OPINION
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
A municipal employee sued his union for breach of the union’s duty of fair representation because it refused to represent him in an arbitration in which he unsuccessfully challenged his termination. The superior court denied the union’s motion for summary judgment, and the union now petitions for review of that denial. We hold that if a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation seriously undermines the integrity of the arbitral process, the arbitration decision may lose its preclusive effect. We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether any union breach seriously undermined the integrity of the arbitral process in this case. We therefore affirm the denial of the union’s summary judgment motion.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This petition for review arises out of the termination of Eric “Frank” Feichtinger’s employment with the Anchorage Police Department. In October 1988 the department arrested Feichtinger and the state brought criminal charges against him. Based on an internal investigation into Feichtinger’s alleged criminal conduct, the department terminated him.
Feichtinger had been a member of the Anchorage Police Department Employees’ Association (the union) since joining the department. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Municipality of Anchorage and the union permitted the municipality to discharge an employee for just cause. Feichtinger filed a grievance within a month of his termination. He alleged that the department had terminated him without just cause, and sought reinstatement and back pay. After extensively debating the grievance’s merits, the union elected not to accept thfe grievance for referral to arbitration. Feichtinger asked the union to reconsider its decision, but it declined to do so.
The CBA authorized an employee to proceed to arbitration without union representation if the union refused to accept the grievance. Feichtinger chose to go to arbitration. He and the department agreed that the arbitration would await the resolution of his criminal charges.
A jury acquitted Feichtinger on all criminal charges in January 1990. Following Feichtinger’s acquittal, the union’s executive board met to reconsider its earlier decision regarding Feichtinger’s grievance. It decided not to change its decision.
Arbitration then began. At the start of the arbitration hearing, Feichtinger asked that the proceedings be postponed “until such time as he would be able to bring legal action against the [union] for ... the financial resources to hire an attorney.” The arbitrator denied Feichtinger’s request, noting that arbitration is less formal than a court proceeding and that non-lawyers often represent themselves well in arbitoation. The arbitrator also told Feichtinger that he could stay and observe the hearing, but that once he left the hearing or declined to participate he could not participate further. Feichtinger left the hearing and did not return.
At the end of the hearing, the arbitrator accepted a pro se brief from Feichtinger [379]*379containing argument and some motions. Nonetheless, the arbitrator determined that the department had terminated Feichtinger for just cause.
Although the CBA provided that the decision of the arbitrator was to be “binding upon all parties thereto,” Feichtinger sued the union, the department, the municipality, the state, arbitrator Eaton Conant, and four other individuals (Kevin O’Leary, Joseph Austin, Thomas Walker, and Dwayne McConnell). He asserted several causes of action; the claims relevant to the case before us are the wrongful discharge claim against the municipality and the breach of the duty of fair representation claim against the union.
The superior court granted summary judgment to the arbitrator and dismissed all claims against him on grounds of arbitral immunity. We affirmed that decision in Feichtinger v. Conant.
The municipality, the department, O’Leary, Austin, and Walker also successfully moved for summary judgment, relying on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The superior court separately granted summary judgment to the state and McConnell.
The union, however, was unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain summary judgment. Its initial motion for summary judgment argued that it owed Feichtinger no duty of fair representation, and that, even if it owed him that duty, it had satisfied that duty and no genuine issue of material fact existed. The superior court denied the union’s motion, apparently finding genuine issues of material fact about whether the union breached its duty.
The union’s second motion for summary judgment relied on the preclusive effect of the arbitration decision, and argued that Feichtinger could not recover from the union unless he showed that the department wrongfully discharged him. The superior court issued a proposed order denying the union’s second motion for summary judgment and sua sponte reversing its previous rulings on the other defendants’ summary judgment motions. The proposed order explained that, while reviewing federal cases, “[t]he court became aware of authorities holding that a breach of the Union’s duty of fair representation may trump the effect res judicata and collateral estoppel have on precluding relitigation, with respect to both the Union and the employer.” The court invited the parties to submit supplemental briefs and proposed orders before it entered a final order. Following briefing, the superior court denied the union’s second motion for summary judgment and reaffirmed its earlier orders granting summary judgment to the other defendants.
The union filed a petition in this court seeking review of the denial of its second summary judgment motion. At the same time, Feichtinger appealed the grant of summary judgment to the non-union defendants. We granted the union’s petition for review to consider whether Feichtinger should be “collaterally estopped from relitigating his wrongful termination claim against the Union,” and if so, whether “denial of summary judgment for the Union [was] improper.” We denied the union’s request that we decide whether Feichtinger had raised “a material issue of fact in support of his claim that the Union breached its duty of fair representation.”
After we granted the union’s petition, Feichtinger and the non-union defendants agreed to dismiss Feichtinger’s appeal with prejudice. This opinion therefore concerns only the union’s petition for review.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”2 We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo.3 We resolve [380]*380questions of law raised by the summary judgment motion by adopting “the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” 4
B. When Can an Arbitration Decision Be Deprived of Its Preclusive Effect ?
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OPINION
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
A municipal employee sued his union for breach of the union’s duty of fair representation because it refused to represent him in an arbitration in which he unsuccessfully challenged his termination. The superior court denied the union’s motion for summary judgment, and the union now petitions for review of that denial. We hold that if a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation seriously undermines the integrity of the arbitral process, the arbitration decision may lose its preclusive effect. We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether any union breach seriously undermined the integrity of the arbitral process in this case. We therefore affirm the denial of the union’s summary judgment motion.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This petition for review arises out of the termination of Eric “Frank” Feichtinger’s employment with the Anchorage Police Department. In October 1988 the department arrested Feichtinger and the state brought criminal charges against him. Based on an internal investigation into Feichtinger’s alleged criminal conduct, the department terminated him.
Feichtinger had been a member of the Anchorage Police Department Employees’ Association (the union) since joining the department. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Municipality of Anchorage and the union permitted the municipality to discharge an employee for just cause. Feichtinger filed a grievance within a month of his termination. He alleged that the department had terminated him without just cause, and sought reinstatement and back pay. After extensively debating the grievance’s merits, the union elected not to accept thfe grievance for referral to arbitration. Feichtinger asked the union to reconsider its decision, but it declined to do so.
The CBA authorized an employee to proceed to arbitration without union representation if the union refused to accept the grievance. Feichtinger chose to go to arbitration. He and the department agreed that the arbitration would await the resolution of his criminal charges.
A jury acquitted Feichtinger on all criminal charges in January 1990. Following Feichtinger’s acquittal, the union’s executive board met to reconsider its earlier decision regarding Feichtinger’s grievance. It decided not to change its decision.
Arbitration then began. At the start of the arbitration hearing, Feichtinger asked that the proceedings be postponed “until such time as he would be able to bring legal action against the [union] for ... the financial resources to hire an attorney.” The arbitrator denied Feichtinger’s request, noting that arbitration is less formal than a court proceeding and that non-lawyers often represent themselves well in arbitoation. The arbitrator also told Feichtinger that he could stay and observe the hearing, but that once he left the hearing or declined to participate he could not participate further. Feichtinger left the hearing and did not return.
At the end of the hearing, the arbitrator accepted a pro se brief from Feichtinger [379]*379containing argument and some motions. Nonetheless, the arbitrator determined that the department had terminated Feichtinger for just cause.
Although the CBA provided that the decision of the arbitrator was to be “binding upon all parties thereto,” Feichtinger sued the union, the department, the municipality, the state, arbitrator Eaton Conant, and four other individuals (Kevin O’Leary, Joseph Austin, Thomas Walker, and Dwayne McConnell). He asserted several causes of action; the claims relevant to the case before us are the wrongful discharge claim against the municipality and the breach of the duty of fair representation claim against the union.
The superior court granted summary judgment to the arbitrator and dismissed all claims against him on grounds of arbitral immunity. We affirmed that decision in Feichtinger v. Conant.
The municipality, the department, O’Leary, Austin, and Walker also successfully moved for summary judgment, relying on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The superior court separately granted summary judgment to the state and McConnell.
The union, however, was unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain summary judgment. Its initial motion for summary judgment argued that it owed Feichtinger no duty of fair representation, and that, even if it owed him that duty, it had satisfied that duty and no genuine issue of material fact existed. The superior court denied the union’s motion, apparently finding genuine issues of material fact about whether the union breached its duty.
The union’s second motion for summary judgment relied on the preclusive effect of the arbitration decision, and argued that Feichtinger could not recover from the union unless he showed that the department wrongfully discharged him. The superior court issued a proposed order denying the union’s second motion for summary judgment and sua sponte reversing its previous rulings on the other defendants’ summary judgment motions. The proposed order explained that, while reviewing federal cases, “[t]he court became aware of authorities holding that a breach of the Union’s duty of fair representation may trump the effect res judicata and collateral estoppel have on precluding relitigation, with respect to both the Union and the employer.” The court invited the parties to submit supplemental briefs and proposed orders before it entered a final order. Following briefing, the superior court denied the union’s second motion for summary judgment and reaffirmed its earlier orders granting summary judgment to the other defendants.
The union filed a petition in this court seeking review of the denial of its second summary judgment motion. At the same time, Feichtinger appealed the grant of summary judgment to the non-union defendants. We granted the union’s petition for review to consider whether Feichtinger should be “collaterally estopped from relitigating his wrongful termination claim against the Union,” and if so, whether “denial of summary judgment for the Union [was] improper.” We denied the union’s request that we decide whether Feichtinger had raised “a material issue of fact in support of his claim that the Union breached its duty of fair representation.”
After we granted the union’s petition, Feichtinger and the non-union defendants agreed to dismiss Feichtinger’s appeal with prejudice. This opinion therefore concerns only the union’s petition for review.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”2 We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo.3 We resolve [380]*380questions of law raised by the summary judgment motion by adopting “the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” 4
B. When Can an Arbitration Decision Be Deprived of Its Preclusive Effect ?
Collective bargaining agreements generally contain procedures for the settlement of disputes through mutual discussion and arbitration. “[T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government. ... The processing of disputes through grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining agreement.” 5 As a result, the federal courts generally give effect to the dispute resolution procedures to which a union and an employer have agreed; judicial review of arbitration awards is exceedingly narrow.6 Employees must exhaust their contractual remedies and they are bound by the results of the agreement’s dispute resolution procedures.7
Nonetheless, the federal courts have created an exception to the general rule of finality, allowing relitigation of those decisions when the employee proves: (1) that the discharge was erroneous; and (2) that the union’s breach of its duty of fair representation seriously undermined the arbitral process.8 If the employee satisfies these two requirements, the employee is entitled to an appropriate remedy against the employer9 and the union.10
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight11 illustrates this exception to the general rule of finality. The employees in Hines had been discharged for seeking “reimbursement for motel expenses in excess of the actual charges sustained by them.”12 Their union carried their grievance to arbitration, and the arbitration committee ruled in the employer’s favor.13 When evidence later surfaced indicating that the motel clerk was in fact the culprit, the employees sued their employer and their union.14 In addition to asserting a wrongful discharge claim against their employer, the employees claimed that their union “had made no effort to ascertain the truth of the charges, and that the Union had violated its duty of fair representation by arbitrarily and in bad faith depriving [them] of their employment and permitting their discharge without sufficient proof.”15
The Supreme Court concluded that the employees could prevail in their hybrid suit if they proved an erroneous discharge and if they proved that the union’s breach of duty tainted the arbitration decision.16 The Court reasoned, “Congress has put its blessing on private dispute settlement arrangements provided in collective agreements, but it was anticipated, we are sure, that the contractual machinery would operate within some mini[381]*381mum levels of integrity.”17 If the union’s misconduct caused a “fundamental [] malfunction” 18 in the arbitration, the arbitration decision need not stand, “for in that event error and injustice of the grossest sort would multiply.”19
Federal law does not necessarily govern this case. The Labor Management Relation Act (LMRA), which governs disputes involving the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements,20 expressly exempts state and municipal government employers from coverage.21 But because federal law in this area is well-developed and we have applied federal law in cases in which the state was the employer,22 we choose to look to federal law in this case, subject to the exception we applied in Casey v. City of Fairbanks.23 We choose to look to federal authorities because we conclude that they have appropriately resolved the conflict inherent here. That conflict arises out of the tension between the desire for arbitral finality and the plight of union members whose unions have undermined the integrity of the arbitral process. In our view, existing Alaska law does not preclude our choice. And today’s case deals not with a claim that a union was merely negligent in representing the employee, but that a union altogether failed to represent him.
In applying this rule, we recognize at the outset that its two requirements may overlap at times. Sometimes, but not always, a union’s breach may so seriously undermine the integrity of the arbitration process that an erroneous decision is made.24 Moreover, employees are not entitled to relit-igate their terminations merely because they offer newly discovered exculpatory evidence.25 An erroneous decision is not necessarily proof that the union breached its duty or that the breach seriously undermined the arbitral process.26
The union argues that Feichtinger cannot show that the arbitration decision was erroneous because he dismissed his case against his employer. Therefore, the union contends that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
We disagree. The federal courts do not require that the employer be joined in a lawsuit against a union for a breach of the duty of fair representation.27 “The employee may, if he chooses, sue one defendant and not the other; but the case he must prove is the same whether he sues one, the other or both.”28 If Feichtinger successfully proves his allegations against the union, the absence of his employer from his suit will only affect his ability to recover damages flowing from his alleged wrongful discharge.29 The union [382]*382is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on this basis.
C. Assuming the Union Breached Its Duty of Fair Representation, a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists Regarding Whether the Breach Seriously Undermined the Integrity of the Arbitration.
The union also argues that it deserves summary judgment because Feichtinger “failed to make any showing that the breach seriously undermined the arbitral process, even assuming the Union breached its duty of fair representation.”30 Feichtinger disputes the union’s argument. Before addressing the merits of this issue, we note that we are following the lead of the federal courts by permitting resolution of this issue on summary judgment.31
To withstand a union’s motion for summary judgment on the question of whether a union’s breach seriously undermined the integrity of the arbitral process, an employee must present some evidence of the nature of the breach and how the arbitration outcome might have been different absent the breach.32 Hines provides a good example of a successful claim. The employees, who were accused of overstating the expenses they incurred at a motel, insisted that they were innocent and that their union did not investigate their case thoroughly.33 The employees alleged that, with minimal investigation, the union would have uncovered evidence suggesting that the motel clerk was at fault; if the arbitrator had considered that evidence, the arbitration result might well have been different.34
In this case, the union argues that its failure to represent Feichtinger did not affect the outcome of the arbitration because the CBA permitted him to arbitrate alone or with his own attorney. We disagree. First, the union’s argument suggests that if a CBA allows employees to go to arbitration without union representation, a union’s decision not to arbitrate could never undermine the arbi-tral process seriously enough to sustain a hybrid suit. We decline to hold that the employee’s contractual right to grieve without union assistance necessarily establishes, as a matter of law, that the union’s breach did not undermine the arbitral process.
Second, to establish that the arbitral process was seriously undermined, Feichtinger does not rely only on the fact that it was difficult to arbitrate alone. He also argues that in this case the lack of union representation was fatal. His case involved special facts — e.g., publicity, resource imbalance, and access to information — that made assistance of counsel and the union crucial to preserving the integrity of the process.
[383]*383Feichtinger alleges that he faced “political and personal animosity” during the arbitration process. In an affidavit supporting his opposition to summary judgment, he suggested that he stood at an immediate disadvantage because his criminal ease had been widely publicized and because rumors about him were rampant. Feichtinger stated that he was financially unable to retain counsel to give him substantive assistance in the arbitration. He also claimed that his lack of legal training left him at a severe disadvantage during arbitration, because he was unfamiliar with the case law cited by the municipality. Finally, he affied that without counsel or union assistance he was unable to produce the evidence necessary to counter the municipality’s case.
Given the negative publicity surrounding his case, union representation might have been critical to lend credibility to the substance of his grievance. Although Feichting-' er filed a pro se brief with the arbitrator, it is questionable whether he was able to present his position fully without actually participating in the hearing. He apparently thought that the hearing would “extend for another week, and he had wanted to respond to the Municipality’s case during that second hearing week.”
Viewing the evidence in Feichtinger’s favor and giving him the benefit of permissible inferences, he has at least raised a factual dispute about whether his lack of counsel, resources, time, and legal expertise kept him from presenting his case and undermined the arbitral process.
For these reasons, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether any breach of the union’s duty of fair representation seriously undermined the arbitral process. Summary judgment on this issue was not appropriate.
D. How Are Damages Against the Union to Be Measured?
Assuming that Feichtinger makes the requisite showing on remand so as to deprive the arbitration decision of its preclusive effect, he will be entitled to seek damages. We briefly address this issue given the possibility that it will become ripe on remand, and given the union’s implicit argument that the dismissal or settlement of Feichtinger’s claims against his employer prevents him from showing what damages the union may owe.
In employee hybrid suits for wrongful discharge and breach of a union’s duty of fair representation, the federal courts apportion damages between the employer and union according to the damages caused by each defendant.35 Federal law does not control this case.36 But the union urges us to look to the federal standard of assessing damages. Feichtinger, on the other hand, argues that we should follow the attorney malpractice model for damages. Under this standard, as Feichtinger describes it, a union that breaches its duty of fair representation becomes liable for all damages the employee suffers, including those flowing from the employee’s wrongful discharge.
We reject the attorney malpractice model of damage assessment for unfair representation cases and hold that in hybrid suits we will follow the federal model of apportioning damages as set out in Vaca v. Sipes37 and subsequent federal cases.
In Vaca, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the imposition of joint and several liability upon a union for its breach of its duty of fair representation.38 Rather, it required courts to apportion damages between [384]*384an employer and union based on fault.39 The Supreme Court explained that an award against a union that ineludes damages attributable only to the employer would impose too great a hardship on the union, even if the union had a right of indemnification against the employer.40 Although only the employer is responsible for back-pay following a wrongful discharge, subsequent federal decisions have made it clear that the union is responsible for any increases in damages, including lost wages, caused by the union’s breach.41
The federal courts have not agreed upon a precise method of apportionment. Two models currently exist. One bases apportionment on the hypothetical date upon which the employee would have been reinstated had the union fulfilled its duty of fair representation.42 The employer is liable for losses incurred before that date; the union is liable for losses incurred after that date.43 The other model apportions damages on a percentage basis, similar to comparative fault.44
We need not decide now which of the two federal models Alaska should follow. Because the superior court has not yet had an opportunity to consider whether one is particularly appropriate to these facts and because the parties’ briefs do not squarely address this question, we do not address this issue and await an appeal directly presenting it to us.
E. Even If the Arbitration Award Has Preclusive Effect, Feichtinger May Recover Damages from the Union.
The union contends that if a discharge is for just cause or if the merits of the discharge cannot be reexamined, a union cannot be liable for breach of the duty of fair representation because the employee has not been injured. The union correctly notes that some case law supports this position.45 But contrary authority also exists; it indicates that an employee may recover some damages (usually attorney’s fees) from the union even absent a wrongful discharge.46
An example of this latter line of authority is Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.47 A pilot there sought to set aside the arbitration decision upholding his discharge by suing his employer for wrongful discharge and the pilots’ union for breach of the duty of fair representation.48 He claimed that the union refused to represent him because he was not a union member.49 Although the Fifth Circuit found no justification for setting aside the arbitration decision in favor of the employer,50 it held that the union breached its duty of fair representation by discriminatorily refusing to represent the pilot in arbitrat[385]*385ion.51 It stated that “[w]hile [the union] has the authority to decide under what conditions an attorney will be supplied to a grievant, the fact that the grievant is not a member of the union can play no part in that decision.”52 The Fifth Circuit further reasoned that even if the arbitration award was untainted by the breach (because the pilot hired his own counsel) the pilot still “suffered loss in the form of fees to be paid to his privately retained attorney.”53 It therefore affirmed the jury’s award of $35,000 in damages (the pilot’s attorney’s fees) for the union’s breach, despite the fact that the arbitration decision was not relitigated or set aside.54
Additional support for this view is found in Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,55 where he explained that the two claims are “closely related” but “conceptually distinct”:56
The fact that the underlying discharge may not have violated the collective-bargaining agreement does not necessarily absolve the union of liability for its breach, although it may limit the size of the employee’s recovery against the union. Thus, while a court considering an employee’s claim against a union will evaluate the validity of the employer’s underlying conduct, that evaluation is not central to the resolution of the duty-of-fair-representation claim.[57]
We choose to follow those federal courts that reason that, even if the arbitration decision upholding an employee’s discharge has preclusive effect, it does not necessarily bar the employee’s suit against the union. A union is liable to the employee for damages flowing from its breach of the duty of fair representation. In most such cases, the employee’s damages will be limited to attorney’s fees and costs expended in the arbitration process.
Applying this rule here may result in de minimus damages because Feichtinger did not retain an attorney to represent him in the arbitration. Nonetheless, Feichtinger should have an opportunity to seek recoverable damages.
IV. CONCLUSION
The denial of the union’s summary judgment motion is AFFIRMED. We REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
57. Id. at 73 n. 4, 101 S.Ct. 1559; see also id. at 72-74, 101 S.Ct. 1559.