Anderson v. United States

143 Ct. Cl. 729, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 186, 1958 WL 7389
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 8, 1958
DocketNo. 506-55
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 143 Ct. Cl. 729 (Anderson v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. United States, 143 Ct. Cl. 729, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 186, 1958 WL 7389 (cc 1958).

Opinion

Littleton, Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of tbe conrt:

Plaintiff, a partnership engaged in tbe construction business, bas brought this action to recover additional costs in the sum of $4,415.60 alleged to be due for extra work performed under a contract with the United States acting through the Pish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior. Plaintiff was awarded the contract on the basis of having submitted the lowest bid in the amount of $257,600. The contract provided for the construction of additional fish cultural facilities at the U. S. Fish Cultural Station in the vicinity of Carson, Washington. Among the facilities to be constructed were rearing ponds, the bottom of which were to be concrete slabs. The dispute here involves the type of gravel to be used beneath the slabs which gravel, together with the several lines of drain title to be embedded in it, was to provide for the drainage of ground water beneath the ponds. With respect to this item the contract specifications provided:

Concrete Slabs. * * * Several inches of gravel shall then be tamped into the surface of this subgrade; after which the remainder of the gravel cushion shall be placed and thoroughly saturated with water.
Drain Tile. * * * All drain tile shall be laid within the prepared gravel fill to the lines and grades as shown. * * * Tile shall be laid on a firm even bed with 14-inch open joints.

Plaintiff sought to use for this purpose gravel obtained from a sandbar in the river adjacent to the construction site. The Government refused to permit the use of gravel from that source unless both the fine and coarse materials were screened out. The Government engineer had determined that use of the sandbar material in its natural state was not the type of gravel contemplated or called for under the contract and that such use would only serve to clog the drainage system beneath the concrete slabs.

Plaintiff did install a screening device known as a grizzly which only screened out coarse material in excess of three inches in diameter. It took the position that the velocity of the flow beneath the slabs would not be rapid enough to carry off the fines in such a way as to cause any stoppage in [731]*731the drain tiles. In addition, plaintiff made two further suggestions to assure no blockage: first, that screen be wrapped around each tile joint, and, second, that access cleanouts be provided at the end of each branch drain.

The engineer-in-charge rejected this method of procedure stating:

All drain tile shall be laid within the “prepared gravel” fill to the lines and grades shown. Prepared gravel is generally defined and accepted among those dealing in this product as a coarse granular material larger than 0.187 inches * * * free of dirt, dust, loam, or foreign materials, and graded to size, and when used as porous backfill for subgrade drainage purposes shall be evenly graded from 3" to and contain not more than 10 percent of fine materials passing a No. 4 sieve. * * *
It will be necessary that the construction work under the subject contract be performed in strict accordance with the plans and specifications and that materials used in the construction meet specifications and serve the purpose for which they are intended. We see no need for revision of specifications for “under drainage” material, estimates, or extra work orders at this time, as we contend that the specifications and construction plans clearly specify the various types of gravel material required to serve the purpose for which they were intended.

Plaintiff concluded that it would not be economical or feasible to screen out both the fines and the coarse material as required by the engineer. It therefore purchased the gravel from a supplier 40 miles distant from the construction. Then, on the alleged basis of having submitted its bid based on the premise that local gravel could be used, plaintiff made claim on the Government for the cost of obtaining the gravel as an extra cost under Article 3 of the contract.

The contracting officer in response to that claim rendered findings supporting the position taken by the engineer and denied the claim. On plaintiff’s appeal to the head of the department as provided for in the standard disputes clause of the contract, the decision of the contracting officer was affirmed.

Here plaintiff seeks recovery on two grounds. First, plaintiff states that upon inspection of the construction site [732]*732prior to the submission of its bid, it was told by Mr. Cannady, Superintendent of the U. S. Fish. Cultural Station, whom the invitation to bid had directed it to contact, that use of the sandbar material as gravel beneath the ponds would be acceptable. Second, plaintiff argues that the decision of the head of the department under Article 15 of the contract upholding the engineer’s conclusion that the sandbar material was unsuitable in the absence of adequate screening, was arbitrary, capricious, or erroneous and was not supported by substantial evidence.

Mr. Cannady had no authority whatsoever with respect to the question of what materials would or would not be acceptable under the proposed construction project. Plaintiff’s reliance on the language of the invitation for bids as vesting Mr. Cannady with such authority is misplaced. The invitation stated as follows:

Prospective bidders may inspect the work site by arrangement with Mr. Bruce Cannady, Superintendent of the Carson U. S. Fish Cultural Station.

This provision merely indicated that would-be bidders desiring to inspect the work site might make the necessary arrangements for such inspection with Mr. Cannady. It falls far short of giving notice that Mr. Cannady was the individual with authority to pass on the suitability of materials. The invitation in other provisions (finding 2) is quite clear in stating that it is the “Engineer” who is vested with authority to make such decisions. Plaintiffs knew that Mr. Cannady was not the engineer and have acknowledged that fact here. Thus, assuming plaintiff’s assertions with respect to the information given it by Mr. Cannady to be correct, plaintiff knew at the time that Mr. Cannady lacked authority to bind the Government with respect to the materials to be used under this contract. The trial commissioner was correct in his refusal to make findings on this point, and plaintiff’s exceptions therefore are not pertinent.

When the contract provisions in issue are read in the light of the contract as a whole and the type of work contemplated, it is apparent that the gravel required in order to assure the proper operation of the drainage system beneath the ponds had to be of the quality required by the Government’s [733]*733engineer. Plaintiff itself, we believe, recognized that the sandbar material contained lines which might canse stoppage when it suggested that the tile joints be wrapped with screens. The fact that the tile joints themselves were expressly required to have % inch clearance indicated that the gravel to be used could not contain any appreciable amount of material less than % inch in size.

Then, too, the contract specifications themselves in speaking of gravel to be used in the grading of roadways and parking areas, specifically mentioned “local river gravel” and “river gravel.” The same specifications with respect to the cushion for the concrete slabs speaks of “gravel” and “prepared gravel.”

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Related

Moyer Bros. v. United States
156 Ct. Cl. 120 (Court of Claims, 1962)
Jefferson Construction Co. v. United States
151 Ct. Cl. 75 (Court of Claims, 1960)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
143 Ct. Cl. 729, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 186, 1958 WL 7389, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-united-states-cc-1958.