Ascher v. Kulongoski

910 P.2d 372, 322 Or. 540, 1996 Ore. LEXIS 12
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 1, 1996
DocketSC S42631; SC S42633
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 910 P.2d 372 (Ascher v. Kulongoski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ascher v. Kulongoski, 910 P.2d 372, 322 Or. 540, 1996 Ore. LEXIS 12 (Or. 1996).

Opinions

[542]*542DURHAM, J.

This is an original proceeding in which petitioners challenge the Attorney General’s ballot title for two initiative measures that the Secretary of State’s office has designated as “Elections Division #48” and “#50.” Those measures are identical in every respect. The Attorney General certified the same ballot title for both measures. Because petitioners present the same challenge to the Attorney General’s ballot title for both measures, we address that challenge in one opinion.

Petitioners are electors who, in a timely manner, submitted written comments about the Attorney General’s draft ballot title, pursuant to ORS 250.067(1). Accordingly, they are entitled to seek a different ballot title for the two measures in this court. ORS 250.085(2). We modify the ballot title in certain respects and, as modified, certify it to the Secretary of State.

At the outset, we note that the context for our discussion in this case includes our treatment of petitioners’ challenges to the Attorney General’s ballot titles in Ascher v. Kulongoski (Elections Division #46), 322 Or 516, 909 P2d 1216 (1996), and Nakamoto v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 181, 904 P2d 165 (1995). Elections Division #48 and #50 are identical to the measure discussed in Nakamoto, except that they add an explanatory “summary,” and a new section 4. Apart from the text contained in section 4, the only difference between the measures in this case and the measure discussed in Ascher (Elections Division #46) is that the former contains a relating clause and the latter does not.1

The Attorney General certified the following ballot title for both measures to the Secretary of State:

“FORBIDS GOVERNMENT PREFERENCES BASED ON RACE, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN
“RESULT OF TES’ VOTE: Tes’ vote adopts statute forbidding government preferences based on listed factors, in employment, other areas.
[543]*543“RESULT OF ‘NO’ VOTE: ‘No’ vote rejects statute forbidding government preferences based on listed factors, in employment, other areas.
“SUMMARY: Adopts statute. Oregon law now forbids government discrimination based on race, religion, color, sex, national origin. Law also provides for government affirmative action programs to provide fair and equal opportunity in employment, public contracting, to cure past and present discrimination. Measure forbids state, local government discrimination against, preference for citizens based on race, religion, color, sex, national origin. Applies in education, employment, contracting, public services. Any unaffected government affirmative action program must show government has history of discrimination. Unaffected state programs implemented under strict scrutiny.”

Pursuant to ORS 250.085(5), we review the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for substantial compliance with the requirements of ORS 250.035.

Petitioners initially restate the same challenges that they made with respect to the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Elections Division #46. See Ascher (Elections Division #46), 322 Or at 520-24 (discussing petitioners’ challenges). Their challenges to the caption and result statements have no greater validity in the context of Elections Division #48 and #50 than they had with respect to Elections Division #46. For the reasons stated in Ascher (Elections Division #46), 322 Or at 520-22, we conclude that the Attorney General’s certified caption and result statements comply substantially with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(a) to (c). In addition, we conclude, as we did in Ascher (Elections Division #46), 322 Or at 522, that the Attorney General’s summary does not comply substantially with ORS 250.035-(2)(d), because it does not inform voters that a “major effect” of the measures, if voters approve them, would be to limit government affirmative action programs in Oregon. Accordingly, we modify the Attorney General’s summary, in the manner described in Ascher (Elections Division #46), to correct that deficiency.

Petitioners’ remaining challenges relate to how the Attorney General’s certified summary treats section 4 of the measures. Section 4 in each measure provides:

[544]*544“(1) Any state affirmative action programs not affected by this amendment shall be implemented by a standard of strict scrutiny.
“(2) any [sic] state or local affirmative action programs not affected by this amendment shall have to prove that the effected [sic] benefactor has had a specific history of past disrimination [sic].”

Petitioners argue that those provisions warrant no mention in the summary, because they would not have a “major effect” if voters approve the measures. See ORS 250.035(2)(d) (ballot title shall contain a summary describing “the measure and its major effect”). In support, petitioners contend that section 4 pertains only to state and local affirmative action programs that otherwise are “not affected” by the measure and that, because section 1 of the measure would abolish most, if not all, state and local government affirmative action in Oregon, section 4 would affect few, if any, programs. In Nakamoto, 322 Or at 186-88, we rejected that contention, and we again reject it here for the same reasons. See Ascher v. Kulongoski (Elections Division #47), 322 Or 531, 535, 909 P2d 1223 (1996) (rejecting similar contention).

Petitioners next argue that section 4(1) would not have a “major effect” if voters approve the measure, because that provision merely codifies existing law. In support, petitioners argue that, under Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469, 109 S Ct 706, 102 L Ed 2d 854 (1989), all state and local government affirmative action programs already must satisfy a standard of “strict scrutiny.”

We reject petitioners’ argument, because its premise is faulty. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,2 a standard of “strict scrutiny” applies to legislation directed at a “suspect class” of citizens. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 487 US 450, 457, 108 S Ct 2481, 101 L Ed 2d 399 (1988). However, not all affirmative action programs in Oregon are targeted at a “suspect class” of citizens. ORS 243.305(2) defines the phrase “affirmative action” to mean

[545]

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Related

State v. Gowan
Montana Supreme Court, 1997
Ascher v. KULONGOSKI (ELECTIONS DIV. 49)
909 P.2d 1228 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1996)
Ascher v. Kulongoski
910 P.2d 372 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1996)
Ascher v. KULONGOSKI (ELECTIONS DIV. 46)
909 P.2d 1216 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1996)
Ascher v. KULONGOSKI (ELECTIONS DIV. 47)
909 P.2d 1223 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
910 P.2d 372, 322 Or. 540, 1996 Ore. LEXIS 12, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ascher-v-kulongoski-or-1996.