Andrade v. NAACP of Austin

345 S.W.3d 1, 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1401, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 510, 2011 WL 2601351
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 1, 2011
Docket09-0420
StatusPublished
Cited by157 cases

This text of 345 S.W.3d 1 (Andrade v. NAACP of Austin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1401, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 510, 2011 WL 2601351 (Tex. 2011).

Opinion

*4 Chief Justice JEFFERSON

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Technology is changing the way we vote. It has not eliminated controversy about the way votes are recorded and verified. We must decide whether voters have standing to pursue complaints about an electronic voting machine that does not produce a contemporaneous paper record of each vote. Because we conclude that most of the voters’ allegations involve generalized grievances about the lawfulness of government acts, and because their remaining claims fail on their merits, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment dismissing the case.

I. Background

Voters in different parts of the state utilize a number of different voting systems, all of which must first be certified by the Secretary of State. 1 Tex. Elec.Code §§ 122.001, .031. To obtain certification, voting system manufacturers must submit an application to a board of examiners appointed by the Secretary and the Attorney General. Id. §§ 122.034-.035. After the board prepares a report, id. § 122.036, the Secretary conducts a public hearing to provide interested persons an opportunity to express their views about a particular system, id. § 122.0371. The Secretary reviews the report, considers public input, and determines whether the system has satisfied the applicable approval requirements. Id. § 122.038(a). If so, she certifies the system for use in elections. Id. § 122.038(c). For each application, she submits a report explaining whether the system was approved. Id. § 122.039. Once a system is certified, local political subdivisions may adopt it for use in elections. Id. § 123.001.

Following certification and adoption, additional testing is required for direct recording electronic machines (DREs). DREs are designed “to allow a direct vote on the machine by the manual touch of a screen, monitor, or other device.” Id. § 121.003(12). DREs store individual votes and vote totals electronically, id., usually in several places within the unit, see Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 Fordham L.Rev. 1711, 1724 (2005). Immediately after receiving a DRE from a vendor, the election records custodian must perform a hardware diagnostic test and a “public test of logic and accuracy.” Tex. EleuCodb § 129.021. The latter involves creating a testing board that will then cast votes, verifying that each contest can be voted and is accurately counted. Id. § 129.023. The test must evaluate, to the extent possible, undervotes, overvotes, straight-party votes, and crossover votes. Id. It must also account for write-in and provisional votes. Id. Notice of the test must be published at least forty-eight hours in advance, and the test is open to the public. Id. § 129.023(b). The test is successful only if the actual results are identical to the expected results. Id. § 129.023(d). Travis County conducts these tests before each early voting period and election day. 2 The Secretary of State may prescribe additional testing. Id. § 129.021(4). DREs must also satisfy, to the extent possible, requirements applicable to other electronic voting systems. 3 Id. § 129.001(b).

*5 In eountywide polling place programs, the Secretary requires an audit of each DRE before, after, and, if feasible, during each election. Id. § 43.007(c). The general custodian of election records must secure access control keys or passwords to DREs, and use of such keys and passwords must be witnessed and documented. Id. § 129.053. The DRE may not be connected to any external communications network, including the Internet, nor are wireless communications permitted (except under certain limited circumstances). Id. § 129.054. The general custodian of election records must create a contingency plan in case of DRE failure. Id. § 129.056.

Copies of the program codes, operator manuals, and copies or units of all other software and any other information, specifications, or documentation required by the Secretary must be kept on file with the Secretary. Id. § 122.0331(a). The Secretary also requires that DREs meet or exceed the minimum requirements established by the Federal Election Commission. 1 Tex. Ajdmin. Code § 81.61 (requiring compliance with FEC’s Performance and Test Standards for Punch Card, Mark Sense, and Direct Record Electronic Voting Systems). Although DREs must provide contemporaneous printouts of “significant election events,” 4 there is no explicit statutory requirement that DREs provide a contemporaneous paper record of each vote cast. Repeated efforts to pass such legislation have failed, both at the federal 5 and state 6 levels.

The eSlate, a paperless DRE manufactured by Hart Intercivic, is one of a handful of DREs the Secretary has certified. *6 See Voting Systems, Texas Secretary Of State, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/ laws/votingsystems.shtml. Voters arriving at the polls in counties using the eSlate are given a unique access code. The voter enters the code into the eSlate, which then displays the ballot. Voters turn a dial to highlight their ballot choice and then press “enter” to make a selection. After a voter completes his selections, the eSlate displays a ballot summary page. If the voter’s choices are correctly displayed,. the voter presses the “cast ballot” button, and the vote is recorded. See Voter Instructions, Travis County, http://www.eo.travis. tx.us/county_clerk/election/eSlate/pdfs/ English_Flyer_050923.pdf. Travis County purchased the eSlate system in 2001 and has used it since 2003.

The NAACP of Austin, its president Nelson Linder, Sonia Santana (a Travis County voter), and David Van Os (a candidate for attorney general) (collectively, the voters), sued Esperanza Andrade, the Secretary of State, 7 arguing that her certification of the eSlate violated the Election Code and our constitution. The voters assert that the Secretary’s failure to require a contemporaneous paper record of an electronic vote violates their statutory right to a recount and an audit, as well as Texas constitutional guarantees of equal protection, the purity of the ballot box, and the right of suffrage. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 3, art. VI, § 2(c), art. VI, § 4; Tex. Elec.Code §§ 122.001, 211.001. The voters sought a declaration that the Secretary acted illegally and an injunction prohibiting the use of paperless election systems without an independent paper ballot mechanism.

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Bluebook (online)
345 S.W.3d 1, 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1401, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 510, 2011 WL 2601351, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrade-v-naacp-of-austin-tex-2011.