Armstrong v. BOARD OF SCH. DIRECTORS, ETC.

471 F. Supp. 827, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610
District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided June 20, 1979·No. Civ. A. 65-C-173·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER ON FACULTY DESEGREGATION REMEDY

REYNOLDS, Chief Judge.

This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the defendants’ alleged unconstitutional actions in creating and maintaining unlawful racial segregation in the Milwaukee public school system. The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

In a decision and order issued on June 1, 1978, the Court discussed and made findings of fact about the history of faculty assignments in the Milwaukee public school sys *829 tern. Armstrong v. O’Connell, 451 F.Supp. 817, 830-836 (E.D.Wis.1978). Based on its findings, the Court concluded at 866 that:

“F-89. The objective evidence previously described in detail demonstrates that defendants’ decisions, at least since 1950, with respect to teacher assignment and transfers, * * * were undertaken with an intent to segregate * * teachers by race. * * * ”

In a decision and order issued on February 8, 1979, see Armstrong v. O’Connell, 463 F.Supp. 1295 (E.D.Wis.1979), the Court found that the defendants’ decisions with respect to teacher assignments and transfers have had a systemwide impact on the Milwaukee public school system, and it concluded at 1309 that:

“L-3. In order to redress the pervasive, systemwide impact' of defendants’ constitutional violations, a systemwide remedy encompassing both student population and teacher assignment is required.”

The Court today in a companion decision approved a settlement agreement submitted by the plaintiffs and defendants,which agreement sets forth a remedy for the systemwide impact of defendants’ constitutional violations on student population. Two separate remedial plans designed to cure the systemwide impact of defendants’ constitutional violations on teacher assignments have been submitted to the Court, one by the plaintiffs and defendants jointly (hereinafter the “administration plan”) and the other by the undesignated intervenor, the Milwaukee Teachers’ Education Association (hereinafter the “MTEA plan”). For the reasons set forth, the Court adopts the administration plan with minor modifications in the provisions for enforcement. *

There are three major differences between the plans. First, the administration plan provides that all school faculties shall be desegregated by the fall of 1979, whereas the MTEA plan provides that five-sixths of the faculties shall be desegregated by the fall of 1979 and the remaining one-sixth by the fall of 1980. Both plans use the same definition of desegregation. Second, the administration plan provides that teachers will be excessed in accordance with the collective bargaining seniority provisions, except where doing so will not help to promote or maintain racial balance, and in the latter case the least senior teacher of the appropriate race will be excessed with a right to return in the event the excessing turns out to have been unnecessary and the return will not negatively affect racial balance; that teachers will be informed of vacancies by May 15, may volunteer to fill vacancies through June 1, and that final assignments will be made prior to commencement of the school year, with mandatory assignments if necessary to reach the desegregation goals; and that a final adjustment will take place after the commencement of the school year if the actual enrollment figures require such an adjustment. The MTEA plan provides that ex-cessing shall occur strictly in accordance with the seniority provisions in the collective bargaining agreement; that teachers may apply for vacancies set forth in a list to be prepared on or about July 1; and that assignments shall be made on a tentative basis until the fourth week of the school year when mandatory reassignment will be used if necessary to meet the desegregation goals. Third and last, with respect to enforcement, the administration plan provides that arbitration provisions in the collective bargaining agreement shall be followed, except that the parties may take matters pertaining to whether or not the goals of the remedial order have been met to a United States Magistrate for review. The MTEA plan provides that all questions arising un *830 der the remedial order shall be settled by arbitration with the usual right of appeal to the court of the arbitrator’s decision.

The MTEA has urged the Court to accept its plan if for no other reason, then because the plan has the support of the teachers and the union. The parties argue that the defendants should have the initial opportunity to devise a constitutionally acceptable remedy and only if they fail should the Court consider an alternative remedy. , See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1955). Each side, in addition, argues that its plan will be the most effective in curing the present effects of defendants’ past unconstitutional actions and departs the least from the terms of the collective bargaining agreement presently in effect.

The Court recognizes the conflicting interests at stake, and recognizes the significance both of local school board autonomy and of the teachers’ role in implementing a remedy and the difference to its effectiveness that their support for the remedy imposed can make. See, e. g., Morgan v. McDonough, 456 F.Supp. 1113, 1116 (D.Mass.1978). Nevertheless, the burden is on the court ultimately to impose the remedy which it believes will most effectively cure the effects of the past constitutional violations, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 439, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968), even if in so doing it must override provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement. Morgan v. McDonough, supra. As stated in Armstrong v. O’Connell, 416 F.Supp. 1325, 1340 (E.D.Wis.1976):

“ * * * The district court’s only legitimate concern is to see to it that the constitutional violation is corrected. As a practical matter, local school officials should have a ‘first crack’ at coming up with a desegregation remedy, * * *. * * * [I]t has been held that ‘[o]rdinarily, the court will not substitute its discretion for that of a board of education but will adopt a plan proposed by the board if it fulfills the board’s duty to eliminate the effects of past illegal conduct.’ (Citation omitted.)
“At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has instructed district courts to consider school board plans ‘in light of any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more promising in their effectiveness.’ (Citation omitted.)”

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Armstrong v. BOARD OF SCH. DIRECTORS, ETC., 471 F. Supp. 827, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610 (E.D. Wis. 1979).

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