Armstrong v. BOARD OF SCH. DIRECTORS, ETC.

471 F. Supp. 800, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12597
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMay 4, 1979
DocketCiv. A. 65-C-173
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 471 F. Supp. 800 (Armstrong v. BOARD OF SCH. DIRECTORS, ETC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Armstrong v. BOARD OF SCH. DIRECTORS, ETC., 471 F. Supp. 800, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12597 (E.D. Wis. 1979).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

REYNOLDS, Chief Judge.

I. Introduction

This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the defendants’ alleged unconstitutional actions in creating and maintaining unlawful racial segregation in the City of Milwaukee public school system. The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

On January 19, 1976, the Court issued a decision and order finding the defendants liable for the constitutional violations alleged in the amended complaint. Amos v. Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee, 408 F.Supp. 765 (E.D.Wis.1976). Following affirmance of that decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976), the decision was vacated and remanded by the United States Supreme Court to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), and Dayton Board of Education v. *803 Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (1977), see Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672, 97 S.Ct. 2907, 53 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1977), and the court of appeals thereafter remanded the case to this court for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s mandate. Armstrong v. Brennan, 566 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1977).

The Court has proceeded in three phases with its reconsideration of the case:

First, the Court took additional evidence on the issue of past intentional discrimination. On June 1, 1978, the Court found:

* * * that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs with segregative intent * * * and in so doing violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Armstrong v. O’Connell, 451 F.Supp. 817, 820 (E.D.Wis.1978).

The Court also found:

“F-89. * * * [Defendants undertook a systematic program designed to prevent whites from being required to attend classes with large numbers of blacks.” Armstrong v. O’Connell, supra, at 866.

Second, on July 10, 1978 through July 14, 1978, and on October 23,1978 through October 25, 1978, the Court took evidence on the issue of the present effects of defendants’ past segregative acts. On February 8,1979, the Court found:

“D-2. * * * [Defendants’ constitutional violations had an incremental segregative effect throughout the school system.
“L — 3. In order to redress the pervasive, systemwide impact of defendants’ constitutional violations, a systemwide remedy encompassing both student population and teacher assignment is required.” Armstrong v. O’Connell, 463 F.Supp. 1295, 1309 (E.D.Wis.1979).

Finally, in its February 8, 1979, decision and order, the Court established a schedule for submission by the parties of proposed remedial plans, and it scheduled a hearing to commence March 23,1979, on the issue of the appropriate remedy to be imposed.

In lieu of proposed remedial plans, on March 1,1979, the plaintiffs and defendants submitted to the Court a proposed agreement (attached hereto as Appendix A) for settlement of all issues remaining in the case with the exception of the issue of a teacher assignment remedial plan, and a motion for approval of the settlement agreement, which motion is the subject of this decision and order. 1 For the following reasons, the motion is granted and the settlement agreement is approved.

II. Settlement of a Class Action

Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

“(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.”

The Seventh Circuit has recognized that the essence of a settlement is compromise and that one of the benefits obtained from it is avoidance of the need for court resolution of disputed issues. In Re General Motors Corporation Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106 at 1132, n. 44 (7th Cir. 1979); Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d 108, 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1976); McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corporation, 565 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1977). Nevertheless, before it can approve a settlement proposal, the Court must be satisfied that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. In Re General Motors, supra, at 1122; In Re Clark Oil & Refining Corporation Antitrust Litigation, 422 If.Supp. 503 (E.D.Wis.1977). The propo *804 nents of the settlement bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of fairness. In Re General Motors, at 1126, n. 30; Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.46 at 56 (1977 ed.) (Wright & Miller) (hereafter “Manual”).

Among the factors which the Court should consider in judging the fairness of the proposal are the following:

“(1) 1 * * * the strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement’;
“(2) ‘[T]he defendant’s ability to pay’;
“(3) ‘[T]he complexity, length and expense of further litigation’;
“(4) ‘[T]he amount of opposition to the settlement’;”
Manual, supra, at 56.

Professor Moore notes in addition the factors of:

Í¿(1) * * *

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