Anderson v. Experian

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 26, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-08833
StatusUnknown

This text of Anderson v. Experian (Anderson v. Experian) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. Experian, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KAIA ANDERSON, Plaintiff, 19-CV-8833 (CM) -against- ORDERTO AMEND EXPERIAN, Defendant. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action asserting claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),15 U.S.C. §1692,the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),15 U.S.C. §1681,and state law.By order dated November 8, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is,in forma pauperis.For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,”Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the“special solicitude”in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim,pro sepleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to

state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.”Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,”which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555.After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible –that the pleader is entitled to relief.Id.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against Experian, acredit reporting agency, asserting claims arising out of a debt. But Plaintiff’s complaint is confusing. Although Plaintiff names Experian as the sole defendant, he appears to conflate his claims against Experian with that of an unnamed company, a debt collector who provided inaccurate information to the three credit reporting agencies. Plaintiff refers to both Experian and the unnamed company as “Defendant,”but because he does not provide the underlying facts giving rise to his claims, it is impossible to determine the basis for Plaintiff’s claims against Experian. Plaintiff alleges that the defendant acted in a “false, deceptive, misleading and unfair manner,”in violation of the FDCPA by: communicating false and inaccurateinformation to the three major credit bureaus; engaging in abusive and harassing conduct through the mail and telephone in connection with the collection of a debt; misrepresenting the amount, character, and legal status of the debt; and threatening to take action against him, including having him arrested. (ECF No. 2, 5.) Plaintiff asserts that the defendant is a debt collector, who purchased the debt at a low price and is now attempting to collect the full amount of the original debt from him. But Plaintiff also refers to the defendant’s failure to take the necessary steps to have an unnamed company comply with the FDCPA after he reported that the debt at issue was not his. Plaintiff further claims that the defendant acted in violation of the FCRA and invaded his privacy by mailing him letters, leaving him phone messages, and threatening to take legal action against him about a debt that does not belong to him. In addition, the defendant has refused to remove inaccurate information from his credit report, which has caused him serious injuries and harm. Plaintiff also claims that the three reporting credit agencies — including Experian — have conducted investigations and “found that Defendant had in fact been reporting false and inaccurate information [and] deleted the inaccurate information as per state and federal laws required.” (/d. at 6.) But Plaintiff asserts that “the defendant continued [sic] to harassing [sic] Plaintiff through mail communication, constitutes [sic] an invasion of privacy and harassment violations.” Ud.) Plaintiff claims that as a result of the defendant’s conduct, he sustained monetary damage, as well as injury to his reputation, credit, and privacy. He seeks compensatory damages. DISCUSSION A. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibits deceptive and misleading practices by “debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The statute seeks to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using

abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §1692(e) (internal quotation marks omitted). To accomplish these goals, the FDCPA creates a private right of action for debtors who have been harmed by abusive debt collection practices. 15 U.S.C. §1692k. The FDCPA applies to

consumer debt “arising out of. . . transaction[s]” that “are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5); Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y.

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Harris v. Mills
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Houston v. TRW Information Services, Inc.
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Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Management, Inc.
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Bluebook (online)
Anderson v. Experian, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-experian-nysd-2019.