NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2021 IL App (3d) 200235-U
Order filed June 28, 2021 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
J. CRAIG ARBOGAST and MISCHELE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ARBOGAST, as Trustees of the Craig and ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, Mischele Arbogast Family Trust, ) Peoria County, Illinois, ) Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) ) v. ) Appeal No. 3-20-0235 ) Circuit No. 19-MR-56 DOUGLAS J. SCHAUB, ) ) Defendant-Appellant, ) ) Honorable (The Marilee Porter Revocable Trust, ) Mark E. Gilles, Defendant). ) Judge, Presiding. ___________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Daugherity and Wright concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s (1) finding of adverse possession was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, (2) finding of trespass was not erroneous as a matter of law, and (3) award of $1000 in nominal damages for the trespass was not excessive.
¶2 The plaintiffs, J. Craig Arbogast and Mischele Arbogast, as Trustees of the Craig and
Mischele Arbogast Family Trust, brought a complaint for adverse possession, prescriptive easement, and trespass against the defendant, Douglas J. Schaub. The circuit court found in favor
of the Arbogasts on their adverse possession and trespass claims. Schaub appeals.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
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Schaub Property
¶4 In August 1985, the Arbogasts purchased real estate in rural Brimfield, Illinois (hereinafter
the Arbogast Property). At that time, the Arbogast Property was bordered on the west and south
by land owned by Robert and Marilee Porter, whose property consisted of 25 acres of farmland to
1 This image is provided by the Peoria County Property Tax website. The website provides a disclaimer that it is a tool for county employees and the general public use and data provided therein is as is without warranty of accuracy, timeliness, or completeness. The website is intended to be used as informational only. We use this information only to better illustrate the location of the property in this case. Schaub’s property at issue is bolded and outlined in red (identified with Parcel Identification Number (PIN) 1101400021). This image was obtained by entering Schaub’s PIN into the search tool. See Peoria County Property Tax, https://gis.peoriacounty.org/peoriagis/ (last visited June 23, 2021). We clarify that the map appears to show the Arbogasts’ detached garage as having a separate driveway than the half-oval gravel driveway to the west of the Arbogasts’ home. However, evidence of record shows that it is one continuous gravel driveway stretching across the strip, thereby connecting the detached garage to the home. Additionally, the gravel driveway’s two points of access are directly connected to Windish Road. 2 the south of the Arbogast Property and a 468’ x 30’ strip that ran along the entire western boundary
of the Arbogast Property. To the west of the strip lies a road owned by Michael Windish (referred
to as Windish Road). Windish Road was created in 1977 when Roy Windish purchased the land
upon which it lies from the Porters. The deed from the Porters to Roy Windish included a perpetual
easement allowing the use of Windish Road for ingress and egress in favor of owners of lots in the
area. When the Arbogasts purchased their property, a gravel driveway resembling the shape of a
half oval existed on the strip, which provided them access to Windish Road then to Route 8.
¶5 In September 1995, the Arbogasts and Marilee Porter, as widow and successor to Robert
Porter, signed a two-part agreement. The first part provided the Arbogasts with an easement to use
a “portion” of the strip for the purpose of maintaining, repairing, or replacing the existing well and
waterline running from the strip to the Arbogasts’ home. The second part of the agreement
provided Marilee Porter with a relocated easement as her existing easement on the northern part
of the Arbogast Property was set to be extinguished by the widening of Route 8.
¶6 In March 2003, Marilee Porter deeded a remainder interest in her property to her son,
Dennis Porter, and reserved herself a life estate. In June 2016, Dennis Porter conveyed his
remainder interest to Schaub. Beginning in September 2018, Schaub plowed the strip and dumped
piles of dirt on the gravel driveway the Arbogasts use to access Windish Road.
¶7 In January 2019, the Arbogasts filed a complaint against Schaub. 2 Count I set forth a claim
for adverse possession, alleging that they continuously, exclusively, and openly and apparently
possessed the strip adversely to the title holder of record (Marilee Porter) since August of 1985.
Count II set forth a claim for a prescriptive easement in that they continuously, exclusively, and
2 The Arbogasts also brought this action against the Marilee Porter Revocable Trust, but later voluntarily dismissed the trust when Marilee Porter conveyed her life estate to Schaub in May 2019. 3 openly and apparently used the entire length of the strip as a means of ingress and egress to their
property by regularly driving their vehicles across it at various points since August 1985, which
was without permission and adverse to Marilee Porter. Count III alleged trespass, describing the
incidents when Schaub accessed the strip and took action to prevent them from using it.
¶8 In February 2019, the Arbogasts filed a petition for a preliminary injunction. In addition to
the facts set forth in their complaint, they added that Schaub had repeatedly made complaints to
local law enforcement agencies alleging trespass, which resulted in the filing of criminal
complaints against them. In March 2019, the court granted the preliminary injunction to enjoin
Schaub from any further interference with the Arbogasts use and possession of the strip.
¶9 In December 2019, the court held a bench trial. The following testimony was adduced.
Michael Windish testified that his brother leased Windish Road in 1977 and he often helped his
brother farm the area. In the 1990s, he did not frequent Windish Road as often, but once he owned
it in 1998, he used it regularly except in the wintertime. After the Arbogasts purchased their home,
he observed them mow and park on the strip. Windish also testified that he farmed land for Marilee
Porter since 1999, never mowed the strip for her, and never saw her use any portion of the strip
for any purpose. He noted that he had observed Schaub mow the strip.
¶ 10 Mischele Arbogast testified that she has lived on the Arbogast Property continuously since
Labor Day weekend in 1985. Since the Arbogasts moved in, they have mowed the grass on the
strip, fertilized it, weeded it, edged it, and trimmed it. She understood that Marilee Porter owned
the strip, never maintained it, and never used it for any purpose during the entire time the Arbogasts
lived there. In addition to maintenance, the Arbogasts used the strip to store and park a truck and
trailer, guest parking, and for children to play. While the Arbogasts’ children were growing up,
they used the strip as the home’s front yard as the home faced west. She stated that these activities
4 took place for anyone in the neighborhood to see and that they were never told by Marilee Porter
or anyone acting on her behalf to stop using the strip. She described that these activities on strip
extended across the entire area of the strip. Mischele also stated that she had a detached garage
built in 2008, which opens to the west toward Windish Lane and cannot be used effectively without
the ability to use the strip. The gravel driveway on the strip is used to access the garage.
¶ 11 Mischele testified that, before Schaub purchased the strip, he would snowplow the gravel
driveway on the strip out to Windish Lane as a favor, but he did not snowplow the gravel driveway
after he owned the strip. She stated that, after Schaub purchased the strip in 2016, he would mow
over the top of her husband Craig’s mowing and Craig would also mow over the top of Schaub’s
mowing. Schaub did not object to their use of the strip until 2018 when he plowed up the strip,
dropped a dirt pile on the gravel driveway that led to the garage, and called the police several
times. She recalled that the sheriff came out about six or seven times in response to Schaub’s calls.
Mischele paid $75 to have the dirt pile removed, $135 for added rock on the driveway to avoid
getting stuck in the mud, and $80 to have the rock spread. It took the Arbogasts a day of work to
repair the area themselves. They also spent $6618.25 in attorney fees to defend the criminal
trespass charges. Mischele described that, since the injunction was granted, Schaub would take
pictures of the area and stop his vehicle in front of the house and sit. This made Mischele feel
intimidated and uncomfortable, which caused her to lock all the doors to the house.
¶ 12 Schaub testified that he purchased the strip in 2016. He maintained it by mowing grass,
plowing snow, and supplying gravel. He knew that the Arbogasts were using the gravel driveway
on the strip and did not have any objections at that time. Schaub stated that the Arbogasts offered
to buy the strip, and they only mowed the strip because they promised Marilee Porter that they
would. Schaub stated that he observed the Arbogasts mowing the property but that he mowed it
5 too. In 2018, he believed that the Arbogasts were not respecting the property and there were “three
DUI’s and some other criminal stuff” so he had the land surveyed. Schaub provided that if adverse
possession was granted, he would be landlocked and no longer have legal access to Windish Road.
¶ 13 Craig Arbogast testified as a rebuttal witness and stated that he never (1) told Schaub that
he promised Marliee Porter that he would cut the grass on the strip, (2) spoke to Marilee Porter
about the strip, and (3) offered to buy the strip from Schaub. He stated that he knew the strip was
owned by Marliee Porter and Schaub subsequently purchased it.
¶ 14 The court found in favor of the Arbogasts as to their adverse possession and trespass claims
and awarded them $1000 in nominal damages for the trespass. Schaub filed a motion to reconsider,
and, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. Among other things, he argued that the court failed
to set the dates of adverse possession, the Arbogasts failed to prove that their possession was
exclusive and adverse (i.e., the cross-easement agreement), the award of damages was not
supported by the evidence, and the court failed to address Schaub’s now landlocked property. The
court denied the motion, stating (1) adverse possession was established by September 3, 2005; (2)
the evidence was uncontroverted that the Arbogasts’ use of the strip was without permission; (3)
it considered all the evidence before it; (4) nominal damages were appropriate as actual damages
were not proved; and (5) Schaub’s property was not left landlocked. Schaub appeals.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 On appeal, Schaub argues (1) the circuit court’s finding of adverse possession was against
the manifest weight of the evidence, (2) the court erred as a matter of law when it determined that
he trespassed on the strip for which he simultaneously possessed color of title at the time of the
alleged trespass, and (3) the award of $1000 for nominal damages was excessive.
¶ 17 A. Adverse Possession
6 ¶ 18 To succeed on a claim for adverse possession, the claimant must establish possession of
the property for the entire 20-year statutory period that was: (1) continuous; (2) hostile or adverse;
(3) actual; (4) open, notorious, and exclusive; and (5) under a claim of title inconsistent with that
of the true owner. Township of Jubilee v. State, 405 Ill. App. 3d 489, 498 (2010). All presumptions
are in favor of the title owner and the claimant must prove each element by clear and unequivocal
evidence. Knauf v. Ryan, 338 Ill. App. 3d 265, 269 (2003); Dotson v. Former Shareholders of
Abraham Lincoln Land & Cattle Co., 332 Ill. App. 3d 846, 855 (2002) (the “clear and unequivocal
evidence” standard has not been explained by the supreme court; thus, courts apply the clear and
convincing standard in adverse possession cases).
¶ 19 A circuit court’s finding of adverse possession will not be reversed unless it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Cobb v. Nagele, 242 Ill. App. 3d 975, 978 (1993). A finding is
against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent
or when the court’s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Best v. Best,
223 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (2006). We give deference to the circuit court as the finder of fact because it
is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses. Id.
Therefore, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court regarding the credibility
of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or inferences to be drawn. Id. at 350-51.
Schaub argues that the court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence because the
Arbogasts failed to establish the elements required to satisfy a claim for adverse possession. 3
¶ 20 1. Continuous Possession
3 Schaub’s post-trial motion only challenged the elements pertaining to exclusivity and hostility/adversity. Supra ¶ 14. We address his arguments that extend beyond the scope of his post-trial motion because, in cases appealed following a civil bench trial, “[n]either the filing of nor the failure to file a post judgment motion limits the scope of review.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(b)(3)(ii) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Therefore, Schaub’s failure to include these issues in his post-judgment motion does not preclude him from raising the issues on appeal. Kic v. Bianucci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 12. 7 ¶ 21 Schaub argues that the activities of mowing, fertilizing, weeding, parking, and playing on
the strip are not, by definition, continuous. Notably, Schaub’s argument fails to address the
Arbogasts’ regular use of the strip for ingress and egress to access their home and their long-term
storage of a truck and trailer on the strip. We find that the Arbogasts’ use of the strip was
continuous. The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the Arbogasts moved into their
property Labor Day weekend in 1985 and used the strip continuously when the adverse possession
period ended on September 3, 2005. There was no evidence presented that the Arbogasts’ use or
possession of the strip was interrupted during the 20-year period. No one other than the Arbogasts
used or maintained the strip at issue and the Porters never attempted to exclude the Arbogasts,
their children, or their guests from the portions of the strip that extended beyond the well easement.
See Brandhorst v. Johnson, 2014 IL App (4th) 130923, ¶ 40. Thus, the court’s finding that the
Arbogasts’ possession was continuous was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 22 2. Hostile or Adverse Possession
¶ 23 The hostile or adverse element is satisfied when an assertion of ownership is incompatible
with any other claim of right. In re Estate of Cargola, 2017 IL App (1st) 151823, ¶ 19. Therefore,
it must be clearly shown that the use of the land was adverse and not merely permissive. Id. Schaub
first argues that the Arbogasts’ use of the strip could not be hostile because it was permissive per
the 1995 cross easement agreement entered into between the Arbogasts and Marilee Porter.
However, the cross-easement agreement only permitted the Arbogasts to access a “portion” of the
strip as it related to maintaining the well. The easement did not provide the Arbogasts with
unfettered access to the entire strip for other purposes, such as parking, storing a trailer, egress and
ingress, or a place for children to play. The Arbogasts use of the strip was hostile as they exceeded
the scope of the easement with respect to boundaries and use. We note that although Schaub
8 testified that the Arbogasts promised Marilee Porter that they would mow the strip, this testimony
was directly refuted, and the court was in the best position to resolve the conflicting evidence.
¶ 24 However, Schaub argues that the court’s holding in Mann v. LaSalle National Bank, 205
Ill. App. 3d 304, 309 (1990), demonstrates that the Arbogasts’ possession of the strip was not
hostile. We find Mann inapposite. In that case, the court held that the land in question was
“essentially an unenclosed vacant lot” and the claimant’s use was “presumptively permissive and
not adverse.” Id. Although it has been held that possession of vacant and unenclosed land is
presumed to be permissive and not adverse (Morris v. Humphrey, 146 Ill. App. 3d 612, 615
(1986)), the strip in the case at bar was not vacant as it abutted the Porters’ property and contained
a well and gravel driveway. See also Light v. Steward, 128 Ill. App. 3d 587, 596 (1984) (“the land
was not vacant as evidenced by the fact that the [right-of-way] ran by the [owners’] residence”).
¶ 25 Schaub also argues that the Arbogasts use of the strip was not hostile because there was no
evidence of an ascertained boundary for the Arbogasts purported use of the property. See Knauf,
338 Ill. App. 3d at 269. Here, the strip has a clear and ascertainable boundary as it is the same
length as the Arbogast Property and extends along the entire west side of the Arbogast Property.
Further, the testimony demonstrated that the Arbogasts possessed the entire strip, albeit different
portions for different uses, such as parking, ingress, egress, children playing, storing vehicles, and
maintaining the landscape and driveway. See Brandhorst, 2014 IL App (4th) 130923, ¶¶ 62-64.
Thus, the court’s finding of hostility was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 26 3. Actual Possession
¶ 27 Schaub argues that mowing, trimming, and occasionally occupying vacant land is not
sufficient to constitute actual possession. “The making of improvements or acts of dominion over
land, indicating to persons residing in the immediate neighborhood who has exclusive management
9 and control of the land, are sufficient to constitute possession.” Ewald v. Horenberger, 37 Ill. App.
3d 348, 351 (1976). Here, the Arbogasts possessed the strip as if they were the true owners. They
mowed the grass on the strip, fertilized it, weeded it, edged it, trimmed it, parked vehicles and
trailers on it, used it for egress and ingress, and their children played on it. Similarly, in Brandhorst,
the court found that mowing the lawn, weeding, raking leaves, shoveling snow, and the claimant’s
children playing on the land demonstrated actual possession. Brandhorst, 2014 IL App (4th)
130923, ¶ 54; see Township of Jubilee, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 498 (the mere mowing of grass alone is
generally insufficient to support a finding of adverse possession). Further, adverse claimants need
not erect a fence or other structures on the land in question to prove actual possession. Brandhorst,
2014 IL App (4th) 130923, ¶ 54. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that the Arbogasts
exercised management, maintenance, and control over the strip during the 20-year period, and the
court’s finding of actual possession was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 28 4. Open, Notorious, & Exclusive Use
¶ 29 The adverse claimant’s use of the land must be of open and visible character to apprise the
world that the land has been appropriated and is occupied. Estate of Welliver v. Alberts, 278 Ill.
App. 3d 1028, 1038 (1996). Regarding exclusivity, the adverse claimant must possess the property
independent of a like right in others and the rightful owner must be deprived of possession.
Brandhorst, 2014 IL App (4th) 130923, ¶ 57 (the adverse claimant only needs to demonstrate that
the alleged rightful owner never possessed the land during the adverse possession period).
¶ 30 Schaub argues that there was no evidence regarding how the community could have been
apprised of the Arbogasts’ purported possession and exclusive use and enjoyment of the entire
strip. We disagree. The evidence demonstrated that the Arbogasts controlled and maintained the
strip during the statutory period as if they were the true owners. Further, the unrebutted evidence
10 demonstrated that, during the 20-year period, the Porters never maintained or possessed the strip.
Windish even testified that he observed the Arbogasts maintain and occupy the strip during the
relevant period. Thus, the Arbogasts’ maintenance of the strip indicated to the community that
they were in possession of and claiming ownership. See Joiner v. Janssen, 85 Ill. 2d 74, 82 (1981).
¶ 31 Nonetheless, Schaub also argues that he possessed and maintained the strip since his
purchase in 2016 by mowing the grass, plowing the snow, and maintaining the gravel portions.
The Arbogasts argue that this fact is irrelevant because they satisfied the prescriptive period for
adverse possession on September 3, 2005. The Arbogasts rely on law pertaining to prescriptive
easements providing that “[p]rescriptive easements are not created by judicial edict; a legal
judgment merely establishes that a prescriptive easement exists or not.” (Emphasis in original.)
Chicago Title Land Trust Co. v. JS II, LLC, 2012 IL App (1st) 063420, ¶ 81. We find that the same
procedure applies here.
¶ 32 When adverse possession is established, the adverse claimant is accorded title to the land
and the previous titleholder is divested of title. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago v. Wilson, 103 Ill. App. 3d 357, 361 (1982). The adverse possessor obtains title that can
only be divested by the conveyance of the land to another or by a subsequent disseisin for the
statutory period. Knauf, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 271. No deed is required to support ownership acquired
by adverse possession. Tapley v. Peterson, 141 Ill. App. 3d 401, 404 (1986). The adverse
possessor’s mere possession bars the owner of recovery, and no deed is required to continue the
bar. Augustus v. Lydig, 353 Ill. 215, 222 (1933). Stated another way, the running of the statute of
limitations, along with the presence of the requisite elements, not only bars the owner but also
vests title created by operation of law in the adverse possessor. Therefore, the Arbogasts obtained
ownership of the strip by adverse possession by operation of law before Schaub purchased it. The
11 case at bar is a formality in the form of a legal judgment establishing whether the elements required
for adverse possession were satisfied.
¶ 33 Thus, the court’s finding that the Arbogasts’ possession was open, notorious, and exclusive
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 34 5. Claim of Title Inconsistent With That of the True Owner
¶ 35 Last, Schaub argues that the Arbogasts made no permanent changes, never believed they
owned the strip, and used the strip with permission. As already mentioned, the Arbogasts were not
required to make permanent changes to the strip and did not use the strip with permission. Also,
there is no requirement that the Arbogasts needed to believe that they actually owned the strip. The
evidence shows that the Arbogasts used and controlled the strip as if it were their own. “Using and
controlling property as owner is the ordinary mode of asserting a claim of title inconsistent with
that of the true owner.” Peters v. Greenmount Cemetery Association, 259 Ill. App. 3d 566, 570
(1994). Thus, the court’s finding that the Arbogasts possessed the strip under a claim of title
inconsistent with that of the true owner was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, the court’s findings that the Arbogasts obtained fee simple
ownership of the strip by adverse possession was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 4
¶ 37 B. Trespass
¶ 38 “A trespass is an invasion in the exclusive possession and physical condition of land.”
Millers Mutual Insurance Association of Illinois v. Graham Oil Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 129, 139
(1996). In Illinois, a person may be liable in trespass for negligently or intentionally causing a
4 In Schaub’s opening brief, he argued that the court failed to address whether the finding of adverse possession left his remaining property landlocked. Upon the filing of supplemental transcripts, the record demonstrates that, during the hearing on his post-trial motion, the court found that Schaub’s remaining property was not landlocked. Schaub has since formally withdrawn this argument in his reply brief. 12 thing or a third person to enter the land of another. Id.
¶ 39 Schaub argues that the court erred when it found him liable for trespassing the strip
because, at the time of the purported intrusion, he had color of title. Thus, he did not “enter the
land of another.” Id. Schaub notes that he obtained title to the strip in 2016 by warranty deed, the
purported trespass occurred in 2017 to 2018, and the Arbogasts’ title by adverse possession was
not adjudicated until 2020. We first note that Schaub only had a remainder interest subject to
Marilee’s life estate at the time of the trespass in this case. He did not acquire a present possessory
interest until the life estate was transferred to him during this litigation. Also, we have already
decided that the finding of adverse possession period running from September 3, 1985, to
September 3, 2005, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Arbogasts were not
required to own the strip in deed to bar Schaub in trespass. See Augustus, 353 Ill. at 222. Thus, an
action brought by an adverse claimant for trespass against a record titleholder is a viable cause of
action. See Applebey v. Lenschow, 144 Ill. App. 3d 208, 215-16 (1986) (likewise a record
titleholder cannot recover from a party found to have adversely possessed the disputed land).
¶ 40 Despite this, Schaub contends that an immediate transfer of title upon the expiration of the
statutory period for adverse possession defies logic and reasoning as no notice would be required
to the record titleholder and it allows the property to be transferred with no real estate taxes ever
being paid by the claimant. Schaub’s position ignores the purpose of the adverse possession
elements. The law of adverse possession requires the adverse claimant to possess the land in a way
that provides notice. For instance, the statutory period is lengthy at 20 years and requires the
claimant to possess the land in a specific manner: continuously, adversely, actually, openly,
notoriously, exclusively, and with an assertion of title over the true owner. These onerous elements
were construed to provide the notice that Schaub complains does not exist. The record titleholder’s
13 continued payment of property taxes has no bearing on this analysis, and Schaub fails to cite
authority providing otherwise. As stated aptly by Oliver Wendell Holmes, “if a man neglects to
enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his example.”
¶ 41 C. Nominal Damages
¶ 42 “[N]ominal damages are a trivial sum of money awarded to a litigant who has established
a cause of action but has not established that he is entitled to compensatory damages.” In re Estate
of Hoellen, 367 Ill. App. 3d 240, 252 n.3 (2006). Schaub argues that the award of $1000 in nominal
damages was excessive. He provides that nominal damages in such cases is typically only $100,
citing only Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. Terra Foundation for
American Art, 2014 IL App (1st) 130307, ¶ 85. However, we fail to see how this case supports his
argument. In that case, the court held that $100 in nominal damages for trespass was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. It included no discussion on how or why it decided this
amount was sufficient. Schaub otherwise fails to develop or further support his argument.
Where an issue is merely included in a vague allegation of error, it is not argued, and it will not
satisfy the requirements of the Supreme Court rule requiring argument and citation to relevant
authority. Lake County Grading Co., LLC v. Village of Antioch, 2014 IL 115805, ¶ 36; Ill. S. Ct.
R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Therefore, Schaub has forfeited this argument. Even if we excuse
his forfeiture, we fail to see how the $1000 award in nominal damages was excessive based on the
facts and circumstances before us.
¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 45 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
¶ 46 Affirmed.