Amit Lamichhane v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-00324
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AMIT LAMICHHANE, Case No. 1:26-cv-00324-JLT-CDB (HC)

12 Petitioner, ORDER CONVERTING THE MATTER TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 13 v. GRANTING THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION1; AND REFERRING THE 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., MATTER TO THE ASSIGNED MAGISTRATE 15 Respondents. (Doc. 3) 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Before the Court for decision is Amit Lamichhane’s request for a temporary restraining 19 order (Doc. 3), filed in conjunction with his petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 20 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his ongoing detention. (Doc. 1.) Having evaluated the TRO request, 21 Respondents’ opposition, (Doc. 9) and Petitioner’s reply (Doc. 10), the Court converts the matter 22 into a motion for preliminary injunction, GRANTS that motion, and REFERS the matter to the 23 assigned magistrate judge for a determination on the merits. 24 II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 25 Petitioner is a citizen of Nepal who entered the United States on or around November 11, 26 2024 without presenting himself for inspection or seeking admission. (Doc. 3 at 5.) A Customs 27 1 Upon the agreement of the parties, the Court converts the motion for temporary restraining order into one for 28 preliminary injunction. (Doc. 3 at 1; Doc. 9 at 2.) The parties have also affirmatively declined an evidentiary 1 and Border Protection officer arrested and detained Petitioner within the United States. (Id.) 2 Petitioner was then released from custody on his own recognizance and placed in removal 3 proceedings. (Id.)2 On December 12, 2024, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear charging 4 him pursuant to §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration Nationality Act, as 5 an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled by an immigration 6 officer. (Id.) As a condition of his release, Petitioner was required to report regularly in person to 7 ICE offices, a requirement he asserts he fulfilled diligently. (Id.) Petitioner also applied for 8 defensive asylum on February 14, 2025 on the basis of political persecution as a member of the 9 Nepali Congress. (Id.) Petitioner was scheduled for his Individual Calendar Hearing on August 10 29, 2028 before the Concord Immigration Court. (Id.) 11 On or about December 12, 2025, Petitioner was arrested when he reported to a routine 12 ICE check-in. (Id.) He is currently being detained at California City Detention Facility in 13 California City, California. (Id.) 14 The government opposes the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief and maintains that 15 Petitioner’s detention is “mandatory” under expedited removal procedures set forth at 8 U.S.C. 16 § 1225(b)(2). (See generally Doc. 7.) 17 III. LEGAL STANDARD 18 The standard governing the issuing of a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard 19 for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 20 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish: (1) 21 they are “likely to succeed on the merits” of their claims, (2) they are “likely to suffer irreparable 22 harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [their] 23 favor” and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 24 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Ctr. For Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) 25 (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in 26 order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”). 27 2 Petitioner states in his petition that he was “[MOST PROBABLY] paroled pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5).” (Doc. 3 28 at 5.) 1 The party seeking a preliminary injunction has the burden to “make a showing on all four 2 prongs” of the Winter test to obtain a preliminary injunction. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 3 Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) 4 (holding that the moving party has “the burden of persuasion”); see also Hecox v. Little, 104 5 F.4th 1061, 1073 (9th Cir. 2023). The Court may weigh the request for a preliminary injunction 6 with a sliding-scale approach. Alliance, at 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a stronger showing 7 on the balance of hardships may support the issuance of a preliminary injunction where there are 8 “serious questions on the merits … so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of 9 irreparable injury, and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Finally, “a preliminary 10 injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. 11 IV. ANALYSIS 12 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 13 This first factor “is the most important” under Winter, and “is especially important when 14 a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation and injury.” Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1041 (9th 15 Cir. 2023). Petitioner argues he is likely to succeed on his claim that Respondents violated his 16 Fifth Amendment Due Process rights when he was detained without notice or provided a custody 17 hearing before a neutral arbiter. (Doc. 3 at 7-13.) 18 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 19 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d 20 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 21 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 22 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including 23 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These 24 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings. Id. at 693–94. “Even when the 25 government has discretion to detain an individual, its subsequent decision to release the 26 individual creates ‘an implicit promise’ that she will be re-detained only if she violates the 27 conditions of her release.” Garro Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-CV-05632-PCP, --- F. Supp. 3d. ----, 28 2025 WL 3691938, at *30 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 1 482 (1972)). Other courts, including this Court, have held similarly. J.E.H.G. v. Chestnut, No. 2 1:25-CV-01673-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (citing Doe v. 3 Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025)). 4 In analyzing procedural due process claims such as this one, courts must first determine 5 whether a protected liberty interest exists under the Due Process Clause. See Kentucky Dep’t of 6 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989.) If a protected liberty interest is found to 7 exist, the court then must examine whether the procedures necessary to ensure that any 8 deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. (Id.) To the extent 9 that Respondents substantively address Petitioner’s due process argument, they deploy a blanket 10 assertion that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under 8 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA and therefore categorically ineligible for a bond hearing. 12 (Doc. 9 at 2-3.) 13 Although Petitioner’s claim is ultimately constitutional in nature, it turns on whether 14 section 1225(b) or section 1226(a) justify Petitioner’s re-detention. Courts nationwide, including 15 this one, have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ new legal position and found the DHS 16 policy unlawful. See, e.g., Ortiz Donis v. Chestnut, 1:25-CV-01228-JLT, 2025 WL 2879514 at 17 *3–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); see also, M.R.R. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01517-JLT, 2025 WL 18 3265446 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025); Hortua v. Chestnut, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 19 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 20 (LAK), ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) 21 (estimating over 350 cases ruled the DHS policy improper across 160 different judges sitting in 22 about 50 different courts nationwide); Mirley Adriana Bautista Pico, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al., 23 No. 25-CV-08002-JST, 2025 WL 3295382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases); 24 Armando Modesto Estrada-Samayoa v. Orestes Cruz, et al., No. 1:25-CV-01565-EFB (HC), 25 2025 WL 3268280, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (collecting cases). 26 Even assuming Respondents are correct that § 1225(b) is the applicable detention 27 authority for all “applicants for admission,” Respondents fail to meaningfully contend with the 28 liberty interest created by the fact that the Petitioner in this case was released on recognizance in 1 November of 2024, before the current manifestation of this interpretation. Thus, the Court must 2 evaluate the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976), to 3 determine whether the procedures (or lack thereof) that have been applied to Petitioner are 4 sufficient to protect the liberty interest at issue. Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921at *3. In Mathews, the 5 Court determined the following: 6 [O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three 7 distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 8 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 9 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 10 procedural requirement would entail. 11 During his time on parole, developed a substantial private interest in being out of custody and his 12 detention denies him that liberty interest. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) 13 (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 14 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). 15 Respondents offer little to rebut Petitioner’s due process claim and do not provide any 16 justification for detaining Petitioner. As such, nothing in the record suggests a change in 17 circumstance material to the question of whether Petitioner is a danger to public safety or a flight 18 risk. It is clear to this Court, despite Respondents arguments otherwise, that Petitioner 19 established his liberty interest. 20 Finally, as to the third Mathews factor, this Court concludes that the government’s 21 interest in detaining Petitioner without proper process is slight. “Since respondents did not 22 engage with Petitioner’s due process arguments, they have not provided the court with any 23 information regarding the burden on the government.” Rocha Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606, at 24 *4. In sum, the Court concludes that Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 25 merits of his due process claim. 26 B. Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors 27 The remaining preliminary injunction factors—irreparable harm, the balance of equities, 28 and the public interest—decidedly weigh in favor of Petitioner. “[I]t is well established that the 1 deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. 2 Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); 3 see also Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Deprivation of physical 4 liberty by detention constitutes irreparable harm.”). By successfully demonstrating that 5 Respondents lack a basis to detain him, Petitioner has succeeded in showing irreparable harm. 6 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 7 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat'l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 8 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 9 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds there is no equitable reason that would tip the balance in 10 the Government's favor. Though the government has a compelling interest in enforcing the 11 immigration laws, granting relief to Petitioner will not seriously impinge its ability to do so. The 12 Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being 13 enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 14 (9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, “the public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections 15 against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of 16 immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at 17 *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (quoting Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No, 21-cv-01434, 2021 WL 18 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021)). In sum, the last two Winter factors also weigh in 19 Petitioner's favor. 20 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 21 1. Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 3) is converted to a 22 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and it is GRANTED. 23 2. Because the government has no evidence that Petitioner poses a risk of flight or 24 poses a danger to the community, Petitioner SHALL be released IMMEDIATELY from DHS 25 custody. DHS SHALL NOT impose any additional restrictions on her, such as electronic 26 monitoring, unless that is determined to be necessary at a later custody hearing. 27 3. Respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from 28 rearresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, which 1 | include, at a minimum, pre-deprivation notice? of at least seven days before a pre-deprivation 2 | hearing at which the government will bear the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing 3 | evidence that he is likely to flee or pose a danger to the community if not arrested 4 4. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. See 5 | Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts regularly waive security in cases 6 | like this one. See, e.g., Zakzouk v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-06254, 2025 WL 2899220, at *8 (N.D. 7 | Cal. Oct. 10, 2025). 8 5. The parties are directed to meet and confer no later than 14 days from the date of 9 | the entry of this order, and, if possible, submit a joint proposed briefing schedule discussing the 10 || abeyance of further proceedings on the merits pending the 9" Circuit Appeal of Rodriguez 11 | Vazquez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). If the parties are unable to agree to 12 | joint proposed briefing schedule, the Court will rule on the request. 13 6. The government may file a further brief on the merits of the habeas petition 14 | within 45 days. Alternatively, as soon as it can within that 30-day period, the government may 15 | file a notice that it does not intend to file further briefing. If the government files an additional 16 | brief, Petitioner may file a further brief within 30 days thereafter. 17 5. The matter is referred to the assigned magistrate judge for consideration of the 18 | merits of the petition as quickly as possible. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _February 4, 2026 Charis [Tourn TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Tf legally sufficient circumstances justify arrest without notice in advance, a post-deprivation hearing consistent with the requirements set forth here, SHALL be provided within seven days of the arrest.