Antoinette de Truff v. 117 West 141 DE LLC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 29, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-07910
StatusUnknown

This text of Antoinette de Truff v. 117 West 141 DE LLC (Antoinette de Truff v. 117 West 141 DE LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Antoinette de Truff v. 117 West 141 DE LLC, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MARTINA ANTOINETTE DE TRUFF, Plaintiff, 24-CV-7910 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL 117 WEST 141 DE LLC; 117 WEST 141LLC; WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD CHAIM SIMKOWITZ; ELEANOR PATRICK, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated her rights under federal and state law. By order dated November 18, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint, with 30 days’ leave to replead. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Martina Antoinette de Truff1 filed this complaint against: (1) 117 West 141 DEL

LLC; (2) 117 West 141 LLC; (3) Chaim Simkowitz; and (4) Eleanor Patrick. Plaintiff alleges that Simkowitz is “listed as the CEO of 117 West 141 DE LLC and 117 West 141 LLC,” and that Patrick is “listed as Landlord of 117 West 141 DE LLC.” (ECF 1 at 2.) The following facts are drawn from the complaint.

1 Plaintiff previously file a pro se complaint under the name Martina Inumidun Iwala. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to replead for failure to state a claim, and then entered civil judgment after Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint. See Iwala v. NYC Police Dep’t, ECF 1:23-CV-5078, 8 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2024). Plaintiff asserts that she was evicted from her apartment “without proper legal notice or adherence to established procedures under New York state law,” and that before the eviction the “New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (“DHCR”) had issued a “rent reduction order, requiring the Defendant to lower Plaintiff’s rent due to uninhabitable

conditions.” (Id.) She further asserts that Defendants “refused to comply with this order, continuing to charge Plaintiff the full rent in direct violation of DHCR’s mandate.” (ECF 1 at 2- 3.) Thereafter, according to Plaintiff, Defendants “wrongfully disposed” of her personal property, worth more than $400,000, which included computers, printers, “mobile devices,” air conditioners, cameras, headsets used for Plaintiff’s “nonprofit work,” “[i]rreplaceable family items” such as her “father’s ashes,” medications, personal documents, including her social security card, passport, and bank statements, which resulted “in potential identity theft and further emotional and financial harm.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated: (1) her right to due process, in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983; (2) the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, by allegedly falsely reporting that Plaintiff owed rent; and (3) the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., by “reproducing, distributing, and displaying [copyrighted works] without” permission or authorization. (Id.) Plaintiff further claims to have “established common law trademark rights through the use of certain names, logos, and designs in connection with Plaintiff’s nonprofit and professional activities,” and that Defendants’ “unauthorized use of these trademarks [is] likely to cause confusion among consumers.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also asserts state law tort claims of conversion, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and “New York State housing law,” and alleged violations of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), and she claims that Defendants have “failed to pay outstanding invoices totaling $5,352,850 due to Plaintiff for services rendered and other contractual obligations.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks money damages “for the improper seizure and disposal of” her personal

property. (Id. at 4-6, 8-9.) DISCUSSION A. Federal claims 42 U.S.C. § 1983 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties therefore generally are not liable under the statute. Sykes v.

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Antoinette de Truff v. 117 West 141 DE LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/antoinette-de-truff-v-117-west-141-de-llc-nysd-2024.