Armann Jamal Johnson v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 24, 2020
• Docket: 19A-CR-2849
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED Jun 24 2020, 5:44 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Elizabeth A. Flynn Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Myriam Serrano Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Armann Jamal Johnson, June 24, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2849 v. Appeal from the LaPorte Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael S. Appellee-Plaintiff. Bergerson, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 46D01-1812-F3-1318

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 1 of 14 Case Summary

[1] Armann Johnson appeals his conviction for battery with a deadly weapon, a

Level 5 felony. We reverse and vacate Johnson’s conviction.

Issues

[2] Johnson raises three issues on appeal; however, we revise and restate as the two

following issues.

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Johnson’s out-of-court statement.

II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Johnson’s conviction.

Facts

[3] From August 2018 to October 2018, a series of incidents occurred between

Johnson and his on-again-off-again girlfriend, M.W. 1 Detective Arwen

LaMotte, with the Michigan City Police Department, became involved with the

investigation of the events beginning in August 2018. In the early stages of her

interactions with M.W., M.W. was not cooperative with Detective LaMotte

and did not want to file charges against Johnson. Ultimately, on October 15,

2018, Detective LaMotte was investigating a fire at M.W.’s apartment that

1 Although several incidents occurred that resulted in multiple charges against Johnson, this appeal focuses on the facts in Johnson’s battery charge and subsequent conviction. Importantly, during the trial, testimony was elicited regarding a physical altercation between M.W. and Johnson in August 2018; however, the charging information on the battery charge in this case was based on the battery that occurred on October 7, 2018.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 2 of 14 occurred earlier that day, which was determined to be intentionally set. In the

course of her investigation, Detective LaMotte interviewed M.W.

[4] During the interview, M.W. was much more cooperative than in the past. In

the course of discussing M.W.’s past history with Johnson, M.W. advised

Detective LaMotte that Johnson had battered her one week prior to the fire. As

a result of the investigation, Detective LaMotte took photographs of bruises on

M.W.’s body and took a security stick from M.W.’s apartment. 2 As a result of

the interview, Detective LaMotte prepared a police report regarding “domestic

battery and strangulation.” Tr. Vol. III p. 105.

[5] On November 30, 2018, Johnson was charged with battery with a deadly

weapon, a Level 5 felony, based on the October 2018 battery, and several other

charges. 3 After Johnson’s arrest, Detective LaMotte interviewed Johnson.

During the interview, Johnson admitted that he was angry with M.W. and hit

M.W. with his fists while at her apartment. See State’s Ex. 11. In the interview,

Johnson told Detective LaMotte that he recalled picking up the security stick

and hitting his own hand with the stick; however, Johnson did not recall hitting

M.W. with the security stick. When asked by Detective LaMotte if it was

2 The security stick was used as reinforcement for a sliding glass door in the apartment. 3 As a result of the Detective LaMotte’s ongoing investigation, the entirety of Johnson’s convictions included: Count I, robbery, a Level 3 felony; Count II, stalking, a Level 4 felony; Count III, battery, a Level 5 felony; Count IV, strangulation, a Level 6 felony; Count V, arson, a Level 4 felony; and Count VI, intimidation, a Level 5 felony. All these charges involved M.W. and came about as a result of Detective LaMotte’s investigation of the time period from August to October 2018. After the State’s presentation of the evidence, the State moved to dismiss Counts IV and VI, which the trial court granted. The jury found Johnson not guilty of Counts I, II, and V. The jury found Johnson guilty only of the battery with a deadly weapon charge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 3 of 14 “possible” if he did so, Johnson responded, “probably.” Id. In the interview,

Johnson also did not recall the security stick being damaged.

[6] Johnson’s jury trial began on October 7, 2019, and after a jury was empaneled,

Johnson made an oral motion in limine. In that motion, Johnson sought to

prevent the State from discussing in its opening statement certain portions of

Johnson’s out-of-court interview with police. Johnson argued the confession

may be inadmissible based on principles of corpus delicti if M.W. did not

appear to testify. The trial court denied Johnson’s motion.

[7] M.W. had moved out of state and did not appear to testify at trial after the State

subpoenaed M.W. to testify. 4 All evidence regarding the battery offense was

presented through Detective LaMotte’s testimony of what M.W. reported to

Detective LaMotte during the course of her investigation. Prior to the

presentation of any evidence on the battery charge, the parties and trial court

discussed the admission of Johnson’s prior out-of-court statement, which the

State anticipated presenting. Johnson argued that the evidence was

inadmissible because the State had “to show in some way that a crime was

committed before [Johnson’s] confession becomes relevant.” Tr. Vol. III p. 71.

The trial court took the matter under advisement until the trial court had an

opportunity to review the parties’ arguments. The trial court did not ultimately

4 In preparation for trial, on September 18, 2019, the trial court certified an interstate subpoena for M.W.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 4 of 14 rule on the motion until the State sought admission of the out-of-court

statement.

[8] Detective LaMotte testified that she and M.W. discussed three incidents

between Johnson and M.W. when they met on October 15, 2018, involving

arson, robbery, and a “prior unreported battery.” Id. at 88. During Detective

LaMotte’s testimony, the State sought admission of photographs of M.W. that

Detective LaMotte took while interviewing M.W. after M.W. reported to

Detective LaMotte that Johnson “battered her.” Id. at 94. Johnson objected to

Detective LaMotte’s statement as hearsay, which the trial court overruled. The

deputy prosecutor then asked Detective LaMotte what was “significant” about

the photos, to which Detective LaMotte testified that M.W. was “bruised.” Id.

at 95.

[9] The State then sought to admit the photographs, and Johnson objected to their

admission. Johnson argued the photos were not relevant because Detective

LaMotte was investigating an arson, and the “bruises that [Detective LaMotte]

saw are not relevant to what’s been presented so far.” Id. at 96. The trial court

overruled the objection saying: “[t]hat is the other (inaudible) the multiple other

complaints regarding battery.” 5 Id. The trial court, however, gave a limiting

instruction to the jury as follows:

5 There was other evidence presented at trial of a physical altercation between M.W. and Johnson. That altercation, however, was related to the allegations that Johnson robbed M.W. in August 2018.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 5 of 14 I’m going to give you a limiting instruction at this point regarding some of the evidence that you may have just heard. And sometimes evidence is admitted for a limited purpose. Uh, you may, [ ], read or will have heard possibly statements made by [M.W.] to the police in the course of their investigation. The statements allegedly made by [M.W.] are not being offered for the truth of the matters being asserted in these statements, but only to provide context for the statements being attributed to the Defendant. You shall not consider the alleged statements of [M.W.] as substantive evidence on the issue of whether the State of Indiana has satisfied its burden of proof. However, you may consider the statements made by the Defendant for any purpose you see fit and give the same weight to which you think they are entitled. Without the in-court testimony of [M.W.], you shall not consider such evidence for any other purpose. Specifically, you shall not consider the purported statements of [M.W.] in arriving at your verdict.

Id. at 97. The photographs were then admitted and published to the jury as

Detective LaMotte described the photographs. Detective LaMotte testified

M.W.’s bruises appeared to be in the “healing stages[.]” Id. at 100.

[10] The deputy prosecutor then asked Detective LaMotte if, after the conversation

with M.W., “an item of evidence [was] collected at the apartment[.]” Id. at

101. Detective LaMotte responded affirmatively. The deputy prosecutor

directed Detective LaMotte to identify State’s Exhibit 24, which Detective

LaMotte identified as a “security stick for a sliding glass door” taken from

M.W.’s home. Id. at 102. The State then sought to admit the security stick.

Johnson objected that the security stick was irrelevant, that the prejudicial effect

outweighed the probative value, and that there had yet to be any connection

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 6 of 14 between the security stick and the alleged battery. The trial court overruled the

objection, concluding that, in view of the photographs of M.W.’s injuries, it

appeared the “type of object” that caused the markings was a “lengthy one.”

Id. at 104. The trial court concluded, therefore, it would let the jury determine

whether the security stick caused the injuries. 6 Id. at 104. Detective LaMotte

provided no testimony to connect the security stick to the marks on M.W.’s

body other than the general assertion that one side of the security stick was

“damaged.” Id. at 105.

[11] Detective LaMotte testified that, a few days after she interviewed M.W.,

Johnson was arrested on October 23, 2018. Detective LaMotte interviewed

Johnson on the day of his arrest about all the events that occurred between

August and October 2018. At trial, the State sought to introduce the video

recording of Johnson’s interview. Johnson objected to the admission of his out-

of-court statements regarding the battery, arguing the State failed to establish

the corpus delicti on that charge. The trial court overruled Johnson’s objection

and Johnson’s out-of-court interview was played for the jury.

[12] The jury found Johnson guilty of battery. Johnson was sentenced to three years

at the Indiana Department of Correction with 508 days to be served in the

6 The State made a similar argument to the trial court prior to the evidence’s admission outside the presence of the jury.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 7 of 14 LaPorte County Jail 7 and 587 days suspended to probation. Johnson now

appeals his conviction.

Analysis

I. Admission of Johnson’s Out-of-Court Statement

[13] Johnson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting: (1)

M.W.’s statement that Johnson battered her to Detective LaMotte; (2)

photographs of M.W.; (3) the security stick; and (4) Johnson’s confession.

“The trial court has discretionary power on the admission of evidence, and its

decisions are reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion.” Lewis v. State, 34

N.E.3d 240, 247 (Ind. 2015). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision

is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Nicholson v.

State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (Ind. 2012). We find it necessary to address only

Johnson’s argument regarding his confession because our determination of this

issue is dispositive.

[14] Johnson argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Johnson’s out-

of-court confession regarding the battery with the security stick because there

was insufficient corpus delicti to establish the crime of battery with a deadly

weapon prior to the admission of the confession.

In Indiana, a person may not be convicted of a crime based solely on a nonjudicial confession of guilt. Rather, independent proof

7 Johnson was given credit for 381 days served and 127 days of good time credit, totaling 508 days served.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 8 of 14 of the corpus delicti is required before the defendant may be convicted upon a nonjudicial confession. Proof of the corpus delicti means proof that the specific crime charged has actually been committed by someone. Thus, admission of a confession requires some independent evidence of commission of the crime charged. The independent evidence need not prove that a crime was committed beyond a reasonable doubt, but merely provide an inference that the crime charged was committed. This inference may be created by circumstantial evidence.

Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017). Importantly, “[t]he corpus

delicti evidence required to have a confession admitted is not the same as the

corpus delicti evidence required to sustain a conviction.” Shinnock, 76 N.E.3d

at 843. In establishing sufficient corpus delicti for the purpose of admitting a

confession into evidence, our Supreme Court “has required independent

evidence of (1) the occurrence of the specific kind of injury . . . , and (2)

somebody’s criminal act as the cause of the injury.” Cambron v. State, 322

N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ind. 1975). This evidence may be circumstantial, and “there

is no requirement that all of the elements of the crime [must be] proven prior to

introduction of the confessions.” Shinnock, 76 N.E.3d at 844.

[15] During trial, after the parties argued whether the confession was admissible, the

trial court here overruled Johnson’s objection citing support from Scott v. State,

632 N.E.2d 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), and Groves v. State, 479 N.E.2d 626 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1985). In Scott, a panel of this Court found sufficient corpus delicti of

the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime to support admission of the

defendant’s confession. The independent evidence presented at trial to support

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 9 of 14 admission of the defendant’s confession included: (1) the victim’s testimony

that he was hit by an individual seen with the defendant that night; (2)

overwhelming evidence demonstrated the victim’s injuries; (3) the victim’s

report to another individual who assisted the victim following the battery that

two men beat him up; (4) physical evidence supported the victim’s account of

battery; and (5) testimony from the doctor that the victim’s injuries were

consistent with a battery. See Scott, 632 N.E.2d at 766. Similarly, in Groves, a

panel of this Court found sufficient corpus delicti was presented regarding the

operating while intoxicated charge to support admission of the defendant’s out-

of-court statement because the defendant was found near the vehicle soon after

the accident and he was the owner of the vehicle. See Groves, 479 N.E.2d at

628.

[16] Scott and Groves, however, are distinguishable from the facts in the instant case.

Here, unlike in Groves, there is no evidence that connects Johnson to ownership

or use of the security stick. Moreover, unlike in Scott, neither M.W. nor any

other witness provided substantive evidence connecting M.W.’s bruises to a

battery. At the time Johnson’s statement was admitted, the only evidence

presented regarding the battery was: (1) Detective LaMotte’s statement that she

was investigating an unreported battery and prepared a police report regarding

domestic battery and strangulation as a result of her interview with M.W.; (2)

the photographs of M.W. showing bruises; and (3) the security stick.

[17] We conclude, based on the record before us, there was insufficient evidence to

support the inference that a crime had been committed with regard to the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 10 of 14 battery with a deadly weapon charge before Johnson’s out-of-court confession

regarding the battery with a deadly weapon was admitted into evidence. The

photographs merely demonstrated that M.W. had bruises. The State presented

no evidence establishing a connection between the security stick and the alleged

crime. M.W.’s statement to Detective LaMotte that Johnson battered her was

not admitted as substantive evidence and was subject to the trial court’s limiting

instruction. See, e.g. Humphrey v. State, 680 N.E.2d 836, 838 (Ind. 1997)

(discussing that “classic hearsay” is not ordinarily admissible as substantive

evidence); see also Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 566 (Ind. 2014) (“There is a

risk the jury will rely upon the out-of-court assertion as substantive evidence of

guilt—rather than for the limited purpose of explaining police investigation—

and the defendant will have no chance to challenge that evidence through cross-

examination.”).

[18] Alone, this evidence is insufficient to support the inference that a crime was

committed. Even assuming that the photographs, security stick, and M.W.’s

statement to Detective LaMotte were properly admitted, the State presented no

evidence that Johnson committed battery by means of a deadly weapon against

M.W. Accordingly, the State presented insufficient evidence to support the

requirement of the corpus delicti before admission of Johnson’s confession.

The trial court abused its discretion in admitting Johnson’s confession regarding

the battery with a deadly weapon.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 11 of 14 II. Insufficient Evidence

[19] Johnson argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of battery with

a deadly weapon. When a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is raised,

“[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State,

51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016) (citing Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 84 (Ind.

1985), cert. denied), cert. denied. Instead, “we ‘consider only that evidence most

favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn

therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 84). “We will affirm the

judgment if it is supported by ‘substantial evidence of probative value even if

there is some conflict in that evidence.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at

84); see also McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 558 (Ind. 2018) (holding that,

even though there was conflicting evidence, it was “beside the point” because

that argument “misapprehend[s] our limited role as a reviewing court”). “We

will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73

N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017) (citing Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.

2007)).

[20] Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1(c)(1) describes battery as “knowingly or

intentionally: . . . (1) touch[ing] another person in a rude, insolent, or angry

manner; . . .” The offense is a Level 5 felony, pursuant to Indiana Code Section

35-42-2-1(g)(2) if the “offense is committed with a deadly weapon.” Indiana

Code Section 35-31.5-2-86(a)(2) defines “deadly weapon,” in part, as:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 12 of 14 (2) A destructive device, weapon, device, taser (as defined in IC 35-47-8-3) or electronic stun weapon (as defined in IC 35-47-8-1), equipment, chemical substance, or other material that in the manner it:

(A) is used;

(B) could ordinarily be used; or

(C) is intended to be used;

is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.

Here, the State alleged that Johnson touched M.W. in a rude, insolent, or angry

manner with the security stick, a deadly weapon.

[21] Without M.W.’s testimony and without Johnson’s confession, the only

evidence remaining regarding the battery charge was M.W.’s statement to

Detective LaMotte, the photographs, and the security stick. As discussed

above, M.W.’s statement to Detective LaMotte was admitted as non-

substantive evidence, and the photographs and security stick do not prove the

offense on their own. The evidence presented did not connect the security stick

to M.W.’s injuries, and none of the evidence connected Johnson to M.W.’s

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 13 of 14 injuries. Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to convict Johnson of

battery with a deadly weapon, and we reverse the conviction. 8

Conclusion

[22] The trial court abused its discretion in admitting Johnson’s confession and the

remaining evidence is insufficient to sustain Johnson’s conviction for battery

with a deadly weapon. We reverse and vacate Johnson’s conviction.

[23] Reversed and vacated.

Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

8 Because the evidence is insufficient to sustain Johnson’s conviction even with admission of M.W.’s statement to Detective LaMotte, the photographs, and the security stick, we need not address the admissibility of that evidence.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 14 of 14