OPINION
W.C. DAVIS, Judge.
A jury convicted appellant of capital murder. Upon receiving the jury’s affirmative answers to the two punishment issues, the court assessed punishment at death. See Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. We abated the appeal so that the trial court could file findings of fact concerning the voluntariness of appellant’s confession. Those thorough and extensive findings are now before us and we proceed to consider the appeal.1
Appellant challenges the legality of his arrest and subsequent confession. In order to put his contention in the proper context we first set out the facts.
Charlie Maldonado, manager of Earl Williams grocery store in Cleburne, was shot to death on August 4, 1981. His body was found slumped on a lettuce crate in the produce freezer of the store at about 7:00 a.m. He had been shot three times, including two shots in the head.
Earl Williams, owner of the grocery store, testified that he had placed about $7600.00 in the safe in the store when he closed the store on August 3, 1981. The safe was found open and the $7600.00 missing on August 4, at about 7:00 a.m.
William Montgomery drove past the grocery store at about 6:35 a.m. on August 4. He saw Maldonado opening up the store, as usual, and also noticed a black male standing slightly behind Maldonado with a newspaper folded over his right wrist. The black male looked in both directions and took the newspaper off his arm. Montgomery saw something in his right hand but could not tell what it was. The black male was wearing a blue shirt, blue jeans, and something on his head. Montgomery testified that the black male could have been appellant, but that he was not positive.
Carolina Marbut passed by the grocery store at about 6:40 a.m. on August 4, 1981, on her way to work. She saw a black male run from the store carrying a brown paper bag in one hand. He was wearing a blue shirt, blue jeans, and something on his head. She could not identify appellant as that man.
Acting on an arrest warrant, Officer Robert Killinger arrested appellant about 11:00 p.m. on August 4, 1981. Appellant attacks his arrest, arguing that the affidavit supporting the arrest warrant does not contain underlying circumstances showing that the “informers” were credible and reliable.
W.D. Baker, a police officer for the city of Cleburne, appeared before Judge Joe Y. [689]*689Post, a justice of the peace in Cleburne, and swore that,
I have good reason to believe and do believe based upon the following information the affidavits of Lora Pollard, Caroline Marbut, Bob Gatlin and W.H. Montgomery which are attached hereto and incorporated herein ... that Kerry Douglas Armstrong on (or about) the 4th day of August, A.D. 1981, ... did intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual to wit: Charlie Maldonado by shooting him with a firearm....
The four statements attached to Baker’s affidavit are unsworn statements. Pollard’s statement is the most directly damaging to appellant. She listed a Cleburne address as her home and stated the following:
On the night of July 28, 1981, I was at the Washateria on Brazos Street, Cle-burne, Texas. Kerry Armstrong called me over to his car. It is a new model car, light green on the bottom and dark green on top. I got in the car with him and went to his house on Brazos Street by Curlee’s filling station. It is a green and white house.
We went in the house and we were talking and all of a sudden, he said he wanted me to go to bed with him. I would not do it and he knew I wouldn’t so he pulled a pistol on me. I started trying to get him off the subject and then he started talking about how he was tired of working for white men and he was talking about Earl Williams and saying he was going to rob Earl Williams store. He said he was going to stay up all that night and be there when they opened the store and rob them when they opened and he didn’t care who was there, that he would just shoot them and take all the money. He was also talking about moving out of Cleburne because everyone here knows his background, then he said that he just might stay here and get married. After all that talk, he still had the gun in his hand and he asked me if I was ready to get in bed with him and I was afraid of him because he said that if I didn’t have sexual relations with him, he would kill me and then kill himself, . because he just didn’t care. I told him that if that was what he wanted I would so we went to bed and he had sexual relations with me.
After that, someone called him on the phone and he talked to them a little while. Then I told him I wanted to go home and he took me home.
Nothing happened at the store the next morning and so I did not think anything else about it. I did tell my boyfriend, Arthur Rogers, what he had said and done, I told Arthur this on Friday July 31, 1981. This morning, August 4, 1981, Arthur called me and told me about Mr. Maldonado being killed up at Earl Williams’ store and the store being robbed and I just know that Kerry Armsrong did it.
Kerry Armstrong is about 5'5", is fairly slight built, usually has a cap on his head which is a little round cap that fits down close to his head with a little short bill on it. It is not like those other caps with the big bills that everyone else wears. It is a tan color, tweed sort of material, and when he puts it on, it spreads out on his head.
Bob Gatlin, an employee at Earl Williams Grocery Store gave a statement saying that on August 4, 1981, he arrived at the store at 6:55 a.m. He saw Maldonado’s pickup truck parked on the side of the store, as usual, and he went inside. He found Maldonado lying inside a walk-in cooler. He also saw Maldonado’s keys beside the open safe. The money was missing from the safe.
Carolina Marbut worked for the Santa Fe railroad. In her statement she said that on August 4, 1981, at about 6:40 a.m., she drove by Earl Williams Grocery Store. She saw a pickup parked at the side of the store. As she passed the store, Marbut noticed a black male, between 17 and 25 years old, about 5'6", slender build of about 135-145 pounds. He was wearing a blue, “uniform type” shirt, blue jeans, and a cap or hat. He was carrying a brown paper [690]*690sack in his hand as he ran from the front of the store and headed east, turning down the first street by the store. Marbut said all the lights in the store were on and she did not see anyone inside the store.
W.H. Montgomery, also an employee of the Santa Fe Railroad, stated that he drove by Earl Williams Grocery Store almost every morning on his way to work and that he usually saw Maldonado opening the door. On August 4, 1981, Montgomery drove by the store at about 6:35 a.m. and saw Maldonado opening the door. He also saw a black male standing behind Maldonado with a newspaper folded over his right forearm. Maldonado opened the door and as the two stepped inside the store Montgomery saw the black male pull the paper off his arm and saw something in his right hand. Montgomery could not tell what it was. Montgomery said the black male was wearing blue jeans and a dark blue shirt, had short hair, and was wearing a light colored object on his head that did not look like a regular hat or cap.
Appellant bases his contention of the insufficiency of the arrest warrant affidavits on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He contends that since the aforementioned statements supporting the warrant were hearsay statements, the “veracity” or “reliability” prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test had to be met and it was not. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). After submission of this case, the Supreme Court abandoned the standard two-prong test of Aguilar-Spinelli in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). While stating that “veracity,” “reliability” and “basis of knowledge” are highly relevant in determining an informant’s report, the Supreme Court said they are no longer separate and rigid requirements which must be met in determining probable cause. The “totality of the circumstances” approach which includes a consideration of the “veracity,” “reliability” and “basis of knowledge” is now the standard to be used in evaluating probable cause in a commonsense, practical fashion.
In the instant case none of the four unsworn statements contain explicit statements of “veracity.” However, three of the statements — Gatlin’s, Montgomery’s, and Marbut’s — fall into the “identified bystander” or witness category in which courts have found an inherent reliability. All three simply describe events witnessed by disinterested citizens, not actual “informers” in the sense of undercover officers or those involved in criminal activity. They are all based on direct, personal observation or first-hand knowledge. Even under pre-Gates law these statements would be found to be reliable. See Lopez v. State, 535 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Frazier v. State, 480 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139 (D.C.Cir.1981) and cases cited therein at n. 4; United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir.1972).
Pollard’s statement does not fit quite so easily into the bystander category. However, Pollard’s statement relates a conversation with appellant which details the crime as far as exact location, time of day, method, and result. The only difference was the date — appellant told Pollard he was going to commit the robbery that morning, instead he committed it a week later. This fact does not detract from the accuracy of the statement as a whole. Examining the statement under the totality of the circumstances we find that Pollard’s statement was corroborated by the facts of the crime itself, which police knew before Pollard gave her statement, and by the two other witness statements which described a man fitting appellant’s description, who was seen entering and then running from the store in the early morning hours. Given these other statements and the facts of the offense, both of which corroborate Pollard’s information we hold that Pollard’s statement is reliable. After examining the totality of the circumstances, including the facts of the crime itself and the four statements, one of which names appellant and [691]*691details the facts of the crime very closely, we find a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to believe that appellant had committed the offense. Cf. Bellah v. State, 653 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). The ground of error is overruled.
Appellant next contends that his confession should not have been admitted into evidence because it was not voluntarily made under the guidelines of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Appellant does not base his contention on a violation of Article 38.22, V.A.C.C.P., thus, we will not address it.
Appellant, who was nineteen at the time, was arrested at about 11:00 p.m. on August 4. He was taken before a magistrate and advised of his rights at about 11:30 p.m. The magistrate, Judge Joe Post, testified that he asked appellant if he understood his rights and that appellant said he understood. Appellant was then taken to a small room in the criminal investigation division of the police department. Claude Zachary, chief of police for Cleburne and a man with twenty-two years of experience in law enforcement, questioned appellant for about an hour and a half beginning at about midnight on August 4. Zachary advised appellant of his rights before he began talking to him and told appellant he had been arrested for the robbery and murder of Charlie Maldonado.
Lieutenant N.H. Laceman, an officer with the Cleburne Police department, arrived at the police station and questioned appellant from about 2:00 to 3:00 a.m. on August 5. He and Zachary talked to appellant until 6:30 or 7:30 a.m. with several breaks in-between. They all ate breakfast, and resumed questioning for a little while. Appellant then agreed to go with them to Dallas to take a polygraph test. Zachary said appellant always answered their questions, talking about various aspects of the case. Many times he said he did not know or did not do it. Laceman said appellant never asked them to stop their questioning and never asked for a lawyer.
Laceman, Zachary, and appellant drove to Dallas for the polygraph test, returning to Cleburne about 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. Appellant was given dinner, and placed in a cell for the night.
Zachary said that he, Officer Robbie Goodnight, and Sergeant W.D. Baker questioned appellant off and on throughout the day on August 6, although none of them talked to him together. Goodnight said he advised appellant of his rights on August 6 before he spoke to him, and said that he only spoke to appellant for about forty-five minutes. Baker testified that he spoke to appellant four or five times the first few days appellant was in city jail, always reading him his rights first. Both Baker and Goodnight said that appellant was always willing to talk to them and that they were checking out what appellant told them and then informing appellant about what they had found. After about 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. appellant would be put back in his cell for the night.
Zachary testified that appellant was not questioned all the time. He talked to appellant almost every day, but not constantly, and often it was simply to tell him whether or not the information he had told the police had been correct. As mentioned several other officers spoke with appellant concerning information he had told them. During the time he was held in city jail appellant was permitted to telephone those people he requested to telephone, and he visited with his mother, sisters, and brother on several occasions.
On August 11, seven days after appellant’s arrest, James Henry who was working on the case as a special investigator for the district attorney’s office, saw appellant in the police station. Henry said he had known appellant for several years and was on a friendly basis with him. Appellant nodded to Henry and Henry acknowledged the greeting. Appellant then indicated that he wanted to talk to Henry and Henry read him his rights. Henry asked him about the money from the robbery, asked him if he knew who committed the offense and if he was involved. Appellant answer[692]*692ed that he had the money and the money bags. Henry asked him what happened to the bags and appellant told him he would show him. Henry called Zachary and the three men got into an unmarked police car and drove to Earl Williams grocery store.
Zachary asked appellant to start from the scene of the crime and direct them as to the route he took after the robbery. Appellant showed them how he had hidden the money bags in a clump of grass, gone to his mother’s house and gotten his car, and driven to a bridge or culvert near a sewage pond. He told Zachary to stop the car, that he was going to tell them everything, and that the gun was there. Zachary asked him if it was the gun he had shot Maldonado with and appellant said “yes.” Henry retrieved the gun from under the bridge. Appellant then directed them to Fort Worth to get the money bags. Henry asked appellant about the offense and appellant told him he had put Maldonado into the freezer at the rear of the store. He said he walked back to see if he had locked the door and as he approached the door Maldonado kicked it open and the gun went off.2
Appellant directed Zachary and Henry to a manhole or drainage cover in a field. Henry and appellant climbed down into the tunnels of the drainage system and appellant showed him where he had burned checks stolen in the robbery. Henry picked up pieces of burned checks, some with the grocery store name stamped on them. He also found the money bags.
In response to questions about the location of the money, appellant directed them to his sister’s house in Arlington. His car was parked in the locked garage at the house. He opened the trunk, looked inside and could not find the money. He told them that his sister, who was not at home, must have the money. The three then drove back to Cleburne, stopping on the way to eat lunch.
When they arrived at the police station, Zachary read appellant his rights from the top of a statement form. Appellant said he understood his rights. Mrs. Williams, a secretary at the police department, wrote appellant’s statement down and then typed it. Zachary handed the typed statement to appellant, told him to read it and make any changes he wanted. Appellant read the statement, corrected something about blue jeans and shoes, and signed the statement. Zachary and Henry testified that no promises were made and that appellant freely, voluntarily, and knowingly waived his rights prior to making the oral and written statements.
Appellant contends that his confession was not voluntary because he was “extensively interrogated” for seven days by numerous people; that his conversations were covertly taped; that he was forced to take a polygraph in Dallas; that he was kept in a small holding cell or a small interrogation room with no way to determine if it were day or night; that he had limited access to his family; that he never saw a lawyer; and that he was treated differently than any other prisoner arrested by the Cle-burne Police in that he was held at the city jail rather than being transferred to the county jail.
In response to these contentions the State points out several things. Officer Goodnight testified that he and Officer Baker hid a tape recorder in the interrogation room on one occasion. Appellant had implicated another man in the commission of the offense and the police brought this man in to talk to appellant while no one else was in the room. Goodnight said they had asked the district attorney’s office about use of the recorder in this instance and the district attorney had informed them that the tape could not be used as evidence, but that they could use the tape for information purposes. No other conversation was recorded.
Concerning the reason appellant was held at the city jail from August 4 through August 14, Zachary testified that in his ten years as police chief no other prisoner had been held in the city jail as long as appel[693]*693lant, but that there were two reasons for holding him. First, the police were informed that relatives of the deceased had come to town and threatened appellant’s life and the police believed the security at the city jail was better than that at the larger county jail. Second, prisoners were usually transferred when the investigation of their case was completed by the police and the investigation into appellant’s case was ongoing. Zachary also testified that appellant was permitted to make telephone calls; that he saw his mother, sisters, and brother on several occasions; that after the night of his arrest he was never questioned after 5:00 or 6:00 p.m.; and that he was not continually interrogated, that he gave basic information to police, which was checked and then the results of which were reported to appellant. Zachary and the other officers said that appellant was always willing to talk with them, that he was informed of his rights repeatedly, and that he voluntarily and knowingly waived them.
The record indicates that appellant agreed to take a polygraph test and contains no hint of coercion or force in that decision.
We agree with appellant that “extensive interrogation” from August 4 to August 11 when he confessed would be suspect. However, the record of the Jackson-Den-no3 hearing does not substantiate that claim. Assuredly, appellant was questioned from the date of his arrest until he confessed on August 11. However, much of the questioning was apparently talking with appellant about the results of the investigation of the story appellant had volunteered, which investigation refuted appellant’s story. While the questioning on the night of his arrest lasted for several hours, thereafter appellant was not questioned for longer than forty-five minutes to an hour at a time during the day. Appellant was permitted to visit with his family and use the telephone when requested.
Appellant did not testify at the hearing on the voluntariness of his confession. The trial court’s extensive and thorough findings of fact conclude that the oral and written confessions were voluntarily given.
The determination of whether a confession is voluntary under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution must be based upon examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding its acquisition. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936); Hawkins v. State, 628 S.W.2d 71 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). Relevant circumstances to determine if a defendant’s will has been overborne have included length of detention, incommunicado or prolonged interrogation, denying a family access to a defendant, refusing a defendant’s request to telephone a lawyer or family, and physical brutality. See 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure, Sec. 6.2 at p. 445 (West 1984). A defendant’s characteristics and status, as well as the conduct of the police, are important concerns. Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 69 S.Ct. 1352, 93 L.Ed. 1810 (1949); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963). Several pre-Miranda cases involved mentally retarded, mentally deficient or insane defendants. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246 (1957); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967).
In the instant case appellant was arrested August 4 and confessed August 11. Immediately following his arrest he was taken before a magistrate and advised of his rights. Throughout the course of questioning, appellant was repeatedly advised of his rights. The record does not indicate that appellant was mentally deficient. He was held at the city jail until August 14, longer than any other individual as far as any of the police officers could remember. However, he was not held incommunicado, but was permitted to make [694]*694telephone calls when he requested to do so and was permitted to and did visit with different members of his family on several occasions. He was well-fed, was not questioned for prolonged periods of time after the night of his arrest, and never indicated a desire to stop the questioning or see an attorney. The officers testified that part of the reason for the prolonged stay in city jail was due to ongoing investigations of various stories relayed to them by appellant concerning the offense, many of which turned out to be false. Cf. Columbe v. Connecticut, supra, 367 U.S. at 580, 81 S.Ct. at 1866. Zachary testified that appellant was kept in the city jail because of threats made on his life and, as mentioned, because the investigation was continuing. Compare Clewis v. Texas, supra, in which the defendant was not advised of his rights, was not taken before a magistrate for 38 hours, had little sleep or food, appeared to be sick, and had little contact with anyone except police, and was interrogated intermittently by many officers for the purpose of getting “the truth.” The coercive atmosphere presented in Clewis v. Texas, supra, and Columbe v. Connecticut, supra, is not presented in the instant case. Viewing the totality of the circumstances as mentioned, we find that the oral and written statements were voluntarily given by appellant. The ground of error is overruled.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support an affirmative answer at the penalty stage of the trial to Special Issue No. 2 as to the probability of future criminal acts of violence. See Art. 37.071(b)(2), V.A.C.C.P.
The state reoffered the evidence from the guilt-innocence stage of trial and called several witnesses. The evidence adduced at trial showed that appellant had mentioned robbing and shooting whoever was in Earl Williams’ grocery store one week before he actually did so. The record also showed that appellant and Maldonado knew each other. The pathologist’s testimony showed that the wounds were contact wounds, meaning that the gun had been in contact with Maldonado’s head when fired. Appellant had twice placed the gun against Maldonado’s head and fired it. Maldonado was apparently seated on a crate with appellant standing over him when he was shot. There was no sign of a struggle.
Several witnesses testified that appellant’s reputation for being peaceful and law-abiding was bad. The vice-principal of the high school which appellant had attended testified that appellant’s school record contained over eighty-five incidents of misconduct, which was more than usual. He said these included class disturbance, disrespectful conduct, refusal to follow orders given, forgery, and one incident of fighting.
David Brunson, who worked at the Santa Fe railroad with appellant, said that appellant told him he had a .38 caliber pistol and that he had had a problem in Fort Worth and a Mexican or Puerto Rican had shot at him and he had shot back.
The State also put on evidence that appellant was found in possession of a car stereo two days after the car had been burglarized and the stereo stolen. Appellant’s explanation of where he had gotten the stereo was found to be false.
Numerous witnesses called by the defense testified that they had grown up with appellant, knew him well, did not consider him a threat, and did not consider him to be violent. They also said that his reputation for being peaceful and law-abiding was good and that they had been shocked when they heard appellant was accused of killing and robbing Charlie Maldonado.
Appellant did not testify.
The State called Larry Duvall who was an inmate of the county jail at the same time appellant was there which was after appellant’s arrest for Maldonado’s murder. Duvall said that during the twenty days in which he was in jail with appellant, appellant assaulted him and several other inmates on four or five occasions. Duvall said appellant was a leader in the jail and took his money and his food. He claimed that appellant told him he wanted to sexually abuse him. Duvall was in jail for [695]*695felony theft by check and was currently on probation for forgery. At the time he testified the theft case was still pending. Du-vall said the district attorney told him that his testimony would not have any effect in his pending case.
Circumstances of the offense itself can sustain an affirmative answer to Art. 37.071(b)(2). Russell v. State, 665 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Mitchell v. State, 650 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); King v. State, 631 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). In the instant case, the evidence suggests premeditation and planning as appellant told someone he was going to commit the offense, although he committed a week later than he had originally said. The medical evidence indicates a deliberate and cold-blooded murder during a robbery of a man who knew appellant and whom appellant knew. The medical testimony indicates that Maldonado was seated on a crate and that appellant placed the gun at his head on two separate occasions and shot him. There was also testimony that after being confined in the county jail appellant assaulted several inmates. There was also testimony that appellant’s reputation for being peaceful and law-abiding was bad.
When the facts of the instant offense are considered with the evidence of the assaults while in jail after the offense, and appellant’s reputation, we find the evidence sufficient to sustain the jury’s affirmative answer to the second special issue. See Russell, supra; Mitchell, supra; Russell v. State, 598 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). The ground of error is overruled.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in permitting Eva Maldonado, the deceased’s wife, to testify in rebuttal at the punishment stage of trial.
The State called Eva Maldonado to testify that the deceased was a peaceful, hardworking man. Prior to her testimony, appellant objected, stating that such testimony was not rebuttal and was not invited by the defense. The court overruled the objection. Eva Maldonado testified that the deceased was a peaceful, hardworking man and that she and the deceased had been married almost twenty-two years and had five children. The State introduced a family picture of the Maldonados and elicited the names and ages of all the children.
Appellant is correct in stating the rule:
It is never competent for the State in the first instance to prove that the person slain was peaceable and inoffensive. Such evidence becomes admissible in rebuttal when the opposite has been testified to in behalf of the defense, or when the defendant seeks to justify the homicide on the ground of threats made by the deceased.
Arthur v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 161, 339 S.W.2d 538, 539 (1960). See Lamb v. State, 680 S.W.2d 11 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) wherein the rule is applicable to capital murder.
At the guilt-innocence stage appellant rested without calling a single witness. At the punishment stage appellant’s witnesses testified that appellant’s reputation for being peaceful and law-abiding was good and that appellant was not a threat. Appellant did not raise an issue or present any evidence about the violent nature, or lack thereof, of the deceased. Evidence that appellant’s reputation for being peaceful and law-abiding was good does not, by itself, raise an issue that the deceased reputation for the same was bad. Thus, nor does it, by itself, permit the State to then introduce evidence concerning the deceased’s reputation for being peaceable. Arthur, supra. Appellant did not present a defense or allude to the deceased in any way. Further, neither appellant nor any witnesses testified as to any provocation.
We agree with appellant that the issue of the deceased’s character for being peaceable and law-abiding was not raised by the evidence, thus the rebuttal testimony of Eva Maldonado was inadmissible. Hatley v. State, 533 S.W.2d 27 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). There was nothing to rebut. The obvious purpose therefore, in calling the wife of the deceased in rebuttal as the last witness the jury heard at the punishment stage, [696]*696was to arouse and inflame the jury against appellant. The harm is compounded in the instant case where, although we find it sufficient, the evidence supporting special issue No. 2 is by no means overwhelmning. The prejudicial effect of such testimony is thus greater.
The testimony was not relevant to either of the two special issues presented to the jury. Where, as in the instant case, such testimony has no other purpose than to inflame the jury and arouse their sympathy at the punishment stage of a capital murder trial, the error is harmful and the case must be reversed.4 Accordingly, this case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
TEAGUE, J., concurs in result.
MILLER, CAMPBELL and WHITE, JJ., dissent.
Before the court en banc.