Arrow Drilling Co. v. Carpenter

125 F. App'x 423

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: March 3, 2005
• Docket: 03-4200
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Appellants Arrow Drilling Co., Inc. and Palm Valley Health Care, Inc. are employers whose employees participated in the Benistar 419 Advantage Plan and Trust (“Benistar 419 Plan.”). 1 Arrow Drilling alleges that Appellees Daniel Carpenter, Benistar 419 Plan Services, Inc., Benistar 419 Admin. Services, Inc., and Benistar Employer Services Trust Corporation (collectively, “Benistar”) are fiduciaries of the Benistar 419 Plan who breached their duties in violation of Section 409 of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).

Arrow Drilling now appeals from the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Benistar appeals the court’s denial of its motion for attorney’s fees.

Discussion

1. Arrow Drilling’s Appeals

Our review of the district court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is plenary. Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir.2000). We review the district court’s denial of Arrow Drilling’s motion for leave to amend its complaint and the motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Heyl & Patterson Int’l, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Housing of the Virgin Islands, Inc., 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir.1981); North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1203 (3d Cir.1995).

Inasmuch as we write only for the parties, there is no need to recite the factual and procedural history of this case. Although Arrow Drilling has filed separate appeals from the original September 25 Memorandum Order and the Amended Final Order, both Orders raise the same issues, and Arrow Drilling has not made additional argument that is specific to the Amended Final Order.

The district court has thoughtfully explained its conclusion that plaintiffs lack standing under ERISA and that the complaint must therefore be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Arrow Drilling Co., Inc. v. Carpenter, 2003 WL 23100808 (E.D.Pa. Sept.23, 2003). The court also explained that Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15 “does not permit a plaintiff to amend a complaint ‘to substitute a new plaintiff to cure the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’ ” Id., at *5. It is evident from the district court’s thoughtful analy sis that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Arrow Drilling’s request to amend in violation of Rule 15, and we will therefore affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the district court. 2

2. Benistar’s Cross-Appeal

In its cross-appeal, Benistar argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 given (what Benistar describes as) Arrow Drilling’s bad faith and vexatious conduct. The district court concluded that Arrow Drilling’s conduct did not unduly “multiply” the proceedings as is required for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and that its conduct also did not warrant sanctions under the court’s inherent power.

Although we do not hesitate to find an abuse of discretion where it appears on the record, the district court was in the best position to assess the impact of counsel’s stewardship of this litigation, and we can not conclude that the court abused its discretion in holding that the stewardship does not warrant sanctions.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney’s fees.

1 . On August 29, 2003, Palm Valley Health Care, Inc. moved for voluntary dismissal without prejudice. By Memorandum and Order of September 23, 2003, the Court dismissed this case and denied Palm Valley Health Care, Inc.'s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice as moot.

2 . The District Court also explained why additional evidence Arrow Drilling sought to present was irrelevant and did not require reconsideration of its March 16, 2004 order.