TONY ASBERRY, Case No. 20-cv-04000-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ v. MOTION TO REVOKE IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS; AND NURSE FLOREZ, et al., DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT Defendants.
Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility, filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 1. He alleges violations of his constitutional rights by prison officials and medical staff at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), where he was formerly incarcerated. Id. at 4-17. In his complaint, plaintiff names the following defendants at SVSP: Nurse Florez, Correctional Officers Alba, Villanueva, and Carrillo. Id. at 3. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 18. Plaintiff was previously granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. 5. The parties are presently before the Court on defendant Villanueva’s motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkt. 12. Defendants Florez, Alba, and Carrillo have filed motions to join defendant Villanueva’s motion. Dkts. 18, 22, 24. Defendants Florez, Alba, and Carrillo motions are GRANTED, and the joinder is accepted. Also pending before this Court are pending motions filed by defendants Villanueva, Florez, Alba, and Carrillo (hereinafter “defendants”) requesting extensions of time to file responsive pleadings to the complaint pending the Court’s ruling on the motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status. Dkts. 13, 19, 21, 25. Having read and considered the papers submitted, and being fully informed, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status and to dismiss the action for the II. BACKGROUND As mentioned above, on January 15, 2021, the Court granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. Dkt. 5. On the same date, the Court issued an Order of Service. Dkt. 6. The following background is taken from the Court’s January 15, 2021 Order, which states as follows: Plaintiff, who is a “full-time . . . wheelchair user,” alleges multiple claims, which the Court has summarized as the following: (1) a claim of deliberate indifference to his safety needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, stemming from a May 20, 2019 incident in which he was attacked by two other inmates at SVSP (who he describes as unnamed “housing unit workers known as porters”), and Plaintiff has adequately linked all the named Defendants to his claim for failing to intervene during the attack; (2) a claim of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, stemming from the failure to properly treat his injuries stemming from the May 20, 2019 incident, and Plaintiff has adequately linked all the named Defendants to his claim; (4) a claim for retaliation based on the named Defendants’ failure to protect Plaintiff from being assaulted during the May 23, 2020 incident because Plaintiff filed grievances against other prison staff members; and (5) state law claims, including “other violations of mandatory duties imposed on Defendants.” Dkt. 1 at 4-17. Plaintiff has stated a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim as well as a cognizable Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to his safety and serious medical needs against all named Defendants. The Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims, including “other violations of mandatory duties imposed on Defendants.” Dkt. 6 at 3. As mentioned above, defendants are requesting the Court revoke plaintiff’s IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and to dismiss the instant action. Dkt. 12. Even though plaintiff was given the opportunity to file an opposition, he did not do so. A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) was enacted, and became effective, on April 26, 1996. It provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Section 1915(g) requires that this Court consider prisoner actions dismissed before, as well as after, the statute’s 1996 enactment. Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997). Section 1915(g) is commonly referred to as the “three strikes rule.” The three strikes rule “requires so-called ‘frequent filer’ prisoners to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider their civil actions and appeals.” Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1127 (10th Cir. 2001). For purposes of a dismissal that may be counted under section 1915(g), the phrase “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same interpretation, the word “frivolous” refers to a case that is “of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact,” and the word “malicious” refers to a case “filed with the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (“Andrews I”). Only cases within one of these three categories can be counted as strikes for section 1915(g) purposes. See id. Dismissal of an action under section 1915(g) should only occur when, “after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an [earlier] action, and other relevant information, the district court determines that the action was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim.” Id. Andrews I requires that the prisoner be given notice of the potential applicability of section 1915(g), by either the district court or the defendants, but also requires the prisoner to bear the ultimate burden of persuasion that section 1915(g) does not bar pauper status for him. Id. A defendant seeking to challenge a prisoner’s IFP status has the burden of producing evidence that allows the district court to conclude that the prisoner plaintiff has suffered at least three prior dismissals that count as strikes under section 1915(g). Id. at 1120. Once the defendants have met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the prisoner to show why a prior dismissal should not count as a strike, or why he is entitled to the imminent danger of serious physical injury exception. Id. A dismissal under section 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed with an action as a pauper under section 1915(g), but he still may pursue his claims if he pays the full filing fee at the outset of the action. See Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming B. Plaintiff’s Prior “Strikes” Defendants allege that plaintiff has filed, while incarcerated, at least three actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California that were dismissed on the basis that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state claim. At the time plaintiff was granted
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TONY ASBERRY, Case No. 20-cv-04000-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ v. MOTION TO REVOKE IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS; AND NURSE FLOREZ, et al., DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT Defendants.
Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility, filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 1. He alleges violations of his constitutional rights by prison officials and medical staff at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), where he was formerly incarcerated. Id. at 4-17. In his complaint, plaintiff names the following defendants at SVSP: Nurse Florez, Correctional Officers Alba, Villanueva, and Carrillo. Id. at 3. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 18. Plaintiff was previously granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. 5. The parties are presently before the Court on defendant Villanueva’s motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkt. 12. Defendants Florez, Alba, and Carrillo have filed motions to join defendant Villanueva’s motion. Dkts. 18, 22, 24. Defendants Florez, Alba, and Carrillo motions are GRANTED, and the joinder is accepted. Also pending before this Court are pending motions filed by defendants Villanueva, Florez, Alba, and Carrillo (hereinafter “defendants”) requesting extensions of time to file responsive pleadings to the complaint pending the Court’s ruling on the motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status. Dkts. 13, 19, 21, 25. Having read and considered the papers submitted, and being fully informed, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status and to dismiss the action for the II. BACKGROUND As mentioned above, on January 15, 2021, the Court granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. Dkt. 5. On the same date, the Court issued an Order of Service. Dkt. 6. The following background is taken from the Court’s January 15, 2021 Order, which states as follows: Plaintiff, who is a “full-time . . . wheelchair user,” alleges multiple claims, which the Court has summarized as the following: (1) a claim of deliberate indifference to his safety needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, stemming from a May 20, 2019 incident in which he was attacked by two other inmates at SVSP (who he describes as unnamed “housing unit workers known as porters”), and Plaintiff has adequately linked all the named Defendants to his claim for failing to intervene during the attack; (2) a claim of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, stemming from the failure to properly treat his injuries stemming from the May 20, 2019 incident, and Plaintiff has adequately linked all the named Defendants to his claim; (4) a claim for retaliation based on the named Defendants’ failure to protect Plaintiff from being assaulted during the May 23, 2020 incident because Plaintiff filed grievances against other prison staff members; and (5) state law claims, including “other violations of mandatory duties imposed on Defendants.” Dkt. 1 at 4-17. Plaintiff has stated a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim as well as a cognizable Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to his safety and serious medical needs against all named Defendants. The Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims, including “other violations of mandatory duties imposed on Defendants.” Dkt. 6 at 3. As mentioned above, defendants are requesting the Court revoke plaintiff’s IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and to dismiss the instant action. Dkt. 12. Even though plaintiff was given the opportunity to file an opposition, he did not do so. A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) was enacted, and became effective, on April 26, 1996. It provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Section 1915(g) requires that this Court consider prisoner actions dismissed before, as well as after, the statute’s 1996 enactment. Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997). Section 1915(g) is commonly referred to as the “three strikes rule.” The three strikes rule “requires so-called ‘frequent filer’ prisoners to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider their civil actions and appeals.” Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1127 (10th Cir. 2001). For purposes of a dismissal that may be counted under section 1915(g), the phrase “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same interpretation, the word “frivolous” refers to a case that is “of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact,” and the word “malicious” refers to a case “filed with the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (“Andrews I”). Only cases within one of these three categories can be counted as strikes for section 1915(g) purposes. See id. Dismissal of an action under section 1915(g) should only occur when, “after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an [earlier] action, and other relevant information, the district court determines that the action was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim.” Id. Andrews I requires that the prisoner be given notice of the potential applicability of section 1915(g), by either the district court or the defendants, but also requires the prisoner to bear the ultimate burden of persuasion that section 1915(g) does not bar pauper status for him. Id. A defendant seeking to challenge a prisoner’s IFP status has the burden of producing evidence that allows the district court to conclude that the prisoner plaintiff has suffered at least three prior dismissals that count as strikes under section 1915(g). Id. at 1120. Once the defendants have met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the prisoner to show why a prior dismissal should not count as a strike, or why he is entitled to the imminent danger of serious physical injury exception. Id. A dismissal under section 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed with an action as a pauper under section 1915(g), but he still may pursue his claims if he pays the full filing fee at the outset of the action. See Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming B. Plaintiff’s Prior “Strikes” Defendants allege that plaintiff has filed, while incarcerated, at least three actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California that were dismissed on the basis that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state claim. At the time plaintiff was granted leave to proceed IFP, the Court was unaware that plaintiff had filed any of these cases or the basis of the dismissals of any such cases in other districts, i.e., the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. This Court GRANTS defendants’ request for judicial notice of the court documents provided in support of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff is barred from proceeding IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).1 Dkt. 26. Defendants argue that the following dismissals may be counted as dismissals for purposes of section 1915(g): (1) Asberry v. Cate, et al., No. 3:13-cv-00055-MMA-DHB (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013) (voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff after district court previously dismissed it for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted); (2) Asberry v. Cate, et al., No. 3:13-cv-3006-CAB-RBB (S.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2013) (dismissed for failure to file timely amended complaint after original complaint was dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim as a matter of law); (3) Asberry v. Cate, et al., No. 3:13- cv-02573-WQH-JLB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (dismissed for failure to file timely third amended complaint after second amended complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim as a matter of law); and (4) Asberry v. Godinez, et al., No. 3:19-cv-00153-DMS-RBB (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2019) (denying request to proceed IFP based on plaintiff accumulated three strikes before filing lawsuit; dismissing complaint as frivolous). See Dkt. 12 at 6-7; Dkt. 34-1 at 3-72 (Exs. A-D). Although defendants have attempted to list four prior dismissals, only three prior dismissals need qualify under section 1915(g). This Court must review at least three dismissals to determine whether they qualify as strikes under section 1915(g). See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1121.
1 The district court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (granting request to take judicial notice in section 1983 action of five prior cases in which plaintiff was pro se litigant, to counter her argument that she deserved special treatment because of Here, the Court will review all four aforementioned dismissals, which were all entered before the instant action was brought by plaintiff on June 16, 2020, in order to determine whether they may be counted as dismissals for purposes of section 1915(g). As further explained below, three of these four dismissals qualify as “strikes” under section 1915(g). See id. 1. Case No. 3:13-cv-00055-MMA-DHB – Voluntary Dismissal Not Strike In Case No. 3:13-cv-00055-MMA-DHB, the district judge dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend, finding that it failed to state a claim. Dkt. 34-1, Ex. A at 3-7. Instead of filing an amended complaint, plaintiff’s voluntarily dismissed the case. Id. at 8-9. Defendants argue that this dismissal constitutes a strike under section 1915(g) because “[a] prisoner may not avoid incurring strikes simply by declining to take advantage of opportunities to amend.” Dkt. 12 at 6. Defendants point out that other “[d]istrict courts have held that voluntary dismissals entered after a court had already, independently dismissed the action for failure to state a claim count as strikes. Id. (citing Williams v. Navarro, 2018 WL 4489683, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2018) (counting a voluntary dismissal as a strike when the case was voluntarily dismissed after the Court had previously dismissed the case for failure to state a claim with leave to amend); Chambers v. Laske, 2018 WL 3219649, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) (finding the same)). The Court disagrees with defendants, as explained below. In Case No. 3:13-cv-00055-MMA-DHB, as mentioned, the district judge found that plaintiff failed to state a claim, and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. Dkt. 34- 1, Ex. A at 3-7. Rather than filing an amended complaint, plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), in which he requested that his complaint be voluntarily dismissed. The docket sheet for Case No. 3:13-cv-00055-MMA- DHB shows no further entries after plaintiff’s notice for voluntary dismissal. See id. at 4-5. Because the record shows that Case No. 3:13-cv-00055-MMA-DHB was closed, this Court assumes that the district judge accepted plaintiff’s request for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a), and dismissed the action without prejudice by operation of law. See id. Because section 1915(g) does not distinguish between dismissals with or without 1146, 1154 (9th Cir.2008). However, “under Rule 41(a)(1)(I), ‘a plaintiff has an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss his action prior to service by the defendant of an answer or a motion for summary judgment.’” Commercial Space Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Boeing Co., Inc., 193 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir.1997)). “[A] dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is effective on filing, no court order is required, the parties are left as though no action had been brought, the defendant can’t complain, and the district court lacks jurisdiction to do anything about it.” Id. at 1078. The Court points out that other district courts have held that a voluntary dismissal does not constitute a strike under section 1915(g). See Williams v. Grannis, 2008 WL 4078664, *4 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that voluntary dismissal did not constitute a strike under section 1915(g)); see also Jones v. Eller, 2018 WL 1801254, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2018) (noting that two stipulated voluntary dismissals did not constitute strikes pursuant to § 1915). Therefore, the Court finds that defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing that the voluntary dismissal of Case No. 3:13-cv-00055-MMA-DHB constitutes a dismissal for a qualifying reason under section 1915(g), and therefore it does not count as a strike. See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 2. Case No. 3:13-cv-3006-CAB-RBB – First Strike In Case No. 3:13-cv-3006-CAB-(RBB), the district judge dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend on December 27, 2013, finding that the complaint was frivolous and failed to state a claim. Dkt. 34-1, Ex. B at 4-11. Nothing in the record shows that plaintiff filed an amended complaint. See id. at 2-3. Thereafter, the record shows that the case was closed. See id. When a court dismisses a complaint with leave to amend, the dismissal does not count as a strike because the suit continues. Lomaz v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1727 n.4 (2020). However, when the district court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim and grants leave to amend, and the plaintiff then fails to file an amended complaint, the dismissal counts as a strike under section 1915(g). Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Harris II”). Here, the record shows that the district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous as well as for failure to state a claim, and that plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint; therefore, it defendants that dismissals of the complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim constitute qualifying reasons for a strike under section 1915(g). Therefore, the Court finds that defendants have met the burden of establishing that Case No. 3:13-cv-3006-CAB-(RBB) was dismissed for qualifying reasons under section 1915(g), and therefore counts as a strike. See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 3. Case No. 3:13-cv-02573-WQH-JLB (S.D. Cal.) – Second Strike In Case No. 3:13-cv-02573-WQH-JLB, the district judge dismissed with leave to amend plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint on the basis that it failed to state a claim. See Dkt. 34-1, Ex. C at 11-28. Having received no third amended complaint more than a month after the filing deadline, the district judge enter another order dismissing the action without prejudice for failing to state a claim, and failing to comply with the previous aforementioned order. Id. at 29-33. Plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal. See id. at 8-9. Defendants again argue that the dismissal in Case No. 3:13-cv-02573-WQH-JLB constitutes an additional strike for the purposes of section 1915. Dkt. 12 at 7 (citing Harris II, 863 F.3d at 1143). Plaintiff has not challenged defendants’ assertion. Therefore, defendants have met the burden of establishing that Case No. 3:13-cv-02573-WQH-JLB counts as a strike. See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 4. Case No. 3:19-cv-00153-DMS-RBB – Third Strike In Case No. 3:19-cv-00153-DMS-RBB, the district judge denied plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP, finding that he had accumulated “three strikes” before filing the lawsuit. Dkt. 34-1, Ex. D 3-8. The court also screened the complaint, and dismissed the action as frivolous. Id. at 8- 9. The Ninth Circuit has held that a case is “dismissed” for the purposes of section 1915(g) “when the court denies the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the filing fee on the ground that the complaint is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim, and thereupon terminates the complaint.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008). When a district court disposes of an IFP complaint on such grounds, the complaint is “dismissed” for the purposes of section 1915(g) “even if the district court styles such dismissal as denial of the (finding that the district court necessarily reviewed the complaints and made an assessment on their merits in making the determination whether the actions qualified for IFP status). This was indeed the case in Case No. 3:19-cv-00153-DMS-RBB, wherein the district judge of the Southern District denied plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP and also dismissed the complaint was frivolous. Dkt. 34-1, Ex. D 3-8. Therefore, the aforementioned decision in Case No. 3:19-cv-00153-DMS- RBB constitutes a qualifying strike under section 1915(g). See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. In sum, three of four plaintiff’s aforementioned dismissals constitute “strikes” under section 1915(g).2 Thus, plaintiff’s IFP status must be revoked unless he can show that he is entitled to the imminent danger of serious physical injury exception under section 1915(g). C. Imminent Danger Exception A plaintiff barred from bringing an action IFP because he has three strikes may still proceed without prepaying court fees if he can show he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The availability of the exception turns on the “conditions a prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Andrews II”). As this is merely a “threshold procedural” question, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that district courts should not conduct an overly detailed inquiry into whether a particular danger is serious enough under the serious physical injury prong. Id. at 1055. Rather, “the exception applies if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Id. In order to satisfy the imminence prong, the prisoner must allege that the danger is ongoing. See id. at 1056-57. A district court should liberally construe the allegations in a complaint filed by a pro se prisoner facing a section 1915(g) bar. See McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709, 710-11 (8th Cir. 2002) (liberally construing allegations in complaint for initial determination of whether prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury). It is sufficient if any part of the complaint 2 The Court points out that even if it has found above that the voluntary dismissal in Case No. 3:13-cv-00055-MMA-DHB did not constitute a strike, only three prior dismissals need plausibly alleges that the prisoner is in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing. Andrews II, 493 F.3d at 1053. Here, the question is whether plaintiff was in imminent danger on June 16, 2020, the date he filed his complaint. The Court finds that plaintiff’s allegations fail to show that he was. As mentioned above, plaintiff alleged in his complaint that his claims stem from a May 20, 2019 incident, which was almost a year prior to the filing of the complaint. The Court notes that plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that he faced an imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his complaint. See generally Dkt. 1. Therefore, plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to the imminent danger exception under section 1915(g) to avoid dismissal without prejudice. Plaintiff’s IFP status is therefore revoked. See Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1998) (revoking IFP status on appeal on three strikes grounds); Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Center, 136 F.3d 458, 461, 465 (5th Cir. 1998) (district court correctly revoked IFP upon discovering on remand that plaintiff had five prior strikes). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status, and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkt. 12. For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows: 1. Defendants Florez, Alba, and Carrillo have filed motions to join defendant Villanueva’s motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkts. 18, 22, 24. Defendants Florez, Alba, and Carrillo motions are GRANTED, and the joinder is accepted. 2. This Court GRANTS defendants’ request for judicial notice of the court documents provided in support of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff is barred from proceeding IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Dkt. 34-1. 3. The Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkt. 12. Leave to proceed IFP is REVOKED, and the Court’s January 15, 2021 Order granting plaintiff IFP status (Dkt. 5) is ] 4. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice to plaintiffs filing a motion to reopen 2 no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order accompanied by the full filing fee 3 of $402.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). If plaintiff fails to file a motion to reopen and pay the 4 full filing fee within the twenty-eight-day time frame, then he may pursue his claims by filing 5 a new civil rights case in which he pays the full filing fee. 6 5. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all remaining pending motions as moot 7 (dkts. 13, 19, 21, and 25). 8 6. The Clerk shall also close the case. 9 7. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 12, 13, 19, 21, and 25. 1] Dated: November 30, 2021 ae 2 HON ONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 13 United States District Judge (14
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