Anthony Thomas v. Satomi, a California Corporation

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 11, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01495
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY THOMAS, Case No. 2:24-cv-01495-CSK 12 Plaintiff, ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS GRANTING 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 14 SATOMI, a California Corporation, (ECF No. 16) 15 Defendant. 16

17 18 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Anthony Thomas’ motion for default judgment 19 against Defendant Satomi pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2).1 (ECF 20 No. 16). This motion was re-noticed for a hearing for October 7, 2025 before the 21 undersigned. (ECF No. 18.) Defendant Satomi, a California Corporation, did not file a 22 response to the motion, nor has it appeared in this case in any way. See Docket.2 On 23 September 22, 2025, Plaintiff’s motion was taken under submission without argument 24 pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). 9/22/2025 Order (ECF No. 19). For the reasons stated 25 below, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be GRANTED, and

26 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) 27 and Local Rule 302(c)(19). 2 Defendant Phung T. Dukinhtroung was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice on July 28 14, 2025 by Plaintiff. 7/14/2025 Order (ECF No. 14). 1 that judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff. 2 I. BACKGROUND 3 A. Facts 4 The Complaint alleges Plaintiff is a physically disabled person who is a paraplegic 5 due to a severe spinal cord injury suffered in a shooting incident over fourteen years ago 6 that led Plaintiff unable to independently stand or walk and now requires the use of a 7 wheelchair for mobility. Compl. ¶ 5 (ECF No. 1). Defendant Satomi owns and operates a 8 restaurant business known as Satomi, located at 819 W. 11th Steet, Tracy, California 9 95376 (“the Property”). Id. ¶¶ 6, 7. Plaintiff alleges that the Property, walkways and 10 adjacent parking facilities, are each a public accommodation and business 11 establishment open to the public. Id. ¶¶ 7, 12. 12 On November 6, 2023, February 9, 2024, and March 29, 2024, Plaintiff visited the 13 Property to purchase food. Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges on each of these occasions, 14 Defendant failed to provide wheelchair accessible handicap parking. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff 15 also alleges he encountered numerous accessibility problems, including failure to 16 provide wheelchair accessible paths of travel, handicap directional signs, handicap 17 seating, an accessible entry door to the Property, and a transaction counter at proper 18 height for use by people in wheelchairs. Id. ¶¶ 15-22. Plaintiff alleges he personally 19 encountered these architectural barriers each time he attempted to visit the Property. Id. 20 ¶ 25. Plaintiff further alleges he was denied full and equal access to the Property which 21 caused him difficulty, discomfort, and embarrassment. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff, who lives in the 22 area, plans to return and patronize the Property once the barriers are removed. Id. ¶ 27. 23 B. Procedural Background 24 On May 25, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action alleging the following three causes 25 of action: (1) violation of the California Health & Safety Code §§ 19955, et seq.; 26 (2) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), pursuant Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 27 52; and (3) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) pursuant to 28 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201, et seq. Compl. ¶¶ 35-64. On October 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed proofs 1 of service of summons and complaint on Defendants. (ECF Nos. 5, 6.) On November 1, 2 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default against Defendants after Defendants 3 failed to appear. (ECF Nos. 7, 8.) On November 18, 2024, the Clerk of the Court entered 4 default as to Defendant Satomi and declined to enter default as to Defendant 5 Dukinhtroung for improper service. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) After no action had been taken by 6 Plaintiff, on July 1, 2025, the Court directed Plaintiff to file a status report as to why this 7 case should not be dismissed against Defendant Dukinhtroung for failure to timely serve, 8 and why Plaintiff had not moved for default judgment against Defendant Satomi. 9 7/1/2025 Order (ECF No. 11). On July 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary 10 dismissal as to Defendant Dukinhtroung and a status report informing the Court he 11 intended to file a request for entry of default judgment against Defendant Satomi only. 12 (ECF Nos. 12, 13.) Defendant Dukinhtroung was dismissed from this action with 13 prejudice on July 14, 2025. 7/14/2025 Order. 14 On August 15, 2025, Plaintiff moved for default judgment against Defendant 15 Satomi. (ECF No. 16). On the same day, the Court informed Plaintiff his motion was 16 deficient and must be re-noticed in compliance with Local Rule 230(b). 8/15/2025 Order 17 (ECF No. 17). On August 30, 2025, Plaintiff re-noticed the motion to be heard before the 18 undersigned for October 7, 2025 and served Defendant with his motion on the same 19 day. (ECF No. 18.) After Defendant failed to respond to the motion for default judgment, 20 on September 22, 2025, the Court issued an order taking Plaintiff’s motion under 21 submission; vacating the hearing; ordering a written response from Defendant by 22 October 6, 2025; and directing Plaintiff to serve Defendant with a copy of the order. 23 9/22/2025 Order. On October 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proof of service indicating that 24 Defendant was served on September 26, 2025 with a copy of the September 22, 2025 25 Order. (ECF No. 20.) Defendant did not respond. See Docket. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 27 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a party 28 against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought who fails to plead or otherwise 1 defend against the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, this default does not 2 automatically entitle the plaintiff to a judgment. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. 3 Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citations omitted). The decision to grant or deny 4 the entry of default judgment is within the district court’s discretion. NewGen, LLC v. 5 Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016). 6 In determining whether to enter default judgment, courts consider the following 7 factors: 8 1. the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; 9 2. the merits of the substantive claim(s); 10 3. the sufficiency of the complaint; 11 4. the amount of money at stake in the lawsuit; 12 5. whether there are any disputes of material fact; 13 6. whether the defendant’s default was due to excusable neglect; and 14 7. the strong policy favoring decisions on the merits. 15 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has long 16 disfavored default judgments, counseling that cases be decided on the merits “whenever 17 reasonably possible.” Id. at 1472. 18 Once a default is entered, all well-pled allegations in the complaint regarding 19 liability are deemed true. Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 20 2002). “On the other hand, a defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well- 21 pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” United States v. Cathcart, 2010 WL 1048829, at 22 *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2010) (citation omitted). “[I]t follows from this that facts which are 23 not established by the pleadings of the prevailing party, or claims which are not well- 24 pleaded, are not binding and cannot support the judgment.” Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 25 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). Necessary facts not contained in the pleadings and claims 26 which are legally insufficient are not established by default. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa 27 Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, a plaintiff’s allegations regarding 28 damages are not deemed true at default, and the plaintiff bears the burden to prove 1 damages with evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(C); Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 2 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 Plaintiff moves for default judgment against Defendant Satomi on his claims for 5 violations under the Unruh Act (Second Cause of Action) and the ADA (Third Cause of 6 Action) only. See generally Pl. Mot. (ECF No. 16-1). Plaintiff seeks declaratory and 7 injunctive relief, statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. Id. at 7. 8 A. Jurisdiction and Service 9 As a preliminary matter, a court considering whether to enter default judgment 10 must first determine whether it has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the 11 parties to the case. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). 12 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to federal 13 question jurisdiction for claims brought pursuant to the ADA. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In 14 addition, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant, who is a California 15 corporation. See AM Tr. v. UBS AG, 681 F. App'x 587, 588 (9th Cir. 2017) (“a 16 corporation is typically subject to general personal jurisdiction only in a forum where it is 17 incorporated or where it maintains its principal place of business”) (citations omitted). 18 The Court also finds service was proper under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 4(h)(1)(B). Under California law, a corporation may be served by delivering a summons 20 and complaint to certain individuals, including the person designated as agent for service 21 of process. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 416.10(a)-(b). Here, Defendant’s designated agent for 22 service of process was personally served on June 14, 2024. (ECF No. 5.) 23 B. Eitel Factors 24 For the following reasons, the Court finds that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of 25 granting default judgment against Defendant. 26 1. Factor One: The Possibility of Prejudice to the Plaintiff 27 The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default 28 judgment were not entered, and such potential prejudice to the plaintiff weighs in favor of 1 granting a default judgment. See PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, the Clerk of 2 the Court entered default against Defendant on November 18, 2024 (ECF No. 9), and 3 Defendant has not participated in the litigation despite being served with the Complaint, 4 default judgment motion, and the Court’s September 22, 2025 Order. See Docket. 5 Plaintiff would suffer prejudice if the Court did not enter a default judgment. Accordingly, 6 the first Eitel factor favors the entry of default judgment. 7 2. Factors Two and Three: The Merits of the Claim and the Sufficiency 8 of the Complaint 9 The merits of Plaintiff’s substantive claim and the sufficiency of the Complaint are 10 considered together due to the relatedness of the two inquiries. The Court must consider 11 whether the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to state a claim that supports the 12 relief sought. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 13 Here, the merits of the claim and the sufficiency of the Complaint favor entry of default 14 judgment. 15 Plaintiff moves for default judgment as to his claims for violations under the Unruh 16 Act (Second Cause of Action) and the ADA (Third Cause of Action) only. See generally 17 Pl. Mot. (ECF No. 16-1). Because Plaintiff did not move for default judgment as to his 18 claim for violation of the California Health and Safety Code (First Cause of Action), the 19 Court does not address this claim below. Id. 20 a. Violation of the ADA 21 “Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination in public accommodations[.]” Kohler v. 22 Bed Bath & Beyond of California, LLC, 780 F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 2015). The 23 elements of a Title III claim are: (1) plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; 24 (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public 25 accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was discriminated against by the defendant 26 because of plaintiff's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins 27 Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010). Discrimination, in this 28 context, includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers […] in existing facilities […] 1 where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); see also 2 Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). 3 Plaintiff alleges he is a paraplegic, who is unable to stand or walk, and requires 4 the use of a wheelchair for mobility, and is therefore physically disabled as defined by 5 applicable California and federal laws. Compl. ¶ 5. As a restaurant, the Property is a 6 facility open to the public, a place of public accommodation, and business establishment. 7 Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges Defendant owns, operates, or leases the Property. Id. ¶ 7. 8 Plaintiff further alleges that he visited the Property on November 6, 2023, February 9, 9 2024, and March 29, 2024 and that he encountered multiple accessibility problems in the 10 following ways: (1) no wheelchair accessible handicap parking; (2) improper wheelchair 11 accessible paths of travel where the concrete leading up to the Property is cracked, 12 sloped, and uneven and creates hazards for persons in wheelchairs; (3) no handicap 13 directional signs; (4) no handicap seating; (5) entry door to the Property was not wide 14 enough and was heavy taking 20 pounds of pressure to attempt to open it; and (6) the 15 transaction counter at the Property was more than 36 inches in height and blocked by 16 inventory items making it inaccessible for persons in wheelchairs. Id. ¶¶ 13-22. Plaintiff 17 alleges that the removal of these architectural barriers is readily achievable and that 18 there are numerous alternative accommodations that could be made to provide a greater 19 level of access if complete removal is not achievable. Id. ¶ 29. Taken as true, the Court 20 finds the allegations of the Complaint are sufficient and state a meritorious ADA claim. 21 b. Violation of the Unruh Act 22 Under California’s Unruh Act, “all persons […] are entitled to the full and equal 23 accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 24 establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). The Unruh Act 25 incorporates “the right of any individual under the [ADA,]” such that a violation of the 26 ADA also constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). The 27 Complaint alleges Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of the Unruh 28 Act. Compl. ¶¶ 49-54. Because Plaintiff has shown that Defendant is in violation of the 1 ADA, he has shown that Defendant is in violation of the Unruh Act. See Lentini v. 2 California Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004) (“a violation of 3 the ADA is, per se, a violation of the Unruh Act.”) Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently 4 pled a meritorious Unruh Act claim. 5 The Court therefore finds the second and third Eitel factors favor the entry of 6 default judgment. 7 3. Factor Four: The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action 8 Under the fourth Eitel factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake in 9 relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 10 The sum of money at stake here is significant, though not unreasonable as it is directly 11 connected to Defendant’s conduct. Accordingly, the fourth Eitel factor favors the entry of 12 default judgment. 13 4. Factor Five: The Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts 14 The facts of this case are relatively straightforward, and Plaintiff has provided the 15 Court with well-pleaded allegations and documentation supporting his claims. See 16 generally Compl. Here, the Court may assume the truth of well-pleaded facts in the 17 complaint (except as to damages) following the clerk's entry of default, and thus, there is 18 no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists. See, e.g., Elektra Entm't 19 Group Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations 20 in a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after the court clerk enters default 21 judgment, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists.”); accord 22 Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. Cal. 2003); 23 PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Accordingly, the fifth Eitel factor favors the entry of 24 default judgment. 25 5. Factor Six: Whether Default was Due to Excusable Neglect 26 Upon review of the record before the Court, there is no indication that the default 27 was the result of excusable neglect. See PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Plaintiff 28 served Defendant with the summons and the Complaint. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff also 1 served Defendant with its motion for default judgment and with the Court’s September 2 22, 2025 Order. (ECF Nos. 18, 20.) Despite ample notice of this lawsuit and Plaintiff’s 3 intention to seek a default judgment, Defendant has failed to participate in this action or 4 to defend itself. Accordingly, the sixth Eitel factor favors the entry of default judgment. 5 6. Factor Seven: The Strong Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 6 “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 7 782 F.2d at 1472. Although the Court is cognizant of the policy favoring decisions on the 8 merits, that policy does not, by itself, preclude the entry of default judgment where a 9 defendant fails to appear or defend itself in an action. See PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 10 1177; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. 11 Cal. 2010). 12 7. Conclusion 13 Upon consideration of the Eitel factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is 14 entitled to the entry of default judgment against Defendant. The Court next determines 15 the terms of judgment. 16 C. Terms of Judgment 17 Plaintiff requests statutory damages in the amount of $8,000, attorneys’ fees in 18 the amount of $3,412.50, costs and litigation expenses in the amount of $405, and 19 injunctive relief. Pl. Mot. at 7. The Court addresses each in turn. 20 1. Statutory Damages 21 The Unruh Act provides for, among other things, a minimum statutory damages 22 amount of $4,000 per violation. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. 23 Supp. 2d 1126, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (the Unruh Act “provides for statutory damages up 24 to a maximum of three times the actual damages but no less than $4,000 for each 25 instance of discrimination”). Plaintiff asserts he has established a violation under the 26 ADA and therefore has established a violation under the Unruh Act and is therefore 27 entitled to $8,000 in statutory damages for the three times he visited the Property on 28 November 6, 2023, February 9, 2024, and March 29, 2024. Pl. Mot. at 4-5. Plaintiff also 1 states he is not requesting damages for the three times he visited the Property but rather 2 just for two attempts. Id. at 7 n.1. 3 “Although [California Civil] Code § 52(a) may permit a plaintiff to obtain the 4 minimum statutory damages for each obstructed visit to a facility, a plaintiff cannot 5 simply visit a facility more often to increase the amount of potential statutory damages.” 6 See Johnson v. Prithviraj, LLC, 2019 WL 718117, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2019), 7 adopted in full by 4/16/2019 Order, No. 2:15-cv-0257-JAM-CKD (ECF No. 14). In this 8 case, Plaintiff made no showing as to why he returned to the Property after his initial 9 visit. See Compl. Like the Johnson case, Plaintiff did not allege that he returned after 10 having received good faith assurances from Defendant or its agents that the 11 architectural barriers were removed. In light of this deficiency, the Court recommends 12 that plaintiff only be awarded minimum statutory damages corresponding to one visit, 13 i.e., $4,000. 14 2. Attorneys’ Fees 15 The Ninth Circuit affords district courts broad discretion in determining the 16 reasonableness of fees. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992). 17 While the amount of a fee award is discretionary, the district court must “provide a 18 concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Carter v. Caleb Brett LLC, 19 757 F.3d 866, 868 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit utilizes the “lodestar” method for 20 assessing reasonable attorney's fees. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 21 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). Under the “lodestar” method, the number of hours reasonably 22 expended is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. Reasonable hourly rates are 23 determined by the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Sorenson v. Mink, 24 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001). “[T]he established standard when determining a 25 reasonable hourly rate is the ‘rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed 26 by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’” Camacho v. Bridgeport 27 Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 502 28 (9th Cir. 1997)). Generally, “the relevant community is the forum in which the district 1 court sits.” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979 (quoting Barjon, 132 F.3d at 500). Here, the 2 relevant community is Sacramento, California, which is where this district court is 3 located. 4 Plaintiff seeks $3,412.50 in attorneys’ fees. Pl. Mot. at 6. Specifically, Plaintiff 5 requests $2,325 for attorney Beilal Chatila, for 7.75 hours of legal services at an hourly 6 rate of $300; and $1,087.50 for paralegal Larry Menton, for 7.25 hours of legal services 7 at an hourly rate of $150. 8/13/2025 Declaration of Beilal Chatila ¶¶ 7-8 (ECF No. 16-2); 8 8/13/2025 Declaration of Larry Menton ¶ 5 (ECF No. 16-3). 9 Plaintiff provides billing records for attorney Chatila from May 8, 2024 to August 4, 10 2025 for initial review of the allegations, reviewing and drafting the Complaint, preparing 11 documents regarding the notice of default, and reviewing and editing the motion for 12 default judgment. Chatila Decl., Exh. A. The Court finds that 7.75 hours is a reasonable 13 amount of time for the work completed. Because Mr. Chatila has been practicing law for 14 12 years, the Court also finds the hourly rate of $300 for an attorney with 12 years of 15 experience is reasonable in Sacramento and recommends granting counsel’s requested 16 $300 hourly rate. See Chatila Decl. ¶ 4. The Court notes that the requested hourly rate is 17 a lower rate than the rate for attorneys with similar years of legal experience in the 18 relevant community. See, e.g., Gong-Chun v. Aetna Inc., 2012 WL 2872788, at *23 (E.D. 19 Cal. July 12, 2012) (awarding between $490 and $695 per hour for senior counsel and 20 partners). 21 Plaintiff also provides billing records for Mr. Menton from May 8, 2024 to August 22 1, 2025 for initial review of the allegations, visiting the Property to assess ADA non- 23 compliance, drafting, filing and serving the Complaint, and preparing related declarations 24 for the motion for default judgment. Menton Decl., Exh. A. The Court finds that 7.25 25 hours are not entirely reasonable and that certain time expended is duplicative of the 26 work done by attorney Chatila (i.e., billing for meeting with client regarding allegations 27 (0.75) and conference with Mr. Chatila regarding site visit and case strategy (0.75)) and 28 should therefore be reduced by 1.50 hours. Further, the Court finds that the following 1 clerical tasks are not recoverable: filing Complaint and related documents (0.5); service 2 of summons and Complaint (1.25); and preparing proofs of service (0.5)). See Missouri 3 v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 (1989) (“purely clerical or secretarial tasks should 4 not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s 5 requested hours for Mr. Menton should be further reduced by 2.25 hours for these 6 clerical tasks. See id. The Court therefore finds that 3.5 hours for Mr. Menton are 7 reasonable. The Court further finds Plaintiff’s requested rate of $150 is reasonable for 8 Mr. Menton, who has 40 years of experience. Menton Decl. ¶ 3; see also Freshko 9 Produce Servs., Inc. v. ILA Prods., Inc., 2021 WL 4033176, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 10 2021) (finding that hourly rate of $150 for a paralegal with over 30 years of experience is 11 reasonable). 12 Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff be granted $2,850 for attorneys’ 13 fees ($2,325 for Mr. Chatila and $525 for Mr. Menton). 14 3. Costs and Litigation Expenses 15 Plaintiff seeks $405 in costs and litigation expenses for the filing fee of the 16 Complaint. Chatila Decl. ¶¶ 7-8. Costs for filing fees are properly recoverable by Plaintiff. 17 See 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s request of $405 in costs 18 and litigation expenses is compensable and should be awarded. 19 4. Injunctive Relief 20 Plaintiff's Complaint seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to make changes to 21 the Property in a manner that makes the Property readily accessible to and usable by 22 individuals with disabilities. Compl. ¶ 64. As the factual allegations in the Complaint are 23 taken as true, Plaintiff is entitled to some injunctive relief.3 See Wander v. Kaus, 304 24 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Damages are not recoverable under Title III of the ADA— 25

26 3 The Court notes that the proposed judgment submitted by Plaintiff improperly included requests for injunctive relief that were not pled in the Complaint. Pl. Proposed Default 27 Judgt (referring to restroom issues not pled in the Complaint) (ECF No. 16-4 at 2). The Court interprets this as an error rather than an attempt to seek injunctive relief for issues 28 not raised in his Complaint. 1 only injunctive relief is available for violations of Title III.”). 2 IV. CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons set forth above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the 4 Court randomly assign a district judge to this action. 5 It is further HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 6 1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 16) be GRANTED; 7 2. Defendant be found and declared to be in violation of Title III of the 8 Americans with Disabilities Act; 9 3. Plaintiff be awarded statutory damages under the Unruh Act in the amount 10 of $4,000; 11 4. Plaintiff be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $2,325 for 12 Mr. Chatila and $525 for Mr. Menton for a total amount of $2,850; 13 5. Plaintiff be awarded costs and litigation expenses in the amount of $405; 14 6. Defendant be ordered to make the following modifications to the business 15 known as Satomi, located at 819 11th Street, Tracy, California 95376 (the 16 "Property"), such that each item is brought into compliance with the 17 accessibility requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act and 18 California Code of Regulations, Title 24, as follows: 19 a. Provide a properly configured, located and identified accessible 20 parking space; 21 b. Provide a properly configured accessible route from the accessible 22 parking space to the entrance of the Property; and 23 c. Provide an accessible entrance with proper operating pressures. 24 7. This case be closed. 25 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 26 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 27 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 28 written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 1 || be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 2 || reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 3 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 4 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 5 || 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 6 7 Dated: February 11, 2026 CC; (i s \C 8 GHI 500 KIM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 4, thom1495.24 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14