Argentine Mining Co. v. Terrible Mining Co.

122 U.S. 478, 7 S. Ct. 1356, 30 L. Ed. 1140, 1887 U.S. LEXIS 2126
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMay 27, 1887
Docket250
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 122 U.S. 478 (Argentine Mining Co. v. Terrible Mining Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Argentine Mining Co. v. Terrible Mining Co., 122 U.S. 478, 7 S. Ct. 1356, 30 L. Ed. 1140, 1887 U.S. LEXIS 2126 (1887).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Field,

after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the,court, as follows:

The instruction, as requested by the defendant, as a proposition of law is undoubtedly sound. It is substantially- a brief repetition of the language of the statute. Its refusal, however, did not prejudice the defendant, for a valid location, as defined by the court, could only be found in favor of the plaintiff in ' cas.e the vein discovered by the locators of the Adelaide claim extended to the ground in dispute. If such were the fact, the principle involved in the instruction asked, applied to that claim, cut off the right asserted by the defendant. If there was an apex or outcropping of the same vein ivithin the surface of the boundaries of the claims of the defendant, that company could not extend -its workings under the Adelaide "location, that being of earlier - date. Assuming that on the *485 same vein there were surface outcroppings within the boundaries of both claims, the one first located necessarily carried the right to work the vein.

But there are other grounds equally conclusive against the contention of the defendant below. The instruction asked, assumes that the longest sides of its claims were their side lines. Such would, undoubtedly, be the case if the locations of.the claim were along the course or strike of the lode. The statute undoubtedly contemplates that the location of a lode or vein claim shall be along the course of the lode or vein. Its language is: “A mining claim located after the 10th day of May, 1872, whether located by one or more persons, may' equal, but shall not exceed, fifteen hundred feet in length along the vein or lode; but no location of a mining claim shall be made until the discovery of the vein or lode within the limits of the claim located.. No claim shall extend more than three hundred feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the surface, nor shall any claim be limited by any mining regulation' to less than twenty-five feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the surface, except where adverse rights existing on the 10th day of May, 1872, render such limitation necessary. The end fines of each claim shall be parallel to each other.” Bev. Stat., § 2320.

When, therefore, a mining claim crosses the course of the lode or vein instead of being “ along the vein or lode,” the end fines are. those which measure the width of the claim as it crosses the lode. Such is evidently the meaning of the' stat-. ute. The side lines are those which measure the extent of the claim on each side of the middle of the vein at the surface. Such is the purport' of the decision in Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U. S. 463. The court there said, referring to the statute of 1866, 14 Stat. 251, and that of 1872, 17 Stat. 91: “We think that the intent -of both statutes is, that mining locations on lodes or veins shall be made thereon, lengthwise, in the general direction of such veins-or lodes on the surface of the earth where they are .discoverable; and' that the end fines are to cross the'lode and extend perpendicularly downwards, and to be continued in-their own direction either way horizontally; *486 and that the right to follow the dip outside of the side lines is based on the hypothesis that the direction of these lines cor- ' responds substantially with the comise of the lode or vein at its apex oh or near the surface. It was not the intent of the law to allow a person to make his location crosswise of the vein,, so that the side lines shall cross it, and thereby give him the' right to follow the strike of the vein outside of his side" lines. That would subvert the whole system sought to be established by the law. If he does locate his claim in that way, his rights must be subordinated to the rights of those who have properly located on the lode.” And again, that the end lines of the claim, properly so called, are “ those which are crosswise of the general course of the vein on the surface.”

Such being the-law, the lines which separate the location of the plaintiff below from the locations of the defendant are end lines, across which, as they are extended downward vertically,, the defendant cannot follow a vein, even if its apex or outcropping is within its surface boundaries,, and, as a consequence, could not touch the premises in dispute, which are conceded to be outside of those lines and outside of vertical planes drawn downward through them.

The defendant relied on the trial upon patents of the United States issued for its several claims, but those patents cofitain an exception which would also seem to exclude its pretensions. It is as follows, after the habendum clause: “ excepting and excluding, however, all that portion of said surface ground embraced by mineral survey No. '254 of the Adelaide mining claim, and also, excepting and excluding all veins, lodes, or deposits, the tops or apexes of which lie inside of the, exterior lines of. said Adelaide survey at the Surface, extended' down vertically, or which' have been ihferein discovered or .developed.”

From a consideration of the whole case we are unable to perceive any'error which would justify a reversal of the judgment helow.. It is-accordingly

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
122 U.S. 478, 7 S. Ct. 1356, 30 L. Ed. 1140, 1887 U.S. LEXIS 2126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/argentine-mining-co-v-terrible-mining-co-scotus-1887.