Angotti v. Celotex Corp.

812 S.W.2d 742, 1991 WL 75160
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 2, 1991
DocketWD 42929
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 812 S.W.2d 742 (Angotti v. Celotex Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Angotti v. Celotex Corp., 812 S.W.2d 742, 1991 WL 75160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).

Opinions

FENNER, Judge.

Appellant, The Celotex Corporation (Cel-otex), appeals a jury verdict against it and in favor of respondents, William Angotti and his wife, Isabella Angotti. William Angotti’s action was for personal injuries as a result of his suffering asbestosis1 from having worked with the asbestos products of Celotex and others. Isabella Angotti’s claim was for loss of consortium;

The jury awarded William Angotti the sum of $250,000 actual damages and $250,-000 punitive damages. Isabella Angotti was awarded the sum of $25,000 on her claim. The trial court adjusted the verdict to reflect pre-trial settlements received by respondents from others originally named as defendants. Crediting Celotex for the amount paid in settlement, the court entered judgment against Celotex in the amount of $164,500 actual damages and $250,000 punitive damages on behalf of William Angotti, and $25,000 on behalf of Isabella Angotti.

William Angotti is a retired asbestos worker who worked with asbestos-containing products from 1948 until 1982. William Angotti’s job was that of an installer of asbestos products. Within the asbestos industry his position was referred to as that of an insulator. As an insulator, Angotti applied insulation materials to objects such as pipes and boilers. Insulators worked with preformed and block insulation, asbestos cement, used to cover and as filler for cracks and joints, and asbestos paper used as a finishing product.

Celotex is the successor corporation to the Philip Carey Company (Philip Carey). Celotex does not dispute that it is liable on behalf of Philip Carey.

From 1951 through 1954 and 1958 through 1960, William Angotti worked for Kelly Asbestos, a distributor of Philip Carey products. During 1959, from 1965 to 1968, and in 1973, William Angotti worked for Central Insulation which was also a distributor of Philip Carey products. Philip Carey products were primarily used on Kelly Asbestos and Central Insulation jobs. William Angotti also worked for various other insulation contractors throughout his career, using asbestos containing products by Philip Carey and other manufacturers.

William Angotti first learned of the hazards of asbestos in 1968. He began experiencing problems of shortness of breath in 1976 and he was diagnosed with asbestosis in 1982. The evidence was that it is now known each exposure to asbestos contributes to the disease process.

The jury found William Angotti’s exposure to asbestos products manufactured by Philip Carey contributed to his asbestosis. Celotex does not challenge the sufficiency [746]*746of the evidence to support the award of actual damages.

In its first point on appeal, Celotex argues that the trial court erred in overruling its motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence with respect to punitive damages. Celotex argues that the evidence failed to establish that it had actual knowledge of the dangers of exposure to asbestos during the time that William An-gotti was exposed to its products. In this regard Celotex argues 1) that William An-gotti was unable to state specifically which asbestos product he used during which time frames and 2) the evidence did not demonstrate actual knowledge on the part of Celotex concerning danger to insulators working with the products.

A defendant’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence is only sustainable when the plaintiff has failed to make a submissible case. Norris v. Jones, 687 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Mo.App.1985). In review of the trial court’s ruling on a defendant's motion for directed verdict, the Court of Appeals views the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, disregarding all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Id. The test to determine when a directed verdict is appropriate is whether reasonable men could differ on the correct disposition of the case. Love v. Deere & Company, 720 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Mo.App.1986).

The test for punitive damages in a products liability case is a strict one. Bhagvandoss v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Mo. banc 1987). No Missouri case has permitted submission of a punitive damage claim in a strict products liability case on the theory that the defendant should have known of a dangerous defect in its product. See, e.g., School District of Independence v. U.S. Gypsum Company, 750 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Mo.App.1988); Bhagvandoss v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 392; Love v. Deere and Co., 684 S.W.2d 70, 77 (Mo.App.1985); Sparks v. Consolidated Aluminum Co., 679 S.W.2d 348, 354 (Mo.App.1984); Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 397 (Mo.App.1981).

MAI 10.04 was adopted effective January 1, 1983, as the appropriate instruction to be given in a case where punitive damages are submissible in connection with a claim for actual damages based on strict products liability. The committee comments under MAI 10.04 reflect that it was drafted to submit the issue of punitive damages in accordance with the court’s opinion in Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387.

In Racer, the jury was instructed at trial that it could award punitive damages upon a finding that the defendant showed complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others. On appeal the award of punitive damages was reversed and that question remanded because the punitive damage instruction did not submit the issues of the defendant’s knowledge of the product defect.

MAI 10.04 now requires that the jury first find that the defendant knew of the defect and danger and secondly, that by selling the product with said knowledge, the defendant thereby showed complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others. The knowledge required within the context of MAI 10.04 is actual knowledge. School District of Independence v. U.S. Gypsum Company, 750 S.W.2d at 446. Missouri law does not permit submission of a punitive damage claim on a theory of constructive knowledge of a product defect. Id.

This is not to say that punitive damages would not be recoverable when there is evidence to show that a defendant had been put on notice of the fact that relevant information in regard to the dangerousness of a product was available to show that the product was actually known to constitute a health hazard to a given class of individuals and the defendant consciously chose to ignore the available information. However, the record in the case at bar does not warrant adoption of such a theory in this case. The record here shows that information in regard to the harmful effect of asbestos was still developing, but it does not establish that, at the relevant times herein, there was already information avail[747]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ellis v. Pneumo Abex Corp.
62 F. Supp. 3d 833 (C.D. Illinois, 2014)
Delacroix v. Doncasters, Inc.
407 S.W.3d 13 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2013)
Rodarmel v. Pneumo Abex, LLC
957 N.E.2d 107 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2011)
Peters v. General Motors Corp.
200 S.W.3d 1 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2006)
Thorndike Ex Rel. Thorndike v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
288 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D. Maine, 2003)
Hoskins v. Business Men's Assurance
116 S.W.3d 557 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2003)
Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France
963 S.W.2d 639 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1997)
United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore
647 A.2d 405 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1994)
Kansas City v. Keene Corp.
855 S.W.2d 360 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1993)
Bilderback v. Skil Corp.
856 S.W.2d 73 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1993)
Porter v. Erickson Transport Corp.
851 S.W.2d 725 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1993)
Hogan v. Armstrong World Industries
840 S.W.2d 230 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1992)
Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc.
842 S.W.2d 133 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1992)
Magnuson Ex Rel. Mabe v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.
844 S.W.2d 448 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1992)
Sealover v. Carey Canada
793 F. Supp. 569 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1992)
Bostic ex rel. Bostic v. Bill Dillard Shows, Inc.
828 S.W.2d 922 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1992)
Davis v. Jefferson Savings & Loan Ass'n
820 S.W.2d 549 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1991)
Angotti v. Celotex Corp.
812 S.W.2d 742 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
812 S.W.2d 742, 1991 WL 75160, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/angotti-v-celotex-corp-moctapp-1991.