Andriy Lyashchenko, et al. v. Shasta County Health and Human Services Agency, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 ANDRIY LYASHCHENKO, et al., No. 2:25-CV-3494-DAD-DMC 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 Plaintiffs, who are proceeding with retained counsel, bring this civil action. 19 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for early discovery. See ECF No. 62. Defendants 20 have filed opposition briefs. See ECF Nos. 65 and 67. Plaintiffs have filed a reply. See ECF No. 21 68. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ motion for early discovery will be denied. 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 2 A. Procedural History 3 Plaintiffs initiated this action with a complaint filed on December 3, 2025. See 4 ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs then filed a first amended complaint as of right on January 15, 2026. See 5 ECF No. 16. Defendants responded with separate motions to dismiss which are pending before 6 the District Judge. Also before the District Judge is Defendant Horan’s motion to strike 7 Plaintiffs’ state law claims under California’s litigation privilege statute, Cal. Code of Civil Pro. 8 § 425.16. 9 B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations 10 Plaintiffs name the following as defendants: (1) Shasta County Health and Human 11 Services Agency; (2) Shasta County Sheriff’s Office; (3) Michelle A. Sager, M.D.; (4) Patricia 12 Dougherty, Ed.D.; (5) Michael Horan; (6) Margaret “Maggie” Keneflick; and (6) Office of the 13 California Attorney General. See ECF No. 16, pgs. 8-9. 14 Plaintiffs’ claims appear to stem from child dependency proceedings initiated on 15 behalf of their child S.L., who Plaintiffs state is biologically female. See id. at 11-12. S.L. was 16 born in 2008. See id. According to Plaintiffs, S.L. is “mentally unhealthy.” Id. Plaintiffs state 17 that S.L has been “cutting herself and threatening suicide” since she was ten years old and that, 18 more recently, S.L. has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), 19 Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), and Oppositional Defiance Disorder (ODD). Id. Plaintiff 20 allege that they have been and continue to be willing to provide mental health care for S.L., and 21 that they have never abused S.L. See id. 22 In 2022, S.L. and her mother – Plaintiff Alexandra Lyashchenko – attended a 23 “well visit” with a doctor at Children’s Legacy Center (CLC). Id. at 14. At the time, S.L. was 13 24 years old. See id. S.L. requested a referred for mental health treatment and was ultimately 25 referred to see a psychiatrist, Defendant Michelle Sager, M.D. See id. S.L. began seeing 26 Defendant Sager in March 2023. See id. At the time, S.L. was 14 years old. See id. Plaintiffs 27 claim that, in March 2023, S.L. began identifying as “Transgender” and that, unbeknownst to 28 them until over a year later, S.L. had chosen a boy’s name. Id. Plaintiff state that S.L. 1 complained to Defendant Sager that her parents refused to “affirm” S.L.’s gender identity and that 2 Defendant Sager “affirmed” S.L.’s gender identity “knowing that such was harmful.” Id. 3 Next, Plaintiffs state that “[s]ometime before 06-03-2024,” a anonymous report 4 was made to county officials that Plaintiffs were emotionally abusing S.L. by failing to affirm 5 S.L.’s gender identity. Id. Plaintiffs believe that Defendant Sager was the reporting party. See 6 id. According to Plaintiff, a social worker – Defendant Crystal Nelson – arrived at Plaintiffs’ 7 home in Redding, California, at which time S.L. “pretended to be scared of her parents, who have 8 never given her any reason to be afraid.” Id. at 15. It appears that S.L. was removed from the 9 home at that time and placed into foster care with Defendant Margaret Kenefick. See id. at 23. 10 Two days later, on June 5, 2024, a juvenile dependency petition was filed on 11 behalf of S.L in the Shasta County Superior Court. See id. at 16. Among other things, the 12 petition alleges: “The child, [S.L.], is at risk of continued emotional abuse by the parents, 13 Alexandra Lyashchenko and Andriy Lyashchenko, due to their inability to support the child in 14 their gender identity exploration causing emotional harm,” and “The child, [S.L.], wants to 15 explore transitioning, but the parents do not support them and will not use the preferred 16 pronouns.” Id. Plaintiffs deny the allegations in the dependency petition. 17 Defendant Michael Horan was appointed by the state court as S.L.’s attorney to 18 represent the child’s best interests. See id. at 28. According to Plaintiffs, he “manifestly failed to 19 do so.” Id. More specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Horan did not act in S.L.’s best 20 interests because Horan “affirmed” S.L.’s gender identity and referred to S.L. by the child’s 21 chosen boy name. Id. at 28-29. 22 On August 29, 2025, Shasta County Superior Court Judge Molly Bigelow issued 23 an order declaring S.L. a dependent of the Shasta County Juvenile Court. See id. at 29. As of the 24 filing of the first amended complaint, S.L. remains in county custody. See id. at 32. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 2 Plaintiffs seek an order permitting early discovery prior to the parties’ initial 3 conference pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). See ECF No. 62. More 4 specifically, Plaintiffs ask to be permitted to engage in limited targeted early discovery and that 5 consideration of Defendant Horan’s motion to strike be deferred pending completion of such 6 discovery. See id. 7 Parties are generally not entitled to engage in discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) 8 conference. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). The Court may, however, permit early discovery on a 9 showing of good cause. See Fluke Elecs. Corp. v. CorDEX Instruments, 2013 WL 566949, at 10 *10 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (“Courts within the Ninth Circuit generally use a ‘good cause’ standard 11 to determine whether to permit discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) conference”); Semitool, Inc. v. 12 Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 275-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Am. LegalNet, Inc. 13 v. Davis, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2009). To determine whether good cause exists, 14 courts consider: “(1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the breadth of the discovery 15 request; (3) the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery; (4) the burden on the defendants 16 to comply with the requests; and (5) how far in advance of the typical discovery process the 17 request was made.” Rovio Ent. Ltd. v. Royal Plush Toys, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1099 (N.D. 18 Cal. 2012). Permitting early discovery deviates from the normal practice under the Federal Rules 19 of Civil Procedure and is an extraordinary form of relief. See Am. LegalNet, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 20 2d at1066 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. O’Connor, 194 F.R.D. 618, 623 (N.D. 21 Ill. 2000)). To obtain early discovery, the moving party must show that “the need for expedited 22 discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the 23 responding party.” See Am. LegalNet, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d at1066 (citing In re Countrywide Fin. 24 Corp. Derivative Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2008)). 25 Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Horan’s motion to strike under California’s anti- 26 SLAPP statute challenges the factual sufficiency of their allegations, Defendant Horan’s motion 27 is essentially a motion for summary judgment and, as such, Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery 28 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). See ECF No 62. 1 Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive. In Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 2 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit explained that an anti-SLAPP motion may be brought 3 on the grounds that (1) the claims have an insufficient legal basis, or (2) there is no evidence of 4 sufficient substantiality that supports a judgment for the plaintiff. See id. at 840. If the court 5 determines the motion is based on legal insufficiency, the motion should be analyzed under Rule 6 12(b)(6). See Herring Networks, Inc., v. Maddow, 8 F.4th 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2021). If the 7 court determines the motion is based on a factual challenge, the court should evaluate the motion 8 as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 and, if appropriate, permit discovery. See id. at 9 1156. Here, Defendant Horan’s motion to strike is pending before the District Judge, who has not 10 made any determination as to the nature of the motion, whether it be a factual or legal challenge. 11 The undersigned will not pre-determine that issue in advance of the District Judge’s 12 consideration. In this regard, the Court notes that Defendant Horan characterizes his motion as a 13 legal, not a factual, challenge to the allegations in the operative amended complaint. See ECF 14 No. 65. 15 Given that it has not yet been determined that Defendant Horan’s motion to strike 16 constitutes a factual challenge which could trigger early discovery, the Court finds that Plaintiffs 17 have not met their burden of showing a need at this time for the early discovery they seek. 18 Further, given that an anti-SLAPP motion is designed to avoid unnecessary delay, the Court 19 further finds that, on the current record and in the absence of the District Judge’s assessment of 20 Defendant Horan’s motion to strike, allowing early discovery now would result in unnecessary 21 delay thereby creating prejudice to Defendant Horan. See Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 839 (stating 22 that the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to allow early dismissal of meritless cases aimed at 23 chilling expression). 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Il. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for early 3 || discovery, ECF No. 62, is denied. 4 5 | Dated: July 2, 2026 Svc 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28