Anderson v. Social Security Administration

E.D. Oklahoma

Anderson v. Social Security Administration

District Court, E.D. Oklahoma·Decided September 18, 2024·No. 6:23-cv-00293·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MARYE ANDERSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 23-cv-293-DES ) MARTIN O’MALLEY, 1 ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Marye Anderson (“Claimant”) seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her claims for disability insurance benefits under Title II and supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). For the reasons explained below, the Court REVERSES and REMANDS the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits. I. Statutory Framework and Standard of Review The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To be deemed disabled under the Act, a claimant’s impairment(s) must be “of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do h[er] previous work but

1 Effective December 20, 2023, Martin O’Malley, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted as the defendant in this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). No further action is necessary to continue this suit by reason of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). cannot, considering h[er] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Social security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). This process requires the Commissioner to consider: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the

claimant suffers from a medically determinable severe impairment(s); (3) whether such impairment meets or medically equals a listed impairment set forth in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work considering the Commissioner’s assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) whether the claimant can perform other work considering the RFC and certain vocational factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084. If it is determined, at any step of the process, that the claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary. Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th

Cir. 1988). A district court’s review of the Commissioner’s final decision is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of judicial review under § 405(g) is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the Commissioner’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Noreja v. Soc. Sec. Comm’r, 952 F.3d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 2020). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but means only “‘such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). In conducting its review, the Court “may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency.” Noreja, 952 F.3d at 1178 (quotation omitted). Rather, the Court must “meticulously examine the record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). II. Claimant’s Background and Procedural History

In June 2021, Claimant applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II and supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Act. (R. 23, 242-58). Claimant alleges she has been unable to work since an amended onset date of August 1, 2022, due to posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, chronic pain, and sleep apnea. (R. 49, 285). Claimant was 40 years old on the date of the ALJ’s decision. (R. 37, 46). She has a ninth-grade education and past work as a nurse assistant. (R. 35, 60). Claimant’s claims for benefits were denied initially and on reconsideration, and she requested a hearing. (R. 98-133, 161-62). ALJ Robert Tjapkes conducted an administrative hearing and issued a decision on May 4, 2023, finding Claimant not disabled. (R. 23-37, 44-66). The

Appeals Council denied review on June 28, 2023 (R. 7-12), rendering the Commissioner’s decision final. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. Claimant filed this appeal on September 6, 2023. (Docket No. 2). III. The ALJ’s Decision The ALJ found at step one that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her amended alleged onset date of August 1, 2022. (R. 26). At step two, the ALJ found Claimant had the severe impairments of lumbar degenerative disc disease, obesity, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and trauma/stressor disorder. (R. 26). At step three, the ALJ found Claimant’s impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. (R. 26- 28). Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the RFC to perform less than the full range of medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c) with the following non-exertional limitations: “understand, remember and carry-out simple instructions and

tasks; have occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors and the public; no production rate work (such as on an assembly line); and occasional changes in the workplace setting.” (R. 28). The ALJ provided a summary of the evidence that went into this finding. (R. 28-35). At step four, the ALJ concluded that Claimant could not return to her past relevant work. (R. 35). Based on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), however, the ALJ found at step five that Claimant could perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including kitchen helper, hand packager, and cleaner II. (R. 36). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Claimant was not disabled. (R. 37). IV. Issues Presented

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