Morgan v. McDonough

456 F. Supp. 1113, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15418
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedSeptember 20, 1978
DocketCiv. A. 72-911-G
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 456 F. Supp. 1113 (Morgan v. McDonough) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morgan v. McDonough, 456 F. Supp. 1113, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15418 (D. Mass. 1978).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDERS TERMINATING TEMPORARY RECEIVERSHIP OF SOUTH BOSTON HIGH SCHOOL

GARRITY, District Judge.

At the hearing on August 31, 1978 the court granted the school defendants’ motion for termination of the temporary receivership of South Boston High School and stated its basic findings supporting that order. The school defendants’ motion, filed April 28, 1978, was accompanied by a form of proposed consent decree. However, in briefs and at the hearing on May 30, 1978, plaintiffs and other parties withheld their consent, objected to termination generally and to various specific provisions. Hence the need for particularized orders. For the most part they adopt the provisions of the proposed consent decree. The principal changes made by the court are in the scope of the provisions affecting the administrative staff and the assignment of monitoring functions to the Department of Implementation.

Termination at this time is the result of a course of proceedings and investigations advised by the Court of Appeals in its opinion dated January 26, 1977, in Morgan v. Mc-Donough, 1 Cir. 1977, 548 F.2d 28, 33. At a hearing on the day after issuance of the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the court ordered that various reports and proposals be filed by February 11,1977 and scheduled a hearing for February 17. In order that more complete information might be obtained the parties requested postponement of the hearing, which was continued until April 21, 1977. At that time and thereafter the court heard the arguments *1115 and positions of the parties and ruled against termination during 1977. Throughout the 1977-78 school year conditions at the high school improved dramatically, as reflected in periodic reports received from the temporary receiver and the court-appointed experts and in stories in the news media. For example, a report by the experts, Deans Dentler and Scott of the Boston University School of Education, on their visit to the school on March 3, 1978 stated,

On our visit, the plant was absolutely transformed. It has been improved tenfold since 1976. It is clean, repaired, new equipment has been added, and it actually looks like a place anyone would be willing to attend. The programmatic and interpersonal environments are even more extraordinarily transformed than is the plant. No one shuffles about anymore. An atmosphere of dignity and participation prevails.

To see for itself, the court visited the school for two and a half hours on May 18, 1978. By the end of the 1977-78 school year it became apparent that the conditions warranting the extraordinary receivership remedy no longer existed. 1 Plaintiffs’ filing on May 19, 1978, in response to the school defendants’ motion for termination, listed at pp. 3-4 twenty problems in and outside the school which, in their opinion, supported the imposition of receivership in December 1975. Almost without exception, these problems have disappeared.

Developments within the school committee and school department also support the court’s order of termination. Foremost is their commitment to desegregation at South Boston High School and to preservation of the changes made pursuant to the court’s orders entered December 9,1975 and subsequently, and ratified in the proposed consent decree accompanying their motion for termination. Additional evidence of the school defendants’ good faith and cooperation is found in their votes on August 25, 1978 appointing administrators nominated by the receiver. The court is relying too on the affirmative action program adopted by the current school committee shortly after it took office at the beginning of this year. Another important development has been the recent reorganization of the school department enacted by the state legislature, Mass.Stats.1978, c. 333. Henceforth the business manager, chief plant engineer and chief structural engineer will be under the control of the Superintendent, who will be accountable for the physical condition of the school. Finally, the Department of Implementation has come into its own and has demonstrated, especially in the matter of student assignments for the 1978-79 academic year, its readiness and capacity to facilitate and monitor implementation of the court’s desegregation plan. These favorable development." underlie the court’s confidence that the fi aits of the temporary receivership at South Boston High School will be preserved without continuing court intervention.

The plaintiff class and State Board of Education objected to termination unless gradual and urged a trial period during which the court and parties might evaluate the actions of the school defendants in carrying out the provisions of the proposed consent decree. In our opinion the school defendants, by their conduct outlined in the previous paragraph, have shown that a longer trial period than one commencing with their filing on April 28,1978 is unwarranted. Their motion for termination represented that they “are now carrying out the proposed consent decree which is designed to give effect to the Court’s Desegregation Orders in a meaningful manner at South Boston High School” and they have been carrying out the proposed decree pending the court’s ruling on their motion. For example, in addition to the accomplishments previously referred to, the school defendants have already exceeded the goals for faculty and staff desegregation set *1116 forth in paragraph 19 of the orders and have completed nearly all of the repairs specified in paragraph 43.

The Boston Teachers Union, which has been heard as an intervenor throughout the remedial phase of these proceedings, endorsed the termination of the receivership, which it opposed from its inception, but filed objections to several specific provisions of the proposed consent decree, herein adopted, which conflict with collective bargaining agreements defining the rights and benefits of teachers and administrators. For examples, paragraph 6 permits the headmaster to select instructional aides, whereas the bargaining agreement provides for recall by seniority; paragraph 10 prescribes certain in-service meetings to be led by the headmaster, whereas the agreement says that they shall be conducted by the teaching staff; paragraph 15, which permits the headmaster to select new faculty members until August 31, 1980, conflicts with teachers’ transfer rights; and paragraph 33 creates the new position of coordinator of the work-experience program without the job description, compensation and qualifications having been negotiated with the union and posted for transfer or promotion. Generally the Union has objected to what it calls the school’s “protective custody for two years described in the proposed Consent Decree”. The court overrules these objections and, in converting proposed consent decree provisions into court orders, has prefaced several sentences with the phrase, “Notwithstanding inconsistent collective bargaining agreement provisions,”. Similarly, paragraph 7 of the orders which follow ratifies school defendants’ appointments and transfers of faculty and staff made pursuant to formal orders of the court, e. g., those entered April 7, June 4, August 20 and September 27, 1976 and those made without formal orders, e. g., the appointments on August 25, 1978, by direction of the receiver with court approval.

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Bluebook (online)
456 F. Supp. 1113, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15418, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morgan-v-mcdonough-mad-1978.