Arun K. v. Sergio Albarran, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 ARUN K.1,

12 Petitioner, No. 1:26-cv-00518-TLN-CSK

13 14 v. ORDER SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., 15 Respondents. 16

17 18 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Arun K.’s (“Petitioner”) Motion for 19 Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, 20 Petitioner’s Motion is GRANTED and Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why a 21 preliminary injunction should not issue. 22 /// 23 /// 24 1 As recommended by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of 25 the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Court omits Petitioner’s full name, using only his first names and last initial, to protect sensitive personal information. See Memorandum Re: 26 Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, Committee on Court 27 Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. The Clerk of Court 28 is directed to update the docket to reflect this change accordingly. 2 Petitioner is a native and citizen of India and an asylum applicant in the United States. 3 (ECF No. 2-1 at 4.) On October 15, 2024, Petitioner entered the United States seeking protection 4 and was initially apprehended by immigration authorities. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The next day, the 5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) released Petitioner on his own recognizance 6 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (Id.) Petitioner then filed an application for asylum and his application is 7 still pending. (Id.) 8 Petitioner asserts he does not have a criminal record, has no history of violence or 9 dangerous behavior, and has consistently demonstrated compliance with immigration authorities 10 throughout his detention. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Nevertheless, on August 2, 2025, Petitioner was 11 detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at his home without any notice 12 or a hearing. (Id. at 5.) Respondents further denied Petitioner a post-detention bond hearing. (Id. 13 at 5.) 14 Petitioner has now been detained nearly six months without a hearing on the basis of a 15 DHS policy change. (See id.) Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his civil detention and 16 seeks immediate release. (See ECF Nos. 1, 2.) 18 For a TRO, courts consider whether a petitioner has established “[1] that he is likely to 19 succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 20 relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 21 interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a 22 showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 23 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 24 In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh petitioner’s showings on 25 the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on the balance of the 26 hardships may support issuing a TRO even where the petitioner shows that there are “serious 27 questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows that there is a likelihood of 28 irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, a petitioner 1 must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were raised [then] the balance of 2 hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to succeed in a request for a TRO. 3 Id. at 1134–35. 4 III. ANALYSIS2 5 The Court considers each of the Winter elements with respect to Petitioner’s motion. 6 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 7 Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on his claims that his detention violates 8 the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.3 9 The Court discusses each claim in turn. 10 i. Violation of the INA 11 Under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”) “provides the general process for 12 arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for 13 removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Section 1226(a) 14 provides the Government broad discretion whether to release or detain the individual and it 15 provides several layers of review for an initial custody determination. Id. It also confers “an 16 initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel 17 and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when 18 circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. 19 Conversely, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (“§ 1225(b)(2)”) mandates detention during removal 20 proceedings for applicants for admission and does not provide for a bond hearing. 21 Until the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) changed its policy in July 2025

22 2 The Court finds Petitioner has sufficiently met the requirements for issuing a TRO without 23 notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Petitioner contacted Respondents about instant motion prior to filing and served Respondents via email. (See ECF No. 2 at 4–6.) See R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 24 1:25-CV-01141-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025) (similarly finding requirements for TRO were met without notice); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RML, 25 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025) (same).

26 3 Petitioner also claims that Respondents have violated INA’s implementing regulations, the 27 Administrative Procedure Act, the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, and the Suspension Clause. (ECF No. 1 at 12–21.) Finding relief warranted under Petitioner’s 28 procedural due process and INA claims, the Court declines to address cumulative violations. 1 (“DHS’s July Policy”), the Government consistently applied § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), to 2 noncitizens residing in the United States who were detained by immigration authorities and 3 subject to removal. 4 Courts nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected the Government’s 5 new legal position and have found DHS’s July Policy unlawful. See Morales-Flores v. Lyons, 6 No. 1:25-CV-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (explaining 7 this Court’s reasons for taking this position and collecting cases); see also Maldonado Bautista v. 8 Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (issuing vacatur of unlawful 9 DHS July Policy for a nationwide certified class). 10 Petitioner asserts he is being unlawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2) when § 1226(a) 11 governs his detention. (ECF No. 2 at 5–15.) This Court agrees. Section 1225(b)(2) applies only 12 to “applicants for admission” “seeking admission” –– a category that does not include noncitizens 13 like Petitioner who have already entered the United States and are residing here at the time ICE 14 re-detains them. See Morales-Flores, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3. Moreover, Petitioner’s release 15 documents state that he was released in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (ECF No. 1-4.) This 16 Court has made its position on this statutory question clear. Id. Absent new argument, case law, 17 or distinguishable facts, this Court will not reconsider its position. 18 Thus, Petitioner is subject to § 1226(a) and is entitled to the process that statute requires, 19 including a bond hearing at a minimum. Yet, Respondents have not provided any such hearing to 20 Petitioner in nearly six months of detention. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Accordingly, Petitioner is likely 21 to succeed on the merits of his claim that Respondents have violated the INA and improperly 22 subjected him to mandatory detention without a hearing. 23 ii. Violation of Procedural Due Process 24 The Fifth Amendment prohibits government deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty, or 25 property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V; Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 26 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 27 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 28 1 These due process rights extend to immigration proceedings and detention. Id. at 693–94. 2 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there 3 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the 4 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 5 Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); 6 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 7 the question remains what process is due.”). 8 a) Liberty Interest 9 As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioner has established a protectable liberty 10 interest. See Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. CV 25-00379 SASP-KJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D. 11 Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (noting “[e]ven where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by 12 statute, that person may retain a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause”). “[T]he 13 government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon 14 which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to 15 the . . . conditions [of release].” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 16 2025) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in original). “Accordingly, a 17 noncitizen released from custody pending removal proceedings has a protected liberty interest in 18 remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 19 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional 20 release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific 21 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by 22 Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. 23 Cal. Sept 9, 2025). 24 Here, Petitioner gained a liberty interest in his continued freedom after he was released 25 from custody in 2024. Under Morrisey, this release implied a promise that he would not be re- 26 detained, during the pendency of his immigration proceedings, if he abided by the terms of his 27 release. During his release, Petitioner asserts he complied with all conditions of his release; he 28 does not have a criminal record; and he has no history of violence or dangerous behavior. (ECF 1 No. 1 at 4.) As this Court has found previously, along with many other courts in this district 2 when confronted with similar circumstances, Petitioner has a clear interest in his continued 3 freedom as he awaits the outcome of his immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 4 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (noting the Government’s actions in allowing petitioner 5 to remain in the community for over five years strengthened petitioner’s liberty interest). 6 b) Procedures Required 7 As to the second step — what procedures or process is due — the Court considers three 8 factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an 9 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 10 of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including 11 the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 12 procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). As set 13 forth below, the Court finds Petitioner has established his due process rights were likely violated. 14 First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from detention. 15 Petitioner has built a life and relationships during his release. Despite that, Petitioner has now 16 been detained for nearly six months without an opportunity to be heard. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) 17 Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding Petitioner’s private interest has been impacted 18 by his detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 19 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding similarly). 20 Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not received 21 any hearing, either pre- or post-detention. Thus, the Court finds there is a serious likelihood 22 Petitioner could be erroneously deprived of his liberty interest. Without any procedural 23 safeguards to determine whether his detention was justifiable, the probative value of additional 24 procedural safeguards is high. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4. 25 Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to provide 26 Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884- 27 TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). Where removal is not imminent 28 under a final order of removal, “[t]he government has no legitimate interest in detaining 1 individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose 2 appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or 3 alternative conditions.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994; see also R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4 4 (“Civil immigration detention, which is nonpunitive in purpose and effect is justified when a 5 noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.”) (cleaned up). 6 Here, Petitioner’s asylum application is ongoing and there is no removal order. (See ECF 7 No. 1 at 2.) Additionally, before releasing him on his own recognizance in 2024, DHS would 8 have found that Petitioner was not a danger to the community nor a flight risk. This Court has no 9 reason to doubt Petitioner’s assertion that he has complied with all conditions of his release and, 10 thus, he was not a flight risk at the time of his detention. Therefore, on this record, the Court 11 cannot find any legitimate interest for Respondents to detain Petitioner. 12 Moreover, the cost and time of procedural safeguards are minimal here. Notice and 13 custody determination hearings are routine processes for Respondents. Indeed, these are the very 14 processes owed to Petitioner under § 1226(a). Any delay in detention (if justified) for the time to 15 provide notice and a hearing would be minimal. It would also be less of a fiscal and 16 administrative burden for the Government to return Petitioner home to await a determination on 17 his immigration proceedings than to continue to detain him. See Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV- 18 05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has recognized 19 that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.”). 20 On balance, this Court finds the Mathews factors demonstrate Petitioner was entitled to 21 notice and hearing to determine whether detention was warranted. Respondents have not 22 provided either and they have affirmatively denied him a post-deprivation bond hearing. 23 Accordingly, with respect to his procedural due process claim, Petitioner has shown he is likely to 24 succeed on the merits. 25 B. Irreparable Harm 26 Petitioner has also established he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO. 27 The Ninth Circuit recognizes “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration 28 detention,” including “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities, the 1 economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention, and the 2 collateral harms to [family.]” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Such harm is present here. Without 3 relief, Petitioner faces the prospect of significant additional time in detention and continued harm 4 while he awaits a decision on his asylum application. Moreover, “[i]t is well established that the 5 deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. 6 Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 7 Thus, Petitioner has sufficiently established irreparable harm. 8 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 9 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 10 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 11 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 12 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds these factors also favor Petitioner. First, the balance of equities 13 tips decidedly in Petitioner’s favor as the Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed 14 in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. 15 Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Second, “it is always in the public 16 interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002. 17 Moreover, “the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention 18 are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 19 14, 2025) (internal citation omitted). 20 Any burden imposed by requiring Respondents to comply with constitutionally required 21 process is both de minimis and clearly outweighed by the substantial harm Petitioner will suffer if 22 he continues to be detained. In sum, these last two factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. 23 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s request for a TRO and orders Petitioner’s 24 immediate release on the same terms as he was released prior to his detention. See Yang v. 25 Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 2791778, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) 26 (status quo ante is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”). 28 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1 1. Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 2 2. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner ARUN K. from custody under 3 the same conditions he was released prior to his current detention. Respondents shall not 4 impose any additional restrictions on him, unless such restrictions are determined to be 5 necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. At the time of his release, 6 Respondents must also return all of Petitioner’s documents and possessions. 7 3. Respondents are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining 8 Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ notice 9 and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where: (a) Respondents show 10 material changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s 11 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate by clear and 12 convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk. At 13 any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present. 14 4. Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not issue a 15 preliminary injunction continuing the terms of this Order. Respondents shall file 16 responsive papers by January 29, 2026. Petitioner may file a reply, if any, by February 17 3, 2026. The parties shall indicate in their briefing whether they waive a hearing. 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3). The Court will consider any stipulation and proposed order filed 19 by the parties if they agree to a less demanding briefing schedule. Respondents’ failure to 20 respond to the Order to Show Cause shall be construed as its non-opposition to the Court 21 granting a preliminary injunction on the same terms and conditions imposed in this Order. 22 See L.R. 230(c). 23 5. Petitioner is ORDERED to immediately serve this Order, along with Petitioner’s A # and 24 all documents filed in this case to date, on Respondents with a copy via email to: 25 usacae.ecf2241-imm@usdoj.gov. 26 6. Respondents are hereby notified of their right to apply to the Court for modification or 27 dissolution of the TRO on two days’ notice to Petitioner. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4). 28 7. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts 1 regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 2 (9th Cir. 2011). 3 8. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket to only list Petitioner’s first name 4 and last initial. 6 | Date: January 22, 2026 7, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10