J. BLAINE ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:
Andrew Taylor, a longshoreman, was injured in a fall while assisting to discharge a cargo of mung beans from a Russian freighter on June 20, 1976. He appeals a district court judgment in favor of defendant Far Eastern Steamship Company (FES-CO) entered after the conclusion of a bench trial. We affirm.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) establishes the rule that findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are “clearly erroneous,” emphasizing that due regard should be given to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. A finding of fact is “clearly erroneous” within the meaning of Rule 52(a) and should be reversed where, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been [1386]*1386committed.” United States of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). To the extent that the findings of the trial court represent an application of the law to the facts found, this court is not restricted by Rule 52(a) and may make its own application of the law as it understands it. Kwikset Locks, Inc. v. Hillgren, 210 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.1954).
Responsibility in Turning Over the Vessel
Section 5(b) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended in 1972, provides in relevant part as follows:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void____
33 U.S.C. § 905(b). The provisions of the Act, in regard to the scope of a vessel owner’s duty and the standard of care to be applied in suits by longshoremen, was recently addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Scindia Steam Navigation v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). Citing an earlier decision in Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, 405, 89 S.Ct. 1144, 1145, 22 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969), the Court held that “the vessel owes to the stevedore and his longshoremen employees the duty of exercising due care ‘under the circumstances,’ ” and that such duty extends
at least to exercising ordinary care under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety to persons and property, and to warning the stevedore of any hazards on the ship or with respect to its equipment that are known to the vessel or should be known to it in the exercise of reasonable care, that would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations and that are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work.
Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622 (emphasis added). The Court went on to hold that “[a]s a general matter, the shipowner may rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoremen to unreasonable hazards.” Id. at 170, 101 S.Ct. at 1623. The Supreme Court also noted that
absent contract provision, positive law, or custom to the contrary, the shipowner has no general duty by way of supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations that are assigned to the stevedore.
Id. at 172, 101 S.Ct. at 1624.
The district court’s finding of shipowner compliance with its responsibility to provide a vessel and equipment in reasonably safe condition is based on sound evidence. The scope of the shipowner’s duty as set forth in Scindia focuses on the character of the ship and its equipment— not on the nature of the cargo. The torn sacks of beans, lying in the hold, posed no threat; it was only when the cargo- discharge began and the wind blew the leaking beans onto the deck and winch platform that a hazardous condition developed. Thus, it was not the torn sacks but the stevedore’s subsequent failure to take appropriate precautions' in the course of the operation that created the danger. Under the provisions of Scindia, a shipowner who has turned over a safe vessel and equipment has the right to rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoremen to hazards which develop within the confines of the cargo operation.
The cases providing a basis for placing a duty to warn of hidden dangers on the shipowner are not dispositive of this [1387]*1387matter. In particular, Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.1981) and Subingsubing v. Reardon Smith Line, Ltd., 682 F.2d 779 (9th Cir.1982), while imposing a duty to warn on the shipowner, would require warning only in regard to hidden (Turner) or nonobvious {Subingsubing ) dangers. .Here, the damaged condition of the sacks was obvious to the stevedore when the hatch, was opened. The difficulty with this type of cargo was well known to the experienced stevedore personnel. In fact, one representative of the stevedore company testified that leakage was a problem with bad sacks of beans and that “if there is beans, there’s going to be slips.” R.T. 456. It was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to have found no hidden danger of which the shipowner had a duty to warn in the- face of the evidence demonstrating that the stevedores were well aware of this particular problem and of the difficulties which were expected in cargo operations of this type.
Shipowner’s Active Involvement and Control
A shipowner may be held liable under Scindia if the shipowner actively involves itself in the cargo operation or fails to exercise due care to avoid exposing longshoremen to hazards in an area or from equipment under the vessel’s active control. The Court in Scindia held that
the vessel’s duty to the longshoreman [does not] require[ ] the shipowner to inspect or supervise the stevedoring operation. Congress intended to make the vessel answerable for its own negligence and to terminate its automatic, faultless responsibility for conditions caused by the negligence or other defaults of the-stevedore.
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J. BLAINE ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:
Andrew Taylor, a longshoreman, was injured in a fall while assisting to discharge a cargo of mung beans from a Russian freighter on June 20, 1976. He appeals a district court judgment in favor of defendant Far Eastern Steamship Company (FES-CO) entered after the conclusion of a bench trial. We affirm.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) establishes the rule that findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are “clearly erroneous,” emphasizing that due regard should be given to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. A finding of fact is “clearly erroneous” within the meaning of Rule 52(a) and should be reversed where, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been [1386]*1386committed.” United States of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). To the extent that the findings of the trial court represent an application of the law to the facts found, this court is not restricted by Rule 52(a) and may make its own application of the law as it understands it. Kwikset Locks, Inc. v. Hillgren, 210 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.1954).
Responsibility in Turning Over the Vessel
Section 5(b) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended in 1972, provides in relevant part as follows:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void____
33 U.S.C. § 905(b). The provisions of the Act, in regard to the scope of a vessel owner’s duty and the standard of care to be applied in suits by longshoremen, was recently addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Scindia Steam Navigation v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). Citing an earlier decision in Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, 405, 89 S.Ct. 1144, 1145, 22 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969), the Court held that “the vessel owes to the stevedore and his longshoremen employees the duty of exercising due care ‘under the circumstances,’ ” and that such duty extends
at least to exercising ordinary care under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety to persons and property, and to warning the stevedore of any hazards on the ship or with respect to its equipment that are known to the vessel or should be known to it in the exercise of reasonable care, that would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations and that are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work.
Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622 (emphasis added). The Court went on to hold that “[a]s a general matter, the shipowner may rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoremen to unreasonable hazards.” Id. at 170, 101 S.Ct. at 1623. The Supreme Court also noted that
absent contract provision, positive law, or custom to the contrary, the shipowner has no general duty by way of supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations that are assigned to the stevedore.
Id. at 172, 101 S.Ct. at 1624.
The district court’s finding of shipowner compliance with its responsibility to provide a vessel and equipment in reasonably safe condition is based on sound evidence. The scope of the shipowner’s duty as set forth in Scindia focuses on the character of the ship and its equipment— not on the nature of the cargo. The torn sacks of beans, lying in the hold, posed no threat; it was only when the cargo- discharge began and the wind blew the leaking beans onto the deck and winch platform that a hazardous condition developed. Thus, it was not the torn sacks but the stevedore’s subsequent failure to take appropriate precautions' in the course of the operation that created the danger. Under the provisions of Scindia, a shipowner who has turned over a safe vessel and equipment has the right to rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoremen to hazards which develop within the confines of the cargo operation.
The cases providing a basis for placing a duty to warn of hidden dangers on the shipowner are not dispositive of this [1387]*1387matter. In particular, Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.1981) and Subingsubing v. Reardon Smith Line, Ltd., 682 F.2d 779 (9th Cir.1982), while imposing a duty to warn on the shipowner, would require warning only in regard to hidden (Turner) or nonobvious {Subingsubing ) dangers. .Here, the damaged condition of the sacks was obvious to the stevedore when the hatch, was opened. The difficulty with this type of cargo was well known to the experienced stevedore personnel. In fact, one representative of the stevedore company testified that leakage was a problem with bad sacks of beans and that “if there is beans, there’s going to be slips.” R.T. 456. It was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to have found no hidden danger of which the shipowner had a duty to warn in the- face of the evidence demonstrating that the stevedores were well aware of this particular problem and of the difficulties which were expected in cargo operations of this type.
Shipowner’s Active Involvement and Control
A shipowner may be held liable under Scindia if the shipowner actively involves itself in the cargo operation or fails to exercise due care to avoid exposing longshoremen to hazards in an area or from equipment under the vessel’s active control. The Court in Scindia held that
the vessel’s duty to the longshoreman [does not] require[ ] the shipowner to inspect or supervise the stevedoring operation. Congress intended to make the vessel answerable for its own negligence and to terminate its automatic, faultless responsibility for conditions caused by the negligence or other defaults of the-stevedore.
451 U.S. at 168, 101 S.Ct. at 1622-23 (emphasis added).
The trial court’s finding that the shipowner had not assumed exclusive or concurrent control of the platform where the accident occurred is not clearly erroneous. There is ample evidence that the handling of the cargo and ship’s gear in connection with the discharge of the sacks of mung beans was accomplished entirely by the longshoremen under the direction of stevedore supervisory personnel. The mates from the ship, although observing the operation, made no attempt to interfere. The winch drum oiling was undertaken by the ship’s crew at the request of stevedore personnel, but this episode cannot serve as the basis for establishing the requisite degree of shipowner involvement and control. Additionally, although the evidence is not clear as to who requested what sweeping on which occasions and when, if more than once, any sweeping occurred, it does appear that any sweeping that was done was undertaken at the specific request of the stevedore personnel and that the ship’s crew did not attempt to interrupt the cargo discharge operation while the sweeping was accomplished.
Recent circuit court decisions accord with the Scindia requirement of active control by the vessel over the equipment or areas in question. See Sarauw v. Oceanic Navigation Corporation, 655 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1981) (gangway to vessel, supplied by stevedore, held not an appurtenance within the confines of cargo operation) and Davis v. Partenreederei M.S. Normannia, 657 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir.1981) (longshoreman injured by cargo discharged in close proximity to gangway held to have action for negligence based on shipowner’s concurrent control of the gangway). The Third Circuit specifically held that the ship had maintained control over the manner in which the gangway was to be secured, an “essential appurtenance of the ship,” rather than equipment strictly within the confines of the cargo operation. Sarauw, 655 F.2d at 529. This active control over the area or equipment utilized in the cargo operation is distinct from the casual use of the deck by the ship’s crew for passage or activities undertaken by the crew at the specific request of stevedore personnel.
Shipowner Intervention
The Scindia Court made it clear that the primary responsibility for maintaining a safe condition during cargo operations rests pn the stevedore. An exception to this rule is recognized where a shipown[1388]*1388er (1) has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition, (2) knows that the longshoremen are continuing to work despite the existence of an unreasonable risk of harm to them, and (3) could not reasonably expect that the stevedore would remedy the situation. 451 U.S. at 175-176, 101 S.Ct. at 1626-1627.
The factual findings of the district court in this regard are not clearly erroneous. Inasmuch as Scindia does not impose a duty to inspect, there is no conclusive evidence that the shipowner knew or had reason to know of the presence of beans on the winch platform. The testimony concerning the requested sweeping was contradictory. Even if the shipowner had knowledge of the beans’ invasion of the winch platform, it would not necessarily follow, as the district court pointed out, that the beans created a sufficiently high risk of harm to require intervention in the cargo operation by the shipowner. Testimony revealed that spillage of beans during this type of operation is normal; the stevedore superintendent himself walked through the beans and did not consider them to be hazardous. In light of custom, regulation and case law which address the matter, it was reasonable for the shipowner to expect the stevedore to do what was necessary to maintain a safe place for the longshoremen to work.
The district court did not err in finding that the shipowner had not assumed an obligation to intervene in the cargo discharge operation by virtue of either the stevedoring contract or the mate’s agreement to take care of the spillage problem. In upholding the district court, we have in mind the rule that a “shipowner’s mere knowledge of a dangerous condition will not serve, without more, as a basis for liability.” Lieggi v. Maritime Co. of Philippines, 667 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1981); cf Bueno v. United States, 687 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir.1982) (during regular safety inspections, shipowner should have noticed and corrected a danger created by third-party sandblaster). In Lieggi, the Second Circuit premised liability on the fact that a ship’s mate had promised to clean up a greasy wire on the deck and then failed to do so. Liability was determined to extend to the shipowner on the ground that the ship had assumed an obligation to clean up the wire and had not fulfilled that responsibility. We do not believe that liability extends to the shipowner in this case.
We agree that neither the stevedoring contract nor the mate’s promise furnishes the basis for shipowner liability. The financial arrangements, standing alone, do not support the conclusion that the longshoremen should continue to work in the face of an obvious danger, nor should those arrangements provide a basis for asserting vessel responsibility for an unsafe condition on its winch platform that was never unequivocally called to its attention and which it never attempted to remedy. Liability might be considered to extend to the shipowner on the basis of the mate’s promise; however, we cannot extend that liability on the facts of this matter.
Had the ship’s mate failed to sweep the deck, this case would be analogous to the mate’s failure to clean up the greasy wire in Lieggi. Here, the deck was swept within 30 minutes of the mate’s promise to do so. We find that by sweeping the deck, without it being clear that he was also asked to clean the winch platform, the mate fulfilled any responsibility the vessel assumed by reason of the promise. In light of the stevedore’s obligation to properly discharge the cargo, we do not believe that the vessel owed a continuing duty to clean up the beans. The stevedore had a duty to discharge the cargo properly to avoid waste and loss to the owner and to avoid hazardous conditions involving the longshoremen’s safety. By assuming the responsibility for cleaning up the original spillage on the deck, the vessel will not be obligated to a continuous duty to clean up additional spillage resulting from the stevedore’s failure to properly discharge the cargo.
Conclusion
Our review of the evidence has established that the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. The dis[1389]*1389trict court had ample opportunity to weigh the evidence presented and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. We will not attempt to do so here. For the foregoing reasons, we
AFFIRM.