amended complaint read:
66. Among the alternative^], the Defendant proposed a secret joint venture with RVLP whereby the Defendants, through a related non-profit corporation, would purchase Phase II of Kenwood Courts from LRL II for $2,500,000.00, after which the RVLP would take control of Phase I of Kenwood Courts.
67. On or about May 15, 1990, the PMHA, through a related non-profit corporation, offered to purchase Phase II of Kenwood Courts from LRL II for [$]2,500,000.00. LRL II refused this offer. ...
Even if these two paragraphs are sufficient to allege a conspiracy, plaintiffs do not allege any other acts in furtherance of the conspiracy or any injury or damage to plaintiffs from this alleged conspiracy that occurred later than May 15, 1990. This Court has rejected the position that “the continuance of a conspiracy beyond the date when injury or damage occurs extends the statute of limitations in a section 1983 action.” McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 906 (6th Cir.1988) (citing Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1432-33 (9th Cir.1984)). So, even if the “conspiracy” did continue past the May 15, 1990 date, a fact not alleged in the complaint, the statute of limitations would not be extended beyond May 15, 1990, the date of the last [1107]*1107overt act of the alleged conspirators. Since the last alleged act of the conspirators occurred in May of 1990, two years and five months before the suit was filed, any claims relating to these allegations are time-barred. In short, we conclude that even giving a very liberal interpretation to the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint, they do not allege a “continuing conspiracy” such that they can get around the two-year statute of limitations.
4. Ohio’s Discovery Rule
Plaintiffs assert that Ohio’s “discovery rule” is the third exception to applying the two-year statute of limitations. Citing O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 447 N.E.2d 727 (1983), an asbestos case, plaintiffs claim that this rule permits claims to survive the statute of limitations when the existence of the claim is learned sometime after the cause of action arises. However, in Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.1984), this Court held that in § 1983 actions, federal law governs the question of when a limitations period begins to run:
The statute of limitations commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action. A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Id. at 273 (citations omitted).
At paragraph 105 of their proposed amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that “[plaintiffs became aware of most of the facts alleged in this Complaint during the spring of 1991, upon uncovering such facts in connection with discovery undertaken during litigation with [RVLP Organizer] Anthony W. Rodriguez.”5
Defendants assert, and we agree, that the plaintiffs were actually aware of most of the alleged acts in this suit, and through due diligence should have been aware of most of the others, before October 21, 1990. Plaintiffs were actually aware of the offers to purchase their property. Plaintiffs knew that their requests for rent increases had been denied, and as owners/managers of this property since 1978, should have endeavored to find out why the rent increases were denied. Their bare assertion that they were unaware of the events underlying their suit is an “unwarranted factual inference” which this Court need not accept. Morgan, 829 F.2d at 12.6
We agree with the district court’s determination that all claims based on acts which allegedly occurred prior to October 21, 1990, are time-barred. Giving the complaint or amended complaint a liberal construction, it does not allege facts sufficient to toll the two-year statute of limitations. Therefore, plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the PMHA’s offers to purchase plaintiffs’ property in early 1987 and May 1990, defendant Smith’s failure to grant rent increases to plaintiffs in April 1988, March 1989, and July 1990, the award of Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Assistance to RVLP in October 1988, June 1989, and November 1989, defendant Anderson’s [1108]*1108alleged defamatory communications to HUD regarding plaintiffs in June, August, and October 1989, and July 1990, defendant Smith’s alleged arbitrary enforcement of HUD’s housing quality standards in May, 1990, and defendants’ urging of residents at Kenwood to move elsewhere by offering them Section 8 certificates, will not be considered in determining whether plaintiffs have stated due process or equal protection claims.
D.
The district court determined that the plaintiffs failed to state either a cognizable liberty or property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court concluded:
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the fourteenth amendment due process clause because they have alleged no cognizable liberty or property interest. The complaint itself states that plaintiffs’ application for participation in the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program was rejected, that is, it failed to meet the qualifying requirements. As defendants correctly point out, there is no property interest in a “unilateral desire to participate in a federal program where plaintiffs acknowledge that discretion is vested with the Housing Authority to determine whether the proposal meets the threshold requirements for further consideration.”
To prevail on its procedural due process claim, the plaintiffs must prove that they had a definite liberty or property interest and that such interest was abridged without appropriate process. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). “The process requirement necessary to satisfy fourteenth amendment procedural due process comes into play only after plaintiff has shown that it has a property or liberty interest.” Curtis Ambulance of Fla., Inc. v. Board of County Comm’rs, 811 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir.1987).
The plaintiffs’ claim that they have stated a cognizable liberty interest is premised on their claims of defamation, failure to receive rent increases, defendants’ inducing of plaintiffs’ tenants to breach their lease agreements, restriction of availability of Section 8 housing at plaintiffs’ property, arbitrary and capricious inspections by defendants to harass plaintiffs, and denial to plaintiffs of Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation funds. All of these alleged actions except the last occurred outside of the two-year statute of limitations and therefore cannot be considered.
' In defining a liberty interest, the Supreme Court has stated:
In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the [Due Process] Clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a “liberty” be “fundamental” ... but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society. As we have put it, the Due Process Clause affords only those protections “so' rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 2341-42, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964)). The plaintiffs’ alleged economic injury resulting from the denial of Section 8 Housing funds does not, even for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, rise to this level.
Plaintiffs also allege that they have a cognizable property interest. To establish a property interest in a particular benefit, the plaintiffs must have a “legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. “ ‘[A]n abstract need. or desire for it’ or a ‘unilateral expectation’ is insufficient.” Curtis Ambulance, 811 F.2d at 1375 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709).
In support of their contention that they have a cognizable property interest, plaintiffs rely on 24 C.F.R. § 882.504, which sets forth the process that PMHA must follow in awarding Section 8 funds. Section 882.504(c) provides:
Selection of Proposals. After the initial inspection and preliminary feasibility anal[1109]*1109ysis, the PHA should select among Owner proposals those proposals which it will approve. The PHA must establish a method of selecting among Owner proposals and must make this method known to any Owner submitting or planning to submit a proposal. Proposals must be approved in accordance with criteria established by the PHA and approved by HUD, and in accordance with the following requirements: 7
24 C.F.R. § 882.504(e) (1990). Section 882.504(d) provides:
Notification of Owners. When the PHA has selected the proposals which it plans to approve, the PHA must notify all Owners specifying:
(1) Whether their proposal has been rejected or approved;
(2) If the proposal was rejected, the reasons) for rejection and the Owner’s right to appeal to the PHA the PHA’s basis for rejection.
24 C.F.R. § 882.504(d) (1990).
Pursuant to the federal regulation, the PMHA was required to establish procedures for processing the proposals. As set out in plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint, the procedures established by PMHA included:
(1) Submission of Proposals; (2) Initial Screening for (a) completeness, (b) evidence indicating that there will be no permanent displacement of tenants, (e) preliminary verification of tenant eligibility, and (d) evidence that the existing rent is below the Moderate Rehabilitation Fair Market Rent. The PMHA procedures state that proposals not meeting these requirements would be notified; (3) Initial Inspection by the PMHA with the owner and tenant present. In connection with this inspection a preliminary work write-up and cost estimate of repairs, prepared by the owner, would be reviewed with the PMHA staff; (4) Feasibility Analysis-Whereby the PMHA would calculate the rents necessary to support the cost of rehabilitation; (5) Selection of Proposals-Whereby all proposals having gone through the first four steps would be ranked based on a ranking system; (6) Rehabilitation Activities-Whereby after ranking the proposals the PMHA would provide the owners with a list of needed repairs and the owner would obtain three bids to determine the actual costs of rehabilitation; (7) Final Feasibility Analysis-Whereby the rents would be recalculated once the actual rehabilitation cost were [sic] known to determine if the proposal was still financially feasible; (8) an AHAP would be executed; (9) Construction^-] (10) Completion of rehabilitation; (11) Continuing owner responsibilities; and (12) Continuing PMHA responsibilities.
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that, based on the federal and PMHA procedures, there is an initial consideration of the threshold criteria, and'
[t]hose failing to meet the threshold criteria are excluded from further consideration; those meeting the threshold criteria are thereafter ranked to determine not their eligibility, but rather their order of receipt of housing funds. In other words, it is no longer a question of whether; it is a question of when. It is not simply a matter of some abstract desire to participate. Having at this point met the threshold criteria, there is a legitimate claim of entitlement unless and until all available funds have been utilized.
Plaintiffs argue that since defendants first responded that plaintiffs’ proposal was rejected for “low ranking,” which implies that the plaintiffs met the threshold requirements but were simply ranked low on the totem pole, the defendants’ later avowal that the plaintiffs had not met the initial threshold is, if nothing else, a hotly contested matter of fact completely inappropriate for dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Plaintiffs also assert that the fact that an appeal from the rejection of the owners’ proposal is specifically provided for in § 882.504(d) is highly probative of the existence of a property right.
[1110]*1110The crux of plaintiffs’ argument is that once a proposal has made it past the initial four steps in the PMHA procedures, the question is no longer whether the owner will receive assistance, but how much assistance that owner will receive, and that the owner at that point has a legitimate entitlement to , benefits. We think that neither the federal regulation, 24 C.F.R. § 882.504, nor the PMHA procedures mandate this conclusion. The regulation grants to the defendants, within certain limits, the discretion to “establish a method of selecting among Owner proposals.” 24 C.F.R. § 882.504(c) (1990). The PMHA’s procedures at Step 5 provide: “Selection of Proposals-Whereby all proposals having gone through the first four steps would be ranked based on a ranking system.” However, it is clear that the procedures permit a proposal to be rejected at Step 7: “Final Feasibility Analysis-Whereby the rents would be recalculated once the actual rehabilitation cost were [sic] known to determine if the proposal was still financially feasible.” The mere fact that the plaintiffs’ proposal had been given some ranking, albeit a low one, did not vest in plaintiffs any right to the funds; the plaintiffs therefore had no legitimate entitlement to benefits.
This Court has held that “no property interest exists in a procedure itself, without more.” United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 960 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Curtis Ambulance, 811 F.2d at 1377). In that case, an insurance company, United of Omaha Life Insurance, was the successful bidder for the provision of administrative services to the State of Michigan. Before the contract was actually awarded, another insurance company persuaded Michigan to change its specifications for selection and to rebid the contract. Prior to completion of the rebidding process, United obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting Michigan from rebidding the contract, claiming that it had a property interest in certain purchasing guidelines in a booklet entitled “Doing Business with the State of Michigan — A Guide for Vendors,” and that Michigan’s failure to follow those procedures deprived United of its property interest without due process.
This Court rejected United’s claim, holding that
[a] “disappointed bidder” to a government contract may establish a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by due process by showing either that it was actually awarded the contract at any procedural stage or that local rules limited the discretion of state officials as to whom the contract should be awarded.
Solomon, 960 F.2d at 34. We concluded that since United could not make either of these showings, its interest lay in the process alone, and that this interest was not a property interest protected by the due process clause. Id. at 35. See also Silver v. Franklin Township, Board of Zoning Appeals, 966 F.2d 1031, 1036 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that discretion of zoning board was not sufficiently circumscribed to support substantive due process claim).
Although the case before us is not a “disappointed bidder” case, the analysis is nonetheless appropriate. These plaintiffs cannot show that they were actually awarded the Section 8 funds at any procedural stage or that the relevant federal regulations limited the discretion of the PMHA. Here, all that was required of the PMHA was that it “should select among Owner proposals those proposals which it will approve,” that it establish criteria for making that selection, and that it apply those criteria, all of which it did. Plaintiffs’ right to the funds never ripened into a legitimate claim of entitlement and the right of appeal is in and of itself no more than a procedure. Therefore, since plaintiffs had no right to the Section 8 funding, denying them a proper appeal, while a violation of the applicable federal regulation, does not create in them a property right which can be vindicated in a § 1983 action.
E.
Next, plaintiffs assert that viewed in a light most favorable to them, PMHA’s actions in this case are an example of “government run amok, a society of men and not law until called to account before the bar of justice.” However, it is clear that under this Circuit’s precedents, the plaintiffs have not alleged a substantive due process violation.
[1111]*1111In Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353 (6th Cir.1993), this Court explained:
Substantive due process claims are of two types. The first type includes claims asserting denial of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or by federal statute other than procedural claims under “the Fourteenth Amendment simpliciter.”
The other type of claim is directed at official acts which may not occur regardless of the procedural safeguards accompanying them. The test for substantive due process claims of this type is whether the conduct complained of “shocks the conscience” of the court.
Id. at 1367 (citations omitted).
In Sutton v. Cleveland Board of Education, 958 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir.1992), this Court specifically addressed the second category of substantive due process rights:
The substantive Due Process Clause is not concerned with the garden variety issues of common law contract. Its concerns are far narrower, but at the same time, far more important. Substantive due process “affords only those protections ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ ” It protects those interests, some yet to be enumerated, “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” like personal choice in mat- ’ ters of marriage and the family.
Id. at 1350-51 (quoting Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir.1990)); see also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122, 109 S.Ct. at 2341-42.
Plaintiffs appear to be alleging violations of both categories of substantive due process. Neither claim has merit. The right to participate in a federal housing funds program simply does not rise to the level of a right “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” and the actions of defendants alleged in the complaint and proposed amended complaint do not.even approach the level of “shocks the conscience.”8 See Solomon, 960 F.2d at 35. Therefore, we conclude that there is no set of facts under which the plaintiffs could prove a substantive due process claim.9
F.
Finally, plaintiffs assert an equal protection claim, alleging that they are part of a “discrete group, i.e., those four persons applying for Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Assistance as well as those property owners participating in the Section 8 Existing Housing Program.”
The district court concluded:
Plaintiffs have also failed to allege a claim for relief under the equal protection prong of the due process clause. “To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege that a state actor intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of membership in a protected class.” Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir.1990).
In Booher v. United States Postal Service, 843 F.2d 943 (6th Cir.1988), this Court held:
Fatal to [plaintiff’s] allegation is the fact that there is no claim that [plaintiff] was victimized because of some suspect classification, which is an essential element of an equal protection claim. Even assuming there was an unjustified action taken against [plaintiff] this single action, without more, cannot form the basis of an equal protection claim. We have previously delineated the difference between a constitutional injury and a common tort action by requiring a showing of suspect classification of a group: “The equal protection concept does not duplicate common law tort liability by conflating all persons not injured into a preferred class receiving better treatment than a plaintiff who alleges tortious injury.”
[1112]*1112Id. at 944 (quoting Joyce v. Mavromatis, 783 F.2d 56, 57 (6th Cir.1986)).
Plaintiffs’ claim in this case must fail for the same reason. Even if property owners and persons applying for Section 8 Housing funds could be shown to be a discrete class for purposes of the § 1983 action, plaintiffs do not claim that they were denied the funds because they are property owners. At best, plaintiffs allege a tort against their business interests. This is simply insufficient to support an equal protection claim and the district court therefore properly dismissed this claim.10
III.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint and denial of leave to file an amended complaint.