Ariean Sorenson v. Bureau of Land Management, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: July 1, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00757
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 ARIEAN SORENSON, Case No.: 2:26-cv-00757-APG-MDC

4 Plaintiff Order (1) Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and (2) Denying Plaintiff’s 5 v. Motions for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction as Moot 6 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, et al., [ECF Nos. 10, 11, 13] 7 Defendants 8

9 Ariean Sorenson1 challenges the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and two of its 10 employees in its administration of the wild horses and burros program under the Wild Free- 11 Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WHBA). He asserts three claims for violation of (1) 18 U.S.C. 12 § 641, which prohibits theft of government property, (2) the WHBA, and (3) the Procurement 13 Integrity Act, the Anti-Deficiency Act, and 18 U.S.C. § 201, which prohibits bribery of 14 government officials. He moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction 15 without notice to the defendants, which I denied. ECF Nos. 7; 12. After filing an amended 16 complaint, he has renewed his motions for injunctive relief. ECF Nos. 10; 11. The defendants 17 oppose the motions for injunctive relief and move to dismiss the amended complaint. Sorenson 18 did not respond to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. 19 Sorenson alleges that a BLM employee “purposefully convoluted the data” in aerial 20 survey counts of wild horses and burros to “increase the count result and promote the Agency 21 agenda.” ECF No. 8 at 2. He also alleges that BLM “management of excess wild horses and 22

1 The government uses “she/her” pronouns to refer to Sorenson, but the amended complaint 23 states Sorenson was injured “in his capacity as a member of the public trust.” ECF No. 8 at 4. I follow Sorenson’s lead and use male pronouns in this order accordingly. 1 burros involved: (a) [their] removal from public lands; (b) holding [them] in short-term or 2 temporary facilities; (c) [their] transfer to longer-term facilities for processing toward lawful 3 adoption or sale (with restrictions); and (d) [the] placement of unadopted/unsold animals in long- 4 term holding facilities.” Id. at 3. Finally, he alleges that Congress “directed the Secretary of the

5 Interior to establish a Task Force to bring experts from all relevant agencies together to address 6 the challenge of wild horses and burros” in a report that accompanied an appropriations bill and 7 that the BLM did not form such a task force. Id. Sorenson contends that there are no laws that 8 allow the BLM to “(a) barter or exchange wild horses/burros as payment for services; (b) transfer 9 animals to contractors as property outside the adoption/sale/destruction processes . . .; or 10 (c) consign animals for transport with intent to cause death by slaughter,” but he does not allege 11 facts showing that the BLM engaged in these actions. Id. Sorenson alleges that through the 12 BLM’s alleged violation of various statutes, he has “suffered injury in his capacity as a member 13 of the public trust.” Id. at 4. 14 I grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss because Sorenson did not oppose the motion

15 and because he pleaded claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 and 641, the Anti-Deficiency Act, and 16 the Procurement Integrity Act, which do not give rise to a private cause of action. I therefore 17 dismiss those claims with prejudice. Sorenson also did not plausibly plead facts to support 18 standing under Article III or a final agency action that was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to 19 law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). I therefore dismiss without prejudice the 20 WHBA claim, which must be pursued through the APA. Because I grant the defendants’ motion 21 to dismiss, I deny Sorenson’s motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 22 injunction as moot. 23 1 I. MOTION TO DISMISS 2 In considering a motion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken 3 as true and construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Wyler Summit P’ship v. 4 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). However, I do not assume the truth

5 of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations in the 6 complaint. See Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). A 7 plaintiff must make sufficient factual allegations to establish a plausible entitlement to relief. Bell 8 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Such allegations must amount to “more than 9 labels and conclusions, [or] a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 10 555. 11 A. Sorenson lacks standing because he does not show a concrete and particularized 12 injury. 13 The defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack 14 of subject matter jurisdiction because they argue that Sorenson does not have standing under

15 Article III. They contend that Sorenson has not articulated a concrete and particularized injury, 16 that there is no causation tying their actions to his supposed injury, and accordingly, that no relief 17 the court could provide would redress such an injury. Sorenson did not respond to the motion to 18 dismiss. 19 “Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘[c]ases’ and 20 ‘[c]ontroversies.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007). “A suit brought by a plaintiff 21 without Article III standing is not a case or controversy, and an Article III federal court therefore 22 lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.” Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 683 F.3d 23 1177, 1184 (9th Cir. 2012) (simplified). The “irreducible constitutional minimum of [Article III] 1 standing consists of three elements.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (quotation 2 omitted). “The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 3 challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 4 decision.” Id. Each element of Article III standing “must be supported in the same way as any

5 other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of 6 evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 7 555, 561 (1992). 8 To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he suffered “an invasion of a legally 9 protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural 10 or hypothetical.” Id. at 560 (quotation omitted). To be particularized, the injury “must affect the 11 plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (quotation omitted). To be 12 concrete, the injury must be “real, and not abstract.” Id. at 340 (quotation omitted). Finally, to be 13 actual or imminent, the alleged injury cannot be “too speculative” and must be “certainly 14 impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (simplified). The Supreme

15 Court has “repeatedly refused to recognize a generalized grievance against allegedly illegal 16 governmental conduct as sufficient for standing to invoke the federal judicial power.” United 17 States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995); see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 18 Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 n.3 (2014) (stating that generalized grievances do not 19 present “cases” or “controversies” under Article III). A plaintiff cannot seek relief that “no more 20 directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74. 21 Sorenson does not plausibly allege that he suffered a concrete and particularized injury. 22 In each cause of action, he alleges that he suffered an injury “in his capacity as a member of the 23 public trust.” ECF No. 8 at 4. He also states that he is a “beneficiary” of the public trust created 1 by the WHBA as a “taxpayer and member of the public.” Id. at 1-2. He does not allege that he 2 experienced a harm different from any other member of the public at large, and he does not 3 allege a harm that is individual or particular to himself. Taxpayer status does not confer standing 4 outside of a particular kind of taxing and spending challenge, nor does being a member of an

5 alleged public trust. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968); Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chi. 6 Park Dist., 971 F.3d 722, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2020). Sorenson therefore does not present a case or 7 controversy under Article III. Additionally, he does not respond to the defendants’ motion to 8 dismiss and thus consents to my granting the motion. LR 7-2(d). 9 B. I dismiss Count One under 18 U.S.C. § 641 because Sorenson does not oppose the 10 motion and lacks a private cause of action. 11 Sorenson asserts a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 641, alleging “theft of, conversion of, or 12 unauthorized conveyance of government property.” ECF No. 8 at 4. This claim is facially 13 inconsistent as Sorenson also argues that the wild horses and burros that were allegedly stolen 14 were “misclassified” as government property to begin with. Id. Regardless, the defendants argue

15 this claim fails because 18 U.S.C. § 641 is a criminal statute that does not create a private cause 16 of action. Sorenson does not respond to this argument, so as above, I grant the motion as 17 unopposed but will consider the merits to determine whether leave to amend is appropriate. 18 “[P]rivate rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.” 19 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). A “bare criminal statute[] with absolutely no 20 indication that civil enforcement of any kind was available to anyone” factors against implying a 21 private cause of action, and § 641 is a criminal statute that does not indicate who may enforce it. 22 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79-80 (1975) (limited on other grounds). Other courts have 23 consistently recognized that § 641 does not provide a private right of action. See, e.g., Rouhi v. 1 Kettler, No. 19-3052-SAG, 2020 WL 3451871, at *2-3 (D. Md. June 24, 2020); Torres v. B&L 2 Mach. & Fabrication, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-318, 2025 WL 802993, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2025); 3 Ali v. Timmons, No. 04-cv-0164E, 2004 WL 1698445, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 26, 2004). 4 Therefore, Sorenson lacks a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 641. Although I ordinarily would

5 grant leave for a pro se litigant like Sorenson to amend, I do not grant him leave to amend this 6 claim because it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint [cannot] be cured by 7 amendment.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). I thus dismiss 8 Sorenson’s claim under 18 U.S.C. § 641 with prejudice. 9 C. I dismiss Count Two under the WHBA because Sorenson does not oppose the 10 motion and did not plead a claim through the Administrative Procedure Act. 11 Sorenson alleges that the government’s actions “bypass[ed] required humane 12 management processes . . . and constitute[d] unauthorized conversion to private use or improper 13 transfer” in violation of the WHBA. ECF No. 8 at 4. He alleges that a BLM employee 14 “purposefully convoluted the data” to support a finding of overpopulation that enabled the

15 agency to round up the animals and send them “to slaughter deaths.” Id. at 2. Sorenson 16 references American Wild Horse Conservation v. Burgum, 768 F. Supp. 3d 1291 (D. Colo. 17 2025), which struck an adoption incentive program, but he does not allege that the adoption 18 program is continuing in violation of that order. Sorenson also claims that Congress required the 19 BLM to create a task force to address wild horse and burro management and that it did not do so. 20 The government argues that Sorenson does not identify a final agency action, does not plausibly 21 allege a statutory or regulatory violation under the APA, and does not plead a failure-to-act claim 22 under the APA. Sorenson does not respond to these arguments, so as above, I grant the motion 23 as unopposed but will consider the merits to determine whether leave to amend is appropriate. 1 1. Sorenson did not plead his WHBA claim through the Administrative Procedure Act. 2 The WHBA does not provide a private right of action and therefore, “challenges alleging 3 violations of [the Act] are brought pursuant to the APA.” Am. Wild Horse Campaign v. 4 Bernhardt, 442 F. Supp. 3d 127, 143 (D.D.C. 2020). To challenge a government violation of a

5 statute under the APA’s general review provisions, the plaintiff must identify a final agency 6 action that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 7 law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990). An agency 8 action is arbitrary and capricious “if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not 9 intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 10 explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 11 implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 12 expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 13 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). An agency action is final when (1) it “mark[s] the consummation of the 14 agency’s decisionmaking process” and (2) it is “one by which rights or obligations have been

15 determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177- 16 78 (1997) (quotations omitted). 17 Sorenson alleges the APA provides jurisdiction for his amended complaint “to the extent 18 agency actions are challenged as arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law” but does not then 19 challenge a BLM final agency action as arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. ECF No. 8 at 2. 20 He alleges that a BLM employee convoluted data “to support the Agency agenda” and ultimately 21 send the horses “to slaughter deaths” but does not identify a discrete final agency action that the 22 23 1 BLM took as a result.2 Id. Construing Sorenson’s complaint broadly, he challenges the general 2 manner that the BLM conducts its management of wild horses and burros, alleging “removal 3 from public lands,” “holding in short-term or temporary facilities,” “transfer to longer-term 4 facilities for processing toward lawful adoption or restrictions,” and “placement of

5 unadopted/unsold animals in long-term holding facilities.” Id. at 3. However, Sorenson “cannot 6 seek wholesale improvement of [the BLM’s management of the wild horse and burro program] 7 by court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of Congress, where 8 programmatic improvements are normally made.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 891 9 (simplified). Instead, Sorenson “must direct [his] attack against some particular ‘agency action’ 10 that causes [him] harm.” Id. Sorenson’s amended complaint does not plausibly allege facts 11 showing that a final agency action by BLM was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, so I 12 dismiss his WHBA claim without prejudice. Sorenson may amend his pleading if sufficient facts 13 exist to do so. 14 2. The BLM is not legally required to form a task force.

15 Sorenson alleges that in 2022, a Congressional committee “directed the Secretary of 16 Interior to establish a Task Force to bring experts from all relevant agencies together to address 17 the challenge of wild horses and burros” according to a “report accompanying Public Law 117- 18 103.”3 ECF No. 8 at 3. Sorenson does not attach this report. The appropriations bill itself did 19 2 Sorenson challenges a particular horse round-up under the APA and the National 20 Environmental Policy Act in his motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. I do not consider whether this round-up is a final agency action because he did not 21 challenge it in his amended complaint. And I do not have authority to issue an injunction based on claims not pleaded. Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 22 (9th Cir. 2015). 3 Sorenson’s allegations regarding the task force do not neatly fit into a “count” in his amended 23 complaint, but I construe them broadly to be an alleged violation of the WHBA under Count Two. ECF No. 8 at 3-4. 1 not require the Secretary of the Interior to establish this task force. See generally Consolidated 2 Appropriations Act 2022, PL 117-103, March 15, 2022, 136 Stat. 49. The government argues 3 that even if Sorenson had properly pleaded his claim that the Secretary of the Interior failed to 4 create the task force under § 706(1) of the APA, it would fail because he did not identify a

5 “discrete agency action that [the agency] is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 6 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (simplified). Sorenson does not respond to this argument, so as above, I 7 grant this motion as unopposed. And amendment would be futile because the appropriations bill 8 did not require creation of the task force, so Sorenson did not identify an action that the 9 government was required to take. I thus dismiss Sorenson’s claim regarding the task force with 10 prejudice. 11 D. I dismiss Count Three under 18 U.S.C. § 201, the Procurement Integrity Act, and 12 the Anti-Deficiency Act because Sorenson does not oppose the motion and the 13 statutes do not create private causes of action. 14 Sorenson asserts claims under 18 U.S.C. § 201, the Procurement Integrity Act, and the

15 Anti-Deficiency Act, alleging that the BLM must “follow competitive bidding” and that 16 “improper exchanges” may “constitute bribery . . . or improper obligation of funds.” ECF No. 8 17 at 4. Sorenson does not allege facts plausibly showing that the BLM did not follow competitive 18 bidding or that it entered improper exchanges. Regardless, the defendants argue this claim fails 19 because these statutes do not create a private cause of action. Sorenson does not respond to this 20 argument, so, as above, I grant the motion as unopposed but will consider the merits to determine 21 whether leave to amend is appropriate. 22 Title 18 U.S.C. § 201 imposes criminal penalties for bribery of public officials and 23 witnesses. As with § 641 above, § 201 is a bare criminal statute that does not imply a private 1 right of action, as other courts have ruled. See, e.g., Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Clinton, 880 F. Supp. 1, 5 2 n.3 (D.D.C. 1995); Davidson v. United States Dep’t of State, 113 F. Supp. 3d 183, 197 n.12 3 (D.D.C. 2015); In re Kalsy, No. MC 22-59 (RDM), 2022 WL 16921534, at *2 n.1 (D.D.C. Nov. 4 14, 2022). Therefore, I do not grant Sorenson leave to amend his § 201 claim, and I dismiss it

5 with prejudice. 6 The Procurement Integrity Act is codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2107 and restricts 7 disclosure of information regarding government contract awards. See 41 U.S.C. § 2102 titled 8 “Prohibitions on disclosing and obtaining procurement information.” Section 2105(b) authorizes 9 the Attorney General to “bring a civil action in an appropriate district court” against those who 10 violate the act, and § 2105(c)(1) authorizes an aggrieved federal agency to seek administrative 11 remedies. Section 2105 does not provide for a private right of action, and “[t]he express 12 provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to 13 preclude others.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290. Accordingly, I do not imply a private right of 14 action into the Procurement Integrity Act. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. The Boeing Co., No.

15 6:03-cv-796-ORL-28KRS, 2003 WL 22962789, at *4-6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2003). I therefore 16 do not grant Sorenson leave to amend his claim based on the Procurement Integrity Act, and I 17 dismiss it with prejudice. 18 The Anti-Deficiency Act is a collection of statutes that regulate federal spending and 19 obligations in excess of apportioned funds. See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1342, 1349-1351, 20 1502, 1511-1518, 1551-1557, and 41 U.S.C. § 6301. These statutes authorize administrative and 21 criminal penalties, but they do not provide for a private right of action. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1349-50, 22 1518-19. Therefore, I do not imply a private right of action into the Anti-Deficiency Act 23 statutes. See Thurston v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 680, 683 (D.D.C. 1988). Accordingly, I do grant Sorenson leave to amend his claim under the Anti-Deficiency Act, and I dismiss it with prejudice. 3) TI. CONCLUSION 4 I THEREFORE ORDER that the defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED. Sorenson’s claims under 18 U.S.C. § 201 and § 641, the Procurement Integrity 6]) Act, the Anti-Deficiency Act, and that the BLM failed to create a task force are dismissed with prejudice. Sorenson’s claim under the WHBA is dismissed without prejudice. 8 I FURTHER ORDER that Sorenson’s motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF Nos. 10, 11) are DENIED as moot. 10 I FURTHER ORDER that Sorenson may file a second amended complaint by July 30, 2026 if sufficient facts exist to plausibly allege (1) Article III standing and (2) an APA claim. 12 DATED this 29th day of June, 2026. 13 G7 4 ANDREWP.GORDON. 15 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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