Annellycis De Jesus Albornoz Lira v. Laura Hermosillo et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02713
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 ANNELLYCIS DE JESUS ALBORNOZ CASE NO. 2:25-cv-02713-LK 11 LIRA, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 12 Petitioner, AND DENYING IN PART v. AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT 13 OF HABEAS CORPUS LAURA HERMOSILLO et al., 14 Respondents. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Annellycis De Jesus Albornoz Lira’s 17 Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Dkt. No. 12. For the reasons stated below, the Court 18 grants the petition in part and denies it in part.1 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Albornoz is a citizen of Venezuela who is currently detained at the Northwest ICE 21 Processing Center (“NWIPC”) in Tacoma, Washington. Id. at 5. In March 2024, she arrived at a 22 23 1 The Court declines to hold an evidentiary hearing because the record is sufficient for adjudication of the petition. See Owino v. Napolitano, 575 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that “the district court must hold an evidentiary 24 hearing” where “the record is insufficient to decide whether [the petitioner’s] detention is authorized by statute”). 1 United States port of entry for an appointment booked through the CBP One mobile application 2 without valid entry or travel documents. Dkt. No. 17 at 1–2. U.S. Customs and Border Protection 3 (“CBP”) issued her a notice to appear that charged her as removable as an arriving alien under 8 4 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Id. at 2; Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2 (Notice to Appear). Albornoz was granted

5 humanitarian parole under Section § 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) (8 6 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)) for up to two years, and she was given a future date to appear in immigration 7 court in Florida. Dkt. No. 12 at 6; Dkt. No. 17 at 2. The next month, she moved to Washington. 8 Dkt. No. 12 at 6–7. She avers that she applied for asylum in August 2025. Dkt. No. 14 at 3. 9 According to Albornoz, once she moved to Washington, she voluntarily enrolled in U.S. 10 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)’s Intensive Supervision Appearance Program 11 (“ISAP”) because she “wanted to do everything right.” Dkt. No. 12 at 6 (quoting Dkt. No. 14 at 12 2). Albornoz avers that she complied with all of her ISAP requirements, and was surprised when 13 she was told to report to the Richland, Washington ICE office on September 30, 2025. Dkt. No. 14 14 at 3. When she did so, she was transported to the ICE office in Yakima “so ICE could take a

15 look at her case,” and then to the NWIPC, where she remains detained. Dkt. No. 12 at 7; see also 16 Dkt. No. 14 at 4. 17 Respondents2 tell a different story. They contend that after Albornoz moved to 18 Washington, ICE enrolled her in the Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) program in January 2025,3 19

20 2 Although Bruce Scott, the warden of the NWIPC, has not appeared in this case, (1) the purpose of naming the petitioner’s custodian is to effectuate injunctive relief where appropriate, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 21 (2004) (the custodian has “the power to produce the body of [the petitioner] before the court or judge,” such that “he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary” (citation modified)); and (2) federal respondents often represent the warden's interests, as they do in this case, see Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2024) 22 (“Even in cases where private contract wardens are named as respondents, the government can and has stepped in to defend its interest in keeping petitioners detained.”). 23 3 One of the alternatives in the ATD program is ISAP, a program that “determines how much supervision is necessary on a person-by-person basis.” ICE Portal, Alternatives to Detention (ATD), available at 24 https://portal.ice.gov/immigration-guide/atd (last visited Feb. 14, 2026). 1 and she “failed to complete required ATD biometric check-ins in April, May, and June 2025,” Dkt. 2 No. 16 at 2 (citing Dkt. No. 17 at 2). She was arrested in September 2025 for these ATD violations. 3 Dkt. No. 16 at 2 (citing Dkt. No. 17 at 2; Dkt. No. 18-3 at 2 (warrant for arrest); Dkt. No. 18-4 at 4 3 (Form I-213)).4

5 Removal proceedings ensued. Dkt. No. 16 at 3. Albornoz attended a master calendar 6 hearing on October 29, 2025. Dkt. No. 14 at 4. On November 3, 2025, an immigration judge denied 7 bond, finding that Albornoz is subject to mandatory detention as an arriving alien under 8 U.S.C. 8 § 1225(b). Dkt. No. 17 at 3; Dkt. No. 18-5 at 2–3 (Order of the Immigration Judge). 9 On November 14, 2025, Albornoz appeared before an immigration judge for a final merits 10 hearing. Dkt. No. 17 at 3. After taking evidence and testimony, the immigration judge denied 11 Albornoz’s application for asylum and other relief and ordered her removed to Venezuela, or in 12 the alternative, to Brazil. Id.; Dkt. No. 18-6 at 2–5. With the help of an attorney, Albornoz appealed 13 the denial of her asylum application, and her appeal remains pending. Dkt. No. 14 at 5. 14 Albornoz next filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District

15 Court for the Eastern District of Washington, which transferred the petition to this district. Dkt. 16 Nos. 1, 3. Counsel then appeared on Albornoz’s behalf and filed an amended petition for habeas 17 corpus. Dkt. Nos. 8, 12. Albornoz alleges a violation of her Fifth Amendment right to due process, 18 and seeks (1) immediate release; (2) an order preventing Respondents from re-detaining her 19 “during the pendency of her removal proceedings absent written notice and a hearing prior to re- 20 detention where Respondents must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [she] is a flight 21 risk or danger to the community and that no alternatives to detention would mitigate those risks”; 22 (3) an order that Respondents must return her personal property; (4) a declaration that her re- 23

4 As Albornoz points out, Respondents “have not submitted any primary records showing the claimed ATD violations 24 that allegedly occurred in April, May, and June 2025.” Dkt. No. 19 at 6 n.2. 1 detention while removal proceedings are ongoing “without first providing an individualized 2 determination before a neutral decisionmaker violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 3 Amendment,” and (5) attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Dkt. No. 12 4 at 12–13.

5 II. DISCUSSION 6 A. Legal Standard 7 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 8 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing 9 U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody 10 upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release 11 from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus 12 may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 13 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 14 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

15 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a district 16 court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 17 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 18 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 19 no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. 20 amend. V. “The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process in deportation proceedings.” Torres- 21 Aguilar v. I.N.S., 246 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 2001). “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all 22 ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, 23 unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.

24 510, 523 (2003) (recognizing that Fifth Amendment due process protections extend to deportation 1 proceedings, but noting that “detention during deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid 2 aspect of the deportation process”). 3 The federal courts have “long recognized the existence of an implied cause of action 4 through which plaintiffs may seek equitable relief to remedy a constitutional violation.” Roman v.

5 Wolf, 977 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must 6 demonstrate (1) that she has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such 7 as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 8 balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 9 (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. eBay Inc. v. 10 MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). “Once a [constitutional] right and a violation 11 have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, 12 for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” Roman, 977 F.3d at 942 (quoting 13 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)). 14 B. Albornoz has Established a Due Process Violation

15 1. Applicability of the Due Process Clause 16 Like many petitions before the Court, Albornoz’s petition ignores the statute to which she 17 is subject, and instead essentially insists that due process demands the same procedures no matter 18 which statute applies. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 12 at 9–12; Dkt. No. 19 at 3–4. But the Ninth Circuit has 19 rejected such a proposition, and this Court does too. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 20 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). The applicable statute matters because the constitutional process required is 21 not necessarily the same for “different statutory provision[s] with [their] own procedural 22 safeguards in place[.]” Id.; see also id. at 1203 (Because “§ 1226(a) provides substantially different 23 procedures than the provisions [the court had] examined in the past,” the court could not accept

24 petitioner’s “suggestion that [the court’s decisions regarding other detention provisions] 1 mandate[d] the same procedural relief in this case”); Demore, 538 U.S. at 529 n.11 (in response to 2 a dissent “suggesti[ng] that [noncitizens] are entitled to an immediate hearing,” pointing to 3 Zadvydas, in which the Supreme Court “permit[ed] [noncitizens] to be detained for several months 4 prior to such a hearing”).

5 As discussed above, the statutory provision applicable here is Section 1225(b). For the 6 reasons set forth in the Court’s order in Dieng v. Hermosillo, 2:26-cv-00190-LK, 2026 WL 7 411857, at *3–5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2026), the Court finds that the Due Process Clause is 8 applicable in this case and adopts the analysis from that order. The Court also reiterates that 9 humanitarian parole under Section 1225(b) can establish the same kinds of liberty interests 10 described in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Flores Torres v. Hermosillo, No. 2:25- 11 CV-02687-LK, 2026 WL 145715, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 20, 2026) (collecting cases). Here, 12 Albornoz has established such an interest: in the year and a half that she has spent in the United 13 States, she “built a supportive community, began working with employment authorization, and 14 went to church.” Dkt. No. 12 at 7; see also Dkt. No. 14 at 3.

15 As noted above, Albornoz does not discuss the adequacy (or lack thereof) of the procedural 16 safeguards in Section 1225(b), and absent any argument to the contrary, the Court assumes that 17 these safeguards suffice for due process purposes. See Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7, 9 (2025) (“To 18 put it plainly, courts call balls and strikes; they don’t get a turn at bat.” (citation modified)); Indep. 19 Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Our adversarial system relies 20 on the advocates to inform the discussion and raise the issues to the court.”). Because “the 21 applicable statutory process shapes [the petitioner’s] procedural due-process rights,” Doe v. 22 Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00333-JLT-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3280777, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 23 2025) (quoting Gonzalez Aguilar v. Wolf, 448 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1212 (D.N.M. 2020)), the Court

24 addresses the process required here. 1 2. The Process Required 2 Section 1182 provides that parole may be granted “only on a case-by-case basis for urgent 3 humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). The implementing 4 regulations include another requirement for parole: the noncitizen must “present neither a security

5 risk nor a risk of absconding.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). In other words, if a noncitizen has been granted 6 parole, it means that a DHS official with authority decided that there were either “urgent 7 humanitarian reasons” or “significant public benefit” justifying the parole of that individual, and 8 that the individual did not pose a security or flight risk. 9 Parole automatically terminates if the noncitizen departs from the United States or “at the 10 expiration of the time for which parole was authorized,” and “no written notice shall be required” 11 for automatic termination. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1). Otherwise, for parole to be terminated, (1) “the 12 purpose for which parole was authorized” must have been accomplished or a DHS official with 13 authority must decide that “neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued 14 presence of the [noncitizen] in the United States”; and (2) written notice must be provided to the

15 noncitizen. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (“[W]hen the purposes of 16 such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the 17 [noncitizen] shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled[.]”). 18 Once a noncitizen’s parole has terminated—either automatically or on notice—“any order 19 of exclusion, deportation, or removal previously entered shall be executed.” 8 C.F.R. 20 § 212.5(e)(2)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1) (“[T]he [noncitizen] shall be processed in 21 accordance with paragraph (e)(2) of this section except that no written notice shall be required.”). 22 “If the exclusion, deportation, or removal order cannot be executed within a reasonable time, the 23 [noncitizen] shall again be released on parole unless in the opinion of [a DHS official with

24 1 authority] the public interest requires that the [noncitizen] be continued in custody.” 8 C.F.R. 2 § 212.5(e)(2)(i). 3 3. Albornoz has Shown that the Government Failed to Follow the Required Process 4 Albornoz asserts that “Respondents revoked [her] release and deprived her of liberty

5 without providing written notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard by a neutral 6 decisionmaker prior to her re-detention” in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 7 Amendment. Specifically, she states that prior to her re-detention, Respondents “did not provide 8 any written notice explaining the basis for the revocation of her release[],” “did not assess whether 9 [she] presented a flight risk or danger to the community,” and did not “provide a hearing before a 10 neutral decisionmaker[.]” Dkt. No. 12 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 14 at 4 (Albornoz declaration 11 attesting that at the time she was re-detained, the government did not notify her that her parole was 12 being revoked or why). 13 Respondents answer that Albornoz “is an arriving alien subject to mandatory detention 14 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).” Dkt. No. 16 at 4 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 235.3(c)); see also id. at

15 3 (stating that “[b]ecause the removal order is not administratively final, [Albornoz] remains 16 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) as an arriving alien”). However, it is undisputed that 17 Albornoz’s two-year period of parole had not been revoked prior to her arrest, see Dkt. No. 18-2 18 at 2 (granting parole until March 17, 2026), and Respondents do not contest Albornoz’s allegations 19 that they did not provide her with written notice explaining the basis for the revocation of her 20 parole before arresting her. See generally Dkt. No. 16. Indeed, Respondents have offered no 21 evidence that they provided Albornoz with the written notice required by 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), 22 even to this date. Respondents also have put forth no evidence that “the purpose for which parole 23 was authorized” has been accomplished or that a relevant official opined that “neither humanitarian

24 reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence” of Albornoz in the United States. See 1 generally Dkt. Nos. 16–18. To the contrary, Respondents only aver that Albornoz was taken into 2 custody because “ERO had reviewed [her] case and determined she was amenable to arrest based 3 on multiple ATD violations.” Dkt. No. 17 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 16 at 8 (arguing that Albornoz’s 4 ATD violations “provided ICE with a basis to arrest her without notice”). Thus, the Court

5 concludes that the manner in which the government revoked Flores Torres’s parole violated 8 6 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) and failed to comport with the process due to her. See Torres v. Noem, No. 7 C25-2697JLR, 2026 WL 234076, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 29, 2026) (finding that by revoking the 8 petitioner’s parole without following the regulatory and statutory requirements, “DHS failed to 9 provide [petitioner] with the minimum process due”); Gabriel v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-4298 10 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (“Without any suggestion that 11 such a determination [as that required under the statute and regulation] occurred, Respondents 12 could not have complied with § 1182(d)(5)(A) and Part 212.5(e)(2)(i) in revoking Petitioner’s 13 parole,” and accordingly, “the revocation, and[ ] . . . Petitioner’s detention[ ] is unlawful.”). 14 4. Mathews Analysis

15 Because the parties agree that the standard laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 16 333 (1976) applies here, and for the reasons this Court previously explained in Flores Torres, 2026 17 WL 145715 regarding the due process implications of the revocation of parole, the Court proceeds 18 to apply the Mathews factors. 19 Under Matthews, Courts analyze three factors to determine whether an administrative 20 procedure provides due process: 21 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 22 probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 23 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 24 1 424 U.S. at 335. In Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, the Ninth Circuit assumed without deciding that 2 Mathews’ three-part test applies in “the immigration detention context,” 53 F.4th at 1206–07, and 3 district courts have applied the Mathews test in that context, see, e.g., Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 4 3d 1025, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2025).

5 With respect to the first factor, it is undisputed that Albornoz has a liberty interest in being 6 free from imprisonment. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Her liberty interest “is valuable and must be 7 seen as within the protection of the [Due Process clause]” such that “its termination calls for some 8 orderly process,” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, as provided under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2). A 9 “petitioner’s liberty interest [does] not expire along with h[er] parole.” Quiroga-Chaparro v. 10 Warden of the Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-CV-1731 AC, 2025 WL 3771473, at *4 11 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025) (citation modified). This factor weighs in Albornoz’s favor. 12 Turning to the second factor, for the reasons stated in this Court’s order in Dieng, due 13 process at least requires that (1) the government justify the basis for re-detention, as prescribed by 14 the statute and its implementing regulations, and (2) Albornoz be given “the opportunity to be

15 heard” with respect to the government’s basis for re-detention under the applicable statutory and 16 regulatory framework “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 2026 WL 411857, at 17 *8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2026) (citation modified). Here, as discussed above, the government did 18 not follow the procedures required by its own regulations in revoking Albornoz’s parole. The risk 19 of erroneous deprivation is significant where the government fails to follow its own procedures, 20 thus depriving the noncitizen of process due prior to being detained.5 “[T]he additional procedural 21

5 See Lopez v. Noem, No. CV-GLR-25-3662, 2025 WL 3496195, at *5 (D. Md. Dec. 5, 2025) (finding that there was 22 a high risk of erroneous deprivation because “the Government’s failure to comply with its own agency regulations necessarily deprive[d] [petitioner] of the procedural process due her, rendering her current detention unlawful”); 23 J.L.R.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01464-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3190589, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (finding that the risk of erroneous deprivation was high where “ICE revoked petitioner’s release on the grounds that his removal was reasonably foreseeable, but it did not provide petitioner the process required by its own regulations, it forced 24 1 safeguards identified in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 are not only valuable for preventing the erroneous 2 deprivation of an important interest, they are required by the Section 1225 statutory scheme[.]” 3 O.F.B. v. Maldonado, No. 25-CV-6336 (HG), 2025 WL 3277677, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025). 4 This factor favors Albornoz.

5 With respect to the last factor, “the government’s interest in efficient administration of the 6 immigration laws at the border is not impermissibly burdened by affording the process laid out in 7 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 because it is required to follow its own regulations.” Id. (citation modified). 8 Therefore, this factor too weighs in favor of Albornoz. 9 Under Matthews, the Court finds that Respondents failed to provide Albornoz with the 10 procedures due to her under the Due Process Clause, and accordingly, her detention is unlawful. 11 C. The Court Denies Albornoz’s Request Preventing Re-Detention 12 Albornoz requests an order “permanently enjoining h[er] re-detention during the pendency 13 of her removal proceeding absent written notice and a hearing prior to re-detention where 14 Respondents must prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is a flight risk or danger to the

15 community and that no alternatives to detention would mitigate those risks[.]” Dkt. No. 12 at 13. 16 Where habeas petitioners raise Due Process claims and have also invoked the Court’s 17 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court has “the authority both to entertain [the petitioner’s] 18 constitutional challenges and to grant injunctive relief in response to them,” “irrespective of the 19 accompanying habeas petition.” Roman, 977 F.3d at 941–42. Importantly, though, “[i]n seeking a 20

petitioner to file a habeas petition to obtain relief, and [it] has failed to identify any evidence that petitioner’s removal 21 was actually reasonably foreseeable at any point”); Salazar v. Casey, No. 25-CV-2784 JLS (VET), 2025 WL 3063629, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (“[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of [petitioner’s] interest [in remaining out of 22 custody pursuant to her humanitarian parole] is high as Petitioner’s parole was revoked without providing her a reason for revocation or giving her an opportunity to be heard”); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25-CV-6137-ER, 2025 WL 23 2630826, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (finding a risk of erroneous deprivation where “Respondents provide[d] no indication that an individualized determination was made as to the revocation of [Petitioner’s] parole; nor d[id] they articulate . . . either that the purpose for which [Petitioner’s] parole was authorized ha[d] been accomplished, []or 24 that neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrant[ed] his continued presence in the United States.”). 1 permanent injunction, the moving party must convince the court that relief is needed: ‘The 2 necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, 3 something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive.’” Cummings v. 4 Connell, 316 F.3d 886, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.

5 629, 633 (1953)). 6 Nowhere in Albornoz’s petition does she allege that re-detention is likely, or that such 7 detention is likely to occur without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. Without argument 8 or evidence that unlawful re-detention is likely to occur, Albornoz’s request constitutes nothing 9 more than a “mere possibility” that does not entitle her to relief. Id. (citation modified); see also 10 Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Our adversarial system 11 relies on the advocates to inform the discussion and raise the issues to the court.”). For this reason, 12 her request for injunctive relief preventing her re-detention is denied. 13 III. CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons stated above, the amended petition writ of habeas corpus, Dkt. No. 12, is

15 GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the Court ORDERS as follows: 16 1. Respondents shall immediately release Albornoz from custody subject to the 17 conditions of her most recent parole agreement and return her personal property to 18 her; 19 2. The parties shall file a Joint Status Report by February 18, 2026, confirming that 20 Albornoz has been released; 21 3. Any fee petition should be filed within the deadlines set by the Equal Access to 22 Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. 23 Ctr., No. 24-2990, 2026 WL 263483, at *10 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2026) (the Equal

24 Access to Justice Act authorizes the award of attorney’s fees to petitioners who 1 prevail against the Government in immigration habeas actions); Daley v. Ceja, 158 2 F.4th 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2025) (same); Petition of Hill, 775 F.2d 1037, 1041 3 (9th Cir. 1985) (reasoning that an award of fees under EAJA was not necessarily 4 foreclosed for a habeas petition brought by “a nonresident [noncitizen]” in the

5 immigration context). Time spent on work that is “excessive, redundant, or 6 otherwise unnecessary” is not compensable. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 7 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation modified). For example, attorneys may not seek 8 compensation for time spent developing a habeas petition template when such 9 template was merely re-used in the instant proceeding; only the time spent 10 dedicated to this proceeding is compensable. See Eve Nevada, LLC v. Derbyshire, 11 No. 21-0251-LK, 2022 WL 279030, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 31, 2022). 12 Dated this 17th day of February, 2026. 13 A 14 Lauren King United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23