OPINION
MACK KIDD, Justice.
This is a summary judgment case. We are asked to review the grant of a traditional 1 motion for summary judgment in favor of appellee, Just Brakes Corporation. The district court ruled as a matter of law that Brian Paul, an employee of Just Brakes, was not within the course and scope of his employment at the time of an automobile collision with appellant, Luz-stella Arbelaez. Concluding that Just Brakes failed to prove as a matter of law that Paul was not acting within the course and scope of his employment, we reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
In January 2001, Paul, a mechanic for Just Brakes, arrived at work at approximately 6:45 a.m. Within a few minutes, according to Paul’s deposition testimony, the shop manager gave Paul his “first assignment” of the day, which was to pick up breakfast for himself, his manager, and his other co-workers at a nearby McDonald’s restaurant. While exiting the Just Brakes parking lot in his own vehicle, Paul collided with Arbelaez.
Arbelaez filed a negligence lawsuit against Paul. After some discovery, she amended her petition to name Just Brakes as an additional defendant, claiming it was vicariously liable for Paul’s negligence. Through discovery, Arbelaez learned of several facts, some of which are disputed, that indicated that Paul was within the course and scope of employment at the time of the collision. Paul testified in a deposition that his manager had asked him to go to McDonald’s as his “first assignment” of the day.2 In a summary-judgment affidavit, Paul’s manager stated that he merely allowed Paul to go after Paul had volunteered. However, in a later deposition, Paul’s manager admitted that he could not state for sure one way or the other and that he could have asked Paul to go. Furthermore, Paul’s manager affirmatively testified in his deposition that an [719]*719employee routinely picked up breakfast for the crew every morning. A corporate representative for Just Brakes also testified via deposition that this practice was used not only at this particular Just Brakes location, but at other Just Brakes locations as well. Moreover, the corporate representative testified that minimizing the number of absent employees, as this method of obtaining breakfast did, benefitted Just Brakes because it was able to service more cars in a shorter period of time.
Paul stated he typically made the breakfast run for the shop because “they” reimbursed him ten dollars a week for his gas money. Just Brakes asserts that the term “they” refers to his fellow employees, but Paul specifically stated in his deposition that it was his manager who paid him.3 Finally, on the morning in question, Paul was “on the clock” and was paid for the time he spent running this errand.
Just Brakes filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, asserting that it was not vicariously liable for Paul’s negligence because he was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The district court granted Just Brakes’ motion. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Standard of review
Because the propriety of a summary judgment is a question of law, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex.1994); Texas Dep’t of Ins. v. American Home Assurance Co., 998 S.W.2d 844, 347 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.). A defendant who moves for a traditional summary judgment must disprove at least one essential element of each of the plaintiffs theories of recovery or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985). Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmov-ant and any doubts resolved in its favor. American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex.1997); Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549. We disregard all conflicts in the evidence and accept the evidence favoring the nonmovant as true. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.1965); Domizio v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied). As Just Brakes so succinctly states in its appellate brief: “The purpose of the summary judgment rule is not to provide either a trial by deposition or a trial by affidavit, but to provide a method of summarily terminating a case when it clearly appears that only a question of law is involved, and that no genuine issue of fact remains.” See Schlager v. Clements, 939 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied); Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. G.T.E. Directories Corp., 905 S.W.2d 318, 320 (TexApp.-Dallas 1995, writ denied).
Although the parties dispute some of the facts at issue, our standard of review requires us to accept the following facts as true:
• Paul was asked by his manager to obtain breakfast for the crew as Paul’s “first assignment” of the day;
[720]*720• Paul’s breakfast run was a daily routine, both at this and other Just Brakes locations;
• Just Brakes benefitted by having only one employee out of the shop at a time;
• Paul’s manager paid him ten dollars a week in gas money to run this errand; and
• Paul was “on the clock” and paid by Just Brakes for the time spent running this errand.
Vicarious liability in general
An employer may be held liable for the tortious acts of an employee if the acts are within the course and scope of employment. See Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex.1998). To defeat Arbelaez’s claim of vicarious liability, Just Brakes was required to establish as a matter of law either that: (1) Paul was not an employee; (2) no negligent act occurred; or (3) Paul was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the collision. See Drooker v. Saeilo Motors, 756 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (citing Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.1972)). Only the third prong — course and scope of employment — is at issue here.
Course and scope of employment is generally a fact issue like negligence or proximate cause. See, e.g., GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 618 (Tex.1999); Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 515 (Tex.1995). In the context of a traditional motion for summary judgment, controlling fact issues are generally for the trier of fact, and summary judgment for a defendant is appropriate only if the defendant-movant proves that no genuine fact issue exists on an essential element of the plaintiffs claim. See El Chico Corp.
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OPINION
MACK KIDD, Justice.
This is a summary judgment case. We are asked to review the grant of a traditional 1 motion for summary judgment in favor of appellee, Just Brakes Corporation. The district court ruled as a matter of law that Brian Paul, an employee of Just Brakes, was not within the course and scope of his employment at the time of an automobile collision with appellant, Luz-stella Arbelaez. Concluding that Just Brakes failed to prove as a matter of law that Paul was not acting within the course and scope of his employment, we reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
In January 2001, Paul, a mechanic for Just Brakes, arrived at work at approximately 6:45 a.m. Within a few minutes, according to Paul’s deposition testimony, the shop manager gave Paul his “first assignment” of the day, which was to pick up breakfast for himself, his manager, and his other co-workers at a nearby McDonald’s restaurant. While exiting the Just Brakes parking lot in his own vehicle, Paul collided with Arbelaez.
Arbelaez filed a negligence lawsuit against Paul. After some discovery, she amended her petition to name Just Brakes as an additional defendant, claiming it was vicariously liable for Paul’s negligence. Through discovery, Arbelaez learned of several facts, some of which are disputed, that indicated that Paul was within the course and scope of employment at the time of the collision. Paul testified in a deposition that his manager had asked him to go to McDonald’s as his “first assignment” of the day.2 In a summary-judgment affidavit, Paul’s manager stated that he merely allowed Paul to go after Paul had volunteered. However, in a later deposition, Paul’s manager admitted that he could not state for sure one way or the other and that he could have asked Paul to go. Furthermore, Paul’s manager affirmatively testified in his deposition that an [719]*719employee routinely picked up breakfast for the crew every morning. A corporate representative for Just Brakes also testified via deposition that this practice was used not only at this particular Just Brakes location, but at other Just Brakes locations as well. Moreover, the corporate representative testified that minimizing the number of absent employees, as this method of obtaining breakfast did, benefitted Just Brakes because it was able to service more cars in a shorter period of time.
Paul stated he typically made the breakfast run for the shop because “they” reimbursed him ten dollars a week for his gas money. Just Brakes asserts that the term “they” refers to his fellow employees, but Paul specifically stated in his deposition that it was his manager who paid him.3 Finally, on the morning in question, Paul was “on the clock” and was paid for the time he spent running this errand.
Just Brakes filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, asserting that it was not vicariously liable for Paul’s negligence because he was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The district court granted Just Brakes’ motion. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Standard of review
Because the propriety of a summary judgment is a question of law, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex.1994); Texas Dep’t of Ins. v. American Home Assurance Co., 998 S.W.2d 844, 347 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.). A defendant who moves for a traditional summary judgment must disprove at least one essential element of each of the plaintiffs theories of recovery or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985). Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmov-ant and any doubts resolved in its favor. American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex.1997); Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549. We disregard all conflicts in the evidence and accept the evidence favoring the nonmovant as true. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.1965); Domizio v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied). As Just Brakes so succinctly states in its appellate brief: “The purpose of the summary judgment rule is not to provide either a trial by deposition or a trial by affidavit, but to provide a method of summarily terminating a case when it clearly appears that only a question of law is involved, and that no genuine issue of fact remains.” See Schlager v. Clements, 939 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied); Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. G.T.E. Directories Corp., 905 S.W.2d 318, 320 (TexApp.-Dallas 1995, writ denied).
Although the parties dispute some of the facts at issue, our standard of review requires us to accept the following facts as true:
• Paul was asked by his manager to obtain breakfast for the crew as Paul’s “first assignment” of the day;
[720]*720• Paul’s breakfast run was a daily routine, both at this and other Just Brakes locations;
• Just Brakes benefitted by having only one employee out of the shop at a time;
• Paul’s manager paid him ten dollars a week in gas money to run this errand; and
• Paul was “on the clock” and paid by Just Brakes for the time spent running this errand.
Vicarious liability in general
An employer may be held liable for the tortious acts of an employee if the acts are within the course and scope of employment. See Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex.1998). To defeat Arbelaez’s claim of vicarious liability, Just Brakes was required to establish as a matter of law either that: (1) Paul was not an employee; (2) no negligent act occurred; or (3) Paul was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the collision. See Drooker v. Saeilo Motors, 756 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (citing Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.1972)). Only the third prong — course and scope of employment — is at issue here.
Course and scope of employment is generally a fact issue like negligence or proximate cause. See, e.g., GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 618 (Tex.1999); Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 515 (Tex.1995). In the context of a traditional motion for summary judgment, controlling fact issues are generally for the trier of fact, and summary judgment for a defendant is appropriate only if the defendant-movant proves that no genuine fact issue exists on an essential element of the plaintiffs claim. See El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 315 (Tex.1987); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1975). The primary test for determining whether an employee is acting within the course and scope of employment is whether the employer has the right to direct and control the employee’s performance at the time of the alleged negligent act. St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 542 (Tex.2003) (“the right to control remains the ‘supreme test’ for whether the master-servant relationship exists” and thus whether the rule of vicarious liability applies) (quoting Golden Spread Council, Inc. No. 562 of Boy Scouts of Am. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex.1996)); American Nat'l Ins., Co. v. Denke, 128 Tex. 229, 95 S.W.2d 370, 373 (1936); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 212, 219, 235 cmt. a (1958).4
To ultimately prove that an employee acted within the course and scope of employment, however, Arbelaez must prove at trial that the act was (1) within the general authority given to the employee; (2) in furtherance of the employer’s business; and (3) for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was employed.5 Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. [721]*721Dumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.1972). We can only uphold the district court’s summary judgment if Just Brakes disproved as a matter of law at least one of these essential elements. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548. Because Paul’s manager authorized Paul to obtain breakfast for the crew, Just Brakes does not dispute that Paul’s actions were within the general authority given to him. We therefore address only the second two prongs.
In conducting our summary-judgment review, however, we wish to stress that our task is not to weigh the evidence to determine whether Paul was in fact within the course and scope of employment at the time of the collision. That question must be resolved by the trier of fact. Rather, we are to review the summary-judgment evidence, construed in favor of the non-movant, Arbelaez, and determine whether Just Brakes has carried its burden to establish as a matter of law that no genuine fact issues exist regarding the question of course and scope. Therefore, Just Brakes’ burden is certainly a heavy one. It must establish as a matter of law that, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Arbelaez, it is entitled to a finding that Paul was not within the course and scope of employment at the time of the collision. We conclude Just Brakes has not met this burden.
Just Brakes’ motion for summary judgment
The sole ground on which Just Brakes moved for summary judgment was that Paul was not within the course and scope of his employment when the collision occurred. In its attempt to prove as a matter of law that Paul was not within the course and scope of employment, Just Brakes advances several arguments. First, Just Brakes states: “It is well established that an employee is not acting in the furtherance of his employer’s business when he deviates from that employer’s business for a personal purpose.” Just Brakes then asserts that Paul’s manager possibly “condoned,” “knew of, or allowed” Paul to make the breakfast run, but Paul was “not ordered” to go. Just Brakes concludes that Paul’s personal errand did not benefit Just Brakes, “regardless of whether [Paul’s] manager knew of, or condoned, the diversion.”
Just Brakes’ argument fails to prove that Paul was not within the course and scope of his employment for several reasons. First, Just Brakes’ argument presupposes that Paul’s manager merely acquiesced in allowing Paul to make the breakfast run. The summary-judgment evidence indicates, however, that Paul’s manager affirmatively asked Paul to make the breakfast run for the shop. Under our standard of review, we cannot — as Just Brakes would have us do — assume that Paul requested permission to make the breakfast run; we must assume Paul’s manager asked Paul to perform this errand. See American Tobacco Co., 951 S.W.2d at 425.
Next, Just Brakes argues that Paul deviated from his employment because the breakfast run was for purely personal purposes. This argument is contradicted by the summary-judgment evidence that Paul made the breakfast run as his “first as[722]*722signment” of the day after he was requested to do so by his manager. See id. “If the purpose of serving the master’s business actuates the servant to any appreciable extent his acts are within the scope of employment.” Howard v. American Paper Stock Co., 523 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975), reformed and aff'd, 528 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.1975); accord Best Steel Buildings, Inc. v. Hardin, 553 S.W.2d 122, 128 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dictaphone Corp. v. Torrealba, 520 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.). Even if Paul was personally benefited to some degree by his breakfast run, his actions could still be within the course and scope of his employment. See Gilgon, Inc. v. Hart, 893 S.W.2d 562, 568 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) (employee’s actions may still be within course and scope of employment even if private matters are mixed with business errand); Torrealba, 520 S.W.2d at 872 (“Conduct may be within the scope of employment, although done in part to serve the purposes of the servant or of a third person.”) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 236 (1958)); Josey-Miller Co. v. Sheppard, 357 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1962, no writ) (employee still within course and scope even when “there is a mingling of the master’s business with the servant’s business”). We therefore hold that Just Brakes failed to prove that Paul deviated from his employment by complying with his manager’s request to make the breakfast run.
Finally, Just Brakes argues that Paul’s “personal errand” was not in furtherance of Just Brakes’ business. As explained above, the summary-judgment evidence does not prove that Paul’s errand was for purely personal purposes. Moreover, summary-judgment evidence exists to indicate that Just Brakes was indeed benefited by Paul’s breakfast run. Just Brakes’ corporate representative testified in a deposition6 that (1) Just Brakes can complete more work in a shorter time period with more mechanics present; (2) the practice of using one employee to obtain breakfast for the entire shop was common at various Just Brakes locations; (3) to get a day’s work done, a store requires a minimal number of mechanics; (4) it is important to have a manager present at all times; and (5) a reasonable manager would try to reduce the number of mechanics missing at any given time. Because this routine practice benefited Just Brakes, albeit indirectly, Just Brakes has failed to prove that Paul’s conduct was a purely personal errand that was not in furtherance of Just Brakes’ business.
We also address the numerous cases Just Brakes cites in support of its contentions laid out above.7 Each of these cases [723]*723is easily distinguishable. See Gant v. Dumas Glass & Mirror, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ) (employee commuting from lunch break); Brown v. American Racing Equip., Inc., 933 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ) (employee exceeded scope of manager’s authorization when performing “favor” for manager while on lunch break); J & C Drilling Co. v. Salaiz, 866 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ) (employee commuting to work site following dinner); Andrews v. Houston Lighting & Power, 820 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (employee going to lunch). None of these cases addresses a situation where an employee complied with an employer’s request to run an errand that benefítted, even indirectly, the employer’s business.
Just Brakes also cites Mitchell v. Ellis, 374 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1963, writ ref'd), for the proposition that no benefit flows to the employer by allowing an employee to engage in a purely personal matter.8 As explained above, Paul’s breakfast run was not a purely personal matter, as was at issue in Mitchell. See id. Paul was complying with his. manager’s request to perform an errand that benefítted Just Brakes.
Finally, Just Brakes cites two cases for the proposition that an employer’s reimbursement of gas money to an employee does not create a fact issue on course and scope of employment. These cases, too, are easily distinguishable in that they involve employees commuting to or from work, where the reimbursement of gas money was the only factor supporting a contention that the employee was within the course and scope of employment. See Wilson v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 758 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ) (employee driving home following work was compensated for extra trip to office); London v. Texas Power & Light Co., 620 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex.App.Dallas 1981, no writ) (employee driving to work at temporary job site was compensated for extra distance traveled to temporary job site). Here, the summary-judgment evidence indicates not only that Paul was reimbursed his gas money on a weekly basis, but also that Paul’s manager asked Paul to perform this errand on a routine basis, and that the errand benefítted Just Brakes.
Having reviewed Just Brakes’ motion for summary judgment, we hold that Just Brakes failed to prove as a matter of law that Paul was not acting within the course and scope of his employment.9
CONCLUSION
Under our standard of review, every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of Arbelaez and all doubts resolved in her favor. Applying this summary-judgment standard, genuine fact issues exist as to whether Paul’s actions were within the course and scope of his employment. Just Brakes has therefore failed to dis[724]*724prove as a matter of law Arbelaez’s claim of vicarious liability. The ultimate question of whether Just Brakes is vicariously liable for Paul’s acts must be decided by a trier of fact. We therefore reverse the summary judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.
Dissenting Opinion by Justice B.A. SMITH.