Angelina Feesago v. Department of Defense

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided August 10, 2022·No. SF-0432-16-0458-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANGELINA M. FEESAGO, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0432-16-0458-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: August 10, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Angelina M. Feesago, Twentynine Palms, California, pro se.

Michael Sandburg, Fort Lee, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed its decision to demote the appellant for unacceptable performance under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order to supplement the administrative judge’s findings concerning the agency’s failure to afford the appellant a reasonable opportunity to improve her performance, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND ¶2 The appellant was employed as a GS-07 Produce Department Manager with the Defense Commissary Agency until the agency demoted her to a GS -04 Store Associate for unacceptable performance in the four critical elements of her position. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 11-24. The agency placed the appellant on a 90-day performance improvement plan (PIP), beginning August 8, 2015. IAF, Tab 21 at 47-56. After determining that the appellant’s performance remained unsatisfactory in all four critical elements, the agency issued her a notice of proposed performance-based demotion on January 23, 2016, IAF, Tab 4 at 38-51, and then demoted her, effective May 1, 2016, id. at 9, 23. ¶3 The appellant timely appealed her demotion to the Board . IAF, Tab 1. She also raised affirmative defenses of race discrimination, whistleblower reprisal, and harmful procedural error. IAF, Tab 38. After the appellant withdrew her request for a hearing, IAF, Tab 39, the administrative judge issued 3

an initial decision based on the written record, reversing the demotion action. IAF, Tab 49, Initial Decision (ID). The administrative judge found that the agency’s performance standards for critical elements 4 and 5 were invalid because they were not precise, specific, and objective. ID at 13. In particular, she found that the agency appeared to use “exceptions” or “discrepancies” to rate the appellant’s performance, yet there was no stated standard as to how many exceptions could occur before an employee would be deemed to have failed to meet the standard. ID at 10. Instead, the standard or “target measurement” appeared to be tied to a sales report, but it was unclear how the exceptions were captured by the target measurement. ID at 10-13. Although the administrative judge determined that critical elements 1 and 2 were valid, she determined that the agency failed to afford the appellant a reasonable opportunity to improve her performance in those elements due to staffing issues during the PIP. ID at 17-21. The administrative judge further found that the appellant failed to prove her affirmative defenses. ID at 21-37. ¶4 The agency has filed a petition for review in which it asserts that the administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to improve her performance. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. 2 The appellant has not challenged the administrative judge’s findings that she failed to prove her affirmative defenses and has not responded to the agency’s petition for review.

2 With its petition for review, the agency failed to include a certification that it complied with the interim relief order. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a). However, in light of our decision to deny the agency’s petition for review on the merits and thereby order the agency to provide full relief consistent with law, the issue of the agency’s compliance with the interim relief order is moot. See Coffey v. U.S. Postal Service, 77 M.S.P.R. 281, 286 (1998). 4

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶5 In a performance-based action taken under chapter 43, an agency must establish by substantial evidence 3 that: (1) the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approved its performance appraisal system; 4 (2) the agency communicated to the appellant the performance standards and critical elements of her position; (3) the appellant’s performance standards are valid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(1); 5 (4) the agency warned the appellant of the inadequacies of her performance during the appraisal period and gave her a reasonable opportunity to improve; and (5) the appellant’s performance remained unacceptable in at least one critical element. 6 White v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶ 5 (2013). On review, the agency does not challenge the admini strative judge’s findings that

3 Substantial evidence is the “degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, might accept as adequate to support a conc lusion, even though other reasonable persons might disagree.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p). 4 The agency has the burden of proving that OPM has approved its performance appraisal system if the appellant specifically raises such a challenge. Sanders v. Social Security Administration, 114 M.S.P.R. 487, ¶ 11 n.2 (2010). Here, the appellant did not raise this issue. ID at 5. 5 This section used to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 4302(b)(1). During the pendency of this appeal, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (NDAA for 2018), Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed into law on December 12, 2017. Section 1097(d)(1) of the NDAA for 2018 redesignated subsection 4302(b) of title 5 as subsection 4302(c). 131 Stat. at 1619. Such change has no impact on the disposition of this appeal.

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Angelina Feesago v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2022).

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