American Service Corp. v. Hickle

Supreme Court of South Carolina

American Service Corp. v. Hickle

435 S.E.2d 870, 312 S.C. 520, 1993 S.C. LEXIS 192

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedSeptember 20, 1993

Docket23936

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 435 S.E.2d 870 (American Service Corp. v. Hickle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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American Service Corp. v. Hickle, 435 S.E.2d 870, 312 S.C. 520, 1993 S.C. LEXIS 192 (S.C. 1993).

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Chandler, Justice:

American Service Corporation of South Carolina (American) appeals an Order holding that the Homestead Exemption Act, S.C. Code Ann § 15-41-30(11)(B) (Supp. 1992)¹ deprives Respondent Bonnie Hickle (Hickle), as a nonresident of this State, equal protection of the laws.² We reverse.

FACTS

In September, 1990, American obtained a $32,000 judgment against Hickle, then a South Carolina resident. Subsequent to the judgment, Hickle became a Virginia resident; American has been unable to collect its judgment.

Thereafter, Hickle settled a personal injury lawsuit in South Carolina for $125,000. American seeks to attach proceeds of the settlement in satisfaction of its judgment.

Trial court awarded Hickle the benefit of the exemption, holding that “to allow American to seize the settlement proceeds would be a denial of equal protection.”

ISSUE

Does the Homestead Exemption statute, in limiting the exemption for personal injury awards to South Carolina residents only, deprive nonresidents of this State equal protection of the laws?

DISCUSSION

“In determining whether a statute violates the equal protection clauses of state and federal constitutions, we must give great deference to the classification passed by the legisla[522]*522ture, and the classification will be sustained against constitutional attack if it is not plainly arbitrary and there is ‘any reasonable hypothesis’ to support it.” Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 424, 354 S.E. (2d) 36, 39 (1987) [citing Gary Concrete Products, Inc., v. Riley, 285 S.C. 498, 331 S.E. (2d) 335 (1985)]. Equal protection is satisfied if: “(1) the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions; and (3) the classification rests on some reasonable basis.” Samson v. Greenville Hospital System, 295 S.C. 359, 364, 368 S.E. (2d) 665, 667 (1988).

Here, the classification of residents versus nonresidents satisfies the three-prong test in Samson: (1) it is reasonably related to the legislative purpose of protecting South Carolina residents from financial indigency; (2) the members of the classes are treated alike since all residents are entitled to the exemption; and, (3) the classification is reasonably based upon South Carolina’s legitimate interest in preventing its citizens from becoming dependent upon the State for support.

The fact that a classification results in some inequity does not render it unconstitutional. Foster v. S.C.D.H.P.T., 306 S.C. 519, 527, 413 S.E. (2d) 31, 36 (1992). A statute enacted pursuant to the legislature’s powers is presumptively constitutional. Nichols v. South Carolina Research Authority, 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E. (2d) 155 (1986).

In the recent case of Cerny v. Salter, — S.C. —, 429 S.E. (2d) 809 (1993), we noted that the rationale for homestead exemptions is “to protect from creditors a certain portion of the debtor’s property.” [Citing Elliott v. Mackorell, 19 S.C. 238 (1883)]. Moreover, this Court has previously held that a classification between resident and nonresident vendors is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of directing benefits to its citizens. See Gary Concrete Products, Inc. v. Riley, 285 S.C. 498, 331 S.E. (2d) 335 (1985).

We find no equal protection violation. The judgment below is

Reversed.

Harwell, C.J., and Finney and Moore, JJ., concur. Toal J., concurs in result in separate opinion.

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Chandler, Justice:

American Service Corporation of South Carolina (American) appeals an Order holding that the Homestead Exemption Act, S.C. Code Ann § 15-41-30(11)(B) (Supp. 1992)¹ deprives Respondent Bonnie Hickle (Hickle), as a nonresident of this State, equal protection of the laws.² We reverse.

FACTS

In September, 1990, American obtained a $32,000 judgment against Hickle, then a South Carolina resident. Subsequent to the judgment, Hickle became a Virginia resident; American has been unable to collect its judgment.

Thereafter, Hickle settled a personal injury lawsuit in South Carolina for $125,000. American seeks to attach proceeds of the settlement in satisfaction of its judgment.

Trial court awarded Hickle the benefit of the exemption, holding that “to allow American to seize the settlement proceeds would be a denial of equal protection.”

ISSUE

Does the Homestead Exemption statute, in limiting the exemption for personal injury awards to South Carolina residents only, deprive nonresidents of this State equal protection of the laws?

DISCUSSION

“In determining whether a statute violates the equal protection clauses of state and federal constitutions, we must give great deference to the classification passed by the legisla[522]*522ture, and the classification will be sustained against constitutional attack if it is not plainly arbitrary and there is ‘any reasonable hypothesis’ to support it.” Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 424, 354 S.E. (2d) 36, 39 (1987) [citing Gary Concrete Products, Inc., v. Riley, 285 S.C. 498, 331 S.E. (2d) 335 (1985)]. Equal protection is satisfied if: “(1) the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions; and (3) the classification rests on some reasonable basis.” Samson v. Greenville Hospital System, 295 S.C. 359, 364, 368 S.E. (2d) 665, 667 (1988).

Here, the classification of residents versus nonresidents satisfies the three-prong test in Samson: (1) it is reasonably related to the legislative purpose of protecting South Carolina residents from financial indigency; (2) the members of the classes are treated alike since all residents are entitled to the exemption; and, (3) the classification is reasonably based upon South Carolina’s legitimate interest in preventing its citizens from becoming dependent upon the State for support.

The fact that a classification results in some inequity does not render it unconstitutional. Foster v. S.C.D.H.P.T., 306 S.C. 519, 527, 413 S.E. (2d) 31, 36 (1992). A statute enacted pursuant to the legislature’s powers is presumptively constitutional. Nichols v. South Carolina Research Authority, 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E. (2d) 155 (1986).

In the recent case of Cerny v. Salter, — S.C. —, 429 S.E. (2d) 809 (1993), we noted that the rationale for homestead exemptions is “to protect from creditors a certain portion of the debtor’s property.” [Citing Elliott v. Mackorell, 19 S.C. 238 (1883)]. Moreover, this Court has previously held that a classification between resident and nonresident vendors is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of directing benefits to its citizens. See Gary Concrete Products, Inc. v. Riley, 285 S.C. 498, 331 S.E. (2d) 335 (1985).

We find no equal protection violation. The judgment below is

Reversed.

Harwell, C.J., and Finney and Moore, JJ., concur. Toal J., concurs in result in separate opinion.

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435 S.E.2d 870, 312 S.C. 520, 1993 S.C. LEXIS 192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-service-corp-v-hickle-sc-1993.

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