Anthony Villa, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated v. C&W Facility Services, Inc.; Cushman & Wakefield U.S., Inc.; Cushman & Wakefield of California, Inc.; Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc.; and Does 1 through 100, inclusive

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: April 8, 2026
• Docket: 5:25-cv-10646
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ANTHONY VILLA, on behalf of himself Case No. 25-cv-10646-NW and others similarly situated, 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 REMAND v. 10 Re: ECF No. 16 C&W FACILITY SERVICES, INC.; 11 CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD U.S., INC.; CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD OF 12 CALIFORNIA, INC.; CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD WESTERN, INC., and 13 DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. 14 15 16 On October 31, 2025, Plaintiff Anthony Villa (“Villa” or “Plaintiff”) filed a putative class 17 action complaint in San Benito County Superior Court against Defendants C&W Facility Services, 18 Inc., Cushman & Wakefield U.S., Inc., Cushman & Wakefield of California, Inc., and Cushman & 19 Wakefield Western, Inc., as well as 100 Doe Defendants (collectively, “C&W” or “Defendants”). 20 Defendants removed the case to this District on December 12, 2025. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 21 1. 22 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand the action to state court. Mot. to Remand, 23 ECF No. 16. Defendants opposed, and Plaintiff filed a reply. Opp’n, ECF No. 20; Reply, ECF 24 No. 21. Having considered the parties’ briefs and the relevant legal authority, the Court concluded 25 that oral argument was not required, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b) and vacated the hearing. ECF 26 No. 26. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 27 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Villa has been employed by C&W, a commercial real estate firm, since June 16, 2025. 3 Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1-1. On October 31, 2025, Villa filed this wage and hour class action on 4 behalf of a putative class of “current, former, and/or future employees of Defendants as direct 5 employees as well as temporary employees employed through temp agencies who work as hourly 6 non-exempt employees.” Id. ¶ 3. Villa filed his complaint in San Benito County Superior Court. 7 See Compl. ¶ 2; ECF No. 1 at 1. 8 The complaint asserts six causes of action: (1) failure to pay minimum wages in violation 9 of California Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197, 1197.1; (2) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of 10 Labor Code §§ 510, 1198; (3) failure to provide meal periods and pay meal period premiums in 11 violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512(a); (4) failure to provide rest periods and pay rest period 12 premiums in violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512(a); (5) failure to reimburse required business 13 expenses in violation of Labor Code § 2802; and (6) violation of California Business & 14 Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. See generally Compl. 15 The complaint was served on Defendants on November 17, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 1. On 16 December 12, 2025, Defendant removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action 17 Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441(b), and 1446, asserting that there are more 18 than 100 proposed class members, the minimum diversity exists, and the amount in controversy is 19 more than $5,000,000. Id. at 1. Plaintiff now moves to remand this case to state court for lack of 20 subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA. ECF No. 16. 21 II. LEGAL STANDARD 22 A defendant may remove a case from state court to federal court only if the federal court 23 would have originally had subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Caterpillar Inc. v. 24 Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed 25 in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). “If at any time before final 26 judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be 27 remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 1 CAFA gives federal courts jurisdiction over class actions where (1) there are at least 100 2 class members, (2) at least one plaintiff is diverse in citizenship from any defendant, and (3) the 3 amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(B); see Ibarra v. 4 Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 2015). The removing party bears the burden 5 of establishing that CAFA’s jurisdictional requirements have been met. Abrego Abrego v. The 6 Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683–685 (9th Cir. 2006); Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 7 1018, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2007). 8 The removing party must file a notice of removal that contains a short and plain statement 9 of the grounds for removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), including a “plausible allegation that the amount 10 in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” De Vega v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 507 F. 11 Supp. 3d 1214, 1216 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197). In determining the 12 amount in controversy, courts first look to the allegations in the complaint. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 13 1197. If the complaint does not state the amount in controversy, the defendant’s notice of removal 14 may do so. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84 (2014). If the 15 amount in controversy alleged by the defendant is contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the 16 court, the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy 17 exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Id. at 82, 88. “The parties may submit evidence outside the 18 complaint, including affidavits or declarations, or other ‘summary judgment-type evidence 19 relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197 (quoting 20 Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). Defendants are 21 allowed to make reasonable assumptions when calculating the amount in controversy. Jauregui v. 22 Roadrunner Transportation Servs., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2022). But “[m]ere 23 speculation and conjecture” are insufficient to establish removal jurisdiction. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 24 1197; see also id. at 1199 (“[A]ssumptions cannot be pulled from thin air but need some 25 reasonable ground underlying them.”); Salazar v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., No. 2:18- 26 CV-05884-SJO-E, 2018 WL 4560683, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2018) (“Courts have routinely 27 remanded cases where amount in controversy calculations rely on speculative assumptions 1 WL 4457228, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2017) (“When the defendant relies on a chain of reasoning 2 that includes assumptions to satisfy its burden of proof, the chain of reasoning and its underlying 3 assumptions must be reasonable, and not constitute mere speculation and conjecture.”). 4 Assumptions can, however, “be ‘founded on the allegations of the complaint’ and do not 5 necessarily need to be supported by evidence.” Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 131 F.4th 804, 808 (9th 6 Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 A. Threshold CAFA Requirements 9 To determine if removal was proper, the Court begins by assessing whether this case meets 10 each of CAFA’s three threshold requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(B). 11 Here, there is no dispute that the first two requirements (minimum of 100 class members, 12 and at least one plaintiff diverse in citizenship from any defendant) are satisfied. C&W contends 13 that “the alleged class is comprised of more than 5,000 proposed class members in aggregate 14 during the alleged class period of October 31, 2021, to the present.” Notice of Removal, ECF No. 15 1 at 4. While Villa disagrees with C&W’s estimate of 5,000 proposed class members, Villa does 16 not dispute that the class size exceeds 100 class members. See Mot. at 10. Further, there is 17 diversity of citizenship because Villa is domiciled in California, and C&W Facility Services is “a 18 corporation organized under the laws of the state of Massachusetts, with its principal place of 19 business outside of the state of California.” Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 at 3. 20 The issue is the amount in controversy. Plaintiff argues it does not exceed $5,000,000 as 21 required under CAFA. Defendants counter that the amount in controversy on Plaintiff’s first two 22 claims alone exceed $5,000,000. Because Plaintiff’s complaint does not state an amount in 23 controversy, the Court considers Defendants’ notice of removal. See Dart Cherokee Basin 24 Operating Co., LLC, 574 U.S. at 84 (“When the plaintiff’s complaint does not state the amount in 25 controversy, the defendant’s notice of removal may do so.”). Defendants must show by a 26 preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is met. Id. at 88. 27 “The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute.” Lewis v. 1 controversy reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably recover.” Arias v. 2 Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019). Here, Defendants allege in their 3 notice of removal that the amount in controversy “is at least $9,100,000 considering Plaintiff’s 4 meal period and overtime claims alone as well as attorney’s fees.” ECF No. 1. 5 For alleged meal period violations, Defendants reach a $4,160,000 valuation by assuming a 6 single meal period violation per two-week period for each proposed class member. ECF No. 1 at 7 7. Defendants then multiply the number of two-week periods worked by the proposed class 8 members (160,000 two-week periods worked by proposed class members over class period) by the 9 average rate of pay ($26.00).1 Id. Defendants assert their calculations are “far below what courts 10 commonly accept as reasonable,” as courts have found that defendants could reasonably assert 11 50% violation rates in connection with their notice of removal under CAFA. ECF No. 1 at 8; 12 Elizarraz v. United Rentals, Inc., 2019 WL 1553664, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2019) (“it is entirely 13 reasonable for Defendant to allege a 50% violation rate for missed meal period and a 25% 14 violation rate for missed rest periods . . . and in any case numerous courts have found a 100% 15 violation rate appropriate”). Defendants’ conservative calculation using the minimum violation 16 rate of one meal period violation per two-week period “does not include Plaintiff’s additional 17 claims that premiums have not been paid at the correct regular rate of pay.” ECF No. 1 at 7. Still, 18 Defendants’ calculation yields $4,160,000 in controversy on the meal period claim alone. 19 Next, Defendants value Plaintiff’s claim for overtime wages at $3,120,000. Id. at 8. 20 Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated employees all wages 21 at the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked” by, among other things, “[r]equiring 22 Plaintiff and similarly situated employees to travel from their workstation to a designated area 23 during their off-the-clock meal breaks.” Compl. ¶ 23 (emphasis added). This, Defendants say, 24 suggests Plaintiff and the proposed class members are “owed overtime for every shift they worked 25 because they were required to work during every meal period and/or incurred compensable travel 26 time during every meal period.” ECF No. 1 at 8. Therefore, to calculate Plaintiff’s alleged unpaid 27 1 overtime claim, Defendants multiply 160,000 two-week periods worked by the proposed class 2 members by 0.5 hours of overtime per two-week period at $39.00 (the overtime rate for the $26.00 3 average rate of pay).2 Defendants assert their 0.5 hours value is reasonable considering courts 4 have found that similar allegations support a claim of 1-2 hours of unpaid overtime per one-week 5 period. See Hender v. American Directions Workforce LLC, 2020 WL 5959909, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 6 Oct. 8, 2020) (accepting the defendants’ calculations based on violation rates of between 20 and 7 40 percent, or one to two hours of overtime a week). The Court agrees. 8 Relying on Defendants’ calculations, the amount in controversy on Plaintiff’s meal period 9 claim and overtime wages claim adds up to $7,280,000, which is well over the $5,000,000 10 threshold under CAFA. The Court notes that even if Defendants overestimated Plaintiff’s 11 overtime claim by 50%, it would still be more than sufficient in combination with the meal period 12 claim to exceed the $5,000,000 minimum. This sum does not include amount in controversy on 13 Plaintiff’s four other claims nor attorney’s fees. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants have 14 shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 15 B. Whether Procedural Defects or Exceptions Preclude CAFA Jurisdiction 16 Having found that Defendants have met the three threshold requirements for removal 17 jurisdiction, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s remaining arguments that (1) Defendants’ removal was 18 procedurally defective, and (2) that CAFA’s “local” and “home-state” controversy exceptions 19 apply. 20 1. Whether Defendants’ Removal was Procedurally Defective 21 Plaintiff argues the action must be remanded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) because 22 Defendants’ removal was procedurally defective under § 1446(d). 23 After filing a notice of removal in federal court, § 1446(d) requires that defendants 24 “promptly” give written notice of the removal to all adverse parties and file a copy of the notice 25 with the clerk in the state court from which the action was removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). The 26

27 2 $3,120,000 = 0.5 (hours of overtime per two-week period) x $160,000 (number of two-week 1 statute does not define “promptly,” and there is “no clear rule about just how prompt a removing 2 defendant must be.” Ligutom v. SunTrust Mortgage, No. C10-05431, 2011 WL 445655, at *2 3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2011). However, “promptly” does not mean simultaneously, and short delays 4 typically do not warrant remand. Shanks v. Northern California Cement Masons Joint 5 Apprenticeship Training Committee, C-93-0609-MHP, 1993 WL 150273, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6 29, 1993); Ligutom, 2011 WL 445655, at *2. 7 Here, Defendants filed their notice of removal in this Court on December 12, 2025. ECF 8 No. 1. Defendants state Plaintiff was served with removal papers by mail the same day the notice 9 of removal was filed. ECF No. 20 at 11. Plaintiff alleges that their counsel’s office has yet to 10 receive any such notice of removal via mail. ECF No. 16 at 8. What matters, however, is that 11 neither party disputes that Plaintiff received actual notice 10 days later on December 22, 2025, 12 when Defendants filed the notice of removal with the state court and Plaintiff’s counsel was 13 served with the notice. ECF Nos. 16, 20. Plaintiff argues that the 10-day delay fails to satisfy 14 § 1446(d)’s “timing rule” under which “the defendant must promptly give notice to adverse parties 15 and file such a notice with the state court” after filing a notice of removal in federal court. 16 Blumberger v. Tilley, 115 F.4th 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2024); 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). 17 A delay of 10 days in filing the notice of removal with the state court does not warrant 18 remand. See Ligutom, 2011 WL 445655, at *2. Courts in this District and in others have held that 19 delays of over a month were timely for purposes of § 1446(d). See Id. (holding that defendant’s 20 roughly one month delay in filing the notice of removal with the Superior Court did not warrant 21 remand of the case); see also Calderon v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 246, 247-48 22 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that a 36-day delay was relatively short and harmless). Another court in 23 this District held that while an “8-day delay in notifying the parties and the state court may have 24 caused some inconvenience, the Court cannot find that this constitutes a procedural defect 25 warranting remand.” Rubin v. Air China Limited, No. 10-CV-05110-LHK, 2011 WL 1002099, at 26 *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011). Similarly, here, despite Plaintiff’s protest that the notice to adverse 27 parties was not filed or served on Plaintiff’s counsel until 10 days later during a holiday week, the 1 The Court finds that Defendants’ filing of the notice of removal in San Benito County 2 Superior Court 10 days after they filed the notice of removal in federal court was not procedurally 3 defective under § 1446(d). 4 2. Whether CAFA’s “Local” and “Home State” Controversy Exceptions 5 Apply 6 Finally, Plaintiff asserts this Court must decline jurisdiction under CAFA because of the 7 “local controversy” exception and the “home state controversy” exception. As the party seeking 8 remand, Plaintiff “bears the burden of proving that a CAFA exception applies.” Navarro v. Ski 9 Data, Inc., 2:20-CV-07370-SVW-SK, 2021 WL 1312579, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021) (citing 10 Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007)). 11 a. Local Controversy Exception 12 “The local controversy exception to CAFA jurisdiction is a narrow exception,” but “if the 13 exception applies, the district court must remand the case to state court.” Allen v. Boeing Co., 821 14 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2016). 15 The local controversy exception applies to a class action in which: (1) greater than two- 16 thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the state in 17 which the action was originally filed; (2) at least one defendant is a defendant from whom 18 significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class, whose alleged conduct forms a 19 significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class, and who is a citizen of the 20 state in which the action was originally filed; and (3) principal injuries resulting from the alleged 21 conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the state in which the action 22 was originally filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). The “local controversy” exception also requires 23 that “during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class action has 24 been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf 25 of the same or other persons.” Id. 26 Here, Defendants do not contest that the first three requirements of the local controversy 27 exception are satisfied. Defendants challenge only the fourth prong of the exception—that no 1 ECF No. 20 at 13. Specifically, Defendants point to Anthony Ports v. Cushman & Wakefield U.S., 2 Inc. et al., Case No. 3:23-cv-02218-RFL, (hereinafter “Ports”), which was removed to the 3 Northern District of California from San Francisco Superior Court and later consolidated with 4 Conriquez v. Cushman & Wakefield U.S., Inc. et al., Case No. 3:22-cv-02734-RFL, (hereinafter 5 “Conriquez”) in the Northern District of California. Id. 6 The Ports action was filed in state court on March 30, 2023, and was removed to federal 7 court on May 5, 2023. In his putative class action complaint, Plaintiff Ports alleged: (1) failure to 8 pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) 9 failure to provide rest breaks; (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (6) failure 10 to indemnify necessary business expenses; and (7) violation of Business and Professions Code 11 section 17200 et. seq. Ports, ECF No. 1. On August 27, 2024, the Ports action was consolidated 12 with Conriquez, which was initiated in state court on December 29, 2021, and removed to federal 13 court on May 6, 2022. 14 Although Ports was later consolidated with Conriquez, “for the purpose of determining 15 CAFA’s effective date, an action is commenced under California law when the original complaint 16 in the action is filed.” McAtee v. Capital One, F.S.B., 479 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). See 17 also Bridewell-Sledge v. Blue Cross of California, 798 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2015) (“the 18 relevant date under the fourth prong [of the local controversy exception test] is the date when the 19 actions were originally filed, and not some later date, such as the date when the two actions were 20 consolidated”). 21 For the Ports action to defeat the local controversy exception, as Defendants allege it does, 22 it must satisfy three requirements: (1) it was filed during the three-year period preceding the filing 23 of this class action; (2) it asserts the same or similar factual allegations; and (3) those allegations 24 are asserted against any of the same defendants. 25 This action was filed in San Benito County Superior Court on October 31, 2025, meaning 26 the preceding three-year period during which time no similar class action may have been filed 27 began on October 31, 2022. The Ports action was originally filed on March 30, 2023, well within 1 case. Ports had one additional claim for failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; 2 otherwise, the other six causes of action were the same. Finally, Ports sued Cushman & 3 Wakefield U.S., Inc. and Cushman & Wakefield of California, Inc., both of which are Defendants 4 in this action. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish the requirements set out in 5 § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii) to demonstrate that the local controversy exception applies. 6 b. Home State Controversy Exception 7 “The home state exception accords two bases for remand: one mandatory and the other 8 within the district court’s discretion.” Adams v. West Marine Products, Inc., 958 F.3d 1216, 1220 9 (9th Cir. 2020). Here, Plaintiff raises only the mandatory home state exception. 10 The mandatory home-state controversy exception applies to a class action in which “two- 11 thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primary 12 defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed.” 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1332(d)(4)(B). Plaintiff asserts, and Defendants do not dispute, that at least two-thirds of the 14 putative class members are citizens of California. The only question, therefore, is whether the 15 primary defendants are also citizens of California. 16 Plaintiff has sued C&W Facility Services, Inc., Cushman & Wakefield U.S., Inc., 17 Cushman & Wakefield of California, Inc., and Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc., as well as 18 100 Doe Defendants. Plaintiff asserts the primary defendants in this case are Cushman & 19 Wakefield of California, Inc., (“C&W CA”) and Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc., (“C&W 20 Western”). ECF No. 16. Although Defendants do not contest that C&W CA and C&W Western 21 are California citizens, Defendants disagree that those entities are the primary defendants in this 22 matter. ECF No. 20. Because C&W CA and C&W Western are the only California-based 23 Defendants in this case, the question before the Court is whether C&W CA and C&W Western are 24 primary defendants. 25 To determine whether a defendant is a “primary defendant” for purposes of CAFA’s home 26 state exception, courts “first assume that all defendants will be found liable.” Singh v. American 27 Honda Finance Corporation, 925 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2019). District courts then consider 1 proposed class or classes, as opposed to being vicariously or secondarily liable.” Id. Courts also 2 consider “the defendant’s potential exposure to the class relative to the exposure of other 3 defendants.” Id. 4 Here, C&W CA and C&W Western are sued directly and “are alleged to have been joint 5 employers and active participants in the challenged policies.” ECF No. 21. Defendants argue the 6 potential exposure of C&W CA and C&W Western is extremely low relative to that of other 7 Defendants. Plaintiff contends that because the putative class members are individuals who were 8 employed by Defendants in California, it is logical to conclude that C&W CA and C&W Western 9 “are both primary defendants.” ECF No. 16 at 18. But as Defendants point out, “[t]here is no 10 logical or legal connection between the citizenship of [a] corporation and its employees.” ECF 11 No. 20 at 15. Indeed, of the more than 5,000 putative class members, 17 were employed by C&W 12 of CA and 16 were employed by C&W Western, representing just 0.66% of the putative class 13 combined. ECF No. 20 at 14; see also Declaration of Timothy Hoppa, ECF No. 20-2 at 1:15-20. 14 Moreover, Defendants say, C&W CA and C&W Western are “tiny brokerages who primarily 15 employ licensed real estate professionals and a truly miniscule number of non-exempt office 16 staff.” ECF No. 20. 17 Given that C&W CA and C&W Western together employed less than one percent of the 18 putative class, the Court concludes that C&W CA and C&W Western are not primary defendants 19 for purposes of the mandatory home state controversy exception. Accordingly, the Court finds the 20 mandatory home state controversy exception does not apply. 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 25 26 27 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Because Defendants have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there are at least 3 100 putative class members and the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, and because 4 || Plaintiff has not established an applicable CAFA exception, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction 5 || under CAFA to hear this dispute. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 || Dated: April 8, 2026 . Noél Wise 9 United States District Judge 10 1] as 12

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