KAUGER, J.:
¶ 1 The dispositive issue is whether the Oldahoma Citizens Participation Act (the OCPA), 12 O.S. Supp. 2014 1430
et. seq.
which became effective November 1, 2014, retroactively applies to the plaintiffs claims in this cause. We hold that it does not.
FACTS
¶ 2 In 2010, the Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision (Board) began investigating the plaintiff/appellant, Dr. Steven Anagnost (Dr. Anagnost). The Oklahoma Attorney General’s office filed a complaint before the Board against Dr.' Anagnost on June 18, 2010. The complaint alleged that the Doctor engaged in incompetence, fraud, over-billing and/or negligence in the care of patients. The prosecution of the complaint lasted over three years and resulted in previous appeals to this Court,
culminating in the Doctor agreeing to discipline by entering into a consent decree with the Board on September 12, 2013.
¶3 On November 7, 2013, Dr. Anagnost filed a lawsuit against Drs. Tomecek, Boxell, and their respective professional L.L.C. companies, Drs. Fell and Baird, and the Oklahoma Spine and Brain Institute, L.L.P. for negligence, abuse of process, tortious interference with business relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. During discovery, Dr. Anagnost served subpoenas seeking the Board’s investigative file on him. The trial court determined that the Board’s file was not discoverable because
it was confidential/privileged. However, the Board did provide its file to the Oklahoma Bar Association (OBA). [The OBA was involved because Dr, Anagnost had filed complaints against the attorneys involved in his licensure proceedings.].
¶ 4 The OBA met with Dr. Anagnost on April 14-15, 2014, and showed him some of the documents from the Board’s file and allowed him to take notes of the contents of the Board’s file. After reviewing the OBA’s information, Dr. Anagnost, on December 12, 2014, filed an amended petition, asserting additional claims and added the Board and certain Board members as defendants. He also insisted that had he known what was in the investigative file, he never would have agreed to the Board’s consent order. The defendants, in turn, on December 29, 2014, filed motions to dismiss the amended petition, relying on the newly effective provisions of the OCPA regarding a new procedure for dismissal.
¶ 5 The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on February 13, 2015. On March 9, 2015, it issued an order sustaining the defendants’ motions to dismiss (collectively, the appellants) the doctor’s negligence claims, with the exception of defendant Tulsa Spine & Specialty Hospital which it reserved to be determined by a separate order. All other requested relief was denied. The appellants filed an appeal on March 16, 2015. Dr. Anagnost filed a counter-appeal on April 20, 2015, and the matter was assigned to the Court of Civil Appeals.
¶ 6 On February 5, 2016, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. It held that the OCPA applied to this cause, and that Dr. Anagnost did not establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of his claim as required by the OCPA
The Doctor filed a petition for certiorari on February 25, 2016, and we granted certiorari on October 24, 2016, to address the retroactive application of the OCPA.
THE OCPA DOES NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY.
¶ 7 Dr. Anagnost’s initial petition was filed on November 7, 2013, in the Oklahoma County District Court. The OCPA became effective November 1, 2014. Dr. Anagnost filed an amended petition on December 12, 2014. The appellants argue that the OCPA applies to this cause and the lawsuit should be dismissed pursuant to the OCPA The Doctor counters that the OCPA does not retroactively apply to this cause.
¶ 8 The Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (OCPA), was amended/re-written in 2014 to become effective on November 1, 2014, 12 O.S. Supp. 2014 1430-440. The stated purpose of the act is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to “peti
tion, speak freely, associate freely and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file a meritorious lawsuit for a demonstrable injury.”
It accomplishes this goal by allowing parties to file motions to dismiss legal actions if the legal action relates or is in response to free speech.
These types of acts are enacted to counteract lawsuits commonly known as SLAPP suits or strategic lawsuits against public participation which are aimed at deterring public participation in decision-making forums.
¶ 9 Legal action is very broadly defined under the terms of the OCPA.
Once such a motion for dismissal is filed, the lawsuit is suspended until the plaintiff can establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case of each essential element of the claim in question.
To decide the motion to dismiss, the Court: may allow discovery;
issue findings as to the purpose the action was brought;
and may award costs, sanctions and attorney fees to the moving party.
Consistent with its stated purpose, the entire Act is devoted to deterring, preventing and dismissing certain free speecb/assoeiation/par-ticipation type lawsuits as soon as possible after filing.
¶ 10 Nowhere in the OCPA is the question of retroactive or prospective application addressed. Yet this question is critical because our Constitution, Art. 5, 52, 54 protect the accrual of an action when the plaintiff could have first maintained the action by safeguarding substantive rights which remain
unaffected by later-enacted legislation, despite statutory language to the contrary.
¶ 11 Because Oklahoma’s Workers’ Compensation statutes often involve after-enacted legislative changes from year to year, the scenario presented in this cause is often seen in Workers’ Compensation eases; nevertheless, the rule of law applicable to such cases is equally applicable here. In Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, 14, 78 P.3d 542 the Court discussed the impact of after-enacted legislative changes to an employee’s compensation rights and benefits.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
KAUGER, J.:
¶ 1 The dispositive issue is whether the Oldahoma Citizens Participation Act (the OCPA), 12 O.S. Supp. 2014 1430
et. seq.
which became effective November 1, 2014, retroactively applies to the plaintiffs claims in this cause. We hold that it does not.
FACTS
¶ 2 In 2010, the Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision (Board) began investigating the plaintiff/appellant, Dr. Steven Anagnost (Dr. Anagnost). The Oklahoma Attorney General’s office filed a complaint before the Board against Dr.' Anagnost on June 18, 2010. The complaint alleged that the Doctor engaged in incompetence, fraud, over-billing and/or negligence in the care of patients. The prosecution of the complaint lasted over three years and resulted in previous appeals to this Court,
culminating in the Doctor agreeing to discipline by entering into a consent decree with the Board on September 12, 2013.
¶3 On November 7, 2013, Dr. Anagnost filed a lawsuit against Drs. Tomecek, Boxell, and their respective professional L.L.C. companies, Drs. Fell and Baird, and the Oklahoma Spine and Brain Institute, L.L.P. for negligence, abuse of process, tortious interference with business relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. During discovery, Dr. Anagnost served subpoenas seeking the Board’s investigative file on him. The trial court determined that the Board’s file was not discoverable because
it was confidential/privileged. However, the Board did provide its file to the Oklahoma Bar Association (OBA). [The OBA was involved because Dr, Anagnost had filed complaints against the attorneys involved in his licensure proceedings.].
¶ 4 The OBA met with Dr. Anagnost on April 14-15, 2014, and showed him some of the documents from the Board’s file and allowed him to take notes of the contents of the Board’s file. After reviewing the OBA’s information, Dr. Anagnost, on December 12, 2014, filed an amended petition, asserting additional claims and added the Board and certain Board members as defendants. He also insisted that had he known what was in the investigative file, he never would have agreed to the Board’s consent order. The defendants, in turn, on December 29, 2014, filed motions to dismiss the amended petition, relying on the newly effective provisions of the OCPA regarding a new procedure for dismissal.
¶ 5 The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on February 13, 2015. On March 9, 2015, it issued an order sustaining the defendants’ motions to dismiss (collectively, the appellants) the doctor’s negligence claims, with the exception of defendant Tulsa Spine & Specialty Hospital which it reserved to be determined by a separate order. All other requested relief was denied. The appellants filed an appeal on March 16, 2015. Dr. Anagnost filed a counter-appeal on April 20, 2015, and the matter was assigned to the Court of Civil Appeals.
¶ 6 On February 5, 2016, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. It held that the OCPA applied to this cause, and that Dr. Anagnost did not establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of his claim as required by the OCPA
The Doctor filed a petition for certiorari on February 25, 2016, and we granted certiorari on October 24, 2016, to address the retroactive application of the OCPA.
THE OCPA DOES NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY.
¶ 7 Dr. Anagnost’s initial petition was filed on November 7, 2013, in the Oklahoma County District Court. The OCPA became effective November 1, 2014. Dr. Anagnost filed an amended petition on December 12, 2014. The appellants argue that the OCPA applies to this cause and the lawsuit should be dismissed pursuant to the OCPA The Doctor counters that the OCPA does not retroactively apply to this cause.
¶ 8 The Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (OCPA), was amended/re-written in 2014 to become effective on November 1, 2014, 12 O.S. Supp. 2014 1430-440. The stated purpose of the act is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to “peti
tion, speak freely, associate freely and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file a meritorious lawsuit for a demonstrable injury.”
It accomplishes this goal by allowing parties to file motions to dismiss legal actions if the legal action relates or is in response to free speech.
These types of acts are enacted to counteract lawsuits commonly known as SLAPP suits or strategic lawsuits against public participation which are aimed at deterring public participation in decision-making forums.
¶ 9 Legal action is very broadly defined under the terms of the OCPA.
Once such a motion for dismissal is filed, the lawsuit is suspended until the plaintiff can establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case of each essential element of the claim in question.
To decide the motion to dismiss, the Court: may allow discovery;
issue findings as to the purpose the action was brought;
and may award costs, sanctions and attorney fees to the moving party.
Consistent with its stated purpose, the entire Act is devoted to deterring, preventing and dismissing certain free speecb/assoeiation/par-ticipation type lawsuits as soon as possible after filing.
¶ 10 Nowhere in the OCPA is the question of retroactive or prospective application addressed. Yet this question is critical because our Constitution, Art. 5, 52, 54 protect the accrual of an action when the plaintiff could have first maintained the action by safeguarding substantive rights which remain
unaffected by later-enacted legislation, despite statutory language to the contrary.
¶ 11 Because Oklahoma’s Workers’ Compensation statutes often involve after-enacted legislative changes from year to year, the scenario presented in this cause is often seen in Workers’ Compensation eases; nevertheless, the rule of law applicable to such cases is equally applicable here. In Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, 14, 78 P.3d 542 the Court discussed the impact of after-enacted legislative changes to an employee’s compensation rights and benefits.
¶ 12 Cole involved a claimant whose statutorily allowed time-span to request a hearing for an adjudication of the workers’ compensation claim was shortened during the pen-dency of an action. The Court noted that statutes which relate solely to remedies and affect only modes of procedure are generally held to operate retroactively and apply to pending proceedings. However, statutes which affect parties’ substantive rights and liabilities are shielded from amendatory changes by the terms of the Okla. Const. Art. 5, 54.
These principles were again reiterated in King Mfg. v. Meadows, 2005 OK 78, 12, 127 P.3d 584 when we determined that an award for a change in condition was governed by the statute in effect at the time of the injury, rather than the statutory limits in effect when the change in condition was discovered.
¶ 13 Similarly in Williams Companies, Inc. v. Dunkelgod, 2012 OK 96, 18, 295 P.3d 1107 we noted the longstanding rules that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff could have first maintained an action;
generally, a statute or its amendments will have only
prospective effect unless the statute clearly provides otherwise;
and the Oklahoma Constitution guarantees that any cause of action which has accrued may not be destroyed by the Legislature after the suit has commenced and that claims which have become barred, due to the passage of time or by statute, may not be revived by the Legislature.
¶ 14 In Dunkelgod, supra, we said:
The standard of review applicable to a workers’ compensation appeal is that which is in effect when the claim accrues. It is determined as of the date of injury and is - a substantive right which remains unaffected by later-enacted legislation, despite statutory language to the contrary. See
Dunlap, Nomac,
supra; Okla. Const., Art. 5, 52, 54. Our constitution protects the accrual of a cause of action so that a person’s failure to exercise rights under a statute prior to the statute’s repeal does not result in the loss of those rights.
Ham-mons v. Muskogee Medical Center Authority,
1985 OK 22, 697 P.2d 539, 542. Generally, a statute or its amendments will have only prospective effect unless it clearly provides otherwise. Id. While the statute at issue, 340(D), provides that the date of injury is irrelevant, applying this provision as written would allow the unconstitutional abrogation of an accrued right.
Hammons,
supra, 697 P.2d at 542.
For the same reasons stated in Dunkelgod, statutes and amendments are to be construed to operate only prospectively unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary
intent.
If doubt exists, it must be resolved against retroactive effect.
¶ 15 We explained in Forest Oil Corp. v. Corp. Comm’n of Oklahoma, 1990 OK 58, 11, 807 P.2d 774, a case involving the application of a statute which delineated proper parties and specified who was entitled to notice of proceedings, that:
The general rule is that statutes are intended to operate prospectively unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent. If doubt exists, it must be resolved against a retroactive effect. However, remedial or procedural statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested rights may operate retrospectively, and apply to pending actions or proceedings. A purely procedural change is one that affects the remedy only, and not the right. Application of 87.2 to the instant cause would alter more than the potential remedy, it would preclude 0N6 from participating in the action. Statutes which act as a complete bar to assertion of an interest affect rights rather than just remedies. (Citations omitted).
¶ 16 Here, there is no indication that the Legislature intended for the OCPA to operate retrospectively. Even if it had, the changes made to the OCPA appear substantive, rather than merely procedural. Section 1434 creates a new defense to causes of action involving first amendment rights, which effectively provides immunity from suit and would act as a complete bar to the plaintiffs claim in this cause.
Similar examples of substantive changes which were not applied retroactively have previously been found in the context of workers’ compensation law, the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, and the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.
The OCPA employs a special motion to dismiss with expedited trial court and appellate review and the stay of discovery pending a decision on the motion which benefits targets of such lawsuits by reducing the time commitment and financial resources to combat the lawsuits, thereby lessening the chill effect on petitioning activity.
¶ 17 Section 1438 of the OCPA allows the target of such lawsuits to recover damages by providing award of attorney fees, costs and other reasonable expenses as well as sanctions in the event that a motion to dismiss is granted.
Statutory amendments which permit newly recoverable damages are an enlargement of substantive rights and generally operate only prospectively.
Because the OCPA affects substantive rights, it must be prospectively applied to legal actions filed after the November 1, 2014, effective
date.
Consequently, the OCPA cannot be applied retroactively to the doctor’s claim in this cause.
¶ 18 The doctor’s amended petition arises out of the same transaction or occurrence set forth in the original petition, but adds additional parties and claims directed to the additional parties. Title 12 O.S. 2011 2015 allows the changes or naming of parties against whom a claim is asserted if the claim asserted in the amended petition arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading and the party received notice, would not be prejudiced should have known that they would have been a party to the lawsuit. It provides:
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
1. Relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action; or
2. The claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading; or
3. The amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if paragraph 2 of this subsection is satisfied and, within the period provided by subsection I of Section 2004 of this title for service of the summons and petition, the party to be brought in by amendment:
a. Has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits; and
b. Knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him. An amendment to add an omitted counterclaim does not relate back to the date of the original answer.
It appears that the amended petition relates back to his original petition, and the filing of the amended petition after the OGPA became effective is inconsequential to this cause.
However, the trial court may determine on remand whether these conditions have been satisfied in this cause.
CONCLUSION
¶ 19 The terms of the Okla. Const., Art. 5, 54 protect matured rights from the effects of after-enacted legislative change.
After-enacted legislation that would effectively act as a complete bar to the plaintiffs claim
and permit newly recoverable damages are an enlargement of substantive rights and generally operate only prospectively.
Consequently, the OCPA is inapplicable to the doctor’s claims in this cause.
COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS’ OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
COMBS, C.J., GURICH, V.C.J., KAUGER, WATT, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, COLBERT, REIF, JJ., concur.