Arsberry v. Baldwin

Appellate Court of Illinois

Arsberry v. Baldwin

2020 IL App (4th) 190358-U

CourtAppellate Court of Illinois

DecidedMay 22, 2020

Docket4-19-0358

StatusUnpublished

This text of 2020 IL App (4th) 190358-U (Arsberry v. Baldwin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Arsberry v. Baldwin, 2020 IL App (4th) 190358-U (Ill. Ct. App. 2020).

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Opinion

NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 190358-U This order was filed under Supreme FILED Court Rule 23 and may not be cited NO. 4-19-0358 May 22, 2020 as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

LONNIE ARSBERRY, ) Appeal from the Petitioner-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County JOHN BALDWIN, in His Official Capacity as Director of ) No. 18MR388 Corrections, ) Respondent-Appellee. ) Honorable ) Rudolph M. Braud Jr., ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court’s dismissal of petitioner’s petition for mandamus was proper.

¶2 In May 2018, petitioner, Lonnie Arsberry, filed a pro se complaint for mandamus

(735 ILCS 5/14-101 et seq. (West 2018)) against respondent, John Baldwin, in his official

capacity as Director of Corrections. In his mandamus petition, petitioner sought additional

sentence credit under section 3-6-3(a)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730

ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4) (West 2018)) and immediate release from prison. Petitioner later filed a

supplement to his mandamus petition, to which he attached numerous exhibits. In September

2018, respondent filed a combined motion to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018)). After a May 2019 hearing, the

Sangamon County circuit court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss.

¶3 Petitioner appeals, asserting the circuit court erred by dismissing his mandamus petition. We affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 A jury found petitioner guilty of armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,

¶ 18-2(a)) and two counts of aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 12-4) for

petitioner’s actions on October 10, 1989. People v. Arsberry, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1034, 611

N.E.2d 1285, 1286 (1993). Armed robbery was a Class X felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,

¶ 18-2(b)) and aggravated battery was a Class 3 felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 12-4(e)).

The Cook County circuit court sentenced petitioner to 60 years’ imprisonment for armed robbery

and two concurrent 5-year terms for each count of aggravated battery, to be served consecutively

to the sentence for armed robbery. Arsberry, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 1034-35, 611 N.E.2d at 1286.

¶6 On May 11, 2018, petitioner filed his petition for mandamus, seeking to have the

circuit court award him additional sentence credit under section 3-6-3(a)(4) of the Unified Code

(730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4) (West 2018)). He asserted a proper application of section 3-6-3(a)(4)

would result in an additional 4½ years of sentence credit to him, and thus he would be entitled to

immediate release from prison. His mandamus petition noted his current date for release from

prison was April 2022. We note petitioner is currently on home custody with a projected release

date of October 2020. See Illinois Department of Corrections, Inmate Search,

http://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/offender/pages/inmateSearch.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). In

June 2018, petitioner filed a supplement to his mandamus petition and attached numerous

diplomas, transcripts, certificates, and documentation supporting his allegation of participation

and successful completion of programming while in prison for the past 28 years. Petitioner also

asserted in the supplement he was owed up to 8 years, 2 months, and 12 days of sentence credit

for his participation in various programs. Petitioner did not seek leave to file his supplement to

-2- his mandamus petition.

¶7 In September 2018, respondent filed a combined motion to dismiss under section

2-619.1 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018)). Respondent argued

petitioner’s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice under section 2-619 of the Procedure

Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)) because the relief petitioner requested involved the

exercise of discretion, and thus relief could not be compelled through a writ of mandamus.

Respondent also argued petitioner’s complaint should be dismissed without prejudice under

section 2-615 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)) because petitioner neither

alleged facts sufficient to plead a cause of action upon which relief can be granted nor alleged

facts sufficient to show he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Petitioner

filed a reply to the motion to dismiss, attaching his February 15, 2018, grievance that requested

sentence credit under section 3-6-3(a)(4).

¶8 On May 6, 2019, the circuit court held a telephone conference on respondent’s

motion to dismiss. The court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss under section 2-619. On

May 9, 2019, the court entered the written dismissal order.

¶9 On June 7, 2019, petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal from the dismissal of

his petition for mandamus in sufficient compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff.

July 1, 2017). Thus, this court has jurisdiction of petitioner’s appeal under Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 In this case, petitioner appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of his mandamus

action. Regardless of whether the circuit court’s dismissal of petitioner’s mandamus action was

under section 2-615 or 2-619, or a combination of both sections pursuant to section 2-619.1, this

-3- court’s standard of review is the same. Jane Doe-3 ex rel. Julie Doe-3 v. White, 409 Ill. App. 3d

1087, 1092, 951 N.E.2d 216, 223 (2011). We review de novo the circuit court’s dismissal.

White, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 951 N.E.2d at 223. “In doing so, we will accept as true all

well-pleaded factual allegations.” White, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 951 N.E.2d at 223.

Additionally, we may affirm the dismissal on any basis in the record, regardless of the circuit

court’s reasoning. O’Callaghan v. Satherlie, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 17, 36 N.E.3d 999.

¶ 12 Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy which will not be granted unless the

petitioner establishes he has a clear right to the relief requested, the respondent public officer has

a clear duty to act, and the public officer has clear authority to comply with the order. People

ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 192-93, 909 N.E.2d 783, 791 (2009). If the act in

question involves the exercise of an official’s discretion, relief will not be granted. Konetski, 233

Ill. 2d at 193, 909 N.E.2d at 791.

¶ 13 Petitioner asserts he is entitled to the additional sentence credit under section

3-6-3(a)(4) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4) (West 2018)). A history of the

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