Angel Estuardo Azogue Atacushi v. Charlotte Collins, Warden of T. Don Hutto Detention Center, et al.

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

ANGEL ESTUARDO AZOGUE ATACUSHI, § § Petitioner, § § v. § 1:26-CV-2259-RP § CHARLOTTE COLLINS, Warden of T. Don § Hutto Detention Center, et al., § § Respondents. §

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Before the Court is Pro Se Petitioner Angel Estuardo Azogue Atacushi’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed on August 17, 2026. (Dkt. 1). On August 19, 2026, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause within three days as to why the petition should not be granted. (Dkt. 3). On August 24, 2026, David Venturella, Markwayne Mullin, and Todd Blanche (collectively, “Respondents”)1 filed a timely response in opposition, (Dkt. 5). Having considered the parties’ arguments, the evidence presented, and the relevant law, the Court will grant Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.2

1 The Response is filed only on behalf of the federal employees in this action. (Resp., Dkt. 5, at 1 n.1). 2 he Court is aware of the Fifth Circuit’s July 21, 2026 Order granting the government’s request to “issue a precedential order staying the district courts’ judgments pending en banc review” of the panel’s now-vacated opinion holding that certain applicants for admission can only be mandatorily detained for 90 days under 8 U.S.C. § l225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing. Sosnava Rodriguez v. Ortega, No. 26-50183, Dkt. No. 178-1 at 13 (5th Cir. July 10, 2026); see Sosnava Rodriguez v. Ortega, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 2104747 (5th Cir. July 21, 2026) (en banc). After careful consideration, the Court finds persuasive the reasoning of sister courts in this District that the interim stay order does not prohibit its continued resolution of pending immigration habeas petitions on due process grounds. See Tiquiram v. Warden, Dilley Immigr. Processing Ctr., et al., No. SA-26-CV- 04473-OLG, 2026 WL 2242499, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. July 31, 2026) (collecting cases).

First: while the Fifth Circuit stayed the three judgments before it on appeal pending its ultimate determination on the merits of the due process issue, Sosnava Rodriguez, 2026 WL 2104747 at *1, a stay order “‘does not make or signal any change to the law’ and ‘is not a ruling on the merits.’” Estrada v. Ybarra, No. 26-CV-1897- KC, 2026 WL 2168090, at * 1 (W.D. Tex. July 28, 2026) (quoting Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 879 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citation modified)). I. BACKGROUND Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ecuador, is currently detained at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center located in Taylor, Texas. (Pet., Dkt. 1, at 2). Petitioner last entered the United States on or about February 24, 2024 “without a valid entry document, and affirmatively surrendered himself to immigration authorities at the border rather than evading apprehension,” (Id. at 4). Petitioner alleges he was then taken into custody, referred for a credible fear interview, and found by

an asylum officer to have demonstrated a credible fear of persecution or torture. (Id.). The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) released Petitioner from custody pursuant to an Order of Release on Recognizance, (id.), and issued him a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) “under 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 based on his credible fear claim,” (Resp., Dkt. 5, at 2). On July 30, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in his home state of New Jersey, as he “stepped off a bus on his way to his construction job.” (Pet., Dkt. 1, at 2). Petitioner was subsequently transferred to the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Texas. (Id.). Respondents assert that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). (Resp., Dkt. 5, at 2). Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to a writ because his detention without legal justification and without a chance to seek redetermination of his custody

Second: unlike typical precedential orders, the stay order “was issued without any explanation [or] analysis.” Estrada, 2026 WL 2168090, at *1−2. This Court, like its sister courts, finds that it cannot “infer directives of constitutional magnitude from the Fifth Circuit where none have been given.” Camacho v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 26-CV-01717-DB, 2026 WL 2137156, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 24, 2026).

Third: the constitutional writ of habeas corpus requires expeditious resolution and “must not be allowed to founder in a procedural morass.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969) (citation modified); see 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“A court . . . entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted.”). The Court concludes that staying dozens of habeas proceedings challenging mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is precisely the type of directive of constitutional magnitude it cannot infer from a stay, issued in a separate case, and without either analysis or clarity as to its scope. See Tiquiram, 2026 WL 2242499, at *1 n.1. As such, the Court will proceed with its resolution of such challenges unless “told to do otherwise.” Estrada, 2026 WL 2168090, at *2 (citation modified) (collecting cases). status violates his rights to substantive and procedural due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, among other arguments. (Pet., Dkt. 1, at 7–10). II. DISCUSSION A. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus This Court previously interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as not applying to noncitizens like Petitioner who has been residing in the country for years, as opposed to a noncitizen present in the

United States who has recently arrived and is actively seeking admission. See, e.g., Guzman v. Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 1:25-CV-2055-RP, 2025 WL 3724465 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2025). This interpretation was recently rejected by a Fifth Circuit panel. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). Buenrostro-Mendez addressed only statutory interpretation. By contrast, it did not examine whether Petitioner’s ongoing detention without access to a bond hearing violates the Constitution. Id.3 As such, the Court turns to Petitioner’s independent claim for release under the Due Process Clause. Respondents attempt to distinguish this case from others frequently before Court by arguing Petitioner is actually subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), rather than the “catchall” provision contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Resp., Dkt. 5, at 2). In other similar cases before the Court, Respondents assert that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (2025) governs petitioners’ claims and dictates that they

are subject to mandatory detention. Here, according to Respondents, because Petitioner was initially placed in expedited removal proceedings, then transferred to full removal proceedings based on his credible fear claim, he is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to a different BIA decision, Matter

3 Indeed, the Government’s counsel stated during oral argument: “We have one issue before the Court now: the statutory question. . . . There’s not, in other words, a due process claim here.” Oral Argument, Buenrostro- Mendez v. Bondi¸ No. 25-20496, at 44:56–45:11 (5th Cir. Feb. 3, 2026), available at https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/25/25-20496_2-3-2026.mp3. of M-S, 27 I&N Dec. 509 (2019). (Id. at 1). Because Petitioner argues 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is unconstitutional as applied to him because it violates his due process protections, the Court “finds the fact that Petitioner is detained under Section 1225(b)(1) versus 1225(b)(2) inconsequential for purposes of its analysis because both require mandatory detention and such detention [is] the main issue raised by Petitioner.” Chauhan v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-00574-DB, at 8 n.5 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2025); see Hassen v. Noem, No. 3:26-CV-00048-DB, 2026 WL 446506, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2026).

As such, the Court proceeds with the due process analysis it has undertaken in other similar matters before it. “Freedom from imprisonment – from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint – lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). Noncitizens are entitled to due process of the law under the Fifth Amendment. Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Contrary to Respondents’ argument, (Resp., Dkt. 5, at 3), “Thuraissigiam does not foreclose [Petitioner’s] due process claims.” Ochoa v. Vergara, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 1:26-CV-266-RP, 2026 WL 482211, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026) (quoting Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons, No. 5:25-CV- 00773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025)). There are “two key points of distinction between Thuraissigiam and [Petitioner’s] case.” Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 801 F. Supp. 3d 668,

682 (W.D. Tex. 2025). First, unlike the petitioner in Thuraissigiam, Petitioner does not challenge the admission process in any way or assert a right to remain in the United States. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“For these reasons, an alien in respondent’s position has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.”) (emphasis added). Petitioner “merely seeks a chance to apply for release . . . [and] [n]othing in Thuraissigiam suggests [he] lacks such a due process right.” Hernandez-Fernandez, 2025 WL 2976923, at *8. A “second key point of distinction is that Thuraissigiam was stopped by Border Patrol ‘within twenty-five yards of the border,’ immediately detained, and never released.” Id. By contrast, Petitioner has lived in the United States for approximately two-and-a-half years prior to his detention. (Pet., Dkt. 1, at 4). For constitutional purposes, Petitioner’s time living in the United States differentiates him from the petitioner in Thuraissigiam because “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “Th[is] distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.”4 Id. Because Petitioner validly makes a due process argument, the Court will address whether Petitioner has succeeded on his procedural due process claim under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). “To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s due process rights, courts apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).” Martinez v. Noem, No. 5:25- CV-1007-JKP, 2025 WL 2598379, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2025). Those factors are: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

All three Mathews factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. First, “[b]ecause he spent [approximately two-and-a-half years] at liberty in the United States, [Petitioner] possesses a cognizable interest in his freedom from detention.” Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons, No. 5:25-CV-

4 See also Mendoza v. Noem, No. 5:26-CV-728-JKP, Dkt. 9, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2026) (quoting Martinez v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-430-KC, 2025 WL 2965859, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025)). (“Further, even in circumstances like those here—lacking a prior detention, release, and re-detention—noncitizens already in the country who have ‘established a life here—albeit without authorization,’ possess ‘a strong liberty interest in their freedom from detention.’”). 00773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025). Moreover, especially given that Respondents released Petitioner and permitted him to live in the United States for a substantial period of time after his entry in 2024, “they cannot revoke that liberty without an individualized determination of the need to do so.” (Resp., Dkt. 5, at 2; Hassen, 2026 WL 446506, at *2). This interest “deserves great weight and gravity.” Vieira v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. EP-25-CV-00432-DB, 2025 WL 2937880, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025) (citations omitted).

The second factor—the risk of erroneous deprivation—also weighs strongly in favor of Petitioner. Petitioner lacks any opportunity to contest the reasonableness of his detention, meaning the risk of erroneous deprivation lies in this “automatic continued deprivation of liberty for a noncitizen.” Id. at *7. As to the third factor, “Respondents, of course, have a generalized interest in ensuring noncitizens appear for their removal hearings and do not pose a risk to the communities in which they live.” Id. at *6. “In any event, if such concerns exist, they would be squarely addressed” at a bond hearing. Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 687. Regardless, the government “conducted [bond hearings] for decades until its reinterpretation of the law earlier this year,” reducing any purported interest in ceasing to hold meaningful bond hearings. Id. (citations omitted). As such, all three factors favor Petitioner, and the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention without any opportunity to challenge his detention through a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause. Federal district courts in Texas, including this Court, have likewise found that similar

instances of detention violated a Petitioner’s right to procedural due process. See, e.g., id.; Ochoa, ---F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 1:26-CV-266-RP, 2026 WL 482211, at *2–4; Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *7 (“In sum, Section 1225(b)(2) as applied to Petitioner violates his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.”); Martinez v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-430-KC, 2025 WL 2965859, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025) (“[T]he Court does not reach the statutory interpretation question because, assuming without finding that the Government’s new interpretation is correct, [petitioner] is entitled to due process and succeeds in his as-applied challenge.”); Ortega-Aguirre v. Noem, No. 4:25-CV-04332, 2025 WL 3684697, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2025) (“Here, the Court finds that Petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits of his due process claim because he ‘has been detained since August of 2025 without any individualized assessment of flight risk or dangerousness.’”); Cordova v. Noem, No. 3:26-CV-97-K- BN, 2026 WL 218938, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2026) (“[T]he Court holds that denying Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1225(b)(2) deprives him of procedural due process protections under the Fifth

Amendment.”); Camacho-Gutierrez v. Thompson, No. 5:25-CV-01876-MA, 2026 WL 195758, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2026) (“[T]he Court finds that Petitioner’s detention without any notice or an individualized assessment deprives her of the constitutional right to procedural due process”); Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons, No. 5:25-CV-00773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025) (finding “that detaining [petitioner] without any individualized assessment of his flight risk and dangerousness deprives him of his constitutional right to procedural due process,” and collecting cases); George v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-2935-S-BW, 2025 WL 3852946, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:25-CV-02935-S-BW, 2026 WL 30829 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2026) (“[D]etaining [petitioner] without a bond hearing violates his Fifth Amendment rights.”). Federal district courts in Texas have also made this finding subsequent to the Fifth Circuit issuing its opinion in Buenrostro-Mendez. See, e.g., Hassen, 2026 WL 446506, at *2 & n.1 (holding that

Buenrostro-Mendez “does not change this case’s outcome on procedural due process grounds”); Clemente Ceballos v. Garite, No. EP-26-CV-00312-DB, 2026 WL 446509, at *2 & n.2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2026) (same); Marceau v. Noem, No. EP-26-CV-237-KC, 2026 WL 368953 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2026) (“The Court’s conclusion is not changed by the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Buenrostro- Mendez . . . Buenrostro-Mendez has no bearing on this Court’s determination of whether [petitioner] is being detained in violation of [his] constitutional right to procedural due process.”); Mendoza v. Noem, No. 5:26-CV-728-JKP, Dkt. 9, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2026) (holding that Buenrostro-Mendez “only addresses a statutory claim” and “did not address and does not preclude consideration of constitutional and other claims”). This Court agrees with the Due Process Clause analysis in the above cases, and finding a constitutional violation, it need not reach the other issues briefed by the parties. Turning to relief, in habeas cases where the Court finds an ongoing detention unlawful, “the

typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). “In recent months, courts across the country have ordered the release of detainees in similar situations.” Moctezuma v. Henkey, No. 1:25-CV-00741-BLW, 2026 WL 18809, at *5 (D. Idaho Jan. 2, 2026) (ordering immediate release and collecting cases across jurisdictions); Cruz-Reyes v. Bondi, 5:26- CV-60, 2026 WL 332315, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2026) (“[D]ue process concerns weigh heavily in favor of granting immediate release.”); Santiago v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-361, 2025 WL 2792588, at *13−14 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025) (collecting cases and finding that “immediate release appropriately remedies Respondents’ violation of [Petitioner’s] due process rights through her continued detention.”); Mendoza v. Noem, No. 5:26-CV-728-JKP, Dkt. 9, at *16–18 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2026) (quoting Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-CV-6065 (NJC), 2025 WL 3314420, at *31 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025)) (explaining, after finding a due process violation, that release is the proper remedy rather than a bond hearing because “a post-deprivation bond hearing

before a DHS officer or even an immigration judge would provide no genuine opportunity to relief because the detention without adequate pre-deprivation procedures has already been carried out.”). The Court agrees that the appropriate remedy for unlawful detention is release and will order Petitioner’s immediate release. III. CONCLUSION The foregoing order constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the reasons discussed above, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED as follows. All relief not granted is DENIED. 1. Upon receipt of this order, Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody; 2. Respondents shall release Petitioner under conditions no more restrictive than those in place prior to the detention at issue in this case, and shall return Petitioner’s identification documents and possessions upon his release; 3. As soon as is practicable, and no less than two hours before release, Respondents shall notify any identifiable next-of-kin of the exact location and time of Petitioner’s release; 4. Respondents are enjoined from further detaining Petitioner without first conducting a bond hearing, scheduled with notice to Petitioner and set at a date agreed upon by both parties. At such a hearing, Respondents bear the burden of justifying, by clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness or flight risk, Petitioner’s detention. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Respondents shall provide a status report on or before August 27, 2026, detailing their compliance with this Order. SIGNED on August 25, 2026. 2e6n-—— ROBERT PITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE