Opinion issued December 31, 2025.
In the
Court of Appeals for the
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00301-CV ——————————— ANNETTE RAMIREZ, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE HARRIS COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR-COLLECTOR AND VOTER REGISTRAR, Appellant v. STEVE HOTZE, M.D., JOSEPH L. TRAHAN, CAROLINE KANE, AND THE HONORABLE SID MILLER, Appellees
On Appeal from the 157th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-72883
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Annette Ramirez, in her official capacity as the Harris County Tax
Assessor-Collector and Voter Registrar (the Registrar) contends that the trial court
erred in denying her plea to the jurisdiction because: (1) there has been no violation of the Texas Election Code1 because the reference to an “address
reclassification” in section 15.022(b) of the Election Code is not a reference to a
change of address, (2) appellees lack standing, (3) the Registrar has not waived her
immunity, and (4) no ultra vires exception applies. We reverse.
Background
A. Appellees’ Claims
Eighteen days before the 2024 general election in Harris County, three
appellees—Steven Hotze, Joseph Trahan, and Caroline Kane, the original plaintiffs
in the trial court—filed suit against Harris County and its then-Registrar, Ann
Harris Bennett, the original defendants. At that time, Kane and Trahan were
candidates in races appearing on Harris County’s general election ballot and
appellees stated that Hotze was a political activist. The plaintiffs argued in their
suit that Harris County had violated section 276.019 of the Texas Election Code,
which provides that: “A public official or election official may not create, alter,
modify, waive, or suspend any election standard, practice, or procedure mandated
by law or rule in a manner not expressly authorized by this code.” The plaintiffs
sought declarations that Bennett had engaged in ultra vires conduct by violating
section 276.019, and by failing in multiple ways to maintain the accuracy and
integrity of Harris County’s voter registration roll, including by failing “to review
1 All references herein to the Election Code are to the Texas Election Code.
2 the National Change of Address database on a monthly basis, and, when necessary,
investigate specific instances where a voter’s registration status in Harris County
should be reasonably questioned.” The plaintiffs sought injunctions requiring
Bennett to correct the alleged failings and prohibiting both Bennett and Harris
County from engaging in the future in the conduct alleged to violate section
276.019.
Harris County and Bennett’s defenses to appellees’ claims included that the
Election Code does not require a county voting registrar to review the National
Change of Address (NCOA) database on a monthly basis, that governmental
immunity barred each of the claims, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring
their claims, and that the plaintiffs’ claims were moot.
B. The Plea to the Jurisdiction
In March 2025, Harris County and Bennett’s successor, appellant Registrar
Annette Ramirez, filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which they argued that (1) the
plaintiffs lacked standing, for reasons including that Kane and Trahan, who had
lost their respective elections, were no longer candidates for office; (2) the
defendants are immune from suit, for reasons including that Harris County
(including the Registrar) has no duty to conduct a monthly review of the NCOA
database; and (3) the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) does not confer
on appellees standing or jurisdiction for the claims asserted in this lawsuit.
3 In April 2025, the plaintiffs argued in response that they had standing as
Harris County residents, voters, and taxpayers; because Kane and Trahan “had a
right to be candidates in a political election which was free from illegal voting”;
and because Hotze’s “constitutionally protected right to vote in the past election
was diluted by the presence of votes which were cast but should not have been
counted.” They argued further that their claims were not moot, taking the position
that the challenged conduct is capable of repetition yet evading review. The
plaintiffs contended that Harris County and the Registrar are not immune from suit
for reasons including that (1) the Registrar engaged in ultra vires acts, including
failing to conduct a monthly review of the NCOA database; (2) Harris County’s
presence in the suit was necessary to effectuate and bind it and appellant to a
judicial declaration; and (3) the UDJA contains waivers of governmental
immunity, such as the requirement, in section 37.006(b) of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code, that a municipality must be made a party to suits challenging
the validity of a municipal ordinance.
C. Appellees’ Amended Pleading
On the same day that the original plaintiffs filed their response to Harris
County and the Registrar’s plea to the jurisdiction, they also filed an amended
petition in which they added appellee Texas Agriculture Commissioner Sid Miller
4 as a plaintiff.2 Miller is only referenced in the amended pleading as being a
resident of Erath County. Miller was re-elected to his position as Agriculture
Commissioner in 2022 and was not a candidate in a race appearing on Harris
County’s general election ballot in 2024.3
In their amended pleading, appellees made no updates to change references
to Bennett to references to Ramirez. Appellees continued to allege that Bennett had
failed to maintain the accuracy and integrity of the Harris County voter registration
roll by failing to review the NCOA database on a monthly basis and “investigate
specific instances where a voter’s registration status in Harris County should be
reasonably questioned.” Appellees alleged that Bennett had included on Harris
County’s voter registration roll “hundreds of thousands” of individuals who should
not be there, including individuals who are deceased, felons, not residents of Harris
County, not citizens of the United States, “not related to each other but . . .
registered at the same address,” “registered at post office or private mail boxes
with commercial mail receiving agencies,” or registered at a commercial address at
which they do not reside, and/or “claim to live on vacant property with no 2 Because the amended petition was filed before the trial court ruled on the Registrar’s plea to the jurisdiction, we treat it as appellees’ live pleading. See Patel v. Trevino, No. 01-20-00445-CV, 2022 WL 3720135, *1 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that amended pleading filed after plea to jurisdiction, but before hearing on plea, was live pleading). 3 Appellees added Miller as a plaintiff after the Registrar filed her plea to the jurisdiction, on the same day that appellees filed their response. Appellees do not mention Miller in their response.
5 structure, utilities, or other indicia of actual residency.” Appellees appeared to also
allege that Bennett had failed to add to the suspense list all voters on the Harris
County voter registration roll who should be on that list and permitted suspense
voters to vote despite having “not properly filled out a statement of residence
form.”
Appellees sought “the following declaratory and injunctive relief”:
(i) to force the Harris County Voter Registrar to monitor and maintain the accuracy and integrity of Harris County’s voter registration roll;
(ii) to remove those listed on the voter registration role who are not eligible to remain listed;
(iii) to review the National Change of Address database on a monthly basis, and, when necessary, investigate specific instances where a voter’s registration status in Harris County should be reasonably questioned;
(iv) to promptly review and determine challenges to the registration status of a voter;
(v) to promptly initiate confirmation notices to voters whose registration status has or may have come into question;
(vi) to ensure that voters are placed on a suspense list so that their current residency credentials may be determined through a statement of residence form required to be filled out as a prerequisite to voting; and
(vii) all other actions necessary to force compliance with the voter registration roll in order to stop her ultra vires conduct.
6 Appellees also asked the trial court to enjoin Harris County and Bennett from
“continuing to violate Chapter 276.019 of the Texas Election Code as described
above.”
D. Denial of Registrar’s Plea to Jurisdiction
On April 8, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Harris County and the
Registrar’s plea to the jurisdiction. On April 10, 2025, without stating its
reasoning, the trial court granted Harris County’s plea to the jurisdiction (which
ruling appellees have not challenged) and denied the Registrar’s.
E. Appeal
The Registrar then filed this interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(7). On appeal, the Registrar argues that the trial court erred
in denying her plea to the jurisdiction because appellees lack standing and she has
immunity from their claims. The Registrar argues that appellees do not have
standing because they have pleaded only a generalized grievance, not a concrete
and particularized actual or imminent injury, and do not have taxpayer standing,
candidate standing, or standing under section 273.081 of the Election Code. The
Registrar argues further that she has immunity from appellees’ claims because
appellees have failed to show that she engaged in ultra vires conduct, and because
appellees have pleaded no applicable statutory waiver of immunity. At oral
7 argument, appellees confirmed that the ultra vires conduct at issue is the
Registrar’s alleged failure to comply with section 15.022 of the Election Code.
Election Code
Certain Election Code provisions have particular impact on our
consideration of the jurisdictional issues raised by the Registrar in her appeal.
A. Residency Requirement
To be eligible to vote in Texas, a person must “be a resident of the territory
covered by the election for the office or measure on which the person desires to
vote.” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 11.001(a)(2). Residency as the term is used in the
Election Code is a determination involving multiple considerations, including an
individual’s circumstances and intent. Medlin v. King, 705 S.W.3d 267, 291 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2024, pet. denied). The Election Code defines “residence” as
“domicile, that is, one’s home and fixed place of habitation to which one intends to
return after any temporary absence.” Id. § 1.015(a). A person “does not lose the
person’s residence by leaving the person’s home to go to another place for
temporary purposes only,” id. § 1.015(c), and “does not acquire a residence in a
place to which the person has come for temporary purposes only and without the
intention of making that place the person’s home,” id. § 1.015(d).
8 B. Statement of Residence
A statement of residence (SOR) is a form requesting residence-related
information and affirmations that multiple categories of voters are required to
complete and submit to an election official in their county of residence before
being accepted for voting. See TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 63.0011(a)-(c), 86.002(a),
15.112. A voter who submits an SOR affirms that the voter is a resident of the
county in which the voter seeks to vote. Id. §§ 63.0011(c)(1)-(2), 13.002(c)(4).
Voters whose residence address is not current because they have changed
residence within a county may still vote in that county if they submit an SOR
affirming that they remain a county resident. Id. §§ 63.0011(a)-(c), 84.001(a),
84.001(d), 86.002(a). Voters who appear on the Texas Secretary of State’s
suspense list are also required to submit an SOR before voting. Id. §§ 86.002(a),
15.112. A voter may be added to the suspense list if, among other reasons, the
voter fails to respond to a voter registrar request for confirmation of residence, if a
confirmation request is returned to the registrar undelivered, or if the voter
registration certificate that the registrar sends every two years to all registered
voters not on the suspense list (referred to as a “renewal certificate”) is returned
undelivered. Id. §§ 15.051, 15.053, 15.081.
9 C. Section 14.022 (Erroneous Return of Renewal Certificate)
A voter registrar’s renewal certificate may be returned undelivered due to
“postal service error, address reclassification, or the registrar’s clerical error.” Id.
§ 14.022. In contemplation of such errors, section 14.022 of the Election Code,
titled “Erroneous Return of Renewal Certificate,” provides that:
If the registrar determines that a voter’s renewal certificate was returned undelivered solely because of postal service error, address reclassification, or the registrar’s clerical error, the registrar shall delete the voter’s name from the suspense list, make any other appropriate corrections in the registration records, and deliver the certificate to the voter.
D. Section 15.022 (Correction of Registration Records)
Section 15.022 of the Election Code, titled “Correction of Registration
Records,” lists other circumstances under which a registrar must make “appropriate
corrections in the registration records, including, if necessary, deleting a voter’s
name from the suspense list.” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 15.022(a). Such circumstances
include, for example, a change in the boundary of an election precinct, the
registrar’s receipt of notice that a data entry error caused a voter’s name to be
inadvertently left off the list of registered voters for the precinct, the registrar’s
receipt of a voter’s SOR, or the registrar’s receipt of notice that a voter has updated
the voter’s residence address on the voter’s voter registration or driver’s license.
TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 15.022(a)(1), (4), (5), (8), (9).
10 At issue here is the requirement set forth in section 15.022(a) that the
registrar must make appropriate corrections in the registration records “after
receipt of [USPS] information indicating an address reclassification.” Id.
§ 15.022(a)(6). The Election Code does not define the term “address
reclassification,” and it does not appear in any Texas statute other than once in
section 14.022 and twice in section 15.022 of the Election Code.4 Section
15.022(b) states that, “[a]t least monthly, the registrar shall request from the
[USPS] any available information indicating address reclassifications affecting the
registered voters of the county.”
Plea to the Jurisdiction
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction on
standing or immunity grounds. See Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley,
598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020). (“Because a plea to the jurisdiction raises a
question of standing, we also review a plea to the jurisdiction de novo.”); Deville v.
Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 634 S.W.3d 324, 329 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“A governmental entity can raise its immunity
from suit in a plea to the jurisdiction, and we review de novo the trial court’s ruling
4 The term “address reclassification” does not appear in the United States Code or federal case law, other than in a single decision quoting without discussing section 15.022(b) of the Texas Election Code. See Gilmore v. Jones, 370 F. Supp. 3d 630, 648 n.11 (W.D. Va. 2019).
11 on the plea.” (citing Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755,
770 (Tex. 2018))). To the extent we must interpret statutory provisions affecting
our jurisdiction, our review remains de novo because the proper interpretation of a
statute is a question of law. Davis v. Morath, 624 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Tex. 2021).
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges a plaintiff’s pleading, we
determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the
court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause. Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d
387, 393 (Tex. 2022). Bare conclusory allegations are insufficient to defeat a plea
to the jurisdiction. See State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 881-85 (Tex. 2009) (where
jurisdiction depended on plaintiff’s having pleaded allegations that, if true, would
establish violation of Whistleblower Act, holding that plaintiff’s pleading was
required to address essential elements of violation to defeat plea to the jurisdiction,
noting that “[a]llowing a plaintiff’s pleadings to stand on bare allegations, alone,
. . . would practically eliminate the use of pleas to the jurisdiction”); Stephen F.
Austin State Univ. v. Flynn, 228 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tex. 2007) (where jurisdiction
depended on plaintiff’s having pleaded allegations that, if true, would establish
gross negligence, holding that “conclusory allegations” that failed to demonstrate
defendant’s awareness of and conscious indifference to risk were insufficient to
defeat plea to the jurisdiction); Pena v. City of Garland, No. 05-21-00611-CV,
2021 WL 6143710, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)
12 (where jurisdiction depended on plaintiff’s having pleaded allegations that, if true,
would establish municipal defendant’s actual knowledge, holding that “bare
allegations that the City had actual knowledge” were insufficient to defeat plea to
the jurisdiction (citing Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 884-85)). Similarly, we are not bound
by the plaintiff’s legal conclusions. Tex. S. Univ. v. Gilford, 277 S.W.3d 65, 68
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); see also Wilson v. Cmty.
Health Choice Tex., Inc., 607 S.W.3d 843, 851 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, pet.
denied) (noting that, when reviewing trial court’s order on plea to jurisdiction,
“[m]ere unsupported legal conclusions do not suffice” to satisfy plaintiff’s burden
to demonstrate trial court’s jurisdiction).
If the pleading does not contain sufficient facts to demonstrate the court’s
jurisdiction but also does not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects, the
plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend. Dohlen, 643 S.W.3d at 393. If
the pleading affirmatively negates jurisdiction, then the plea to the jurisdiction
should be granted without the opportunity to amend. Id.
B. Standing
Because appellees seek only declaratory and injunctive relief, and all seek
the same relief, only one of them must have standing. Andrade v. NAACP of
Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2011) (citing Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground
Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 627 (Tex. 1996)). Contrary to the
13 Registrar’s position on appeal, a threshold inquiry into standing would not depend
on the merits of appellees’ contention that the Registrar’s failure to conduct a
monthly review of the NCOA database violates section 15.022(b) of the Election
Code. See id. at 7 (noting that threshold inquiry into whether voter had standing to
pursue claims did not depend on merits of her contention that particular conduct is
illegal (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975))). However, we need not reach the question of whether
any of appellees has standing because, even if one of them has standing, appellees
have not shown that the Registrar either has no immunity or waived her immunity
from suit under the circumstances at issue. See, e.g., id. at 11-14 (holding that
supreme court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over equal protection claim based
on county’s use of electronic voting system because, even though voters had
standing to bring claim, Secretary of State retained immunity from suit because
claim was not viable); Ramsey v. Miller, No. 02-22-00412-CV, 2023 WL 3645468,
at *4 n.5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 25, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting
that, even if court of appeals were to assume that appellants had standing to bring
equal protection claim based on county’s use of electronic voting system, it would
still lack subject matter jurisdiction because claim was not viable and county
would thus retain governmental immunity (citing Andrade, 345 S.W.3d at 6)).
14 C. Immunity
In the trial court, appellees argued that Harris County’s immunity from suit
was waived under Texas’s Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) and that the Registrar
has engaged in ultra vires conduct for which she has no immunity from suit. To the
extent appellees claim that the Registrar’s immunity from suit is waived under the
DJA, that argument is incorrect. Appellees appear to contend that language in
sections 37.002(b), 37.003(a), 37.004(a), and 37.006(b) of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code constitutes such a waiver. Appellees also claim, without
support, that the DJA contains “a waiver of immunity from suit for governmental
bodies whose presence is necessary to effectuate and bind them to a judicial
declaration.”5
The DJA contains no general waiver of sovereign immunity for claims for
declaratory judgment against the government, and instead provides only a limited
waiver for challenges to the validity of an ordinance or statute. State v. Zurawski,
690 S.W.3d 644, 660 (Tex. 2024).6 Claims for other types of declaratory relief,
5 Appellees made the necessary party argument in the trial court only as to “Harris County” but, on appeal, direct it toward the Registrar. 6 See also Martinez v. Northern, No. 01-22-00435-CV, 2023 WL 162743, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 12, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting argument that DJA “contains a waiver of immunity from suit for governmental bodies whose presence is necessary to effectuate and bind them to a judicial declaration”); Green v. Harris Cnty. Inst. of Forensic Scis., No. 01-20-00357-CV, 2021 WL 3159801, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 27, 2021, pet. denied) (noting both broad purpose of DJA under section 37.002(b) of Texas Civil 15 including those merely seeking guidance about the application of the law to
particular facts, are barred absent a legislative waiver of immunity with respect to
the underlying action. Id. at 661. Because appellees do not challenge the validity of
a statute or ordinance, the DJA provides no waiver of immunity. We thus turn to
appellees’ argument that the Registrar has engaged in ultra vires conduct for which
she has no immunity from suit.
1. Applicable law
A suit against a government official can proceed even in the absence of a
waiver of immunity if the official’s actions are ultra vires. Chambers-Liberty
Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 344-45 (Tex. 2019). To demonstrate
that government officers acted ultra vires, a plaintiff must show that the officers
acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act. Jones v.
Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319, 325 (Tex. 2022) (noting that “an ultra vires claim may
not be maintained if the officials’ acts are within their discretion”). An act is
without legal authority if it requires discretion or judgment and the officer
“exceeds the bounds of his granted authority or if his acts conflict with the law
Practice and Remedies Code and that DJA waiver for non-ultra vires claims is limited to claims challenging validity of statute or ordinance); Fallon v. Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., 586 S.W.3d 37, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (discussing interaction of sections 37.003(a), 37.004(a), and 37.006(b) in context of rule that DJA provides only limited waiver of sovereign immunity for claims challenging validity or constitutionality of statute or ordinance).
16 itself.” Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 158
(Tex. 2016). An act is ministerial if the law “prescribes and defines the duties to be
performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of
discretion or judgment.” Van Boven v. Freshour, 659 S.W.3d 396, 402 (Tex. 2022)
(citation modified).
“We apply the plain meaning of statutory language unless (1) the
Legislature has prescribed definitions, (2) the words have acquired a technical or
particular meaning, (3) a contrary intention is apparent from the context, or (4) a
plain-meaning construction leads to nonsensical or absurd results.” In re Tex.
Educ. Agency, 619 S.W.3d 679, 687 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). We endeavor
to afford meaning to all of a statute’s language such that none is rendered
surplusage. Id. at 687-88. We construe the Legislature’s chosen words and phrases
“within the context and framework of the statute as a whole, not in isolation.” Id. at
687.
When a statute is not ambiguous on its face, it is inappropriate to use
extrinsic aids to construe the unambiguous statutory language. Willacy Cnty.
Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd., 555 S.W.3d 29, 38 (Tex. 2018)
(citing City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. 2008)). A statute is
ambiguous if its words are susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations
and we cannot discern legislative intent from the language alone. Id. (citing Tex.
17 State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage & Family Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511
S.W.3d 28, 41 (Tex. 2017)). We use definitions prescribed by the Legislature and
any technical or particular meaning the words have acquired. Id. (citing TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 311.011(b); City of Rockwall, 246 S.W.3d at 625)). Otherwise, we
construe the statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning. Id.
(citing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011(a); City of Rockwall, 246 S.W.3d at 625-26).
2. Alleged ultra vires conduct
The Registrar argues that appellees have not pleaded facts that, if true,
would show that the Registrar failed to comply with sections 15.022(a)(6) and (b)
of the Election Code and thus committed an ultra vires act. We agree.
Appellees’ position is that the Registrar has acted ultra vires in violation of
sections 15.022(a)(6) and (b), which require the Registrar to make “appropriate
corrections in the registration records . . . after receipt of [USPS] information
indicating an address reclassification” and, at least monthly, to request from the
USPS “any available information indicating address reclassifications affecting the
registered voters of the county.” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 15.022(a)(6), (b). Appellees
assert that the term “address reclassification” includes changes of address and that
these sections required the Registrar to “perform[] her obligation every month to
compare [the] Voter Role [sic] with the NCOA database” and then, on the basis of
any “discrepancies” between the two, send out residency confirmation notices.
18 Appellees contend that the Registrar has improperly failed, on a monthly basis, to
identify and send residency confirmations to individuals on the Harris County
voter roll who, according to the NCOA database, have submitted a request to
receive mail at an address outside Harris County. Appellees allege further that, had
the Registrar performed that obligation, each such confirmation notice would have
“result[ed] in a particular person either remaining or coming off of the list of
eligible registered voters” because “challenged voters would have been asked to
supply a[n] SOR upon check-in for voting or as a condition to cast a ballot by
mail.” Appellees claim that the Registrar’s failure to comply with their
interpretation of section 15.022 means that “a Court will be unable to ascertain
whether these specific voters did or did not cast a legal vote in the specific election
that is eventually contested in Harris County.”7 Appellees claim that “a simple
7 Appellees offer no support for this claim and we have found none. Texas courts for many years made residency determinations in election contests without reference to SORs. See, e.g., De La Paz v. Gutierrez, No. 13-18-00377-CV, 2018 WL 5289553, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); Rivera v. Lopez, No. 13-14-00581-CV, 2014 WL 8843788, at *9- 10 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 14, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); McDuffee v. Miller, 327 S.W.3d 808, 816-20 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.); Kiehne v. Jones, 247 S.W.3d 259, 264-66 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet. denied); Speights v. Willis, 88 S.W.3d 817, 820-21 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.); Slusher v. Streater, 896 S.W.2d 239, 243-46 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Alvarez v. Espinoza, 844 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.). More recently, SORs have been used as some, but not conclusive, evidence to be considered in such a determination. See, e.g., Medlin v. King, 705 S.W.3d 267, 293-308 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2024, pet. denied) (considering statements in SOR as some but not conclusive evidence of voters’ residency); Rodriguez v. Rangel, 679 S.W.3d 890, 916-17 (Tex. App.—San 19 comparison of: (i) [SORs] to the NCOA database; and/or (ii) a comparison of the
Harris County Voter Roster to the NCOA database” would “reveal countless
instances whereby voters cast a ballot in Harris County elections, despite the fact
that they previously have told the [USPS] that they have an address which calls
into question whether that individual is or is not currently still eligible to vote.”
Appellees’ interpretation of the term “address reclassification” in section
15.022 of the Election Code is untenable, particularly when that section is
considered within the context and framework of the Code as a whole. First,
interpreting the term “address reclassification” as meaning a voter’s change of
address is not a plain-meaning construction of the term. Cf. FLCT, Ltd. v. City of
Frisco, 493 S.W.3d 238, 262 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied) (noting
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary definition of “classification” as “a
system of classes or groups or a systematic division of a series of related
phenomena [into] one of such classes”). Voters who request to receive mail at a
new address have changed rather than “reclassified” their address.
Indeed, when the Legislature references a request to change a voter’s
address on the voter’s driver’s license and (typically) voter registration, the
Antonio 2023, pet. denied) (considering statement in SOR as some but not conclusive evidence of voter’s residency); see also Medlin, 705 S.W.3d at 312 (voter’s statement regarding residence that conflicts with other evidence of residence cannot on its own establish residence); Woods v. Legg, 363 S.W.3d 710, 715 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (noting that residency must be established by nexus of factors; one element alone is insufficient).
20 Legislature references a “change of address that relates to a license” and “change
of address for voter registration.” See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 20.063(c) (emphasis
added). Similarly, elsewhere in the Code, the Legislature makes express reference
to the NCOA database. See TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 18.062(h)(2), (i) (referencing
“National Change of Address database”). The Legislature’s express references to
“changes of address” and the NCOA database elsewhere in the Code further
undermines appellees’ proposed interpretation of sections 15.022(a)(6) and (b) as
referencing, respectively, changes of address and the NCOA database. See In re
Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 176 (Tex. 2013) (rejecting
interpretation of statutory use of term “costs” as encompassing “litigation costs”
due in part to express use of term “litigation costs” elsewhere in statute).
Second, interpreting the term “address reclassification” as appellees propose
would not make sense in the context of section 14.022 of the Election Code.
Section 14.022, titled “Erroneous Return of Renewal Certificate,” provides that:
If the registrar determines that a voter’s renewal certificate was returned undelivered solely because of postal service error, address reclassification, or the registrar’s clerical error, the registrar shall delete the voter’s name from the suspense list, make any other appropriate corrections in the registration records, and deliver the certificate to the voter.
At least two of the three factual scenarios referenced in section 14.022 are
circumstances under which a renewal certificate sent by the registrar to a voter
would be returned undelivered through no fault of the voter: a postal service error 21 or the registrar’s clerical error. Appellees’ proposed interpretation of the third
scenario as referencing a renewal certificate that is returned undeliverable because
the voter has changed the voter’s address for mail delivery is illogical because the
change of address would presumably help ensure rather than impede delivery of
the renewal certificate to the voter. And if the change of address did prevent
delivery of the renewal certificate to the voter, the certificate’s return undelivered
could not be considered an erroneous return.
Third, under the Election Code, a Harris County voter’s submission of a
request to receive mail at an address outside Harris County does not create a
registration records “discrepancy” as claimed by appellees. As discussed above, a
voter’s “residence” is the voter’s “home and fixed place of habitation to which one
intends to return after any temporary absence,” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 1.015(a), and
residency is thus a determination involving multiple considerations, including an
individual’s circumstances and intent. Medlin v. King, 705 S.W.3d 267, 291 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2024, pet. denied). No single factor, including the address at which
someone has their mail delivered, is determinative of residency. Id.; Olsen v. Cox,
No. 14-23-00893-CV, 2025 WL 2399150, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Aug. 19, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“The address where someone has their mail
delivered ‘by itself is not determinative of residency.’” (quoting Speights v. Willis,
88 S.W.3d 817, 820-21 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.))).
22 DPS provides each person who applies for an original, renewed, or corrected
driver’s license the opportunity to complete a voter registration application. TEX.
ELEC. CODE §§ 20.063(a), (b). The Election Code treats a change of address
submitted to the DPS as a change of address for voter registration absent an
indication that is not the voter’s intent. Id. § 20.063(c). The Election Code does not
give similar treatment to a change of address submitted to the USPS. Nor does the
Election Code state that a change of address submitted to the USPS is a “reason to
believe that a voter’s current residence is different from that indicated on the
registration records” that requires a voter registrar to “deliver to the voter a written
confirmation notice requesting confirmation of the voter's current residence” under
section 15.051 of the Election Code, putting into motion a series of events that
could result in the voter’s being placed on the suspense list, see TEX. ELEC. CODE
§§ 15.051-.054, 15.081, and having to submit an SOR before being permitted to
vote, see id. § 15.112.
For these reasons, we agree with the Registrar that the plain meaning of the
term “address reclassification” as used in sections 14.022 and 15.022 of the
Election Code is a USPS reclassification of an address and not a voter’s change of
the address at which the voter receives mail. The Registrar points to legislative
history that she argues corroborates that reading, including evidence that the term
“address reclassification” references USPS actions such as reclassifying “Airport
23 Boulevard” as “Airport Drive.”8 Because we conclude that appellees’ interpretation
of Section 15.022, which the trial court appears to have adopted, is not a
reasonable interpretation, particularly when the statute is considered in the context
of the Election Code as a whole, we need not consider the statute’s legislative
history. See Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d at 38 (noting that use of
extrinsic aids to construe statutory language is appropriate only if it is ambiguous,
including being susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations).
For these reasons, we conclude that the ultra vires exception does not apply
as an exception to the Registrar’s immunity from suit, and that the trial court erred
in rejecting the Registrar’s plea to the jurisdiction.
D. Opportunity to Replead
Because appellees’ pleading affirmatively negates jurisdiction, we further
conclude that the trial court should have granted the Registrar’s plea to the
jurisdiction without giving appellees the opportunity to amend. Dohlen, 643 8 The Registrar alleges, for example, that: (1) the NCOA database did not exist at the time the Legislature adopted section 15.022(b); (2) bills such as H.B. 3046 (2009), H.B. 1100 (2011), and H.B. 198 (2013) have unsuccessfully sought to amend section 15.022(a)(6) and (b) to include information available from the NCOA database as part of the information that a voter registrar must take into consideration, where appropriate, in making corrections to registration records; (3) testimony at an April 20, 2005 hearing before the House Elections Committee indicates that the Legislature purposefully did not reference the NCOA database in section 15.022 given that a change of address for mail delivery does not necessarily mean a change of permanent residence; and (4) other testimony at that hearing indicates that a past Texas Secretary of State took the position that references to an “address reclassification” in section 15.022 are references to a USPS action such as reclassifying “Airport Boulevard” as “Airport Drive.”
24 S.W.3d at 393 (if pleading affirmatively negates jurisdiction, then plea to
jurisdiction should be granted without opportunity to amend).
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s denial of the Registrar’s plea to the jurisdiction
and render judgment dismissing appellees’ suit for lack of jurisdiction.
Amparo “Amy” Guerra Justice
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Guiney, and Johnson.