Anita Foundations Inc. v. ILGWU National Retirement Fund

710 F. Supp. 983, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1092, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4290, 1989 WL 40901
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 20, 1989
Docket87 Civ. 7242(KC)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 710 F. Supp. 983 (Anita Foundations Inc. v. ILGWU National Retirement Fund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anita Foundations Inc. v. ILGWU National Retirement Fund, 710 F. Supp. 983, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1092, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4290, 1989 WL 40901 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

CONBOY, District Judge:

This is an action brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), as amended by the Mul-tiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (“MPPAA”).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are each corporations with principal places of business in the State of New York, and who were, at all times relevant to this action, engaged in the ladies’ garment industry and employers under the provisions of ERISA and MPPAA. The IGLWU National Retirement Fund (the “Fund”) is a New York trust created to provide pension benefits for workers in the garment industry based on employer contributions required by collective bargaining agreements entered between employers and local chapters of the ILGWU. The Fund is a “pension plan,” an “employee pension benefit plan,” an “employee pension benefit plan,” and a “multiemployer plan” of sections 3(2) and 3(37) of ERISA, as amended by the MPPAA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(2), (37). The individual defendants, Jay Mazur and Joseph Moore, were, at all relevant times, the co-trustees of the Fund.

Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the Fund and the defendant trustees who administer the Fund should be barred from reopening final settlements entered into with each plaintiff several years ago in which each plaintiff paid the full amount of adjusted “withdrawal liability” demanded by the defendants. When an employer withdraws from a multiemployer pension plan, it must pay a fixed and certain debt to the plan known as withdrawal liability. “This withdrawal liability is the employer’s proportionate amount of unfunded vested benefits, calculated as the difference between the present value of the vested benefits and the plan’s assets,” and subject to various statutory deductions and limita *985 tions. PBGC v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 725, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 2715, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984); 29 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment. Defendants have cross-moved for summary judgment, and in the event that either their motion is granted or all of the motions are denied, they have moved to amend their answer to add counterclaims for the additional withdrawal liability they contend is owed by the plaintiffs to the Fund.

The relevant facts are not in dispute, and are distilled below from the Local Rule 3(g) Statements of both sides. Prior to 1982, each of the plaintiffs made the contributions required of them to the Fund pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. During the period 1982 through 1985, however, the defendants learned that each of the plaintiff had completely withdrawn from the fund within the meaning of the MPPAA. The defendants then notified the plaintiffs that they had incurred withdrawal liability in the amount of 100% of their allocable share of the Fund’s unfunded vested benefits. After receiving these notices, each of the plaintiffs asserted that it had sold all of its assets to unrelated parties and, accordingly, that each was entitled to a reduction in its withdrawal liability, to 30% of its liquidation or dissolution value, under ERISA Section 4225(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1405(a).

After much negotiation, all of the plaintiffs eventually settled with the Fund. These settlements were memorialized in a variety of ways such as stipulations, accords and satisfactions, general releases and other types of writings. Both sides agree, however, that for the purposes of these motions these variations are not important and that all of the settlements at issue herein should be treated equally. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Cross-motion for Summary Judgment at 10, n. 8; Affidavit of Stanley D. Halperin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at ¶¶ 2-3. These settlements were made at 30% of the liquidation or dissolution value. There is no question that each plaintiff paid the full amount negotiated under the settlements. Plaintiffs claim that they were given to understand by the defendants that payment of these settlements constituted full and complete satisfaction of their respective withdrawal liability obligations, and therefore, in most cases, the assets remaining after the payments were made were distributed to the shareholders of the corporations.

Now the controversy. In 1986, after many of the settlements had been final for some time, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a decision which interpreted sections 4225(a), (b) and (d) for the first time. Trustees of the Amalgamated Insurance Fund v. Geltman Industries, Inc., 784 F.2d 926 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822, 107 S.Ct. 90, 93 L.Ed.2d 42 (1986). The Geltman decision adopted an interpretation of section 4225(a) which differed substantially from the interpretation previously applied by the Fund and by the plaintiffs in the settlements mentioned above. The question before the Court is whether, notwithstanding the final settlements, the defendants are entitled to seek additional money from the plaintiffs pursuant to the interpretation of withdrawal liability set out in Geltman. Plaintiffs, of course, assert that the defendants are barred from undoing the settlements. Defendants claim the settlement agreements are voidable based on the doctrine of mistake of law and that once the settlements are vacated, the Gelt-man interpretation of the Ninth Circuit should be applied retroactively and the withdrawal liability recalculated.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

In their papers, the parties erroneously assumed that the doctrine of retroactive application, by itself, permits final settlements to be disturbed. As this doctrine relates exclusively to open, pending matters, it need be reached only if the Court decides that the final settlement agreements should be avoided. Because I conclude, for the reasons set forth below, that these agreements should not be avoided, there is no need to address the retroactivity issue.

*986 The defendants’ contention that the final settlements are voidable and may be reopened under the doctrine of mutual mistake of law requires an examination of the law existing at the time the settlements were negotiated as well as the law which purportedly was applied to the settlements so that a determination can be made as to whether the parties were indeed mistaken. When the settlements were negotiated and finalized during the years 1982 through 1985, the parties agreed that section 4225(a) of ERISA controlled. The parties were also well aware that during this time period there were no cases involving the interaction of ERISA sections 4225(a), (b) and (d). See Defendants’ Memorandum at 7.

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Bluebook (online)
710 F. Supp. 983, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1092, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4290, 1989 WL 40901, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anita-foundations-inc-v-ilgwu-national-retirement-fund-nysd-1989.