1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 ANGELA RELIFORD, 4 Plaintiff, Case No.: 2:25-cv-01088-GMN-BNW 5 vs. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 6 SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, INC., et DISMISS AND STAYING CASE 7 al.,
8 Defendants.
9 10 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 24), filed by Defendant 11 Sony Music Entertainment (“SME”).1 Plaintiff Angela Reliford filed a Response, (ECF No. 12 39), to which SME filed a Reply, (ECF No. 51).2 Also before the Court are the parties’ 13 Responses, (ECF Nos. 108, 110), to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, (ECF No. 107), ordering 14 the parties to show cause why this Court should not stay or dismiss this action under the 15 doctrine articulated in Colorado River Water Conversation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 16 800 (1976). Further pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, (ECF No. 9), to 17 which SME filed a Response, (ECF No. 37), and Plaintiff filed a Reply, (ECF No. 55). Also 18 19
20 1 Plaintiff’s Complaint also names Defendants RCA Records and Christoper M. Brown. RCA Records is a 21 division of SME, not a separate entity. (Mot. Dismiss 1:19, ECF No. 24). SME’s Motion to Dismiss therefore applies to all claims asserted against both SME and RCA Records, who is erroneously sued as a separate entity. 22 2 Plaintiff also filed the pending Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 52). In her Motion, Plaintiff essentially seeks leave to file a surreply. Per Local Rule 7-2, 23 “motions for leave to file a surreply are discouraged.” Generally, surreplies are permitted where new arguments were raised in the Reply. That is not the case here. Plaintiff was given an opportunity to respond to SME’s 24 arguments in her Response and makes no showing of why she was unable to make the arguments included in the proposed surreply in her original Response. The information did not become available only after the filing of 25 SME’s Reply; rather, it appears Plaintiff merely seeks another opportunity to rebut SME’s arguments. Such an opportunity is not provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or this Court’s Local Rules. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Opposition. 1 pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment, (ECF No. 28),3 Motion 2 for Consideration of Plaintiff’s Statement Regarding Jurisdictional Harm, (ECF No. 46), 3 Motion to Stay Discovery, (ECF No. 45),4 Motion for Leave to File Revised Proposed Second 4 Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 88), and Motion for Court Ordered Alternative Service, (ECF 5 No. 103). Lastly, SME’s Motion to Stay Discovery, (ECF No. 45), is also pending before the 6 Court. 7 Because the Court finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction over SME, and stays 8 this case under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, the Court GRANTS SME’s Motion to 9 Dismiss and DENIES the remaining motions as moot.5 10 I. BACKGROUND 11 This case arises out of Defendant Chris Brown’s alleged posting of a defamatory post 12 about Plaintiff. (Compl., Ex. 2 to Pet. Removal, ECF No. 1-2). Plaintiff is an aspiring actress 13 and content creator. (Id. ¶ 1). Plaintiff alleges that Brown posted a video on Instagram that 14 used a manipulated version of Plaintiff’s original video and falsely depicted her as a violent and 15 mentally unstable individual. (Id. at 3). The post reached over 145 million followers, which 16 Plaintiff avers incited harassment, ridicule, workplace hostility, and physical assault against 17 her. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that SME and RCA Records, who exercise control over Brown’s
18 branding and public activity, failed to intervene when Brown posted the video. (Id. ¶ 12). She 19 asserts the following claims for relief: (1) Defamation/Slander; (2) False Light; (3) Libel; (4) 20
21 22 3 Also pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Weksler, (ECF No. 79). Because the Court denies the Motion for Default Judgment as moot, it also rejects the Report and 23 Recommendation as moot. 4 Plaintiff also filed the pending Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply to the Motion to Stay Discovery, (ECF No. 24 70). Because the Court denies the Motion to Stay Discovery as moot, it also Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply as moot. 25 5 Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Revised Proposed Second Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 88), and Motion for Court Ordered Alternative Service, (ECF No. 103), are denied without prejudice, with leave to refile after this case is unstayed in the event the state court litigation does not resolve all issues in this case. 1 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (5) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; and 2 (6) Negligence. (Id. at 7). 3 Plaintiff originally filed this case in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, 4 Nevada on January 21, 2025. (Pet. Removal 1:23–25, ECF No. 1). SME removed the case to 5 this Court on June 18, 2025. (Id.). Plaintiff then filed the instant Motion to Remand, and SME 6 filed the instant Motion to Dismiss asserting that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 7 SME and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against it. In response to SME’s filing of a Notice 8 of Related Cases, (ECF No. 104), the Court entered an Order to Show Cause in writing why 9 this Court should not stay or dismiss this action under the Colorado River doctrine. The parties 10 both filed a Response, (ECF Nos. 108, 110), and this Order follows. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(2) permits a defendant, by way of 14 motion, to assert the defense that a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Fed. R. 15 Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The party asserting the existence of jurisdiction bears the burden of 16 establishing it. See Mattel, Inc. v. Greiner & Hausser GmbH, 354 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 17 2003). When a 12(b)(2) motion is based on written materials, rather than an evidentiary
18 hearing, a “plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand 19 the motion to dismiss.” Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). “This prima 20 facie standard ‘is not toothless,’ however; [plaintiff] ‘cannot simply rest on the bare allegations 21 of its complaint.’” AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2020) 22 (quoting In re Boon Glob. Ltd., 923 F.3d 643, 650 (9th Cir. 2019)), overruled in part on other 23 grounds by Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739 (9th Cir. 2025). 24 In reviewing a motion, the court accepts “as true all uncontroverted allegations in the 25 complaint.” Glob. Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972 1 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2020). If the defendant comes forward with a “contradictory 2 affidavit, the plaintiff cannot simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint.” Yamashita v. 3 LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 502 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal citation and quotations omitted). 4 However, “[i]f both sides submit affidavits, then ‘[c]onflicts between the parties over 5 statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.’” LNS Enters. LLC 6 v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 7 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). 8 When no federal statute applies to the determination of personal jurisdiction, the law of 9 the state in which the district court sits applies. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 10 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). Because Nevada’s long-arm statute reaches the outer limits of 11 federal constitutional due process, courts in Nevada need only assess constitutional principles 12 of due process when determining personal jurisdiction. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 14.065; Galatz v. 13 Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 683 P.2d 26, 28 (Nev. 1984). 14 Due process requires that a non-resident defendant have minimum contacts with the 15 forum state such that the “maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 16 play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash. Off of Unemployment Compl. & 17 Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
18 Minimum contacts may give rise to either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. LSI 19 Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000). General 20 jurisdiction exists where a defendant maintains “continuous and systematic” ties with the forum 21 state, even if those ties are unrelated to the cause of action. Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales 22 de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–16 (1984)). Specific jurisdiction exists where 23 claims “arise[ ] out of” or “relate[ ] to” the contacts with the forum, even if those contacts are 24 “isolated and sporadic.” Id. 25 /// 1 B. Remand 2 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and “possess only that power 3 authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” 4 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations 5 omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden 6 of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations 7 omitted). 8 The federal removal statute provides that a defendant may remove an action to federal 9 court based on federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. “The 10 ‘strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the 11 burden of establishing that removal is proper,’ and that the court resolves all ambiguity in favor 12 of remand to state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) 13 (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)). “If at any time 14 before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case 15 shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 16 To remove a state law civil action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 17 a removing defendant must show that the parties are completely diverse and that the matter in
18 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Complete diversity of 19 citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that each plaintiff be a citizen of a different state 20 than each defendant. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). 21 Diversity is determined, and must exist, at the time the complaint is filed, and removal is 22 effected. Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002). 23 C. Colorado River Doctrine 24 “In exceptional circumstances, a federal court may decline to exercise its ‘virtually 25 unflagging obligation’ to exercise federal jurisdiction, in deference to pending, parallel state 1 proceedings.” Montanore Mins. Corp. v. Bakie, 867 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 2 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). The 3 Ninth Circuit directs courts to consider eight factors when deciding whether to stay or dismiss 4 under Colorado River: 5 (1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation; (4) the 6 order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether federal law or state law 7 provides the rule of decision on the merits; (6) whether the state court proceedings can adequately protect the rights of the federal litigants; (7) the desire to avoid forum 8 shopping; and (8) whether state court proceedings will resolve all issues before the federal court. 9
10 R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 978–79 (9th Cir. 2011). The decision to 11 abstain under Colorado River “does not rest on a mechanical checklist;” it instead requires “a 12 careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case, with the balance 13 heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 14 Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 The Court begins by addressing the pending Motion to Dismiss before turning to other 17 pending matters. 18 A. Motion to Dismiss 19 Defendant SME moves to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting 20 that the Court has neither general nor specific jurisdiction over it. Because Plaintiff concedes 21 that the Court does not have general jurisdiction over SME, and the Court agrees, the Court 22 analyzes only whether specific jurisdiction exists. 23 Specific jurisdiction refers to “jurisdiction based on the relationship between the 24 defendant’s forum contacts and plaintiff’s claims.” Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th 25 Cir. 2007). Specific jurisdiction must arise out of “contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates 1 with the forum State” and cannot be established from the conduct of a plaintiff or third parties 2 within the forum. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 3 Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). 4 Courts employ a three-prong test to analyze whether the assertion of specific personal 5 jurisdiction in a given forum is proper: 6 1) The non-resident defendant must [a] purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or [b] perform 7 some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protection of its laws; 8 (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum related activities; and 9 (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, 10 i.e. it must be reasonable. 11 Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). 12 “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test.” Id. If the 13 plaintiff satisfies the first two prongs, the burden will shift to the defendant to show that 14 exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id. “If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these 15 prongs, personal jurisdiction is not established in the forum state.” Id. 16 In considering the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test, the Court must ensure “that 17 a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or 18 attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party.” Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 19 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit typically distinguishes between cases 20 sounding in contract and those sounding in tort. Id. In contract actions, the inquiry considers 21 whether a defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities or 22 consummates a transaction in the forum, focusing on activities such as delivering goods or 23 executing a contract.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 24 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). In tort cases, the inquiry assesses whether the 25 defendant “purposefully directs his activities at the forum state.” Id. (cleaned up). 1 Here, Plaintiff asserts only tort claims;6 the Court therefore analyzes whether SME has 2 purposefully directed its activities at Nevada. The purposeful direction test, based on Calder v. 3 Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), requires Plaintiff to establish that Defendant “(1) committed an 4 intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant 5 knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 6 874 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 7 704 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2012)). If these elements are met, a court can exercise jurisdiction 8 “even if the defendant never set foot in the forum state.” Burri L. PA v. Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207, 9 1213 (9th Cir. 2022). An action may be directed at a forum state even if it occurred elsewhere. 10 Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017). 11 Plaintiff does not plead facts that satisfy any of the Calder elements. She does not allege 12 that SME took any intentional acts that were directed at Nevada; instead, her claims against 13 SME appear to be premised on harm she suffered in Georgia. In her Response, Plaintiff argues 14 that SME purposefully directed its activity at Nevada because of its “financial interest in 15 [Brown’s meet-and-greet] campaign, its access to Chris Brown’s branding, and its failure to 16 intervene” after Brown’s allegedly defamatory post went viral. (Resp. 3:23–4:2). But none of 17 those alleged involvements or failures to act was expressly aimed at Nevada. Nor did they
18 cause harm that SME knew was “likely to be suffered in [Nevada].” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 19 1069. Even if Plaintiff had successfully alleged that SME committed intentional acts, the 20 alleged harm in this case was clearly felt in Georgia, where Plaintiff resides. Additionally, 21 Plaintiff claims for the first time in her Response that her reputation was harmed in Nevada’s 22 entertainment and music industry. (Resp. 4:5–7). Even if the Court were to accept this 23
24 6 In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following claims against unspecified Defendants: Defamation, 25 Slander, False Light, Invasion of Privacy, Libel, Copyright Infringement, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Negligence. (Am. Compl. at 2, Ex. 2 to Pet. Removal, ECF No. 1-2); (see also Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Copyright Claim, ECF No. 8). 1 allegation despite not being made in her Complaint, Plaintiff offers no explanation for why she 2 experienced harm in Nevada despite residing in Georgia. Moreover, such a conclusory 3 statement cannot support a finding that SME knew the alleged harm was likely to be suffered in 4 Nevada. 5 Plaintiff also points to a concert Brown held in Las Vegas on August 3, 2024, in 6 connection with the 11:11 Tour. (Resp. 3:15–20). Again, Plaintiff did not allege facts relating 7 to that concert in her Complaint. Even if the Court were to consider the new allegations in her 8 Response, the fact that Brown had a concert in Las Vegas while on a national tour does nothing 9 to support a finding that SME purposefully directed any actions at Nevada. Even accepting the 10 unsupported allegation that SME was involved in the 11:11 tour, which SME contests, having a 11 single stop in Nevada on a nationwide tour is insufficient to find that SME intentionally aimed 12 its conduct at Nevada. Plaintiff’s alleged harm does not arise out of that tour stop in Nevada; 13 rather, she alleges that she attended a meet-and-greet on the 11:11 tour in Montreal, and that 14 she was defamed by Brown’s post while residing in Georgia. Nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint 15 or Response supports a finding that SME committed an intentional act, that such an act was 16 aimed at Nevada, or that SME knew the harm was likely to be experienced in Nevada; thus, 17 Plaintiff fails to meet her burden of proving that SME directed its activities at Nevada. See
18 Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069. 19 Because the Court finds Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving the first prong of 20 the specific jurisdiction test, it need not analyze the next two prongs to reach the conclusion 21 that it does not have personal jurisdiction over SME. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS SME’s 22 Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.7 23 /// 24
25 7 Because Defendant RCA Records is not a separate entity from SME, (Mot. Dismiss 1:19), all claims asserted against it are also dismissed. 1 B. Remand 2 Plaintiff moves to remand this case because she voluntarily dismissed “any language 3 that could be construed” as a federal copyright infringement claim, leaving only state law 4 claims remaining. (Mot. Remand 3:17–18, ECF No. 9). She further argues that the forum 5 defendant rule prevents removal because Brown is a resident of Nevada. (Id. 3:24–27). 6 Even though only state law claims remain, the Court finds that it has diversity 7 jurisdiction on the face of the Complaint. Plaintiff is a citizen of Georgia, and the last 8 remaining Defendant (Brown) allegedly resides in Nevada. (Compl. at 4, Ex. 2 to Pet. 9 Removal). Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks compensatory damages in the amount of 10 $30,000,000, as well as punitive damages. (Id. at 8). Thus, all requirements for diversity 11 jurisdiction are met. Where a case is properly removed based on federal question jurisdiction 12 but the plaintiff subsequently amends their complaint to eliminate federal claims, a federal 13 court cannot remand the remaining state law claims if diversity jurisdiction exits. See Williams 14 v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 976–77 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Court 15 DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand the remaining claims against Brown. 16 C. Colorado River 17 Though the Court dismisses the claims asserted against SME, claims against Brown
18 remain. Because there are still pending claims, the Court next considers whether this case 19 should be stayed or dismissed during the pendency of Plaintiff’s state suit under the Colorado 20 River doctrine.8 21 The Court considers the following factors when deciding whether a stay or dismissal of 22 this case is warranted: 23 24 25 8 As the Ninth Circuit has recently emphasized, Colorado River is not an abstention doctrine, because Colorado River stays are based on administrative rather than federalism concerns. See Ernest Bock, LLC v. Steelman, 76 F.4th 827, 836 (9th Cir. 2023). 1 (1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation; (4) the 2 order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether federal law or state law provides the rule of decision on the merits; (6) whether the state court proceedings can 3 adequately protect the rights of the federal litigants; (7) the desire to avoid forum shopping; and (8) whether state court proceedings will resolve all issues before the 4 federal court. 5 6 R.R. Street & Co., 656 F.3d at 978–79. “These factors are not a ‘mechanical checklist’; 7 indeed, some may not have any applicability to a case. Seneca Ins. Co., Inc. v. Strange Land, 8 Inc., 862 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 16). Rather, 9 the courts examine them in a “pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case 10 at hand.” Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 21. “The underlying principle guiding this review is a 11 strong presumption against federal abstention.” Seneca Ins., 862 F.3d at 841. 12 The Court addresses in turn each Colorado River factor that applies to this case.9 13 1. Avoidance of piecemeal litigation 14 Piecemeal litigation is when “different tribunals consider the same issue, thereby 15 duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different results.” Am. Int’l Underwriters 16 (Philippines), Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, there is a 17 strong possibility of piecemeal litigation. Plaintiff has brought the exact same tort claims 18 against the same Defendant in both tribunals, which would require duplicated efforts from both 19 courts that could possibly reach different conclusions on those claims. See Am. Int’l 20 Underwriters, 843 F.2d at 1258. As a result, these “parallel proceedings could waste judicial 21 resources and cause confusion in the continuing disputes between the parties.” See Ernest Bock, 22 LLC v. Steelman, 76 F.4th 827, 837 (9th Cir. 2023). Accordingly, the Court finds that this 23 factor weighs in favor of staying this case. 24
25 9 The first factor does not apply here as this case does not involve tangible property. 1 2. The order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction 2 This case was filed prior to Plaintiff’s California case. But this factor does not only 3 consider which complaint was filed first; instead, courts must weigh this factor “in a pragmatic, 4 flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case at hand.” R&R Street, 656 F.3d at 980. 5 Despite having been filed first, this action remains at the early stages: the only remaining 6 Defendant has not been served and discovery has not commenced. Meanwhile, in the 7 California action, SME answered Plaintiff’s Complaint and has not contested that court’s 8 jurisdiction. Additionally, the Tech defendants have been served, and TikTok and Meta have 9 filed demurrers. Because more progress has been made in the state court case than in this case, 10 where the sole Defendant has not been served, the Court finds that this factor weighs slightly in 11 favor of staying this case. 12 3. The rule of decision 13 Only state law claims remain in this case, but the claims are not notably complex. So, 14 this factor is neutral. See R.R. Street, 656 F.3d at 980–81 (finding this factor to be neutral where 15 the source of law is state law, but not complex). 16 4. The adequacy of the state forum and parallelism of the suits 17 The adequacy factor looks to whether the state court might be unable to enforce federal
18 rights. See, e.g., Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26–27 (finding state proceedings might be 19 inadequate because it was unclear whether state courts would compel arbitration under the 20 Federal Arbitration Act); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1370 (9th Cir. 21 1990) (“This factor involves the state court’s adequacy to protect federal rights, not the federal 22 court's adequacy to protect state rights.” (citing Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26)). Plaintiff 23 does not assert any federal claims, so there are no federal rights at issue. Because there is no 24 concern regarding the state court’s adequacy here, the Court finds that this factor weighs in 25 favor of staying this case. 1 5. The avoidance of forum shopping 2 When evaluating forum shopping under Colorado River, courts consider whether either 3 party improperly sought more favorable rules in its choice of forum or pursued suit in a new 4 forum after facing setbacks in the original proceeding. See Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 5 1417 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding forum shopping where, after three-and-a-half years of litigation in 6 a case that was progressing to its detriment, one party sought a “new forum for [its] claims”). 7 Here, Plaintiff originally filed this case in Nevada state court on January 21, 2025. (Pet. 8 Removal 1:23). SME removed the case to federal court on June 18, 2025. (Id.). Just a few 9 weeks after this case was removed and Plaintiff filed her Motion to Remand, she filed the 10 parallel case in California state court. (Not. Related Case 1:20–25, ECF No. 104). Plaintiff 11 voluntarily dismissed any language that could be construed as asserting a federal copyright 12 infringement claim and strenuously argued for the remanding of this case. Thus, it is at least 13 possible that Plaintiff’s filing of a nearly identical case in California state court was an attempt 14 to litigate this case in a state rather than federal forum. But, given Plaintiff’s pro se status, it is 15 perhaps equally as likely that she was not aware that she could amend her Complaint in this 16 case to include the additional claims and defendants named in her California case. The Court 17 therefore finds that this factor is neutral.
18 6. Parallelism 19 Parallelism is a “threshold requirement for a Colorado River stay.” Ernest Bock, 76 20 F.4th at 838. As the Supreme Court has explained: 21 When a district court decides to dismiss or stay under Colorado River, it presumably 22 concludes that the parallel state-court litigation will be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of the issues between the parties. If there is any 23 substantial doubt as to this, it would be a serious abuse of discretion to grant the stay or dismissal at all. Thus, the decision to invoke Colorado River necessarily contemplates 24 that the federal court will have nothing further to do in resolving any substantive part of 25 the case, whether it stays or dismisses. 1 Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 28 (citations omitted). 2 “Exact parallelism” between the state and federal actions “is not required” to warrant 3 abstention. Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Interstate Material Corp. v. City of 4 Chicago, 847 F.2d 1285, 1288 (7th Cir. 1988)). Instead, “[i]t is enough if the two proceedings 5 are ‘substantially similar.’” Id. Further, when the “federal action is but a ‘spin-off’ of more 6 comprehensive state litigation,” courts should be “particularly reluctant to find that the actions 7 are not parallel.” Id. at 1417 (quoting Lumen Constr., Inc. v. Brant Constr. Co., 780 F.2d 691, 8 695–96 (7th Cir. 1985)). 9 Plaintiff’s California action seeks relief based on the same underlying events as this 10 case: she alleges that Brown posted a manipulated version of her video that wrongly labeled her 11 as a “stalker” who threatened to kill Brown and his dancers. (State Court Compl. 2:1–12, Ex. 1 12 to Notice of Related Case, ECF No. 104-1). She similarly alleges that the video went viral as a 13 coordinated smear campaign, and that she was harassed as a result of the video being posted. 14 (Id. 2:11–18). Plaintiff brings the following causes of action in both cases: defamation/slander, 15 false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 16 and negligence. (Id. 5:18–6:18). She also asserts additional claims for invasion of privacy and 17 civil conspiracy in her California case. (Id.). Her California case is brought against Brown,
18 SME, RCA Records, Meta Platforms, Inc., Snap, Inc., and X. Corp. (formerly Twitter). 19 In other words, Plaintiff’s California case brings all the claims asserted against the sole 20 Defendant in this case, which makes them at least “substantially similar.” See Nakash, 882 F.2d 21 at 1416. Given that the claims are identical, the Court expects that the state court will resolve 22 this dispute in its entirety, and this Order will “settle the matter for all time.” See Gulfstream 23 Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988). Moreover, the California case 24 includes additional claims brought against more Defendants, all arising out of the same 25 underlying event. Thus, because the California case is both parallel and “vastly more 1 comprehensive” than this action, the Court concludes that this factor counsels staying this case. 2 See Madonna, 914 F.2d at 1369 (reasoning that a Colorado River stay may be appropriate 3 where there is a “‘vastly more comprehensive’ state action that can adjudicate the rights of 4 many parties”); see also Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1417 (“We should be particularly reluctant to find 5 that the actions are not parallel when the federal action is but a ‘spin-off’ of more 6 comprehensive state litigation.”). 7 Having considered the above factors, most of which weigh in favor of a stay the Court 8 finds that staying this case pending the state court’s adjudication is warranted and serves 9 efficient and just judicial administration. 10 V. CONCLUSION 11 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 24), is 12 GRANTED for lack of personal jurisdiction over Sony Music Entertainment. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, (ECF No. 9), is 14 DENIED. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is STAYED. Once the California state 16 court proceedings have concluded, any party may move to lift this stay. 17 IT IS FURTHER OTHERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment, (ECF No.
18 28), Motion for Consideration of Plaintiff’s Statement Regarding Jurisdictional Harm, (ECF 19 No. 46), Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Opposition, (ECF No. 52), Motion for Leave 20 to File Sur-Reply, (ECF No. 70), Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Objection, (ECF 21 No. 84), Motion for Leave to File Revised Proposed Second Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 22 88), and Motion for Court Ordered Alternative Service, (ECF No. 103), are DENIED as moot. 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation, (ECF No. 79), is 24 REJECTED as moot. 25 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Stay Discovery, (ECF No. 2 ||45), is DENIED as moot. 3 The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to stay this case. 4 DATED this day of February, 2026. 5 6
Gloria M. arro, District Judge 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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