UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
ANDREA SOLEDAD PEROZO YENDEZ ON BEHALF OF HECTOR JAVIER SOLORZANO BELISARIO, Case No. 1:26-cv-212
Petitioner, Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou
v.
PAMELA BONDI et al.,
Respondents. ____________________________/ OPINION Andrea Soledad Perozo Yendez initiated this action on January 20, 2026, by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint for emergency injunctive relief on behalf of her husband, Hector Javier Solorzano Belisario, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan. (Pet., ECF No. 1), as well as a motion to expedite review (ECF No. 2) and a motion for immediate release (ECF No. 3). For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, dismiss Petitioner’s motion to expedite review as moot, and deny Petitioner’s motion for immediate release. Discussion I. Procedural History In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of Mr. Solorzano Belisario’s current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Mr. Solorzano Belisario or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) In an order entered on February 3, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 7.) Respondents filed their response on February 6, 2026, (ECF No. 8), and Petitioner filed her reply on February 10, 2026 (ECF No. 9). II. Next Friend Status As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Ms. Perozo Yendez may proceed as “next friend” of Mr. Solorzano Belisario. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in [her] behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not [herself] become a party to the habeas corpus action in which [she] participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend
status, therefore, is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is unable to prosecute the case on his/her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate her dedication to the “best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with that party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety of his [or her] status” in order to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted). Standing to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically to
whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163. “[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee if the detainee [himself/herself] could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements” because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device,
the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163. In this action, the Court concludes that the justice system is inaccessible to Mr. Solorzano Belisario, who is presently detained in an ICE detention facility. Moreover, based upon the filing with this Court and attached documents, Ms. Perozo Yendez, the wife of Mr. Solorzano Belisario, has demonstrated both a significant relationship with Mr. Solorzano Belisario, and that she is truly dedicated to acting in Mr. Solorzano Belisario’s best interests. Accordingly, the Court will permit Ms. Perozo Yendez to proceed as next friend to Mr. Solorzano Belisario. III. Factual Background Mr. Solorzano Belisario is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 1-1, PageID.25.) Mr. Solorzano Belisario entered the United States at or near Hidalgo, Texas on or about January 24, 2022, without inspection. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.25.) The Department of Homeland Security issued Mr. Solorzano Belisario a Form I-862,
NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” (Id.) Mr. Solorzano Belisario was then released from custody on an order of recognizance. (Order of Release on Recognizance, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.21.) Prior to his present detention, Mr. Solorzano Belisario resided in Detroit, Michigan, with his pregnant wife. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) On December 17, 2025, ICE agents encountered and arrested Mr. Solorzano Belisario. (Id.; Resp., ECF No. 8, PageID.50.) Mr. Solorzano Belisario has not been provided with a bond hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
IV. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
ANDREA SOLEDAD PEROZO YENDEZ ON BEHALF OF HECTOR JAVIER SOLORZANO BELISARIO, Case No. 1:26-cv-212
Petitioner, Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou
v.
PAMELA BONDI et al.,
Respondents. ____________________________/ OPINION Andrea Soledad Perozo Yendez initiated this action on January 20, 2026, by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint for emergency injunctive relief on behalf of her husband, Hector Javier Solorzano Belisario, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan. (Pet., ECF No. 1), as well as a motion to expedite review (ECF No. 2) and a motion for immediate release (ECF No. 3). For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, dismiss Petitioner’s motion to expedite review as moot, and deny Petitioner’s motion for immediate release. Discussion I. Procedural History In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of Mr. Solorzano Belisario’s current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Mr. Solorzano Belisario or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) In an order entered on February 3, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 7.) Respondents filed their response on February 6, 2026, (ECF No. 8), and Petitioner filed her reply on February 10, 2026 (ECF No. 9). II. Next Friend Status As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Ms. Perozo Yendez may proceed as “next friend” of Mr. Solorzano Belisario. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in [her] behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not [herself] become a party to the habeas corpus action in which [she] participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend
status, therefore, is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is unable to prosecute the case on his/her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate her dedication to the “best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with that party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety of his [or her] status” in order to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted). Standing to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically to
whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163. “[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee if the detainee [himself/herself] could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements” because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device,
the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163. In this action, the Court concludes that the justice system is inaccessible to Mr. Solorzano Belisario, who is presently detained in an ICE detention facility. Moreover, based upon the filing with this Court and attached documents, Ms. Perozo Yendez, the wife of Mr. Solorzano Belisario, has demonstrated both a significant relationship with Mr. Solorzano Belisario, and that she is truly dedicated to acting in Mr. Solorzano Belisario’s best interests. Accordingly, the Court will permit Ms. Perozo Yendez to proceed as next friend to Mr. Solorzano Belisario. III. Factual Background Mr. Solorzano Belisario is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 1-1, PageID.25.) Mr. Solorzano Belisario entered the United States at or near Hidalgo, Texas on or about January 24, 2022, without inspection. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.25.) The Department of Homeland Security issued Mr. Solorzano Belisario a Form I-862,
NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” (Id.) Mr. Solorzano Belisario was then released from custody on an order of recognizance. (Order of Release on Recognizance, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.21.) Prior to his present detention, Mr. Solorzano Belisario resided in Detroit, Michigan, with his pregnant wife. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) On December 17, 2025, ICE agents encountered and arrested Mr. Solorzano Belisario. (Id.; Resp., ECF No. 8, PageID.50.) Mr. Solorzano Belisario has not been provided with a bond hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
IV. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration- related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). V. Exhaustion Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief because Mr. Solorzano Belisario has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue that Mr. Solorzano Belisario should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Mr. Solorzano Belisario, and even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv- 1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25- cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. VI. Merits Discussion A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Mr. Solorzano Belisario is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Respondents, however, contend that Mr. Solorzano Belisario meets every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation. The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Mr. Solorzano Belisario, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations Petitioner also argues that Mr. Solorzano Belisario’s detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Mr. Solorzano Belisario has received notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings with an immigration judge, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a relatively short period of time. The Court concludes that Mr. Solorzano Belisario’s current detention under the mandatory detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). VII. Pending Motions, Other Claims, and Other Forms of Relief Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s motion to expedite review (ECF No. 2) as moot, deny Petitioner’s motion for immediate release (ECF No. 3), and does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. VIII. Proper Respondents Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District of Michigan, the Court will retain the Acting Director of ICE and the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States Attorney General as Respondents.
Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will order Respondents to provide Mr. Solorzano Belisario with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative, immediately release Mr. Solorzano Belisario from custody.1 The Court will also
1 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days, even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer. order Respondents to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will dismiss the United States Attorney General as Respondents.
Dated: February 12, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou HALA Y. JARBOU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE