Anderson v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Board

192 Cal. App. 3d 1336, 237 Cal. Rptr. 894, 1987 Cal. App. LEXIS 1859

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: June 25, 1987
• Docket: A031219
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion

SMITH, J.

San Francisco’s residential rehabilitation loan program, more commonly known as the rehabilitation assistance program or RAP (San Francisco Admin. Code, § 32.1 et seq.), provides property owners in designated areas of the city with low-interest loans to rehabilitate residential property. Since its inception in 1974, the program has been administered so as to allow borrowers to pass through to tenants, under a prescribed rent formula (id., § 32.73), increased “monthly loan payments” secured by the property at the time the loan is made, including payments unrelated to rehabilitation of the property. We uphold that interpretation and, accordingly, overturn a judgment of the superior court directing that only rehabilitation-related payments be included.

Appellants are the City and County of San Francisco (city), on behalf of the San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board (rent board), and real parties in interest, three co-owners of rental property who borrowed under the RAP program. Respondents are six of their tenants.

Background

RAP is administered by the city’s chief administrative officer (CAO), who is assisted in all rehabilitation financing aspects of the program by the city’s real estate department. (San Francisco Admin. Code, § 32.20; all undesignated section references hereafter are to that code.)

The program functions as follows. A neighborhood is first designated a “residential rehabilitation area” and targeted for building code standards enforcement and public improvements. (§§ 32.11-32.12, 32.41-32.44.) A citizens advisory committee (CAC) and an area rent committee (ARC) are formed for each area. (§§ 32.30, 32.34.)

City bond issues authorized under the enabling act, the Marks-Foran Residential Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Marks-Foran Act or Act) (Health & Saf. Code, § 37910 et seq.), fund low-interest loans to property owners (§ 32.10) as an alternative to conventional funding sources which, in many deteriorating areas, might be unavailable as a practical matter. (Board of Supervisors v. Dolan (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 237, 244 & fn. 8 [119 Cal.Rptr. 347].) The term of the loan can be as long as 20 years. (§ 32.61.) Owners who do not participate in RAP still have to bring their properties up to code.

RAP borrowers must meet eligibility requirements and satisfy the CAO of their ability to repay the loan. (§ 32.30, subd. (a).) In limited circumstances, a borrower can refinance preexisting debt on the property as part of a RAP loan. (§ 32.53.) The borrower signs a promissory note (§ 32.60) and gives a deed of trust on the property as security, with the city as named beneficiary. (§ 32.63.) The unpaid balance of a loan becomes due and payable on sale or transfer of ownership except where, for hardship reasons, the CAO allows assignment to a qualified new owner. (§ 32.66.)

Tenants displaced during rehabilitation of their units may qualify for relocation assistance from the city (§ 32.69, subd. (2)(b)), and the borrower agrees as a condition of the loan to give displaced tenants the right of first refusal to reoccupy the units afterward (§ 32.69, subd. (2)(a); see § 32.60, subd. (a)).

Another loan condition is that rents following rehabilitation are limited for the life of the loan. For residential rehabilitation areas designated on or after July 1, 1977, rents are governed by the city’s Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance (rent control ordinance) (§ 37.1 et seq.) passed in July 1979. (§ 32.73-1.) For areas designated before July 1977, rents are limited by this three-part formula: “The property owner shall agree that during the time any conventional RAP loan is outstanding, rent for any dwelling unit in the rehabilitated residence shall not exceed [1] the base rent plus [2] actual increased costs to the owner in the form of monthly loan payments, property taxes, insurance, maintenance, and [3] annual adjustments tied to the Bay Area Cost of Living Index.” (§ 32.73, subd. (a), numbering added.)

Tenants who feel that a rent increase exceeds allowable limits can seek reduction and a rebate of amounts overpaid. The program originally provided for a petition to the CAO and an appeal, by either side, to the ARC. A July 1982 amendment transferred jurisdiction over such disputes to the rent board, created under the rent control ordinance, but disputes arising in RAP areas designated before July 1977 continue to be controlled by the section-32.73 formula quoted above. (§§ 32.74, 37.8, subds. (a) and (e)(5).) The sanction for an owner who refuses to rebate excess rents or otherwise comply with a rent board decision is termination of the RAP loan. (§ 32.75.)

Appellants Richard and Eva Klein bought a one-half interest in a 12-unit building in the Upper Ashbury in December 1980. They paid $175,000, putting $50,000 down and financing the remaining $125,000 with a purchase money mortgage. Their monthly payments were $1,509.25. Appellant Lena Field held the other one-half interest in the property, apparently free of mortgage payments.

The Upper Ashbury had been designated a RAP area in June 1974. Appellant owners performed RAP-mandated plumbing work without a RAP loan in the first year and then, in May 1982, received a RAP loan of $7,100 to do electrical and painting work. Their monthly RAP loan payment was $63.33. The rent formula of section 32.73 applied because the area had been designated before July 1977. When applying for the loan, appellant Richard Klein spoke with a Mr. Soo Hoo, a loan officer for the real estate department. Soo Hoo described the program in depth and explained that the costs of the purchase money mortgage could be passed along to tenants as “monthly loan payments.”

Under section 32.73’s formula, the initial “base rent” for a dwelling unit is ordinarily its rent as of a “base rent date” at least six months preceding the area’s designation under RAP. (§ 32.73, subds. (c) and (d).) For appellant owners’ units, that date was in 1973, and the rents charged at that time varied from $145 to $165, depending on the particular unit. “[A]ctual increased costs” added to “base rent” under the formula are the amounts by which “monthly loan payments, property taxes, insurance [and] maintenance” existing at the time of the RAP loan exceed any such costs that existed on the “base rent date.” There were no monthly loan payments on appellants’ property in 1973; thus, all allowable monthly payments for them were “actual increased costs” that they could pass on to their tenants. Finally, section 32.73’s cost-of-living adjustment is applied and added to the “base rent” figure. The adjustment ultimately allowed in this case, calculated as of 1982, was 82.7 percent.

Respondent tenants objected to a notice of increased rents they received in 1982. Following initial efforts misdirected through the then-recently abolished ARC appeal procedure, they took the matter to the rent board, challenging several aspects of the increase.

The instant appeal involves only the board’s actions regarding whether the Kleins’ monthly mortgage payments could be passed through as increased costs under section 32.73. The matter was first heard before a hearing officer, who disallowed the payments. On appeal to the full board (§ 37.8, subd. (f)), the payments were allowed. Respondent tenants then petitioned the superior court for writ of mandate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) The court concluded that the rent board abused its discretion and acted contrary to law (id., § 1094.5, subd. (b)) “by calculating the rent increase allowable ... under the Rehabilitation Assistance Program to include increased monthly loan payments unrelated to rehabilitation of the property.” This timely appeal follows entry of the court’s judgment granting a peremptory writ directing the rent board to vacate its decision.

Appellants urge (1) that the court erred by not allowing the mortgage payment pass-through and (2) that the court’s interpretation would unconstitutionally deny RAP loan holders a fair rate of return on their investments (see Health & Saf. Code, § 37922.5, subd. (a)). We agree with their first argument and so do not reach the second.

Appeal

This case came about because whoever drafted the printed promissory note signed by RAP borrowers added three qualifying words to the provision about monthly loan payments. The ordinance states that the owner can pass on, as rent, “actual increased costs ... in the form of monthly loan payments,...” (§ 32.73, subd. (a), italics added.) The phrase “monthly loan payments” is not qualified, and it is not defined anywhere else in the ordinance. The same, unqualified language is mirrored in the rules promulgated to implement the program. (Rule 7.19, par. 3(A), RAP rules; hereafter cited only by rule.)¹ It is found, again without qualification, in the deed of trust that RAP borrowers must sign.²

The promissory note, however, reads as follows: “I agree that so long as this loan, or any portion thereof, is unpaid, rent for any dwelling unit ... shall not exceed the base rent plus actual increased costs in the form of loan payments to finance rehabilitation, ...” (Italics added.)

There is no accounting for the note’s language. According to testimony taken before the rent board, someone in the city attorney’s office drafted the note, but the words “to finance rehabilitation” were apparently overlooked at the time and then went unnoticed by anyone in the city attorney’s office or the real estate department until late 1982, after appellant owners herein had signed their note. As soon as the discrepant language was noticed, the real estate department began crossing the words out on all new loans. Borrowers had never been told that monthly loan payments had to be related to rehabilitation, as far as the record shows.

The only administrative support for the promissory note language comes from two consolidated cases that made their way to the superior court on a petition for writ of mandate. In Dodson v. Upper Ashbury Area Rent Committee (Super. Ct. City & County of S.F., No. 802210) and West v. Upper Ashbury Area Rent Committee (Super. Ct. City & County of S.F., No. 805 717) (the Dodson cases), the court upheld an ARC decision to disallow a pass-through of monthly mortgage payments unrelated to rehabilitation. The cases evidently involved property owners who refinanced their property to the hilt just before taking out a RAP loan, planning to take advantage of the pass-through and perhaps to avoid the rent control ordinance, which exempts RAP-loan property in RAP areas designated before July 1977. (§ 37.8, subd. (e)(5); see § 32.73, subd. (e).) The Dodson cases were never appealed to this court and thus have no precedential value. Nevertheless, they directly influenced the hearing officer’s decision in this case and probably were what called the city attorney’s office and real estate department’s attention to the promissory note language. We note them for that limited, explanatory purpose.

The promissory note language is at odds with the RAP ordinance and rules, the deed of trust, and a decade of administrative interpretation relied on by RAP borrowers.

The central question for us is whether the superior court correctly interpreted the term “monthly loan payments” (§ 32.73, subd. (a); rule 7.19, par. 3(A)) as restricting pass-throughs to rehabilitation-related loans. We construe ordinances by the same rules we apply to statutes. (County of Madera v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 665, 668 [114 Cal.Rptr. 283].) The interpretation of a statute is ultimately the responsibility of the courts. Nevertheless, “the contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with its administration and interpretation, while not necessarily controlling, is entitled to great weight and should be respected by the courts unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized [citations]. This is true particularly where there has been continued public reliance upon and acquiescence in such interpretations. [Citations.]” (City of Santa Ana v. City of Garden Grove (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 521, 530 [160 Cal.Rptr. 907], fn. omitted; Engs Motor Truck Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1458, 1471 [235 Cal.Rptr. 117].)

The administrative interpretation in this case merits great weight. Responsibility for all rehabilitation financing aspects of the program was delegated to the real estate department through the CAO. (§ 32.20; rules 1.2, 7.0, 7.6, and 7.19, par. 3.) The department always allowed passthroughs of preexisting debt service, not just rehabilitation-related loan payments, and department loan officers began crossing out the contrary promissory note language as soon as it was discovered. Borrowers obviously must have relied on being able to pass through their mortgage debt, the greatest single cost to most property owners. The city’s board of supervisors was presumptively aware of the department’s long-standing interpretation when it passed many amendments over the years, none of which qualified the language “monthly loan payments.” That implies acquiescence in the department’s practice. (Coca-Cola Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1945) 25 Cal.2d 918, 922 [156 P.2d 1]; Horn v. Swoap (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 375, 382 [116 Cal.Rptr. 113]; Engs Motor Truck Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d 1458, 1471.) We do not think that the board of supervisors’ failure to clarify the ordinance following the Dodson cases implies any acquiescence in the Dodson holding. The cases had no precedential value. Besides, the record shows that the real estate department, after discussions with the city attorney’s office, began crossing out the promissory note language. That was after the Dodson decisions, which refutes any idea of acquiescence in Dodson as opposed to the department’s view.³

Was the real estate department’s interpretation consistent with the RAP program? “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.]” (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [335 P.2d 672].) “If the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history. [Citations.] Certainly the court is not at liberty to seek hidden meanings not suggested by the statute or by the available extrinsic aids. [Citation.]” (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 183 [217 P.2d 1], cert. den. 340 U.S. 879 [95 L.Ed.2d 639, 71 S.Ct. 117]; Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 814, 827 [230 Cal.Rptr. 875].)

The ordinance says that increased costs in the form of “monthly loan payments” can be passed on to the tenant after rehabilitation. (§ 32.73, subd. (a).) The words are clear. Adding to them the limiting phrase “to finance rehabilitation” is permitted only if the ordinance, its legislative history or available extrinsic evidence requires it.

The limitation is manifestly not required here. RAP’s enabling legislation, the Marks-Foran Act (Act), “was passed as urgency legislation in the fall of 1973 [citation] in order to fill a gap to be created by the federal government’s discontinuance of its Federally Assisted Code Enforcement (FACE) program, as the federal government moved away from grants for specific purposes into revenue sharing, [fl] The FACE program, in operation since 1967, had been successful in arresting the decline of several areas in San Francisco as well as in other California communities.” (Board of Supervisors v. Dolan, supra, 45 Cal.App.3d 237, 243, fns. omitted.)

The Act allows local agencies to make long-term, low-interest loans “to finance residential rehabilitation in depressed residential areas in order to encourage the upgrading of property” and predicts that, without local government assistance, “many depressed residential areas will deteriorate at an accelerated pace because property owners are not able to obtain rehabilitation loans from private sources.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 37911.) The Act also grants local agencies limited authority to help prevent steep rent hikes that the loans might engender. “A local agency, in order to prevent precipitous increases in rent which the loans would engender as to residential rental property, may require, as a condition of making a loan ..., that the borrower contract during the term of the loan not to raise the rental amount over an amount which the agency by regulation establishes will yield a fair rate of return for similar investments and will allow for increases that are reasonably necessary to provide and continue proper maintenance of the property.” (Id., § 37922.5, subd. (a), italics added.)

We think it crucially significant that the Act empowers the local agency to limit precipitous rent increases that “the loans”—i.e., the agency’s rehabilitation loans—would engender. That narrow purpose is also reflected in the Act’s grant of authority to require advance notice to tenants so that, in the event of tenant protest, “the amount of rehabilitation work may, at the discretion of the local agency, be limited in order to prevent precipitous rent increases which may cause displacement.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 37922.5, subd. (b), italics added.) It is again apparent from the Act’s relocation assistance provisions: “[T]he local agency shall take every possible action to prevent displacement of all residents as a result of the operation of the residential rehabilitation program----Such actions shall include relocation payments to persons and families of low or moderate income ... who are tenants displaced because of... rent increases resulting from rehabilitation, ...” (Id., § 37922.2, italics added.)

The RAP ordinance reflects the same narrow scope of rent control. Its general purpose is “to improve the condition of housing and the quality of life in San Francisco by providing a means through which property owners in designated residential areas ... which are deteriorating may obtain financial assistance to rehabilitate their property. It shall be the policy of RAP to maintain the existing diversity of San Francisco’s neighborhoods, to encourage the existence of low and moderate income housing, and to preserve the residential character of designated areas.” (§ 32.1.) While the general language about maintaining “existing diversity” and encouraging the existence of low and moderate income housing might suggest broad ranging rent control, RAP’s specific loan-related sections are designed to limit rent increases caused by the loan program. Thus, for example, criteria for deciding whether refinancing of existing debt should be allowed as part of a RAP loan include “the need to prevent significant rent increases which would result in a hardship for tenants, and the need to prevent speculators from profiting from the use of residential rehabilitation financing.” (§ 32.53, subd. (c).) To be eligible for relocation benefits, tenants must be “displaced by Rehabilitation Assistance Program (RAP) activities____” (§ 32.90, subd. (a).)

The RAP rules also show concern only for increases caused by the loan. For example, in deciding whether to approve refinancing as part of the RAP loan, “[t]he Director [of property for the real estate department] shall be satisfied that an applicant did not purchase or refinance the property with the intent of using a RAP loan to refinance purchase money debt and consequently improve the applicant’s position in acquiring the property.” (Rule 7.4.)

The trouble with limiting pass-throughs of preexisting monthly loan payments on the property, of course, is that it does not reduce rent increases engendered by the RAP loan. The debt would be there with or without the loan. We have to remember that in 1974, when RAP came into existence, there was no city-wide rent control. A landlord could pass on as much monthly debt service as the market allowed.

We conclude that neither the Marks-Foran Act nor the RAP ordinance was intended to limit pass-throughs of debt service already existing at the time of the rehabilitation loan. It makes good sense that the Legislature and the city’s board of supervisors would not want to penalize an owner for using the loan program. One evident purpose of both enactments is to prevent windfall rent increases caused by any sudden appreciation of the improved property, something that could unfairly displace the very residents whose presence was important to retaining the neighborhood’s existing character. However, nothing in either enactment convincingly suggests an attempt to interfere with the market forces that brought about any increased value occurring before the RAP loan and resulting rehabilitation. RAP’s use of a base rent figure derived from a pre-RAP-designation date does show concern for preventing artificial rises in rental values that mere designation of a RAP area might cause, but section 32.73’s cost-of-living adjustment takes care of that by putting a cap on year-to-year increases commensurate with the overall rental market.

Extrinsic evidence in the record buttresses our interpretation of the ordinance as intended to control rent hikes occurring because of RAP-loan rehabilitation work, not preexisting debt service. Judy Teichman, an assistant city attorney involved in negotiations leading to passage of the MarksForan Act, also worked with community members and the board of supervisors in drafting the RAP ordinance, especially with its principal author, then-Supervisor John Barbagelata. Teichman explained: “[Ojur assumption was in drafting [section 32.73] that we were not drafting a rent control measure, but that there had been concern in the neighborhood about what the effect might be on the tenants of the program----There was a lot of activity in the area, a lot of sales and things going on at the time. The concern was that tenants might be forced out as a result of this. The idea was not to make rent control but to enact some kind of a measure that would limit the amount by which landlords might raise their rent. [A]nd to allocate any windfall benefits from the activity in the neighborhood that the program might generate, to the tenants rather than the landlords. []f] To put it more simply: the idea was to let the landlord pass on any increased costs that they had, but any additional amount that might have been obtainable in the market because of the enhanced neighborhood!)] that would be to the benefit of the tenant.” To the extent that Ms. Teichman’s comments reflect legislative discussion and events leading to enactment of the ordinance, they illuminate legislative intent. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 769-770 [170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856].)

We hold that the rent board correctly allowed the pass-through and that the superior court, in concluding otherwise, improperly interpreted the ordinance. We further hold that the ordinance and its enabling statute simply do not authorize the exclusion of preexisting debt service from the term “monthly loan payments” (§ 32.73, subd. (a)). Thus, to the extent that the superior court was seeking to enforce the promissory note language as a resolution of “ambiguity” in the ordinance, the court erred. The real estate department had no power to exact such a condition.⁴

Our conclusion is bolstered by compelling practical considerations. The success of RAP has depended on owners using the loans. Without that financing, rental housing would have been lost to accelerating deterioration, and many owners could not have obtained or afforded private financing. Ironically, the RAP program’s aim of stepped-up code enforcement could have hastened the loss of rental units had the loan program not offered a practical solution for owners caught in the squeeze.

It seems safe to say that many or most of RAP’s potential borrowers would have been driven away, as a practical matter, had they been told that existing debt service could not be passed through. Consider this simple illustration:

The base rent date for an apartment in the Upper Ashbury RAP area is July 1, 1973. The rent paid for the unit on that date was $100 a month. This is the “base rent” on which the real estate department calculates the initial maximum rent for the unit at the time the RAP loan is made. This is the case even if the RAP loan is not taken until 1982, for example, and the 1982 tenant is then paying rent much in excess of $100. In 1976, X buys the property, incurring a purchase money mortgage. The pro rata share of the monthly payment assignable to the apartment is $150 a month. In 1978, X secures a RAP loan, the apartment’s pro rata share of which is $20 a month. The real estate department, consistent with its interpretation of the term “monthly loan payments,” would calculate the initial maximum allowable rent for the apartment this way: $100 (base rent from 1973) plus $150 (monthly mortgage payment) plus $100 (increases in property taxes, insurance, maintenance, etc., plus cost-of-living adjustment, since 1973) plus $20 (RAP loan). The total monthly rent would be $370. However, under respondents’ and the superior court’s interpretation of the term “monthly loan payments,” the $150 for the mortgage payment would be disallowed, leaving a maximum rent of $220, not $370.

Assuming, as we should, that X had at least covered the $150 in his tenant’s rent in 1976, plus insurance and other costs, before taking out the RAP loan, the sudden reduction to $220 total monthly rent creates a negative cash flow. Twenty dollars of that amount goes to cover the RAP loan, a cost that he did not have before, leaving only $200 to cover all other costs. His actual costs are $150 (mortgage) plus, in all likelihood, $100 or more in insurance, maintenance, taxes and other costs. He is operating in the red.

Who would be willing or able to take on a RAP loan under those circumstances? Also, the problem is exacerbated if we assume in our hypothetical a purchase date in, say, 1982, when the owner would have paid far more for the property, incurred a greater mortgage, and yet still have been limited to cost-of-living adjustments based on $100. Recall, too, that the prospective borrower could look forward to as many as 20 more years of that formula. Chances are RAP would have had few takers, especially after its first years of operation.⁵

The superior court erred in granting mandate. Contrary to the court’s conclusion, the rent board was not acting contrary to law in allowing the pass-through. There was thus no abuse of discretion by the agency. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)

Disposition

The judgment granting peremptory writ of mandate is reversed. Appellants shall recover costs on appeal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 26).

Benson, J., concurred.

1 The rules vest responsibility for calculating allowable increased costs, including monthly loan payments, with the real estate department’s director of property, the department head. (Rules 1.2, 7.0, def. 5, 7.19, par. 3(B).) Paragraph 3(A) of rule 7.19 directs: “The owner shall agree that during the time his/her conventional RAP loan is outstanding, rent for any dwelling unit in the rehabilitated residence shall not exceed the base rent plus actual increased costs to the owner in the form of monthly loan payments, ...” (Italics added.)

2 Paragraph 32 of the deed of trust signed by appellant owners begins: “Rent Increase Limitations. (a) Trustor agrees that during the time the obligation being secured by this Deed of Trust, or any portion thereof, is unpaid, rent for any dwelling unit in the rehabilitated residence shall not exceed the base rent plus actual increased costs to the Trustor in the form of monthly loan payments, ...” (Italics added.)

3 Respondent tenants would have us defer, not to the department’s interpretation, but to the promissory note language because, they say, “it is the promissory note that represents a long-standing interpretation by the City Attorney’s office, whereas the Real Estate Department, which never read the note, based its ‘interpretation’ only on informal conversations among its staff.” Respondents lose perspective. It is the interpretation of the ordinance, not the promissory note, that concerns us. Also, even if there was evidence that the promissory note was the city attorney’s “interpretation” of the ordinance, it is the real estate department, not the city attorney’s office, whose interpretation matters. Only the department was charged with administering the loan program.

4 We also note that the promissory note is internally inconsistent, leaving room for serious disagreement as to whether it really embodies a promise to pass on only loans related to rehabilitation. The borrower agrees in numbered paragraph 3 of the note to limit rents to increased costs in the form of “loan payments to finance rehabilitation.....” However, the very next sentence of the same paragraph states: “I agree to abide by the rent increase limitation provisions as they are set forth in paragraphs (32), (33), (34) of the Deed of Trust securing this note.” (Italics added.) As we have already noted, paragraph 32 of the deed of trust mirrors the language of the ordinance, “monthly loan payments,” without qualification (see fn. 2, ante).

5 The record shows that only the Upper Ashbury and Inner Richmond RAP areas are subject to the section 32.73 rent formula and that the last RAP loans made those areas were in 1984 and 1982, respectively. The issue we confront in this case is thus of limited import, affecting only loans that have been in existence for many years. We assume from the record that the promissory note language at issue here was not used after 1982, which narrows the impact still further.

A decision contrary to our holding could generate many tenant actions for rent rebates as far back as 1974. As a practical matter, however, few tenants would find relief. Rather than rebate exorbitant sums of past rents, most borrowers would probably either flee the program on their own or be forced out. It seems that the only sanction the rent board can impose on an owner who refuses to rebate rents is to terminate the loan. (§ 32.75; rule 7.19, par. 6.)